TRANSPORTATION POLICY FORMATION IN DETROIT 1945-1985

by

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

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Abstract

The thesis traces the development of transportation policy formation at regional and local levels of government in the Detroit region since 1945. Three postwar transportation policy climates are identified. The first, to the early sixties, was marked by a reasonable degree of regional consensus on freeways as the basis of regional transportation policy. The second, covering the period to the 1970's, saw this consensus begin to break down. The subsequent period to the present has been marked by an almost total collapse in regional consensus on transportation policy. Within the maintenance of a sensitivity to the dangers inherent in structuralist Marxist theorizing, the hypothesis is explored that class relationships have been of primary influence in accounting for this "macro dynamic" of transportation policy formation. The role of physical planners and implications for planning theory is a particular focus of study. The research concludes that, at a time when "grand" Marxist theorizing is coming under criticism, the primacy of class relationships as an explanatory variable can be sustained in the case of Detroit but in terms of the development of a more adequate theory of planning the research points to the need for supplemental theory construction on the discretion and influence of planners within the class pattern (as opposed to determination) of events.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

(a) Scope of the Research

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(a) Scope of the Research Task

This thesis is concerned with understanding the dynamics of transportation policy formation at regional and local levels of government in Detroit in the postwar period. The general hypothesis or proposition is advanced that class relationships in the Marxist sense have been primary in influencing policy changes but that government or "state" policy cannot in a deterministic way be "read off" from particular conjunctures of economic forces. Within the limitations imposed by a fairly macro level approach to the analysis of policy over a forty year period the thesis seeks to draw some conclusions concerning the role of planners in the policy formation process with consequent implications for a theory of planning. Introducing a personal note, the case study approach had its genesis in a dissatisfaction with the rational procedural theory of planning (still dominant during the writers enrolment in British and American planning schools in the mid-seventies) in explaining what it was that planners actually did. The dissatisfaction was heightened during subsequent involvement as an urban planner working for the State government in Michigan in many policy issues affecting the Detroit region. The justification of a search for answers within the Marxist paragigm will be considered shortly. Suffice it to say at this stage that this dissatisfaction coincided with a major upsurge in attention given by Marxist scholars to "urban" issues especially upon the availability in English translation in 1976 and 1977 of work on "the urban question" emanating from the French structuralist Marxist tradition influenced in particular by the French philosopher Louis Althusser.[1] A major well-spring of the research undertaken here has been an attachment to the view (to be examined in Section 3 of this Chapter) that a Marxist mode of enquiry does offer much potential for understanding policy formation but that a structuralist type methodology through its extraction of individual human agency from societal processes leads to overly simplistic and erroneous conclusions regarding state policy making and is "stiffling" as far as the construction of a more adequate prescriptive procedural planning theory is concerned. Various "structural pitfalls" that several writers on the Detroit scene have fallen into have, therefore, been examined in the course of the research. Before I can more fully

elaborate the research task (undertaken in the final section of this chapter) it is necessary to outline and justify the particular theoretical approach adopted. As a first step in this the following section will review the current status of planning theory focussing on the planning issues to which the research is in part directed. The treatment is indicative rather than exhaustive pending a return to a consideration of recent developments in planning theory in the light of the research in the concluding chapter.

(b) Planning Theory - An Overview

As shall be indicated later the very nomenclature "planning" has come under increasing attack in recent years[2] as being vacuous in its breadth without a substantive prefix - town and country planning, economic planning etc. Jumping ahead slightly this is a view which has been accepted and which circumscribes the present overview. I have focussed on the role of urban planners in regional and local government in Detroit as defined by the substantive knowledge or expertise which such actors (whether designated as "planners" or otherwise) have brought to bear in government policy making upon the production, design and spatial articulation of the physical environment. Transportation planners, more particularly the focus, are seen as occupying a specialist field within urban planning, one in which government itself is to a large extent responsible for implementation and provision of the resources to meet the objectives for which planning is taking place. It has not been sought to delimit the boundaries of those engaged in a certain generic form of decision making which is seen as "equatable" between various policy areas. I will return later to the question of how the relationship of planners to others involved in transportation policy formation has been conceptualised. Attention is turned now to a review of debates within the terrain of "planning theory".

Excluding what McConnell[3] calls "theory in planning" - "the substantive theories used in planning which are derived from many disciplines" (emphasis original) there would seem to be three broad

groups of theories which attempt to explain what it is that physical planners actually do ie. theory of planning:-

1. Explanatory and normative procedural planning theory
2. Planners as urban managers - the neo-Weberian view
3. Planners as state agents - the neo-Marxist view

These theories stand in various relationships to theories of political power. Following Kirk[4] who argues that 'any conception of planning is clearly intimately bound up with a conception of the role and nature of the state" I will, before concentrating on planning theory proper, consider three distinctive views on the nature of political power:-[5]

1. Pluralist models
2. Elitist models
3. Class models.

Wolff distinguishes two interpretations of pluralism. Firstly the "vector-sum" or "balance of power" interpretation in which "the major groups in society compete through the electoral process for control over the actions of the government. Politicians are forced to accommodate themselves to a number of opposed interests and in so doing achieve a rough distributive justice."[6] Secondly, according to the "referee" version of pluralism, "the role of the government is to oversee and regulate the competition among interest groups in the society".[7] This body of theory in the liberal democratic tradition traces its origins back to J.S. Mill, Rousseau and Greek models of democracy. Its major exponent in the United States in recent years has been Robert Dahl drawing upon an empirical analysis of power which he conducted in the town of New Haven and recounted in his book "Who Governs?" in 1961.[8] Dahl's work (and that of colleagues such as Nelson Polsby)[9] has emphasised the balance of power position with government agencies seen as "one set of pressure groups among many others ... (where) government both pursues its own preferences and responds to demands coming from outside interests".[10] Dahl's position does not state that power is equally distributed rather as Miliband puts it "that power in Western societies is competitive,

fragmented and diffused; everybody, directly or through organized groups, has some power and nobody has or can have too much of it".[11] As Ham and Hill state: "the importance of pluralist theory is demonstrated by the fact that, implicitly if not always explicitly, its assumptions and arguments now pervade much Anglo-American writing and research on politics, government and the State".[12]

Marxism is not the sole challenger to pluralist theory. There exists a well established tradition of elitist theory dating back to the classical elite theorists, Pareto and Mosca[13] and represented perhaps most strongly today by the relatively recent writing of C. Wright Mills.[14] These writers point to the concentration of political power in the hands of a minority of the population or "political elite". The work of Bottomore,[15] for exmaple, postulates elites rising to the fore in many areas of social life based on wealth, knowledge, heredity, expertise etc with these individuals forming the recruiting ground for the political elite. Unlike in the Marxist view, which will be considered in a moment, political power is not ultimately necessarily derivative of economic power. Mills in his study of political power in the US in the 1950's thus identified a quite coherent "power elite" occupying key positions in government, business, corporations and the military with much movement between the various spheres.[16] Weberian analysis of political power also emphasising the importance of institutional position as a political resource, may also be said to fall into the elitist camp. Weber recognized in modern state bureaucracies "the possibility of power being vested in officials who were accountable neither to the public nor politicians".[17] As Saunders points out in critique of the work of Lambert et al who characterize Weber as a democratic pluralist of the "referee" school (the States interest being one among many that are reconciled), Weber's political sociology analysed "the limited role of elected assemblies and the virtual impotence of elected leaders in relation to the power of the bureaucracy."[18] Pahl,[19] drawing on Weber's notion of the autonomy of state bureaucrats, provides a possible avenue for the construction of a planning theory which I shall consider. Before moving to this and other planning theories, and bypassing the question of where pluralism may be said to end and elitism begin[20] one must introduce the Marxist view of

political power - an approach which, because adopted in this research, is explored more fully in subsequent sections.

There is not one homogenous Marxist paradigm but as a generalization, in an approach which both strives to uncover underlying essences rather than phenomenal appearances and to "totalize" or provide a holistic understanding of social reality (concepts discussed in the consideration of epistemology in Section 3), Marxism attaches special importance to the form of economic organization or mode of production in understanding social systems in their entirety. This is especially so under capitalism. In all societies characterized by class exploitation in the sphere of production there are, Marxism argues, inherent limits and constraints derivative of this operating on the social system as a whole. The economic system is not just one part of some Parsonsian system of mutually influential parts but rather has a special importance or weight. Under capitalism, however, Marxist analysis asserts that the economic system is more than an important framework of constraints but is "dominant" within the social system as a whole. As Harrington[21] puts it: "it is only under capitalism that economics as such plays the leading social part in its own name" and to borrow from Marx becomes the "pervasive lighting" in which the rest of the social system is "bathed". And at the core of capitalism is the process of capital accumulation and the particular nature of class conflict associated with it. Class struggle and accumulation are what Harvey[22] calls "different sides of the same coin - different windows from which to view the totality of capitalist activity".

Marxist theory posits that capitalist society is dominated as a structure by conflict between two basic classes - CAPITAL and LABOUR. This conflict, while taking many forms and permeating the society as a whole, is centred around the process of capital accumulation. To quote Harvey[23] further:

> "The class character of capitalist society means the domination of labour by capital. Put more concretetely, a class of capitalists is in command of the work process and organizes that process for the purposes of producing profit. The labourer, on the other hand, has command only over his or her labour power

which must be sold as a commodity on the market. The domination arises because the labourer must yield the capitalist a profit (surplus value) in return for a living wage."

Profit is the basis from which additional capital can be accumulated. Capitalists are driven to accumulate not just out of greed but because they are compelled to do so by competitive market forces. To quote Heilbroner[24] "one accumulates or one gets accumulated".

Embedded in these social relationships the state in capitalist society is more truly described as the capitalist state. The political realm is not seen as autonomous of the economic realm but is very much derivative of it. While the exact characterization of the relationship between economic power and political power remains the subject of much debate within Marxist scholarship and indeed is at the nub of understanding state policy from a Marxist perspective (to be examined in Section 5) in general terms Marxism asserts that the capitalist state is ultimately run in the interests of the capitalist class. In the Communist Manifesto Marx expressed the view that "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie".[25] Recent Marxist analysis of the state (capitalization as Faludi caustically points out is usually insisted upon[26]) attributes capitalist control to three sources. These are summed up by Ham and Hill as follows:

"First, there is the similarity in social background between the bourgeoisie and members of the state elite, that is those who occupy senior positions in government, the civil service, the military, the judiciary and other state institutions. Second, there is the power that the bourgeoisie is able to exercise as a pressure group through personal contacts and networks and through the associations representing business and industry. Third, there is the constraint placed on the state by the objective power of capital. Another way of putting this is to say that the freedom of action of state officials is limited, although not eliminated, by their need to assist the process of capital accumulation, which stems from their dependence on a successful economic base for their continued survival in office.

Seen in this way O'Connor,[28] therefore, has distinguished two basic functions which a capitalist state must perform by virtue of being a capitalist state. These are on the one hand the facilitation of the process of accumulation and on the other the maintenance of social cohesion and legitimacy. O'Connor has suggested a typology of state expenditure corresponding to these functions. Thus "social investment" expenditures such as transportation infrastructure increase labour productivity and "social consumption" expenditures lower the cost to individual capitalists of reproducing labour power obviating the need for private pension plans, for example. Together these expenditures facilitate the process of accumulation. Social expense outlays such as law and order and welfare expenditures correspondingly ensure social "harmony" and legitimacy. That this dichotomization of state activities can, however, only be a starting point to analysing the role of the state in specific instances (as involved, for example, in the formation of transportation policy) has been stressed by various writers in recent years[29] who point to the danger of a functionalist Marxist interpretation of state actions ie. the pitfall of concluding that by definition what the state does must be in the interests of capital. This is a subject to which I return. One is now, however, in a position to consider planning theory in relation to the various perspectives on political power which have been outlined.

Attention is turned firstly to procedural planning theory undoubtedly the most influential over the past two decades in urban planning education in both Britain and the United States.[30] Cooke has this to say:

> "The planning theory which first began to be widely discussed in planning education in the 1960's was almost exclusively American in origin. Although it contained many different facets which, as in the case of the disagreements between rational-comprehensive planning theorists and incrementalists or the later rejection of the former by adherents of advocacy planning it shared certain key assumptions .... firstly, that whatever form planning took it should strive to be rational in the sense that clear objections should be identified and then achieved, either by large steps (comprehensive plans), small steps (incrementalism) or popular

will (advocacy). Secondly, it was accepted that planning should seek social goals by assisting market processes to function more smoothly. Thirdly, it was accepted, even by the most centralist of comprehensive planners, that plans should primarily provide opportunities which individuals and organizations could exploit without transgressing basic principles of a capitalist society."(31)

In 1962 Davidoff and Reiner had offered a "Choice Theory of Planning" in what is now a major marker in the literature. They had defined planning as "a process for determining appropriate future action through a sequence of choices".(32) Systems theory(33) and corporate planning theory(34) could also be added to the list of other attempts - both prescriptive and explanatory - to define an activity of planning in relation to a particular process or set of procedures - what Healey et.al. call "developments of the procedural tradition"(35) My discussion will primiarily focus, however, on what IRA Robinson in 1972 identified in the Reader "Decision-Making in Urban Planning" as a "commonly accepted" set of procedures which make up the "now familiar and well-established model of the rational planning process"(36)

"1. (Goal-Setting) Identify the problem or problems to be solved, the needs to be met, the opportunities to be seized upon, and the goals of the community to be pursued, and translate the broad goals into measurable operational criteria;

2. (Plan-Formulation) Design alternative solutions or courses of action (plans, policies, programs) to solve the problems and/or fulfill the needs, opportunities or goals, and predict the consequences and effectiveness of each alternative;

3. (Plan-Evaluation) Compare and evaluate the alternatives with each other and with the predicted consequences of unplanned development, and choose, or help the decision-maker or decision-making body to choose, that alternative whose probably consequences would be preferable;

4. (Plan-Implementation) Develop a plan of action for effectuating or implementing the alternative selected, including budgets, project schedules, regulatory measures, and the like;

5. (Plan-Review and Feedback) Maintain the plan on a current and up-to-date basis, based on feedback and review of information

to adjust steps 1 through 4 above."

Hemmens,[37] writing in the American literature, points out that while there has been increasing criticism of this "ruling planning theory" - the rational action model which has as its central idea the notion that "planning is essentially a technical activity characterized by the task of fitting means to ends" - it "remains in force because no competing set of ideas has attracted sufficient support to supplant it". Thus one finds, for example, a relatively recent work on health service planning in the United States, using the phrase "professional planners irrespective of their particular disciplines" and accepting the view that "the work of town planners ... is one branch of a family of disciplines and activities which plan and use planning methods eg. administration, management, budgeting, engineering and systems analysis".[38] The American Journal of Planning Education and Research" carries in recent issues articles from this varied "family of disciplines".[39] In Britain, Healey et.al. in 1981 did go so far as to state that "in the 1970's we saw the collapse of the dominance of the procedural planning theory position" but also "the failure of any other theoretical position to establish dominance".[40] This vacuum, partially filled with "theoretical pluralism and collective ignorance"[41] was the reason, therefore, for a major British conference on planning theory in the same year.

I will consider criticisms of procedural planning theory from a number of writers. All are concerned with its explanatory deficiencies. Healey et.al. in the position paper for the above conference, link the past dominance of procedural planning theory to an underpinning consensual/pluralist view of political power:

> "... ideologically procedural planning theory is based on a particular socio-economic and political viewpoint which bears a strong resemblance to the American "end of ideology" theorists (eg. Bell). It rests upon a consensus view of society where major conflicts over values and interests and consequently over social distribution are absent. Its operating values are technicist and conservative and deny the political nature of planning practice. Furthermore, procedural planning theory assumes that society will experience economic growth and that

this will ensure that political and social harmony will be maintained."[42]

Healey et.al. see this view as appealing to planners in Britain in the early seventies according as it did to some of the dominant tendencies of the time - the tendency to depoliticize decision making, to emphasise technical expertise and corporate management. Procedural planning theory "provided an apparently appropriate operating ideology for the profession".[43] Things, however, have changed:

> "... the premises of procedural planning theory meant that it could not cope with any breakdown of political and social consensus, with economic stagnation, with challenges to the structure and processes of decision-making. Consequently as the seventies progressed and the economic crisis and fiscal crisis of the state intensified, procedural planning theory could neither explain what was happening nor provide a suitable mode of operation for planning activity.[44]

Healey, herself,[45] admits to being"disabused early on of the notion that there was any value in identifying planning as some kind of generic phenomenon that could be abstracted from a specific institutional existence" (ie such theory does not adequately explain what planners do). She leaves open the question as to how much the theoretical focus must be narrowed to give a valid theoretical object for study (should planning schools really be concerned with definitions of planning as broad as "societal guidance"?)[46] and pragmatically chooses to restrict her own theorizing to the substantive field of land policy.

Cooke links the ascendancy of rational planning theory not just to the idealistic strain in plannings normative tradition[47] but primarily to postwar settlements between Capital and Labour in Britain and the United States.[48] With this consensual/ pluralistic basis, he argues, it has been imbued with a strong dose of structural-functionalism. Cooke defines functionalism as "an over-arching epistemological position in which telelogical as distinct from causal explanatory forms are stressed".[49] Structural functionalism is functionalism writ large at the societal level. To quote Cooke:

"(it) has the professed aim of producing a theoretical account of a total social system, itself represented as a structured whole, each of whose institutional parts is integrated to the others to meet the functional needs of survival and evolution for the system as a whole. Central to the methodology of explanation in this project is a functionalist teleology employed to account for system and sub-system integration and for linking individual motivations to system requirements".(50)

In general terms Cooke criticizes structural functionalism for "its over-emphasis on values, its failure to consider the historical sources of ideas and institutions, and its neglect of the importance of the analysis of power for purposes of explanation".(51) More particularly Cooke refers to a "basic weakness of the structural functionalism which has been applied as a normative model for planning. From its earliest adaptations by Foley, Webber and Chapin to its more general diffusion into the planning process as unreflective, goal setting ... it has represented narrow particular interests as generalizable ones". Concerned as it is with analysing and explaining the bases of social order,

"theoretically it is assumed that any functioning institution, social sub-system or set of norms has some useful purpose otherwise it would have ceased to function. Its usefulness to the continued functioning of the social system is therefore taken as a justification for its continuation, and, by implication, its reproduction in parts of the system undergoing renewal. Thus if two sets of values co-exist in a system, even where they are contradictory, they are seen as functionally important to its continuation."(52)

The charge of structural functionalism is an important one to which attention is addressedin the case of plan-making in Detroit in the concluding chapter. Other writers loosely from a Marxist vantage point have criticized the depoliticizing role of procedural planning theory. Thus Paris refers to the "central ideology of planning" -

"(it) obscures by definitional exclusion, the relationship between the practice of planning and its social, economic and political context ... the activities of planners and the

apparatuses of planning present the appearance of a (potentially) rational system of decision-making and resource allocation which helps to obscure the real workings of the space economy."(53)

Likewise to quote Fainstein and Fainstein:

"Planners depoliticize, that is, cast in technical terms, the planning activities of the state. They further universalise the legitimating ideology by bolstering justification in the name of the public interest with arguments ostensibly based on scientific rationality."(54)

Thomas, in turn, lays the accusation against Faludi who "probably stands at the high point of rational procedural theory" that he "contributes to the attempts to depoliticse politics as well as planning".(55) In a rejoinder to Thomas, Faludi, while admitting of "an attempt to reach out beyond my own initial position and to encompass an awareness of others",(56) has defended general procedural planning theory. This is done largely through an attack on the deficiencies of the grander and more general level theorizing of Marxist analysis and the assertion that the decision making paradigm is useful in understanding decision making at the more mundane day to day political level. While criticizing the political economy approach for too cavalierly assuming that "organizations and procedures have no significant impact on the outcomes of planning" and that "planning is completely circumscribed by the political and economic processes in the society of which it forms a part",(57) Faludi puts forward his more modest research task - an "emphasis on procedural questions" in "the belief that questions internal to the process of planning do form a valid field of study".(58) Rather than accepting Thomas' criticism that his work is premised upon a pluralist/consensual view of political power Faludi asserts on the contrary that it is compatible with a Marxist perspective and that convergence is both possible and desirable:

"Theories which follow the political economy and the decision-making paradigms of planning may not be necessarily exclusive. My work is being undertaken in this belief, the emphasis being on the decisions and actions of participants in the 'planning process' but with the awareness that these are set within a

framework which is determined by macro-level forces and which frequently limits their freedom of action. One might even think in terms of a combined paradigm. Certainly for the purpose of explaining the reality of planning, both should be drawn upon... Only for the purpose of theory building does it seem possible to isolate particular aspects of planning such as the organizations and procedures of decision-making. But then, isolating particular aspects of reality, catching them in the net of specific theories, is a precondition of theory-formation anyway. Obviously, there are nets of various types catching fish of various sizes. Thomas and his like seem to aim for the big catches, ie. the structural conditions in society which set the parameters of planning. I am quite content with the small fry of decision-making theories, knowing that they will be of more immediate application to the practice of planning. But there seems little reason why we should not sit side by side."(59)

The limitations inherent on "meta" Marxist theorizing have influenced my research approach. Reade(60) has, however, recently offered a critique of procedural planning theory which, while not from a mainstream Marxist standpoint, gives reason to doubt that Marxist analysis will be enticed to move towards the combined paradigm approach suggested by Faludi. Analysing what he calls the purported "constituent ideas" of procedural planning theory Reade divides them into two groups. On the one hand he identifies ideas (the idea of commitment to a pre-stated outcome, of trading-off present satisfactions for future well being, of according a greater role in decision making to experts, of monitoring and forecasting) which while "intellectually credible"(61) are far from being the prerogative of professional "planners" and are not indissolubly linked together in some way - one can take some of these ideas without the others and planners' attempts to wrap them up into a package is seen by Reade as "ideological". Planning is, therefore, "not an analytically distinct method of informing or making public policy"(62) and by implication a discipline of general procedural planning theory along the lines of Faludi is in danger of being hopelessly normative and lacking correspondence to the real world of policy making. Marxist analysis would be better forming links with policy analysis generally. (This

is in fact happening and is discussed in the concluding chapter). The other constituent ideas of planning, also not the prerogative of planners, (the ideas of comprehensiveness, scientific method, rationality and public interest - "the ideas most stressed by planners")[63] are regarded by Reade as worse than too exclusively normative. They "lack credibility because in the planning literature they are merely asserted and not explained."[64] Reade makes the accusation that town and country planners have "avoided theory in the true sense of explanation of practice":

> "Physical planners ... have shown relatively little interest in the explanation of their own activity - in the theoretical explanation of governmental interventions in the processes whereby property development is carried out. Instead ... they took up the notion of planning as a generic method. This encouraged the development of a literature of procedural planning theory, consisting of highly elaborated notions of rational decision making, largely divorced from any specific empirical context .... Its divorce from reality, however, is reflected in its ignoring almost completely the entire corpus of pre-existing knowledge yielded by such disciplines as political science and political philosophy which show us how government <u>is</u> informed ... those called planners might consider abandoning this title, together with the notion of planning as method, and instead concentrate upon clarifying the effects of the specific governmental interventions with which they are involved."[65]

I move on to consider neo-Weberian and Marxist approaches to the explanation of urban planning practice - approaches in contrast to procedural theory involving much less prescriptive content. One turns firstly to the "new Weberian urban sociology"[66] which developed in Britain in the late sixties and into the seventies and most closely associated with the work of Rex and Moore[67] and Ray Pahl.[68] Since the writings of Pahl and his urban managerialist thesis are of particular interest in theorizing the role of urban planners attention will be concentrated there. Williams, however, sounds a much needed cautionary note:

> "Urban managerialism is not a theory, nor even an agreed perspective. It is, instead a framework for study."[69]

Drawing on the review and critique of Saunders[70] I will consider Pahl's ideas chronologically. Pahl defined the "urban" as a distinct object of study in its own right. Following the Weberian epistemological procedure of breaking social reality down into manageable sub-areas for analysis by the use of ideal type methodological constructs, Pahl made urban inequalities (as distinct from general economic inequalities) the focus of his concerns. The study of the production of differential access to "urban" resources (housing, recreational facilities, transport etc) all with a major locational dimension, struggles by groups for access to such resources and the allocative role of "urban managers" in the process provide the framework for Pahl's study. Urban planners thus formed a constituent part of those managers or urban "gate keepers" in both public and private sectors who controlled access to key urban resources. Pahl suggested the following research task:

> "The crucial urban types are those who control or manipulate scarce resources and facilities such as housing managers, estate agents, local government officers, property developers, representatives of building societies and insurance companies, youth employment officers, social workers, ,magistrates, councillors and so on. These occupations and professions should be studied comparatively to discover how far their ideologies are consistent, how far they conflict with each other and how far they help to confirm a stratification order in urban situations."[71]

Again with a Weberian epistemology embodying a "rejection of any attempt to explain social phenomena as a result of anything other than subjectively meaningful human actions"[72] a focus on the subjectively meaningful actions of urban managers is legitimate. Also along Weberian lines an overlap between economic and political power is not assumed. The study of local state officials leans towards a bureaucratic elitist view of political power.

Saunders identifies the two major problems (within its own terms of reference) with Pahl's initial formulations - the problem of how to come up with a more precise theoretical definition of urban managers to guide research (thus avoiding a rag-bag collection of studies) and

the problem of theorizing the autonomy of urban managers - just how independently as variables for research can they be treated?[73] Addressing these criticisms Pahl's later work has advocated a research concentration on local state officials only, the latter's autonomy constrained by capitalist economic relations and by an increasingly corporatist central state.[74]

Corporatism, maintaining the theoretical autonomy of the economic and political realms, "is principally defined by one particularly important qualitiative change, the shift from a supportive to a directive role for the state in the economy ... (it is) an economic system of private ownership and state control".[75] Rather than standing as independent variables urban managers within this perspective are seen as "intervening variables mediating between, on the one hand, the contradictory pressures of private sector profitability and social need, and on the other the demands of central government and the local population."[76]

Pahl's corporatist thesis (which has been challenged itself on its own terms)[77] while a step forward in theorizing the role of urban managers (ie they are more properly regarded as intervening variables), still in the opinion of Saunders, falls short of what is required.[78] The problem of theorizing autonomy and discretion remain. Since within a Marxist perspective I have been concerned with problems involved in theorizing the relationship between the state and capital Saunder's critique of Pahl's attempt to theoretically "locate" the role of urban managers is of considerable interest. Saunders in essence argues that Pahl has taken a non-Weberian approach in launching out into a study of the wider political economy while still inadequately theorizing the role of urban managers. The approach is non-Weberian because it departs from Weber's argument that "total sociological explanations were impossible and that research must progress by selecting partial aspects of the social world for study on the basis of ideal type constructions".[79] And the role of urban managers is inadequately theorized because:

> "The problem with Pahl's view of urban managers as mediators between the central state authority, the private capitalist sector and the social needs and demands of the local population

for state services is that it remains unclear how far managers enjoy some discretion in discharging their role. That they enjoy some autonomy from the dictates of central government and the constraints imposed by the operation of the process of capital accumulation is taken as axiomatic, but how far and in which situations does this autonomy extend? Pahl's answer appears to be that this is an empirical question, but such an answer is inadequate given that empirical research, even if conducted comparatively across different types of local authority (or even different types of society), will be unable to identify the sources of particular policies unless it is grounded in a theoretical framework that specifies the sorts of situations in which managers are able to exercise discretion as opposed to those in which they are not. If we start out merely on the assumption that they are constrained to some extent, then we lack any theoretically informed criteria for determining where in the economic and political organization of society to being looking for the explanation of any given policy. Quite simply, Pahl's recent work leads empirical research into the familiar problem of the receding locus of power."(80)

In contrast to Pahl who "continually emphasises that the state, both at national and local levels, cannot be studied merely in terms of the 'needs' of capital",(81) Marxist approaches to theorizing the role of urban planning which have developed since the 1970's emphasise the importance of the process of capital accumulation, and of understanding planning as intervention undertaken by a capitalist state. Castells, in particular, has been concerned with defining a specific "urban" theoretical object for analysis (akin to the enterprize of Pahl) in the light of the preceding two factors.(82) McDougall(83) identifies David Harvey as the first to try to establish a Marxist tradition within planning thought. Harvey has argued that physical planning has failed to come to grips with an understanding of the forces producing the public and private goods of the built environment. Concentrating on capital accumulation, class relations and the role of the capitalist state this is a task which he has undertaken.(84) The recent work of Harvey is considered in Chapter Two. Other writers concerned to locate urban planning within "the

development process of the built environment"[85] include Scott, Preteceille, Lamarche, Broadbent, Massey and Catalano.[86] It is perhaps, however, the work of Castells which has occupied centre stage in Marxist debate on "the urban question". Castells has argued that the "urban system" performs a "significant and specific function" within the total social system - it is increasingly the sub-system within which labour-power is reproduced.[87] More specifically Castells concentrates on the urban system as a spatial unit for the provision of collective consumption goods by the state. Urban planning is regarded, within this perspective, as performing a state management function in relation to collective consumption.[88] As part of the state in the discharge of this function, urban planning performs a mediating and necessarily ideological role:

> "Urban planning is a privileged instrument for the ideological formalisation of interests of classes, fractions and groups ie. by developing the capacities for social integration to the maximum, which is the primary function of dominant ideology...
>
> the political role of urban planning is its ability to act as an instrument of negotiation and mediation for, on the one hand, the dominant classes and their demands for the realisation of their common interests, and on the other hand the pressures and protests of the dominated classes."[89]

Castells' use of the concept of collective consumption in defining "the urban" has been criticized for lacking any necessary correspondence with localized spatial units (welfare payments, for example) and for ignoring other important urban processes.[90] Lojkine[91] has argued that "capitalist urbanization cannot be understood in terms of consumption processes alone since the city simultaneously reproduces labour-power and supports capital accumulation ... through investment in necessary but non-profitable economic infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications, ports and so on". While Saunders[92] points out that Castells only concentrates on collective consumption in his efforts to define a distinctively urban theoretical object to facilitate research (abstracting, therefore, from the very great diversity of processes found in cities), Lojkine's comments have guided my approach to

conceptualizing 'the urban' for the purpose of understanding transportation policy formation in Detroit. This is elaborated upon in Chapter Two. For my purposes Castells' definition of urban planning seemed too narrow. More generally, Reade has criticized neo-Marxist explanations of planning and urban phenomena based, as many of them are, on an Althusserian epistemology which "tends to a rather abstract form of theory construction, which tends to run ahead of empirical evidence".(93) Pointing to a relative dearth of empirical research Reade makes the rather damning criticism that "the neo-Marxist interpretation of planning simply has not added to our knowledge".(94) Reade also makes the point that some neo-Marxist writers "tend to use the term 'planning' in a very vague and ill-defined way, even, apparently, often describing any governmental intervention or initiative as 'planning'".(95) I will deal with these comments in the consideration of epistemology and further examination of Marxist theories of the state. For the moment it seems appropriate to consider why one has chosen to locate the research within a Marxist framework.

There are a number of reasons. Reade despite his strong criticism of the results of Marxist theorizing on planning admits that "the neo-Marxist interpretation of planning concerns itself above all with precisely those questions which planners themselves most neglect". In particular it "asks the most fundamental question of all: Why does government attempt to plan the physical environment anyway?"(96) While this question need not necessarily be approached from a Marxist standpoint there is likewise no reason why it should not. Paris points to the unfortunate perjorative connotations associated with the wide ranging use of the label "Marxist".(97) Academically Marxism has been open to the charge of dogmatism but this can be answered and is considered in the following section on epistemology. The literature on the concentration of wealth in the United States is quite extensive.(98) An exhaustive review of this, considering also the relationship between economic and political power, has led Lundberg to conclude that "while one might balk at assenting to the propositon that government is the executive committee of the ruling class, it is a demonstrable fact that it is peculiarly at the service of the upper economic class which accordingly is warrantably regarded as in effect

a ruling class."[99] It is probably Domhoff,[100] however, who has done most in the American context (paralleling work undertaken by Miliband in Britain)[101] to examine from a Marxist perspective the instrumental ways in which the federal state is controlled by the country's economic elite ie. asserting the position that there is not a separate political and economic elite in the United States. One is not theorizing in other words in a vacuum. As Healey puts it in justifying her own use of a materialist approach:

> "In the end one has to choose along which line of research and theorizing one wishes to proceed. Ultimately, I think this choice will relate to one's values and to one's one perceptions of the credibility of explanation which may of course change over time."[102]

(c) Epistemological Considerations

Since general epistemological considerations will arise in the consideration of Marxist epistemology I will proceed immediately to the latter. Summing up the recent debates dating back to the sixties on the possibility of a value free social science, Saunders states:

> "Social scientists have increasingly come to recognize that the traditional assumption behind positivist research that 'facts' can be assembled through direct experience of the social world must be treated with some caution. It is now generally agreed that knowledge cannot be the product of unmediated experience through the senses, but that the way in which we come to 'see' the world is in some way dependent upon the theoretical assumptions and conceptual frameworks that we apply to it.[103]

Whilst there is disagreement within Marxism over the ways in which experience should be mediated there is general agreement on two other aspects of the Marxist epistemological position. The first is an insistence that parts of the social system, while open to abstraction from the rest of the social system for purposes of analysis, must be reintegrated with the totality to arrive at their true nature. This contrasts with Weberian analysis, which because of the complexity of human relations, insists on the isolation of parts of that reality for

study with the interrogative device of ideal type constructs.[104] Secondly, Marxism eschews superficial empiricism in the distinction it draws between the level of appearances or of phenomenal forms and the level of essential reality. It maintains that "the essential reality that science attempts to discover may be obscurred by the phenomenal forms through which this reality is represented in our everyday experience. The task of science is to penetrate the realm of appearances in order to discover the essential relations that give rise to these appearances."[105] Again this contrasts with Weber's "rejection of any attempt to explain social phenomena as the result of anything other than subjectively meaningful human actions."[106]

The key question, of course, is the strength of Marxist method in delivering the goods. In this regard, in recent years, it is the particular epistemology of the French structural Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser[107] around which debate has tended to center. It is this epistemology which formed the foundation for the early work of Castells. One approaches the kernel of Althusser's thinking, through a comparison with Thomas Kuhn's characterization of scientific knowledge in the physical sciences. In the physical sciences, according to Kuhn,[108] the normal situation is the advance of scientific knowledge on the basis of the progressive articulation of a basic paradigm. Kuhn defines paradigms as:

> "... universally recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners."[109]

The paradigm colours the conceptual universe of the scientist. It gives him/her the framework inside which scientific problems may be posed and solutions sought. Most of normal scientific activity consists of "puzzle solving" inside the framework of the paradigm. Hypotheses are formed and tested but as Kuhn points out - the range of outcomes from an experiment is narrowly limited - the solution to scientific problems falls within narrow ranges.

> "Sometimes, as in a wavelength measurement, everything but the most esoteric detail of the result is known in advance."[110]

Normal scientific activity consists, then of the logical working out

of a paradigm - the following of the logic and implications of already existing theory. The result is a set of structures which represent our understanding of the real world.

The Althusserian position is that Marx, in founding the science of historical materialism, did for history what, say, Einstein did for modern physics (even more so, in fact, because pre-Marx there was no science of history at all). Marx provided the basic paradigm, the basic categories, that made the science of society and its transformations possible. The science of historical materialism is the progressive development of the Marxist paradigm. Theory is developed in accordance with the logic of the paradigm and is tested against the "real world", the facts. Facts have no independent existence from theory and can only be treated theoretically. The paradigm in other words very much determines what are considered facts. Behind the epistemology is the assumption that the social world can be studied in similar fashion to the physical world. Marxism for Althusser is the science which uncovers the structures which govern the social world and in which individuals as role players are located. Thus Castells' "The Urban Question"(111) is replete with structures of circuit diagram-like representations of how the urban system functions.

The comments of Reade on structural type Althusserian analysis have been noted already. Glass has shown that despite a quite elaborate structure diagram in "The Urban Question" of the processes at work in the British New Towns policy, Castells gets the story quite wrong.(112) Satre some time ago, referring to mechanistic and deterministic Marxist analysis in general(113) criticized "lazy Marxists who constitute the real, a priori .... The proof is the fact that they know in advance what they must find."(114) Althusser's schema can be seen as falling into a strain of Marxist theorizing which has at its core the idea that a determining mode of production or economic base can be isolated in a particular society and upon which is erected an ideological superstructure of politics, ideas and so forth. This line of argument elicits the comment from Lefebvre that "for some Marxists, the mode of production is the answer to everything".(115) Lefebvre is no less critical of Althusser's attempt

to "carefully toughen up" the concept of mode of production "in the name of the perfect science".(116) The "rigidification" of the concept is still there and Althusser's attempt from his "Reading of CAPITAL" to define degrees of relative autonomy for other "levels" in the social formation in relation to the mode of production Lefbvre sees as "going through ideological contortions" which "needs to be dealt with in the ironic mode, that is to say as farce".(117)

The reaction against Althusserian Marxism has now firmly set in. Cooke, referring to Castells' past work, has recently argued that "the problem which undermines his theoretical approach most of all is its affinities with structural functionalism".(118) He quotes Mingione:

> "Castells disregards essential social connections and relations and, worse, he reduces some important social relations to mechanical roles and functional links. The dominating interests of the monopolistic sector of the bourgeoisie appear to determine every social event."(119)

Saunders(120) argues that the epistemology advocated by Althusser and santified with reference to Marx was in fact not Marx's method at all but confuses Marx's mode of exposition with that of his analysis. Marx's abstract categories, Saunders argues, were always worked up from an analysis of concrete situations and do not represent a privileged "scientific" starting point. Marxism, therefore, cannot cavalierly dismiss other approaches to analysis because they are epistemologically unsound because "no general epistemology can be self-justifiable".(121) One must choose between different approaches on the basis of what one judges to be their relative explanatory power. While this can involve no independent appeal to "the facts" (since facts are theory dependent and theory must also be judged according to its own logic) in social science Saunders insists, expressing criticism of overly general Marxist interpretations in particular, theory building must descend to the level of concrete appearances and make specific statements which can be empirically tested.(122) Castells in his latest work (City and the Grassroots, 1983) admits to having divested himself of the mantel of Althusserianism, and points to the need to build on the "ruins of the Marxism tradition"(123) through the development of theory grounded in

particular case studies - the need, in relation to the study of state activity, for a "theorized history of states".[124]

The research conducted here has been guided by the rebuttal to Althusser provided by the English historian E.P. Thompson and published in 1978.[125] While other rebuttals of Althusser date back to this time, Thompson's intervention (writing from the tradition of British Marxist historiography which includes such names as Eric Hobsbawn, Christopher Hill and Raymond Williams) while polemical, was probably the most extensive. For this reason it is somewhat surprising, despite past accusations from others on the Left of "pseudo-empiricism" and "vacuity",[126] that scant or no attention is paid to Thompson's ideas in more recent anti-Althusserian works.[127] It is the more surprising since these works seem to borrow unabashedly from Thompson. I will return to this again in my concluding chapter and will turn the attention now to a sketch of the research method advocated by Thomspon.

Williams writing within the same tradition echoes Thompson's rejection of any objectification of the Marxist notions of "base" of "superstructure":

> "A persistent dissatisfaction, within Marxism, about the proposition of 'base and superstructure', has been most often expressed by an attempted refinement and revaluation of 'the super-structure'. Apologists have emphasized its complexity, substance and 'autonomy' or autonomous value. Yet most of the difficulty still lies in the original extension of metaphorical terms for a relationship into abstract categories or concrete areas between which connections are looked for and complexities or relative autonomies emphasized."[128]

Rather Williams puts forward his interpretation of Marx's statement that "the mode of production of material life determines the social, political and spiritual life processes in general".[129] Marx, Williams maintains, was asserting the propositon that the organization of "productive activities" in any society has a determining effect in the sense of "the setting of limits" and the "exertion of pressures" on the social system as a whole.[130] Further:

"Determination of this whole kind - a complex and interrelated process of limits and pressures - is in the whole social process itself and nowhere else: not in an abstracted 'mode of production' nor in an abstracted 'psychology'. Any abstraction of determinism, based on the isolation of autonomous categories, which are seen as controlling or which can be used for prediction, is then a mystification of the specific and always related determinants which are the real social process - an active and conscious as well as, by default, a passive and objectified historical experience"(131)

(ie. an approach which does not loose the agency of human action in structures but recognizes, nevertheless, that people act under conditions which are given).

Turning to Thompson(132) proper, Thompson argues, in common with Saunders, that the structuralist Althusserian interpretation was fundamentally not Marx's method at all (although Marx did display such a tendency in parts of his work). He rejects the assertion that the epistemology appropriate to the study of the physical world is the one appropriate to the social world. Althusser in his opinion represents a perversion of Marxism. It is a perversion because it assumes that the social world/history can be understood as the working out of a set of structures. Rather, history for Thompson is the study of men and women who under conditions which are given struggle and make decisions and choices - and in the process change those conditions. Althusser, for Thompson, ignores the consciousness and experience of the individual or rather totally incorporates them within structures. There is thus no room with Althusser for empathy with people in history. Althusser's model Thompson argues is a cause and effect one. It maps out antagonisms but is "undialectical" in that it does not see contradictions as "a moment of co-existent opposed possibilities"(133) but abstracts the agency from human actions. For Thompson there are no laws/rules to history, to the social world. History consists of men and women in many different situations living their lives and making choices. No one paradigm, however elaborately articulated, can neatly encapsulate such diversity. That does not mean to say that we cannot generalize and talk at a relatively high level of abstraction about the "lessons of history". "History", while not exhibiting laws,

or while not consisting of structures, is nevertheless not unstructured. History, for Thompson, consists of structured process - with an emphasis on process. It is open-ended, indeterminate. It does show tendencies (and Marx in concentrating on class highlighted, of course, a crucial variable in the structured process of history) - and one can refer to such tendencies as constituting a paradigm of sorts - but what is absolutely inexcusable, in Thompson's view, is the conversion of such tendencies into laws, into closed structures, and then proceeding to make logical inferences from them which are then superimposed onto individual situations with a corresponding constricting selectivity on the evidence which is considered relevant. This is to misunderstand the nature of Marx's categories. They cannot and were never meant to be fine tuned and refined to the degree of sophistication which Althusser seems to think and moreover they cannot be refined in the abstract which is what Althusser tries to do. They can only be increasingly articulated with reference to individual historical situations from which they have been generalized in the first place. By imposing concepts on the evidence of individual situations through a prior idealist rationality, Althusser fails to treat, Thompson argues, Marx's concepts as historical concepts. Thompson argues in other words that Althusser's method leads to the invention of theory which is not properly worked up from evidence.

What Thompson puts forward as method is a much more "messy", if you like, approach. It is a more interactive relationship with data and evidence - a "dialogue" as he calls it with the evidence.(134) Althusser, Thompson argues, fails to understand the distinction between "empiricism" and "the empirical mode of analysis". There is no substitute for confrontation with the evidence, but this is not a naive confrontation in which the evidence "reveals" its secrets. The historian interrogates the evidence. In doing so, he/she is not "naked" before the "facts" nor, if the Althusserian system is rejected, is he/she inevitably swamped by ideology. Rather, and this is the backbone of Thompson's method, the historian brings concepts and theoretical notions to the evidence as expectations, not as rules (and, of course, the selection of the evidence is influenced, but not rigidly determined by, theoretical expecations). Thompson puts it thus. He talks of:

"... concepts generalized by logic from many examples, brought to bear upon the evidence, not so much as "models" but rather as "expectations". They do not impose a rule, but they hasten and facilitate the interrogation of the evidence, even though it is often found that each case departs, in this or that particular form, from the rule... The evidence (and the real world) is not rule-governed, and yet it could not be understood without the rule, to which it offers its own irregularities. This provokes impatience in some philosophers (and even sociologists) who consider that a concept with such elasticity is not a true concept, and a rule is not a rule, unless the evidence conforms to it, and stands to attention in one place ... Historical concepts and rules are often of this order. They display extreme elasticity and allow for great irregularity - historical materialism employs concepts of equal generality and elasticity - "exploitation", "hegemony", "class struggle" - as expectations rather than as rules."(135)

"Proof" of the argument in Thompson's schema takes two forms.(136) The first is an "evidential appeal". "Concepts, hypotheses as to causation" are brought into a "disciplined dialogue with the evidence". Through interrogation "inconvenient evidence" may be discovered and ones initial concepts modified or discarded. The resultant is a theory which "has been shown to 'work'; that is, it has not been <u>disproved</u> by contrary evidence (emphasis original)":

"While any theory of historical process may be proposed, all theories are false which are not in conformity with the evidence's determinations. Herein lies the disciplinary court of appeal. In this sense it is true that while historical knowledge must always fall short of positive proof, false historical knowledge is generally subject to <u>disproof</u>" (emphasis original)(137)

The second form of "proving the argument" involves a "theoretical appeal to the coherence, adequacy and consistency of the concepts, and to their congruence with the knowledge of adjacent disciplines".(138) In this characteristic Marxist call for holism one finds a companionship with Mannheim's call in his essay on the sociology of

knowledge for a "synthetical approach", of a "viewpoint further back from which the partiality of other viewpoints is seen"[139] and with the call of C.W. Mills for the "sociological imagination".[140] But the cautionary note of Saunders[141] that theorizing purporting to discover underlying essences should be specific enough in going beyond the hypothesing of major "tendencies" to the development of counter-facutal statements (statements as to the circumstances under which major tendencies will be counteracted) which allow of the possibility of disproof would seem consistent with Thompson's methodology. Indeed the Marxist method of social science inquiry in general finding sympathy with Saunders approximates closely that advocated by Thompson for historical inquiry. Saunders endorses an interpretation of Marx's method as a retroductive conjectural one. He quotes Sayer:

> "The "logic" of Marx's analytic is essentially a logic of hypothesis formation, for what he basically does is to posit mechanisms and conditions which would, if they existed, respectively explain how and why the phenomena we observe come to assume the forms they do."[142]

Saunders continues:

> "The logic of retroductive explanation involves the attempt to explain observable phenomena by developing hypotheses about underlying causes. It cannot support any conjecture, since the hypothesized causes must be able to explain evidence at the level of appearances, but it is equally a weak form of inference since the hypotheses can never be directly tested. In other words, it is never possible finally to demonstrate that a posited 'law' of capitalist development is actually true since such a law refers to processes which, even if they do exist, remain hidden. Furthermore, it is never possible to demonstrate that the essential relations posited by the theory are the correct ones since there is always the possibility that other essences could be put forward which could explain phenomenal forms equally as well.
>
> Marx's method, understood as a method of retroduction, thus carries no guarantees of truth and no privileged insight into the inner workings of society. There is no warrant in this method

for dismissing alternative theories that can also explain phenomenal appearances, nor for claiming a monopoly over the 'correct' scientific mode of analysis. Equally, of course, it makes no sense to attack this method on the grounds that its results cannot be directly tested against experience, since its very purpose is to theorize processes that by definition cannot be amenable to direct observation. The results of the application of such a method must be evaluated on its own terms (for example, does the posited essence explain phenomenal forms? are the predictions - as opposed to the prophecies - that arise out of this method borne out historically? how well does the theory explain comparative variations between societies? and so on)."(143)

To this interpretation of Marxist research method Saunders does add what he considers to be the necessary requirement of the development of "counterfactuals". Theory must be capable of disproof (but not in a "naive falsificationist"(144) way) and must, therefore, specify how disconfirming instances which would contradict the theory may be identified. It will not do, Saunders argues, for Marxist enquiry to hide behind the fail-safe reasoning that if things are not as predicted by theory then they must be different due to counteracting forces. While the specification of and testing for counterfactual conditions is likely to be an easier task in social science as opposed to historical enquiry, Thompson's own work certainly is not lacking in specificity. This is a subject to which I shall return in the concluding chapter. One turns for the moment to a consideration of the Marxist concept of class, central to the research task, and upon which the epistemological considerations discussed have a major bearing.

(d) The Marxist Concept of Class

Marx never wrote systematically about classes. Volume Three of Capital breaks off just where he is about to do this. McLellan[145] recounts how Marx's usage of the term varied and that often he used it in common with the usage of his time as a synonym for a faction or group. In more methodological usage, however, it is clear that Marx did not consider classes as income groups, status groups or, even though conflict was basic to his conception of class, as conflict groups. Cooke[146] provides a useful overview of the current state of Marxist theorizing on class. The basic dichotomy is between structural type definitions based on occupational structures and approaches which Cooke links particularly to Gramsci.

Falling into the former camp have been most notably the writings of Nico Poulantzas[147] and Eric Olin Wright.[148] Poulantzas introduces the term "economic ownership" as distinct from formal legal ownership of the means of production. It is thus real control of the means of production, the power to assign them to given uses and to dispose of the products obtained, which defines the dominant class in modern capitalism. It is the basic factor lying behind class conflict with an economic surplus extracted from a subordinate class of direct producers who are excluded from control of the productive apparatus. Added to this Poulantzas conceives of another major group which he labels "the new petty bourgeoisie" and merges with the traditional petty bourgeoisie to form a single class. This group is characterized at the economic level by differing locations with respect to and varying degrees of participation in the basic relation of domination. It bears a close resemblance to what is generally referred to as the new "middle class" - white collar workers, technicians, bureaucrats etc. More exactly Poulantzas includes in the new petty bourgeoisie the following: non-productive workers who by his definition lie outside the basic relationship of exploitation between capitalist and productive laborers (direct producers) who produce surplus value; supervisory labour which though its direction of labour participates in the domination of the working class; and mental labourers, experts, who lie outside the working class because they participate in ideological domination by making it appear natural to workers that

they are incapable of organizing production themselves. Poulantzas conceives of the petty bourgeoisie and various components of the "new petty bourgeoisie" while standing, therefore, in different relationships to each other on the basis of economic criteria, nevertheless, forming a single class because they are united by political and ideological factors (more specifically at the political and ideological "levels"). The appeal is overtly to Althusserian structuralism in an attempt to break out of the more simplistic structuralism of a base/superstructure model ascribing strictly secondary importance to political and ideological factors. Wright was led to criticize this theorizing arguing that Poulantzas in fact "undermined the economic basis of the theory of class". He thus disagrees that the unproductive/productive distinction represents a significant division of class interests:

> "... the question is not whether divisions of immediate interests exist between productive and unproductive workers, but whether such divisions generate different objective interests in socialism. Many divisions of immediate economic interest exist within the working class - between monopoly and competitive sector workers, between black and white workers, between workers in imperialist countries and workers in the third world, etc. But none of these divisions imply that the 'privileged' group of workers has an interest in perpetuating the system of capitalist exploitation. None of these divisions change the fundamental fact that all workers, by virtue of their position within the social relations of production, have a basic interest in socialism. I would argue that this is true for most unproductive workers as well."(149)

Regarding the mental/manual labor distinction Wright says the following:

> "... it is never clear exactly why the mental/manual division should be considered a determinant of an actual class boundary, rather than simply an internal divison within the working class. And it is also not clear why this particular ideological dimension was chosen over a variety of others as the essential axis of ideological domination/ subordination within the social division of labour. For example, sexism, by identifying certain

jobs as 'women's work' and of inferior status to men's work, is also a dimension of ideological domination/subordination within the social division of labour. This puts men as a whole in a position of ideological domination, and yet this hardly makes a male worker not a worker. The same can be said of racism, nationalism and other ideologies of domination. All of these create important divisions within the proletariat; but unless they correspond to different actual relations of production, they do not constitute criteria for class boundaries in their own right."(150)

Wright puts forward an alternative view of class relations - a notion of "contradictory class locations" - contradictory in the sense of being located between classes. He takes up Poulantzas' concept of "possession" or "economic ownership" - the capacity to put the means of production into operation involving both control over the physical means of production and control over labour power. The bourgeoisie is defined by full economic ownership. However, in the capitalist mode of production as a whole Wright conceives of contradicoty locations defined by partial participation in and degrees of freedom from, these relations of domination. On the boundary of the bourgeoisie are the top and middle managers and technocrats. On the boundary of the proletariat are the line supervisors, for example, foremen and bottom managers. The petty bourgeoisie is a small but separate class. "Semi-autonomous employees" (craftsmen and public sector workers) with sufficient residual control over their immediate means of production are placed in a contradictory position between the petty bourgeoisie and proletariat. For Wright ideology and class struggle play a crucial role in determining how close contradictory locations gravitate in outlook to the class poles.

While the work of Poulantzas and Wright is certainly suggestive as far as understanding the formation of class behaviour is concerned(151) Cooke points to a major underlying weakness in both approaches.(152) Even Wright is guilty of "heavy overtones of economism and reductionism involved in deriving classes simply from occupational structures". "Classes cannot be thought of as being uniquely set in motion as a result of being assigned places in the social structure".

Here Cooke points to the recent work of Przeworski derivative of Gramsci which argues firstly that classes, arising out of production relations, can only be defined dynamically in the process of conflict with other classes and secondly that all political behaviour cannot be reduced in some simplistic way to conflicts arising out of the sphere of production. Cooke, therefore, agrees with Przeworski in the interposing of the Gramscian concept of "civil society" between the state and the productive sphere. It is the recognition of a "realm in which individuals are capable of becoming conscious of a certain commonality of experience with others"(153) but not in any mechanistic way derivative of production. The state though, however much we open up the realm of politics to determinants having a more peripheral association with the economic roots of class behaviour, must be an "instrument for conforming civil society to the economic structure".(154) I will turn to Marxist conceptions of the state in the following section. For the moment it is interesting to note the affinity of these ideas, although unacknowledged by Cooke, to the work of Thompson whose own debt to Gramsci, admittedly as Johnson(155) points out, has only been partially acknowledged.

The essence of Thompson's view of class would seem to be the acknowledgement that whether the concept is used heuristically or to refer to aggregates of people with "class consciousness" (the notion of class, as Hobsbawn(156) says, in the "fuller sense"), classes and class behaviour only exist in a dynamic sense. More specifically, it is only because occupants of locations within the economic structure engage in conflictual behaviour related to those locations that we can talk of class behaviour. Classes cannot be identified a priori independently of a consideration of behaviour. One brings even the lofty concept of class to "the evidence" as an expectation not as a rule. This is in contra distinction to "static concepts of class" and concepts derived from "a prior theoretical model of a structured totality" which lead one to "suppose that class is instantaneously present (derivative, like geometric projection, from productive relations) and that <u>hence</u> classes struggle"(157) (emphasis original). And class in the fuller sense, in Thompson's opinion, cannot be totally conceived as behaviour derivative of production relationships. It is not divorced from other areas of social life which people

experience and interpret. To quote:

> "... people find themselves in a society structured in determined ways (crucially, but not exclusively, in productive relations), they experience exploitation (or the need to maintain power over those whom they exploit), they identify points of antagonistic interest, they commence to struggle around these issues .... Class (here Thompson is talking of class in the fuller sense - my addition) eventuates as men and women live their productive relations, and as they experience their determinate situations, within the ensemble of the social relations, with their inherited culture and expectations, and as they handle these experiences in cultural ways" (emphasis original).(158)

In "The Making of the English Working Class", Thompson points out fundamentally "that class is a relationship, and not a thing":

> "If we stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of experiences. But if we watch these men over an adequate period of social change, we observe patterns in their relationships, their ideas, and their institutions. Class is defined by men as they live their own history, and, in the end, this is its only definition."(159)

(e) Marxist Theories of the State

Emanating also from a reaction against the distortions of structuralism, recent years have seen Marxist theorizing on the capitalist state undergoing a period of critical reevaluation.(160) The starting point for a consideration of this debate must still be the series of seminal exchanges which took place between Miliband and Poulantzas in the pages of the New Left Review(161) following publication of Miliband's book, The State in Capitalist Society, in 1968.(162) Poulantzas accused Miliband of concentrating too exclusively on the control of the state apparatus by members of the capitalist class or their representatives (an "instrumental" view of the state) and thereby ignoring the structural constraints, derivative of class struggle as a whole, within which the state operated. Poulantzas in Althusserian fashion argued in fact, that the state was a structural relationship between classes with state occupants conceived as carriers of structurally determined roles. Miliband in turn accused Poulantzas of ignoring the fact that the state, in order to discharge its function in protecting the long term interests of the capitalist system as a whole, needed a degree of "relative autonomy" or independence from any particular class interest or fraction ie. that Poulantzas was emptying the state of a necessary discretionary role for state officials. Poulantzas replied that relative autonomy can only mean "relative in relation to the classes and class fractions in a given society".(163) The state as a relation between classes could not have discretionary power but represented the balance of class forces at any particular time:

> "... the very principles of the Marxist theory of the state, lay down the general negative limits of this autonomy. The capitalist state, in the long run, can only corrrespond to the political interests of the dominant class or classes .... Yet within these limits, the degree, the extent, the forms etc. (how relative, and how it is relative) of the relative autonomy of the state can only be examined with reference to a given capitalist state, and to the precise conjuncture of the corresponding class struggle, the specific configuration of the power bloc, the degree of hegemony within this bloc, the relations between the bourgeoisie and its different fractions on the one hand and the

working classes and supporting classes on the other, etc."[164]

The reaction against Althusserian structuralism has had its impact on approaches to theorizing the capitalist state. There seems no reason, however, why the basic notion of Poulantzas of the state as expressing a relation between classes (interpreted in the sense of being subject to class constraints and pressures) cannot coexist comfortably with instrumentalist ideas. This is in fact the approach which I have taken. As recent writers[165] have pointed out, however, while the concept of "relative autonomy" may still be useful, there is a danger, even in non-Althusserian structuralist usage, of employing the term in a structural functionalist way as a substitute for real analysis. The temptation is to analyse state policy formation in terms of its effects and from there to argue backwards in order to establish causality. Adopting an O'Connor[166] like typology of state functions policy can all too easily be seen as by definition in the long term interests of Capital. To quote Saunders:

> "It is in fact, a characteristic feature of the political economy literature that it tends to regard the effects of class struggle as secondary to the effects and requirements of capital accumulation ... (the) problem is that much of the literature too readily deduces the causes of state intervention from an analysis of its subsequent effects".[167]

Likewise Cooke criticizes the "reading off of State and other institutional functions from the imputed needs of capital".[168] While at one level Saunders suggests the concept of relative autonomy "does at least provide a reasonable description of what the state does, its problem is that it fails to explain how it does it".[169]

A recognition of the need to move beyond crude economic reductionist notions in theorizing the capitalist state has been a characteristic feature of recent writers sympathetic to a Marxist approach. The charge of "revisionism" would no doubt be made in more doctrinaire quarters. Saunders points to the need to complement Marxist analysis with a Weberian attempt to understand behaviour in terms of subjectively meaningful human actions.[170] Ham and Hill likewise point to the need to integrate various levels of analysis.[171] The

implication is the one suggested by Faludi that "there are nets of various types catching fish of various sizes".(172) Fainstein and Fainstein write:

> "the capitalist state is not monolithic and has sufficient leeway to respond to non-elite interests if pressed, provided that the concessions granted are not so great as to threaten overall bourgeois hegemony. A less than deterministic conception of state actions views them as responsive to the character of state officials, on the one hand, and to the forces making demands, on the other."(173)

Miliband has rejoined the fray acknowledging that "the tendency to one form or another of 'economic reductionism' has had a marked influence on the Marxist discussion of politics and the state, even when the deformation has been acknowledged and pledges made to correct it". Referring to the ground covered by the concept of relative autonomy he continues:

> "It is only in very exceptional cases that those who make the decisions are left with no range of choice at all. Much more often, there is some degree of choice: even where governments are subjected to the imperative will of other governments, they are usually left with some freedom of decision in relation to matters which directly and greatly affect the lives of those whom they govern."(174)

Referring to state officials Miliband states:

> "Capitalist interests are in no danger of being overlooked, but they are not the sole or primary concern of these office holders."(175)

And Cooke, as has been indicated already, has introduced the mediating concept of "civil society" standing between production relations and the state thus allowing for determinants of state behaviour less directly linked to class. I will return to such ideas in the conclusion. One must say something, however, about recent Marxist attempts to theorize "the local state".

One can distinguish three different approaches. Cockburn's original

study of the "local state" in the London borough of Lambeth published in 1977 provided the original reference point for debate in Britain.(176) This has been criticized for failing to deal with the question of the specificity of the local state. To quote Boddy: "Theoretically, the local state is identified by mapping out which functions, established in Marxist theory of 'the state in general' are performed by local authorities ... the local state is interpreted very much as 'the state at the local level'".(177) Saunders terms this approach one of assuming that the local state is "the national state writ small".(178) Saunders in turn has suggested an ideal type model for analysing state behaviour involving a dualism between national and local levels. The national state, where social investment decisions dominate, is primarily under the influence of Capital. There is a "corporatist" relationship between the state and Capital.(179) At the local level where consumption issues are primary, following Dunleavey, Saunders sees the concept of class as less useful in terms of understanding state behaviour with pluralist ideas as more appropriate. To quote:

> "... local government in Britain is typically concerned with provision of social consumption through competitive modes of political mediation and organised around the principle of citizenship rights and social need. Central and regional levels of government, on the other hand, are typically the agencies through which social investment and fiscal policies are developed within a relatively exclusive corporate sector of politics organised around the principle of private property rights and the need to maintain private sector profitability...
>
> Given its primary function, it is apparent that the political forces which are mobilized around the 'local state' cannot be analysed in class terms at all, for the social bases on which they draw are defined not by relations of production but by differential patterns of consumption. Following Dunleavy, I find it useful to refer to such groupings as consumption sectors.(180)

Saunders hypothesises therefore that:

> "Local political processes can to a large extent be explained by a pluralist theoretical perspective which recognises that

political outcomes are likely to reflect the relative weight of effective preferences as articulated through shifting political alliances between different consumption sectors in the population. National political processes, on the other hand, may best be explained through a theory such as that offered by Miliband according to which the interests of capital generally prevail due to the personnel occupying top state positions, the privileged access enjoyed by big business to central government policy-making, and the recognition by government that its primary objective must always be to maintain the conditions for capital accumulation in the private sector."(181)

Of Saunders' thesis, albeit put forward as an ideal type construct, Martlew (not insignificantly coming from a background in public administration) has recently observed:

"While the dual state thesis points to the important conclusion that 'the local state is not simply the national state writ small' it nevertheless does tend to reduce both local and central state to undifferentiated monoliths without recognizing the diversity existing within each category. There is no such thing as 'central government'; rather, a series of functional departments whose attitudes to, and interests in local government vary considerably. The same point can be made about local government whose departmental boundaries are often even more clearly drawn as a result of professional domination. Furthermore, the dual state thesis underplays the fact that the central/local relationship is in reality characterized by strong vertical linkages between levels and ascribes little importance to the problem of financing state services."(182)

The third approach to conceptualizing the local state (like Saunders a reaction against the non-specificity of Cockburn) is that represented by Duncan and Goodwin and supported by Cooke with the reservation that it is articulated without a Gramscian theory of civil society "within which to ground an otherwise important conceptualization".(183) I will return to Cooke's ideas more fully in the concluding chapter. The basic notion, however, is the "derivation of the specificity of the local state from the uniqueness of local class relations".(184)

Cooke, in fact, broadens this to a "derivation of specificity from the form of its local social relations"(185) recognizing as do Saunders and Dunleavey that local state actions cannot always be linked directly to "the effects of struggles in the sphere of production relations".(186) The derivation of the sepcificity of the local and regional state in Detroit from the specificity of local class relations is in fact the path which my own research has followed. It has not been without its problems and these are discussed in the concluding chapter.

(f) Detailed Methodology

One is in a position to restate more specifically the research task. The hypothesis is put forward that postwar transportation policy formation at regional and local levels of government in the Detroit region can be primarily understood with reference to class relations over the period. On the assumption of the veracity of this connection, and within the limitations imposed by the macro-level of analysis involved, the research has the subsidiary aim of considering the role of urban planners and transportation planners in particular in the formation of the transportation policy agenda.

An awareness of the pitfalls of structuralist Marxism forms a starting point of the research with an effort made to consider the limitations of such approaches in the specific case of Detroit. The method is, therefore, one of conjectural interrogation of the evidence of the sort found legitimate by Saunders (although without the explicit generation of "counterfactuals" - a subject for the concluding chapter) and practiced by Thompson. The hypothesis and other related general concepts such as the notion of the "reproduction of labour power" are put forward as expectation not a rigid rule to which the evidence is made to conform. The substantiation for this, albeit requiring a degree of acceptance on faith, is the process of maturation involved in the development of the argument. Thus the intertwining of transportation policy formation with the "regionalist" and economic development dynamics explained in the text emerged as the result of "engagement" or a "working up" from "the evidence" (being

theory laden rather than determined) over quite a long period of time. While there is a danger of a retrospective idealization of method it is fair to say that the criticism of overly simplistic structural interpretations warded against the ignoring of "awkward" evidence.

As previously stated, the local and regional state has been theorized in terms of the uniqueness of local class process. This uniqueness, in relation to the object of study, has been presented in particular as manifesting itself in the associated economic development and regionalist themes of a metropolitan area fractured along inter and intra class lines. The class influences on state behaviour have been approached through a consideratioin of "instrumental" factors (are classes and class fractions exerting direct or "hands on" influence on state policy making) and also the influence of more "structural" factors in terms of the framework of class constraints and pressures within which the state operates. While one is concerned with why and how planners make plans, following the view expressed by Reade that "planning is not an analytically distinct method of informing or making public policy"(187) I do not define planning as based on a distinctive methodology. Rather within the overall concern with transportation policy formation one has attempted to focus in particular on those who consider themselves to be transportation planners or planners involved with transportation issues and on those who considered themselves to be involved in transportation planning. This is a pragmatic approach but one for the purposes of research regarded by Healey et al, for example, as valid.(188) Research precedes common agreement on what a substantive definition of urban planning should be. Importantly also, I have not attempted to establish rigid boundary lines between the activity of planners and transportation policy formation in broad terms. The work of planners is located within the latter and inevitably touches upon aspects of policy formation which are more centrally (but not exclusively) the preserve of policy agents other than urban planners. As Underwood(189) has pointed out planning by its very nature, concerned as it is with the various processes producing the physical environment, cannot avoid interjecting itself into many policy areas affecting that production.

A critical appraisal of the research approach awaits consideration in the concluding chapter. Attention is turned finally in this chapter to some detailed methodological matters as follows:

(a) Consideration of relevant academic research
(b) The use of interviews in the research
(c) Libraries consulted
(d) Other organizations and government agencies supplying information
(e) Newspaper sources.

A nationwide computer search, using the library service of Michigan State University, was conducted to ascertain relevant PhD research. The time period considered was 1925-1981 with the following "key words" applied in the search. "Michigan", "Detroit" and "SEMCOG" (acronym for Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments) provided the initial "filter". PhD research titles generated included at least one of the geographical designators in addition to at least one of the following: city, economic, economy, fiscal, freeway, highway, metropolitan, race, region, regional, road, social, subway, transit, transportation, urban. The net cast was deliberately wide with approximately 600 titles generated many of an engineering type background. The fifteen or so of significant interest had their origins in one or other of Michigan's three major universities (the University of Michigan, Michigan State University and Wayne State University) and the material was borrowed directly from the libraries concerned without recourse to the nationwide service of University Microfilms in Ann Arbor, Michigan. It was to be expected that most pertinent research would center around these universities and contact with the following individuals was designed to ensure that to the extent possible nothing of major significance was overlooked:

Professor Bernard Klein
Professor of Political Science
Wayne State University, Detroit

Professor R. C. Hill
Sociology Department
Michigan State University, Lansing

Professor Paul Ray
Department of Urban and Regional Planning
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

The survey of academic research confirmed a more initial impression that while there are accounts of specific highway projects in Detroit, no previous study had considered the broad sweep of transportation policy in Detroit - the "Motor City" - let alone from a class perspective.

Interviews with policy agents as a research tool was chosen over a survey questionnaire approach. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, an adequate response rate to a questionnaire from key policy agents seemed highly unlikely. Secondly, and related to this, a questionnaire could not deal with the qualitative nature of the information which was being sought. An attempt at drafting a questionnaire revealed too plainly its crudity. A questionnaire cannot adequately anticipate answers in what is a learning situation for the researcher or deal with the range of possible human responses over a broad subject matter. The question was rather one of whom to interview, what to ask, how to ask it and how to record it. Taking the first of these the following criteria were employed in interviewee selection:

(a) The range of substantive policy areas to be covered and the organizations, and government agencies associated with them. This was a broadening out process in practice from a narrow focus on transportation policy to an additional concern with economic development and regionalist issues. One third of the interviewees (see Appendix II) had transportation matters as their primary responsibility.

(b) Organizational position of the individual. An effort was made to achieve a balance between those involved or previously involved in governmental agencies at top and middle levels. The actual split is 50/50 (see Appendix II) While those at higher levels can be expected to know more of the "bigger picture" those at lower levels, it was expected, might be less inhibited. While

this was not always the case the contrast of perspective was considered worthwhile in any event. Only one politician (of senior rank and with a long term perspective on the Detroit region) was interviewed. The views of Detroit politicians, however, are not lacking in the local press.

(c) Experience of the individual of the Detroit scene. A particular effort was made to interview those with longer term experience of transportation matters in Detroit. It is quite unsurprisingly easier to obtain informed views on transportation policy formation in the seventies and eighties than on the fifties and even sixties. Fifty percent (ie 17) of those interviewed had experience of the Detroit scene extending beyond twenty years (Appendix II). Seven of these were involved at a top level in transportation policy and associated policy formation in the fifties and sixties. Inevitably, however, the more one goes back in time the more one is thrown back onto published sources. It was not possible, for example, to interview Dr Douglas Carroll Jr., Director of the Detroit Metropolitan Area Traffic Study in the 1950's.

(d) The involvement of the individual in a planning role.
As indicated, a particular interest of the research concerned the role of physical planners - those bringing a certain substantive knowledge to bear upon the production, design and spatial articulation of the physical environment. Our interest was in those who considered themselves to be planners and also those who considered themselves to be involved in planning activity. The title "planning" in a particular organization or job description proved to be a reliable guide to this. In other cases the substantive nature of the work "spoke for itself" eg. the selection for interview of the director of the Detroit Transportation and Land Use Study. In total just less than 40% of interviewees considered themselves involved in planning work (Appendix II).

(e) Recommendations of other interviewees. In practice interviewee selection was aided by advice and leads from

interviewees themselves. Through a process of exploration and within the above guidelines the decision on whom to interview developed over time.

Before moving on to consider the conduct of the interviews themselves a note is in order concerning business sector under represenation in the interview sample. While representatives of organizations funded primarily through business support are included, influential businessmen on the Detroit political scene (Hendry Fords and such like) proved to be impossible to bring into the research net. This was an unavoidable constraint. One is left with their actions, public statements and second hand reports.

Most interviews were conducted face to face excepting where this was impossible either through excessive distance or the time that the interviewee could make available. The interviews focussed on the respondents perception of the factors influencing policy formation - what was the policy at the time (?), why was it adopted (?), what was the attitude of the respondent and other actors towards the policy (?), what other options were considered (?). Respondents were encouraged to range over broader constraining factors and pressures to matters of organizational relationships and perceptions of individuals involved. In terms of conducting the interview the manual of Schatzman and Strauss on "Field Research" was quite invaluable - especially the chapters on interview tactics (Chapters 5 and 6).[190] As the authors point out, the interview can give the "variation and the nuance lost in questionnaire construction".[191] The guidelines of Schatzman and Strauss on qualitative social science research need not be reproduced here. The following comment, however, conveys the frame of mind in which one approaches an interview:

> "The researcher believes 'everything' and 'nothing' simultaneously ... Specifically, what the listener is after are the expressed "is's" and "because's" of his subjects. The "is" reveals their designations of the things, people and events - the objectified content of these people's reality. The "because" reveals the presumed relations among all the designations, the why's and wherefore's, the causes, processes, and reasons - in short, the very logic of their thinking about the content of

their reality ... To grasp the shared and variable properties of this symbolic universe, the researcher must be a good role-taker; that is, he must "stand" with each respondent in the latter's relationship to the universe, and view it and its associated vocabulary from that perspective. The role-taking process is the first stage of understanding, requiring systematic listening without applying one's own analytic categories. In a second stage, the listener performs a simple comparative analysis of what he is hearing now, against what others (in this universe) in like or different positions have been telling him. Only then does he engage in a third stage - applying his own initial and developing framework. In the normal course of listening, these three stages occur almost simultaneously; but we distinguish them to emphasize their separate importance, and particularly to highlight the first stage - the need to "listen" in its most literal sense, to take the role of the other."(192)

On the method of recording, the advise of Schatzman and Strauss was again followed:

"... notes will be very brief - mere words, phrases, possibly a drawing. Their purpose is to provide stimulation for recall done within a matter of hours. A single word, even one merely descriptive of the dress of a person, or a particular word uttered by someone usually is enough to "trip off" a string of images that afford substantial reconstruction of the observed scene."(193)

Such "reconstructions of the observed scene" resulted in an unhealthy intake of caffeine in innumerable Detroit restaurants. Other details of the interview process are given in Appendix II.

The following libraries, in addition to those of universities, were consulted and found useful in the course of the research:

- the library of the Citizens Research Council of Michigan, Detroit.

- the library of the city government of Detroit (not to be confused

with the Detroit Public Library)

- the former Resource Library of the State of Michigan, Office of Intergovernmental Relations, sadly falling between the cracks of bureaucratic reorganization.

- the library of SEMCOG (the Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments), Detroit.

- the library of SEMTA (the Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority), Detroit.

- the library of the State Government of Michigan, Lansing.

- the library of the Wayne County Road Commission.

In addition to the above library sources (all of which are internal to the organizations concerned and to which access was facilitated by being an employee of the State of Michigan) the following agencies were particularly helpful in making available relevant material:

- The State of Michigan, Department of Transportation
- The City of Detroit Planning Department
- The City of Detroit Department of Community and Economic Development
- Metropolitan Fund Inc.

To conclude, a note on newspaper sources. The Detroit region is served by two major daily newspapers recognized nationally for "quality": "The Detroit Free Press" and "The Detroit News". Clippings files from these newspapers on transportation and a range of issues relating to the Detroit region kept by the former State of Michigan, Office of Intergovernmental Relations, proved extremely helpful and enabled a degree of cross corraboration between the two sources. In addition access was obtained to past issues of the "Gongwer News Service Report". This is an independent daily journalistic news-sheet on the activities of the Michigan Legislature

and its relations with the Executive. Few Detroit issues of major importance escape its reportage.

FOOTNOTES

1. Castells, Manuel, **The Urban Question - A Marxist Approach**, MIT Press 1977, Also essays by Castells in ed. Pickvance, C.G. **Urban Sociology - Critical Essays**, Tavistock Publications 1976. For the epistemological underpinning to this work see in particular: Althusser, Louis, **For Marx**, Vintage Books, 1970 and Althusser, Louis and Balibar Etiennie, **Reading Capital**, New Left Books, 1970

2. See especially: Reade, Eric; **If Planning is Anything, Maybe it can be Identified**, Urban Studies, 1983, 20 pps.159-171

3. McConnell, Shean; **Theories for Planning**, Heinemann, London, 1981, p.14

4. Kirk, Gwyneth; **Urban Planning in a Capitalist Society**, Croom Helm, London, 1980, p.181

5. What Kirk calls "a reformist perspective" which as distinct from a pluralist one recognizes the "basic structural inequalities of power, influence, income and wealth in modern Britain" (Kirk p.73) is incorporated here into the elitist perspective. The neo-Weberian approach emphasising the "power of public bureaucracy" (Kirk p.66) is also subsumed under the elitist perspective.

6. Wolff, Paul, Robert; **Beyond Tolerance** in Wolff, R.P.; Moore Jr Barrington; Marcuse, Herbert. A Critique of Pure Tolerance, Jonathan Cape, London, 1969, p.49

7. Ibid. p.55

8. Dahl, R.A.; **Who Governs?**, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1961

9. Polsby, N.W.; **Community Power and Political Theory**, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1963

10. Ham, Christopher and Hill, Michael; **The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State**, Wheatsheaf Books, Harvester Press, 1984

11. Miliband, Ralph; **The State in Capitalist Society**, Quartet Books, London, 1973, p.5

12. Ibid. p.27

13. For a summary see: ibid p.29

14. Mills, C.W.; The Power Elite, Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 1956

15. Bottomore, T.B.; **Elites and Society**, Penguin, 1966

16. Mills, C.W. ibid

17. Ham and Hill, ibid p.30

18. Saunders, Peter; **Social Theory and the Urban Question,** Hutchinson, 1981, p.131

19. Pahl, Ray, **Whose City?,** Penguin Books, 1975

20. Ham and Hill point to the view that "the existence of elites is not incompatible with pluralist democracy because competition between elites protects democratic government", ibid. p.31-32

21. Harrington, M.; **The Twilight of Capitalism,** Simon and Shuster, 1976 pp.67-68

22. Harvey, David; **The Urban Process Under Capitalism : A Framework for Analysis** in ed. Dear, Michael and Scott, Allen, J., Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society, Methuen, 1981, p.91

23. Ibid. p.91

24. Heilbroner, quoted in: Babcock, Blair; **Unfairly Structured Cities,** Basil Blackwell, 1984, p.65

25. Quoted Ham, C and Hill, M; ibid, pps.32-33

26. Faludi, Andreas; **Towards a Combined Paradigm of Planning Theory?** in ed. Paris, Chris; **Critical Readings in Planning Theory,** Pergamon Press, 1982, p.33

27. Ham, C and Hill, M; op.cit. p.33

28. O'Connor, James; **The Fiscal Crisis of the State,** St. Martins Press, 1973, p.6

29. See for example: Saunders, Peter; **Social Theory and the Urban Question,** op.cit., p.245 and Cooke, Philip; **Theories of Planning and Spatial Development,** Hutchinson, 1983, p.175

30. Our discussion gravitates around the dominant ideas circulating within urban and regional planning. We will return to the specificity of this as a theoretical object in Chapter Six but the implication here is that we treat only peripherally notions of "planning" equating it with government intervention generally or notions of "planning" current in other policy fields eg. social policy. For an overview of definitions of planning see Healey, Patsy et.al. **Theoretical Debates in Planning: Towards a Coherent Dialogue** in ed. Healey, Patsy; McDougall Glen; and Thomas, Michael J. **Planning Theory - Prospects for the 1980s,** Selected Papers from a Conference held in Oxford, 2-4 April 1981, Pergamon, 1982, p.18

31. Cooke, Philip; op.cit. p.67

32. Davidoff, P. and Reiner, T.A.; **A Choice Theory of Planning,** Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 1962, Vol.28, pps.103-115, p.103

33. See, for example, the work of J.B. McLoughlin and G. Chadwick, proponents of systems planning in the British context: McLoughlin, B; **Urban and Regional Planning : A Systems Approach**, Faber, London, 1969; Chadwick, G; **A Systems View of Planning**, Pergamon, Oxford, 1971

34. See the discussion by Kirk, G., op.cit. pps.107-109

35. Healey, Patsy, et.al. **Theoretical Debates in Planning : Towards a Coherent Dialogue**, op.cit. p.8

36. Robinson, I.M.; **Decision Making in Urban Planning**, Sage Publications, California, 1972, pps.27-28

37. Hemmens, George, C. **New Directions in Planning Theory**, Journal of the American Planning Association, Vol.46, No.3, July 1980, p.259

38. Parston, Gregory; **Planners, Politics and Health Services**, Croom Helm, London, 1980, p.23

39. See for example: Journal of Planning Education and Research Vol.1, No.1, Summer 1981, especially the article on **"The Health Planning Professional : A New Opportunity for Planning Education"** by Ann Ford

40. Healey, Patsy, et.al. op.cit. p.5

41. Ibid. p.5

42. Ibid. p.14

43. Ibid. p.15

44. Ibid. p.15

45. Healey, Patsy; **Understanding Land Use Planning - The Contribution of Recent Developments in Political Economy and Policy Studies**, Ch.12 in ed. Healey, P; McDougall, Glen; Thomas, Michael J. op.cit. p.180

46. Healey, et.al. op.cit. p.18

47. Cooke, Philip; **Theories of Planning and Spatial Development**, op.cit. p.10

48. Ibid. p.73

49. Ibid. p.72. By teleological Cooke means that "phenomena are explained by showing that they are necessary to bring about some consequence". This is unacceptable according to Cooke because in normal scientific discourse causes precede effects, whereas teleological explanation allows effects to be treated as causes. Cooke, ibid, p.98

50. Ibid. pps.72-73

51. Ibid. p.73

52. Ibid. p.97

53. Paris, Chris (ed); **Critical Readings in Planning Theory**, op.cit. pps.10-11.

54. Fainstein, Norman, I. and Fainstein, Susan, S.; **New Debates in Urban Planning : The Impact of Marxist Theory within the United States** in ed. Paris, Chris (ed) op.cit. p.149

55. Thomas, Michael, J; **The Procedural Planning Theory of A. Faludi** in ed. Paris, Chris, op.cit. pps.24-25

56. Faludi, Andreas; **Towards a Combined Paradigm of Planning Theory?** op.cit. p.28

57. Ibid. pps.33-34

58. Ibid. p.35

59. Ibid. pps.37-38

60. Reade, Eric; **If Planning is Anything, Maybe it can be Identified** op.cit.

61. Ibid. p.169

62. Ibid. p.169

63. Ibid. p.169

64. Ibid. p.169

65. Ibid. pps.169-170

66. Dunleavy, Patrick; **Perspectives on Urban Studies**, Section I in ed. Blowers, et.al., Urban Change and Conflict : An Interdisciplinary Reader, The Open University, Harper and Row, 1981, p.1

67. Rex, J and Moore R.; Race, Community and Conflict, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1967

68. See in particular the collection of essays in Pahl, Ray; **Whose City**, op.cit.

69. Quoted in: Saunders, Peter; **Social Theory and the Urban Question**, op.cit. p.128

70. Saunders, Peter; **Social Theory and the Urban Question**, op.cit., Ch.4, pps.110-1148

71. Pahl, Ray; **Whose City**, op.cit., p.206

72. Saunders, Peter; **Social Theory and the Urban Question**, op.cit. p.26

73. Ibid. pps.120-121

74. Ibid. pps.121-136

75. Winkler, J; quoted Saunders, Peter; ibid. p.126

76. Saunders, Peter; op.cit. p.121

77. Panitch argues, for example, that the thesis is asserted rather than demonstrated. See Saunders, op.cit. p.133

78. Saunders, P.; ibid. pps.134-136

79. Ibid. p.135

80. Ibid. pps.134-135

81. Ibid. p.127

82. See the essays **"Is there an Urban Sociology"** and **"Theory and Ideology in Urban Sociology"** by Manuel Castells in ed. Pickvance, C.G., **Urban Sociology - Critical Essays**, op.cit.

83. McDougall, Glen; **Theory and Practice : A Critique of the Political Economy Approach to Planning**, Ch.17 in ed. Healey, Patsy, et.al. op.cit. p.259

84. Harvey, David; **The Urban Process under Capitalism : A Framework for Analysis**, Ch.5 in ed. Dear, Michael and Scott, Allen J. **Urbanisation and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society**, Methuen, 1981

85. McDougall, Glen; **Theory and Pracitce : A Critique of the Political Economy Approach to Planning**, op.cit. p.260

86. For a review see ibid. pps.260-261

87. Saunders, Peter; op.cit. p.186

88. Castells, Manuel; **The Urban Question - A Marxist Approach**, op.cit. p.263

89. Castells, quoted by McDougall, op.cit. p.261

90. Saunders, Peter; op.cit. p.211

91. Quoted, ibid, p.211

92. Ibid. p.213

93. Reade, Eric, **The British Planning System**, Urban Change and Conflict, Block 5, Unit 19, Open University, 1981, p.48

94. Ibid. p.46

95. Ibid. p.47

96. Ibid. p.45

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CHAPTER 2

THE POSTWAR MODEL OF METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT IN DETROIT - SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

(a) Overview

(b) Three Postwar Transportation "Policy Climates"

(c) The Region - Location and Definition

(d) Detroit - Economic Context 1945-1960
  (1) "Motor City" - Detroit and the Automobile
  (2) Capital/Labour Relations
  (3) Racism

(e) Suburbanisation
  (1) A Theoretical Framework
  (2) Suburbanisation in Detroit

(a) Overview

This chapter considers some general characteristics of the postwar model of metropolitan development in Detroit, primarily concentrating on the period up to 1960 when the basic framework was established. This will provide some basic reference points to which subsequent analysis of transportation policy formation can be related.

The basic analytical concepts employed are those of "accumulation" and "class struggle" (cf. Ch. 1); the major phenomena studied are the regional economy and the dynamics of suburbanisation. Prior to this, however, it is helpful at the outset to place transportation policy in Detroit in a more longitudinal perspective.

(b) Three Postwar Transportation "Policy Climates"

The broad sweep of transportation policy in the Detroit region (to be defined shortly) is divided throughout into three reasonably distinct "policy climates". The first, the subject of the next chapter, was characterised by general enthusiasm for freeways in the region. Freeways were seen by city of Detroit politicians and planners as the solution to many of the city's problems (eg. congestion, lack of attraction as an economic location). Freeways were seen as complementing the Detroit urban renewal agenda. The period was one of increasing economic competition between Detroit and the emerging suburban political jurisdictions, but there was a reasonable degree of regional consensus on transportation policy issues.

The following period, the subject of Chapter Four, roughly covering the time from the early 1960's to the assumption of control by Detroit's first black Mayor in 1974, saw this consensus begin to break down. The freeway agenda, it is argued, was part of a model of metropolitan development that in this period was subject to developing crisis of which the "riots" or "rebellion" in 1967 were the most dramatic manifestation.

The third period, dealt with in Chapter Five, brings us up to the

present. It has been marked by an almost complete absence of regional consensus on transportation policy. Freeways have been characterised by politicians and planners as the cause of many of the city of Detroit's problems - a volte face in a mere 15 to 20 year period. Public transportation, in particular a rapid transit system, has now been heralded as the key to the city of Detroit's economic regeneration.

(c) The Southeastern Michigan Region - Location and Definition

The object of study is transportation policy formation by units of government within the south-eastern Michigan region. This geographical area covers the seven counties of Wayne (in which is located the city of Detroit), Oakland, Macomb, St. Clair, Livingston, Washtenaw and Monroe (Maps 1, 2 and 3). These counties comprise the present South-Eastern Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG). This broad region covers about 4.5 thousand square miles and during the period of study has contained about one-half of the population of Michigan - a regional total of 4.7 million in 1980 (Table 4). Most of these people, however, have been concentrated in the regional "core" counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb (85% in 1980, Table 4), which comprise about 40% of the total land area and which have always contained the bulk of the region's and indeed the State's economic activity. The city of Detroit with 1.2 million people (1980 - Table 4) is now about 25% of the SEMCOG total and covers 140 square miles.

The basic analytical concept employed to define the Detroit region is that of the region as a locale of accumulation and class struggle whose "distinctiveness" can be defined on the basis of a number of properties (environmental, cultural, governmental, the particular nature of the economy, etc., or a combination of these), many of which are subject to change over time. My focus is Detroit as an economic and governmental entity. This regional "definition" is admittedly vague but it seems advisable to avoid too rigid a separation between "regional" or "city" space and the rest of capitalist space. Castells,[1] for example, in his desire to avoid any ideological connotations associated with the term "urban", defines "the city" as

LOCATION OF SOUTHEAST MICHIGAN REGION IN NORTH AMERICA



LOCATION OF SOUTHEAST MICHIGAN REGION IN MICHIGAN



THE SOUTHEAST MICHIGAN REGION



"in the last analysis ... a residential unit of labour power ... a unit of collective consumption corresponding more or less to the daily organization of a section of labour power." This holds the problem that regional and local governmental bodies (the analytical focus of this research) deal with more than "collective consumption" and the "reproduction of labour power"(2) (they deal with, for example, the direct facilitation of accumulation itself). Besides, collective consumption can be organized from far (eg. state and federal police services) or near (city police forces) ie. to fully understand goods and services consumed, one must go beyond the boundaries of the city or region.

The following characterisations of "the city" by Marxist writers (which seem interchangeable with "region") are useful even if suffering from a certain, perhaps inevitable, indistinctiveness from the rest of capitalist space. Mollenkopf,(3) for example:

> "First and foremost, cities must be analyzed as the main physical, and more importantly social and political, setting in which production, distribution, and the accumulation of wealth take place. Cities mobilize the economy's basic ingredients. They are the places in which basic infrastructural investments (public and private) are located, and in which an organized labour force is concentrated. Above all, cities are a social and political device for creating the cohesive, ordered environment necessary for combining labor and capital effectively."

And Hill,(4) who makes the proviso that "a particular city cannot be divorced from the encompassing political economy within which it is embedded and through which it manifests its particular functions and form":

> "The capitalist city is a production site, a locale for the reproduction of the labour force, a market for the circulation of commodities and the realization of profit, and a control center for these complex relationships."

(d) Detroit - Economic Context 1945-1960

The regional economic context is considered in aspatial terms here. In fact this is for purposes of exposition only. The spatial articulation of the postwar development process in the region is crucial to an understanding of the process as a whole and the place of transportation policy within it. A spatial consideration which focuses on suburbanisation is the subject of the following section (Section (e)) of this chapter.

(1) "Motor City" - Detroit and the Automobile

Harvey[5] provides a useful theoretical starting point:

> "The geographical pattern in the circulation of surplus can be conceived only as a moment in a process. In terms of that moment, particular cities attain positions with respect to the circulation of surplus which, at the next moment in the process, are changed. Urbanism, as a general phenomenon, should not be viewed as the history of particular cities, but as the history of the system of cities within, between, and around which the surplus circulates .... The history of particular cities is best understood in terms of the circulation of surplus value at a moment of history within a system of cities."

Detroit during the period in question enjoyed a favoured location with respect to the geographical circulation of the surplus. There was a good base on which to build. Looked at in broad aggregative terms, Detroit since the turn of the century had seen Capital and Labour combine to make it the "heart" of the Mid-western industrial belt - an area heavily tied to basic manufacturing industries (automobiles, steel, machine tools, rubber, electrical machinery). The broader mid-western region has been sketched as follows:

> "Beneath the soil of this region lie coal, iron ore, and limestone for the production of steel - the structural fabric of an industrial society. Lacing this region is an extensive system of rivers and lakes which provide relatively inexpensive transportation for the heavy produce of the region's factories .... Since the 1920's the Midwest has largely functioned to transmit raw materials and semi-finished products into the heart of the

industrial monolith - the automotive realm."[6]

Building on Detroit's early metal working base, particularly in railroad equipment and shipbuilding, the early automakers proliferated here. While by World War II the "Big Three" - General Motors, Ford and Chrysler - clearly dominated the field, in 1910 there were a documented 58 corporations assembling motor vehicles in Detroit.[7] In 1914, Michigan produced almost 80% of the over half-million cars, trucks and buses made in the United States.[8] Since these early days there has never been any doubt as to Detroit's reliance on the automobile industry. In World War II Detroit's ability to "bend metal" was turned to war production and the Detroit area became known as the "Arsenal of Democracy". In the intervening years, Detroit had seen in addition to the Depression, the continuing inflow of immigrants from Europe, Southerners and Midwestern farm families attracted by the prospect of relatively high wages.[9] In 1940, almost half of the over 850,000 people employed in the Detroit "tri-county" core area (Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties) were employed in manufacturing. 65% of these were engaged in the manufacture of transportation equipment (Table 1).

In the pre-World War II period relations between Capital and Labour were antagonistic and often violent.[10] The struggle by Labour for the right to organise had ensured, however, that in 1945 a large United Autoworkers Union henceforth sat down with the large autocompanies in institutionalised collective bargaining. Solidarity House, world headquarters of the UAW, on Jefferson Avenue in Detroit, symbolised Detroit as a major centre of the American union movement. And the world headquarters of the "Big Three" automakers in the region symbolised Detroit as the centre of the United States and world automobile industry. Over the latter part of the 1950's, for example, the United States was turning out roughly half of the motor vehicles produced in the world with about 30% of these coming from Michigan - primarily the Detroit region, and nearby Lansing and Flint.[11] Detroit, in addition to vehicle assembly and world management functions, was also for the Big Three a major centre of parts production, design and proving. And independent suppliers, both large and small, were tied into the automotive network, producing everything

from nuts and bolts to steel and contract tool and die services. In 1960 the Detroit region, in relation to national employment, displayed a location quotient of 2.27 for durable goods manufacturing and a quotient of 13.58 for motor vehicle manufacture.(12) The tri-county region in 1960 employed over 40% of its total of almost 1,330,000 employed persons in manufacturing. Almost half of these worked in the manufacture of transportation equipment (Table 1).

The postwar to 1960 period had seen the intensification of the national and international decentralisation of the American automobile companies, as new assembly plants catered to dispersed regional and overseas markets. Until 1955, when U.S. production of motor vehicles reached a peak of over 9 million, Michigan losses in percentage terms were more than offset by increases in postwar production levels. The lag in new car sales, however, after 1955 and the severe recession which hit Michigan in 1958 (sending unemployment in the Detroit region to 15%, more than double the national rate - Table 12) brought home the heavily pro-cyclical nature of an economy so dependent on durable goods; and in particular the evidence, if further evidence was needed, of the direct dependence of the region's prosperity on the automobile.(13) It was a point, as shall be argued, not lost on the transportation policy makers. For at the end of the fifties, the Detroit regional economy faltered. In a "rehearsal" of events to follow in the 1980's, concerns were expressed over the employment effects of the decentralisation of the auto industry, automation, the shift in federal defence expenditure away from wheeled vehicles, in which Detroit dominated, toward aircraft, electronics and missiles and the Michigan "business climate" as a whole.(14)

(2) Capital/Labour Relations

While manufacturing in general and the automobile industry in particular underlay the relatively high income levels in the Detroit region, O'Connor(15) sees this as based on a deal struck between Big Capital and Big Labour in the United States of the postwar period - an agreement made at the expense of workers in competitive and non-unionised industries (more likely in Detroit to be black). Gains in productivity were to be shared with auto workers, for example, through higher wages, not through lower prices, in which all workers would

have participated. There was a "bifurcation" involved in the labour market but one which provided a certain stability in class relations necessary for sustained capital accumulation.

More recently, Marxist writers have used the term "Pax Americana"[16] to refer to "the heyday of modern American capitalist growth ... during which US-based companies dominated the international economy" and which underpinned this "settlement" between Capital and Labour. In Detroit this settlement must be seen in conjunction with the phenomenon of racism.

(3) Racism

Stable and profitable though in general as this period was for accumulation in Detroit, racism formed an integral part of its structure. June 20, 1943 had seen, in the city of Detroit, the worst racial riot up to that time in American history (the city had at that time about 150,000 blacks). In the wartime tension of the influx of people to Detroit's war industries and the resulting competition for city resources, fist fights between blacks and whites escalated into full scale rioting as rumours swept through the city of dead women and children of both races. By the time federal troups restored order, 25 blacks and 9 whites were dead.[17]

A strong link can be made between racism and the structure of capitalist production relationships. There is strong evidence that the auto companies in Detroit "deliberately cultivated and institutionalised racism in order that white workers and black workers would face their workaday lives in racial conflict with one another rather than in class solidarity".[18]

In the mid 1930's most of the blacks employed in the Ford Motor Company's River Rouge complex were "in the dirtiest and most dangerous jobs, as in the foundry". In the mid 1960's at the Chrysler Corporation's Dodge Main plant "all the better jobs were overwhelmingly dominated by whites".[19]

The interpretation of racism, however, in a capitalist system is not a settled matter within Marxist theory. Hill[20] refers to the

relationship between class and race as "a 'Gordian knot' of Marxian theory and an 'Achilles heel' of Marxist practice". He draws on the work of Bonacich on split labour markets. A split labour market occurs when the "relative surplus population" or unemployed and those at the bottom of the economic heap coincides with a group whose race or ethnicity differs from that of the majority of the working class.(21) In these circumstances Bonacich sees discrimination against blacks and other minorities as primarily rooted in the short term material interests of the white working class. In a caste-like manner higher priced workers reserve certain jobs for themselves and make it difficult for capitalists to use cheaper labour to displace them.

Undoubtedly there is truth in this argument. It sits comfortably with O'Connor's concept of a Big Capital/Big Labour "pact" and has been a fundamental impulse in the pattern of suburbanisation in Detroit. For many years after World War II white workers in Detroit did stage walkouts whenever a factory or a particular department hired its first blacks.(22) It is perhaps too simple, though. Hill considers that it "severely underestimates the benefits that racial discrimination bestows on various fractions of the capitalist class as well as the role played by discrimination in reproducing the capitalist system as a whole". Hill suggests that "discrimination fosters super-exploitation of black workers through the medium of a segregated reserve army by enforcing lower wages, poorer work conditions, more frequent speed-up, less attention to health and safety standards, etc., in job categories, plants and industries where work is primarily performed by black labour".(23) But there is no reason why both tendencies should not be present together as causes of racism in capitalism.

I turn now to a general consideration of the spatial development of the Detroit region during the postwar period to 1960, but some continuities will be traced into the 1960's. One is brought up against the phenomenon of suburbanisation, an understanding of which is necessary to locate the dynamic of regional and local transport-ation policy. The following section considers, firstly, a recent comprehensive theoretical contribution to the understanding of sub-

urbanisation. Given its comprehensiveness and usefulness it is presented in some detail. An attempt is then made to interpret suburbanisation in Detroit in terms of it.

(e) Suburbanisation

(1) A Theoretical Framework

Walker[24] has pulled together various Marxist strands of analysis to present a more holistic theory of suburbanisation from a geographical point of view. He considers suburbanisation in terms of three major defining characteristics:

(a) Spatial differentiation
(b) Decentralisation and
(c) The relationship of suburbanisation to cycles of capital accumulation.

Spatial differentiation: This is broken down into business and residential spatial differentiation. Concerning the former, Walker relates it fundamentally to the basic capitalist drive (which led to the division of labour in the workplace) to rationalise production, consumption and circulation in cost and revenue terms. This is the subject of conventional location theory which is easily incorporated into Marxist analysis. The latter, however, is better able to deal with factors which fall less neatly into models focusing on competitive efficiency; eg. spatial segregation by capital to avoid concentration of militant workers. Walker points to research showing how the territorial form of local government in the U.S. has been useful to Capital in enabling it to seek out "friendly" jurisdictions and escape central city political controls.

Transportation and communication networks have played a facilitating role in spatial differentiation - not a simple causal one. Along with other factors (eg. improved financial networks, more flexible energy sources) they have broken down spatial barriers and increased locational freedom - they have enabled the "spatial generalisation of capital" but they have not created it. Transportation and communication, Walker points out, have "developed to a large degree

directly in response to emergent demands for putting space between activities ...." (emphasis original).[25]

Residential differentation is considered by Walker in terms of:

(i) the spatial linkage between work and residence;

(ii) the pursuit of consumption; and

(iii) the reproduction of labour power - "ie. the necessity of returning each day and each generation a workforce appropriate to the needs of production and circulation".[26]

The employment linkage, with the development of auto transport, multiple workplaces within the family and so forth, has become "more tenuous" - "producing the well-known complexity of criss-cross commuting patterns and making the consumption factor more important in housing than in the past".[27] Picking up a Marcusian theme, Walker argues that "social differentiation in consumption is sought because it enriches and even defines the individual" - while in Europe vertical space has been a stronger indication of class position, in the United States the horizontal dimension (the idea of a single family detached house in the suburbs) has been dominant. Walker links this to "the sheer promotion of a consumerist way of life by capital out of its own realisation problem".[28]

Allied to the psychological need to express relative exclusivity of individual consumption patterns in space, the balkanised form of local government in the U.S. metropolis owes much, in addition, to the desire to enforce exclusivity in the provision of collective consumption goods by government and the desire to ensure that state regulation of private activities is in the interests of the collectivity. Deep seated Jeffersonian traditions are often called upon to explain metropolitan fragmentation. Walker states, however:

> "While the fragmented form of local government rests on the unique basis of American federalist tradition, it cannot simply be ascribed to this 'cause' of a mythical continuity with past New England town meetings. The specific form of metropolitan fragmentation was a specific construction of the twentieth century, which was nurtured in connection with the logic of spatial differentiation as a whole, by a 'selective use of

traditions' ..." (my emphasis).[29]

The argument pulls in the role of consumption in the reproduction of labour power. To quote:

> "Spatial differentiation aids in the reproduction of the widely divergent types of people needed to fit the various slots in the division of labour by creating differential access to social resources, from school to health care, and reinforcing very different experiences, behaviours and ideologies among sectors of the population."[30]

Walker recognises that spatial differentiation cannot just be understood in terms of the demand for "use" values, but rather that supply side forces concerned with the "exchange" value of land and property must also be explicitly brought in. Property capital in its efforts to increase sales, for example, has engaged in the promotion of residential discrimination. Simply because people have a major financial investment (housing as an exchange value) wrapped up in their homes, they are forced to take a conservative view of land values and change within their neighbourhood. And the federal government has tended, over the years, to respect discriminatory market processes. Likewise, those capitalists concerned with developing non-residential land and property are interested in spatial differentiation as a means of maximising exchange values through the clustering of high-value functions.

Decentralisation: This is closely allied to spatial differentiation. As a general statement Walker says:

> "Decentralisation of uses arises partly out of the dissolution of forces of aggregation (ie. diminishing restraints on location) and partly out of repulsion from the center (and attraction to the opposite, the fringe)."[31]

He points out that while residential suburbanisation, by the new middle class of managers and professionals around the turn of the century, played a historical leading role (and was followed before World War II by lower middle and working class suburbanites riding the trolley cars), it was only with employment dispersal and the general

availability of the automobile that mass suburbanisation was possible after 1945. This he maintains was "rather closely allied to paths of industrial dispersal".(32) Walker describes the "logic of industrial decentralisation" as it got under way in the first decade of this century:

> "What is involved is ... the historical process by which capital becomes more 'generalised', or universal, in space. As it does so, it frees itself progressively from the constraints of locating in any one spot, but particularly from the traditional locus of production in the city center.(33)"

Walker relates decentralisation to the beginnings of the corporate stage of capitalist development which made, through greater control over resources and market, a new generation of large factory complexes possible. He relates this in turn to the "facilitating" nature of technological developments - development of the telephone, the developing railway network's role in opening up urban space, the trolley system making reverse commuting by inner city workers possible. And a significant propelling factor in this was capital's desire to escape the class tension in urban cores that had developed by the turn of the century.

Walker recognises that "the kind of mass suburbanisation of today is strongly mutually reinforcing, and would not be possible without a whole ensemble of uses moving outward together".(34)

It is apparent that there is some difficulty involved in the attribution of leading and lagging factors. Walker attributes a leading role to industrial decentralisation. As we shall see, this was certainly a leading factor in Detroit. However, the conception of postwar suburbanisation as involving successive waves of industrial concentration, improvements in transportation-communication networks, and rapid extension of the general urban infrastructure, and intensified class conflict, followed by waves of factory dispersal, as Walker suggests, would seem an unnecessary over-simplification. As far as the state and federal role in this are concerned, Walker sees "a conscious effort to sustain a budding suburbanisation process ... eagerly greasing the wheels of suburbanisation" but not any

"procreative" role.[35] Again this is probably an exaggeration, at least as far as transportation policy is concerned. Freeways in Detroit, as will be apparent, are best conceived certainly as primarily facilitating a dispersal process which had other roots (and indeed in a very narrow sense can be seen as strictly facilitative in that they only made possible phenomena which had other impulses), but as linked to the federal interstate programme (cf. pp 94f) must also be seen in sheer scale as promotive or "creative" of suburbanisation through deliberate policy choice.

Walker also considers decentralisation from the exchange value side. The land market is not just a passive sorter and arranger of uses, spreading users out according to their ability to pay, involving the pull of cheaper land at the periphery and the push of dearer land at the centre. Active speculation by property capital is also at work at the centre and periphery propelling the suburbanisation process.

The general point is clear, however. Suburbanisation can be convincingly conceptualised in terms of the articulation of Capital and Labour in space based on changing inter and intra class relationships and dependent on the technological possibilities available - the latter not "autonomous" causative factors (ie. freeways did not "cause" suburbanisation), but their production and "take up" arising out of the fundamental class relation between Capital and Labour.

Relationship of Suburbanisation to Cycles of Accumulation: Walker makes the following statement:

> Progressive accumulation ... practically demands that the city expand to keep pace, else a crisis of accumulation develops." (emphasis original).[36]

By "crisis" Walker means a tendency within capitalism towards "over-accumulation" or "under-consumption". This idea is most closely associated with the postwar writings of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy[37] and vies in its attempt to come to terms with the "laws of motion of capitalism", with theory concentrating on "rising costs" to capitalists, in particular the "wage squeeze on profits" thesis. The

relative importance of these tendencies is again a matter of some debate in Marxist theory. Since both have implications for one's ability to understand suburbanisation and the political economy of postwar Detroit I will briefly summarise the respective arguments.

The wage squeeze on profits thesis argues that Labour increases its bargaining power as a "reserve army" of workers is depleted during economic expansions leading to higher unit labour costs for the capitalist. Profit margins are squeezed. This results in a contraction of business activity, once again an increase in the reserve army thus restoring the basis for another profitable expansion. Full employment is thus incompatible with profit maximisation. Economic downturns perform the curative function of disciplining Labour by creating unemployment.(38) Considered in relation to this argument, the reserve army or "relative surplus population" in Detroit has been less likely to participate in the full benefits of the Big Capital/Big Labour pact, and has been disproportionately concentrated, in the postwar period through the suburbanisation process, within the city of Detroit.

In contrast, under-consumptionist theory focuses on the problem of inadequate demand. There are a number of different strands, but Weisskopf(39) summarises the basic idea very well:

> "The essential tenet of under-consumption theory is that there is a secular (ie long-run) tendency for aggregate demand to fall short of potential output in a capitalist economy. This tendency results from the inequality of income inherent in capitalism, which concentrates a large fraction of total purchasing power in the hands of people (eg. capitalists) who use only a fraction of it for their own consumption purposes and who save the rest of it.
>
> To maintain a level of aggregate demand equal to potential output, it is necessary to find non-consumption sources of demand sufficient to offset the level of saving that occurs when the potential output is actually produced. The prime source of non-consumption demand is investment demand. But investment demand

itself is ultimately dependent on the growth of consumption demand, since investment increases the capacity to produce commodities that must be sold on the market. Given the limits on consumption demand inherent in a capitalist economy, it is questionable whether the investment demand of private capitalists will be high enough to sustain a level of aggregate demand equal to potential output."

Walker[40] sees in government efforts to encourage suburbanisation an effort to stave off a crisis of over-accumulation (or inadequate demand in relation to productive potential). This is surely a "procreative" role. Harvey[41] likewise states:

"The dilemmas of potential over-accumulation which faced the United States in 1945 were in part resolved by the creation of a whole new life style through the rapid proliferation of the suburbanisation process."

The under-consumptionist thesis has been criticised for lacking sufficient empirical demonstration.[42] It is especially difficult to "prove", however, that major government intervention to encourage suburbanisation (such as the interstate programme, pp.94f) arose out of an attempt to stave off a crisis of over-accumulation as opposed to simply being responsive to Capital seeking profitable investment opportunities in general.

Walker takes the thesis further, however, and perhaps does run the risk of an over-theoreticism.[43] He makes a link between the dynamics of accumulation and the "property circuit" of capital - the latter a part of the "secondary circuit" of capital. The secondary circuit is distinguished from the primary circuit (that devoted to the production of commodities) in being "the overall process of fixed capital formation and the creation of the built environment". Walker hypothesises that "over-accumulated" capital pushes (or switches) into the property circuit in the hope of staving off crisis. Mutually reinforcing but false expectations are at work (a "speculative bubble" atmosphere) leading to an overly extended city in terms of use value. This theorising parallels work being done by Harvey.[44] While it

provides much grist for fruitful intellectual speculation, there is, as Cooke[45] points out of Harvey, a danger in it - the danger of too "mechanistic an account of the accumulation process" and the danger of producing "a rationalistic conceptual logic which succeeds mainly in producing ideal systems devoid of the agency and ambiguity of struggling groups and classes in capitalist society".

There is certainly a tension in Walker's analysis between a theoretical approach on the one hand and on the other a recognition of the inevitable openness of action where human agency is involved. In recognition of the latter point, Walker states for example:

> "Without over-stating the importance of this, it must nonetheless be admitted that to some degree there is no logic whatsoever to suburbanisation: it was just the road down which society and economy headed."[46]

Achieving a balance in analysis between theory and empirical reality is something which, as Thompson has pointed out, Marx did not always manage either.[47]

(2) Suburbanisation and the Local State in Detroit

This section deals with some broad characteristics of suburbanisation in Detroit and the associated nature of local government structure on which it was based. The treatment is somewhat general. Other important characteristics (eg. the failure of the region to put in place a rapid transit system before or during this period) are considered in relation to transportation policy proper in the following chapters. I consider in turn business and residential decentralisation and spatial differentiation.

(a) Business suburbanisation: That manufacturing decentralisation was a major pull factor on other forms of decentralisation is borne out in Detroit.[48] Automobile assembly plants played a major role. Until World War II such plants were concentrated in the outlying city of Pontiac and in the contiguous cities of Detroit, Highland Park, Hamtramck, Dearborn (location of the major Ford River Rouge plant - in pre-war days the most integrated freestanding industrial complex in

the world) and the Canadian city of Windsor. These plants, built in the 1910-30 period, were constructed adjacent to rail facilities on the periphery of the existing built up area. Subsequent wartime and postwar assembly plants were again built on the existing periphery and tied to rail transportation - plants in Warren, Ypsilanti, Wayne, and Wixom (Maps 3 and 4 are helpful here). Such plants were not always served by freeways at the time of construction. The first was the Ford Willow Run aircraft assembly plant (converted later to auto production) constructed in the early 1940's on the outskirts of Ypsilanti and subsequently followed by construction of the Detroit Industrial Expressway linking it to the labour pool of the city of Detroit. In the mid 1950's a series of industrial corridors could be traced following the major railroads into the city of Detroit and feeding into an industrial belt within Detroit, roughly following the boundary between the "middle aged" city (residences built 1904-1933) and the "new" city (residences built after 1934 - see Maps 5 and 6).

In the growing metropolitan area the share of tri-county manufacturing jobs located in the city of Detroit fell from just over 60% in 1948 to just over 40% in 1962 (Table3A). The retail business sector also underwent a major decentralisation in the Detroit region in the 1950's. Between 1954 and 1961, 29 new one-stop shopping centres opened in suburban locations outside the city of Detroit.(49) These included two large regional shopping centres - Northland and Eastlane - just outside the northern and easternmost limits of the city of Detroit in Southfield and Harper Woods respectively. The former was built without the assurance of freeway access to start with (although necessitating a widening of eight mile road, the city of Detroit's northern boundary line).(50) The latter was held to be dependent by the developer (the J.L. Hudson Corp.) on freeway access to the Detroit market being available, and this was expedited by the State Highway Department.(51) It is difficult not to conceive of such centres as both causes and consequences of the residential decentralisation which we will examine in a moment.

Between 1948 and 1962 the proportion of tri-county employment in the retail sector accounted for by the city of Detroit fell from 73% to 43%. The proportion of wholesale employment fell from 90% to 69% over

1955 LAND USE MAP OF THE CORE AREA

MAP4



SOURCE: DETROIT METROPOLITAN AREA TRAFFIC STUDY 1955

SCHEMATIC BREAKDOWN OF CITY OF DETROIT BASED ON AGE OF RESIDENCES



THE OLD CITY BUILT PRIOR TO 1904

MIDDLE AGE CITY BUILT 1904-1933

NEW CITY BUILT POST 1934

SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM: PARKINS, MAURICE, FRANK - NEIGHBOURHOOD CONSERVATION - A PILOT STUDY, DETROIT CITY PLAN COMMISSION 1958 pp.3-5



SOURCE: DETROIT OVERALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN.
DETROIT DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1978

INDUSTRIAL CORRIDOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE CITY OF DETROIT

the same period (Table 3A). Large scale office decentralisation (which Walker attributes primarily to the attraction of cheap female labour in the suburbs) - especially the growth of Southfield and Troy as suburban office centres - was a phenomenon of the sixties and seventies (Table 14). The decision by the Ford Motor Company in the mid 1950's to build its new world headquarters in suburban Dearborn, while influenced by a family attachment to the area, was a sign of things to come.

(b) Residential Suburbanisation and the Local State: I turn to residential decentralisation and differentiation and the nature of the local state on which it was based. By 1930, with an area of 139.6 sq. miles and with 50 of those annexed in the 1920's, the city of Detroit reached its present day boundaries.(52) From 1940 onwards in a context of overall regional growth from natural increase and inward migration, the population growth in the balance of the tri-county region (ie. Wayne, Oakland and Macomb minus Detroit) far outstripped in absolute numbers the growth of the city of Detroit. The population of Detroit, in fact, started to decline in the mid 1950's (Table 4A). The 1950's was an explosive decade for suburbanisation. The balance of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties, with a 1960 population of almost 2.1 million, had grown by over 925,000 people between 1950 and 1960 (Table 4C). While over the same period the population of the city of Detroit fell by approximately 179,000 to 1,670,000, the black population of the city increased by almost a corresponding amount, from over 303,000 to over 478,000.(53) In the 1950's the population of the suburbs went from being substantially less than the city of Detroit to being substantially more (Table 4B and 4C).

In 1960, 64% of those living in the suburbs (the balance of the tri-county region) worked in the suburbs (Table 5). Given the scale of suburbanisation during the 1950's and the fact that one-third of those in the suburbs still worked in Detroit in 1960, it is difficult not to conceive of residential decentralisation as being a major "pull" factor in its own right. While industrial decentralisation would indeed seem to have taken the lead in postwar suburbanisation in Detroit, Walker would still, in relation to Detroit at least (perhaps due to a bias in favour of attributing too much motive force directly

to capital), seem to underplay the pull factor of the generalisation of consumption and labour reproduction in space as facilitated by the automobile. The attribution of leading and lagging factors is indeed difficult.

The explosive suburban population growth is disaggregatred on Map 7 and for selected cities in Table 6. Many of the areas in the immediate vicinity of Detroit's boundary (Livonia, Dearborn Heights, Southfield, Taylor, Southgate, Roseville, etc.) grew by over 150%; others by over 100% - Warren, East Detroit, Westland, Wayne, etc. By the mid 1950's (Map 4) residential development had followed the main arterials (Woodward Ave., Grand River, Gratiot, West Jefferson, Michigan Avenue, and M53) out of the city of Detroit, and already the area between the spokes was beginning to fill in. That this suburbanisation was an overwhelmingly white affair is revealed by a glance at column 4 on Table 6, which shows the percentage minority population for selected local governments in 1960. Only the older political jurisdictions in the seven county region - Detroit, Ecorse, Hamtramck, Highland Park, Inkster, River Rouge, Pontiac, Mt. Clemens, Ann Arbor, Ypsilanti, Port Huron, and Monroe - show percentages of over 1.5%.

This brings one to a consideration of the fragmented and racist spatial structure which emerged associated with the process of suburbanisation - in particular the character of the local state. While there is stark evidence of the role of property Capital in promoting racial separateness to increase the total exchange value in housing (the practices of the Detroit Real Estate Board were notorious in the 1950's),[54] it is Walker's conceptualisations of differential consumption and labour reproduction in space that go furthest towards explaining racial exclusion and the fragmented nature of the local state in Detroit.

The postwar structure of local government in the region did grow out of past historical traditions. While it is beyond present scope to trace these traditions to past class contexts, one must say something about both Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism.

Michigan, in common with other north-east and mid-west states, did not

PERCENTAGE POPULATION CHANGE IN SOUTHEASTERN MICHIGAN 1950-1960



Source: U.S. Census of Population.
Note on Procedures: Due to boundary changes the following procedures have been followed in plotting Population Change:

1. Where a village has incorporated as a city, village and city population data are directly compared.
2. Where the whole or remaining portion of a township has incorporated as a city, township and city census data are directly compared.
3. Where part of a township has incorporated as a village or city, city & village areas are combined with the rest of the township.
4. Annexations involving less than 500 people are ignored. For annexations over 500 the annexing and annexed jurisdiction are combined.

have a tradition of strong county government in relation to more local units of government.(55) County powers have been closely associated with public health matters and welfare provision, the administration of justice and law enforcement, and the work of the County Road Commissions. And County administration has traditionally been very fragmented with the existence of a large number of independent elective executive offices and many semi-autonomous executive boards and commissions. This high degree of executive fragmentation has its roots in the Jacksonian tradition of distrust for concentrated executive power.(56) This tradition, making to begin with, for weak county government, fed into a Jeffersonian tradition which is more important for the phenomena under present study. The Jeffersonian tradition carries a presumption in favour of vesting governmental powers where possible at the most local level. This represents, in Jeffersonian terms, the most "direct" form of democracy.(57) It is this tradition which the emerging pre and postwar suburban jurisdictions tapped into in Michigan or, as Walker puts it, made "selective" use of. And this was reflected back at the County level. In Wayne County, for example, until 1969 the legislative body consisted of 130 members appointed individually by the constituent local governments.(58)

The Jeffersonian tradition has strongly influenced the two most basic kinds of local governmental entity in Michigan: the township and the city. Both are constitutionally creations of State government. Townships as geographical entities date back to 1787 and the Northwest Ordinance, when boundaries, usuallyencompassing an area of 36 sq. miles, were arbitrarily drawn on maps to facilitate the surveying and selling of land. As political entities the concept of Jeffersonian "pure and elementary republics" dates back to early settlement in New England. Settlers from there and other eastern states brought the geographical and political dimensions together in Michigan as elsewhere. The orientation of township government has traditionally been towards a rural economy with fewer enabling powers and a more basic governmental structure than necessitated by more "urban" needs. But during the rash of city incorporations in the 1930's and onwards, townships had major and comparable powers to cities in the matters of infrastructure provision (sewers, water, though excepting roads),

local service provision (lighting, fire service, etc., including the power to organise township police departments) and land use.[59]

Most cities in Michigan are organised under the 1909 Home Rule Cities Act.[60] This allowed, until 1968, city incorporation by areas with a density of 500 persons per square mile and a population of 2,000 (from 1931 as low as 750). Cities have traditionally had greater powers than townships. Of particular interest here is the fact that they have complete responsibility for all roads within their jurisdiction excepting state highways and interstate freeways, where, while control is shared with State government, cities must still assent to the construction of all roads. Under the 1909 Act, cities have the power to choose their own "home rule" local government structure or "charter". Significantly again home rule cities under the 1909 legislation are protected from annexation and other incorporation initiatives. They cannot have territory annexed by an adjoining jurisdiction without their consent and are protected from being included, without their consent, in any wider attempt at incorporation. The 1909 legislation had its origins in the genuine problems thrown up by urban as opposed to more rural administration and in the municipal reform movement of the time. Prior to this, city powers and organisation rested on individual State charters which were the object of State level influence by special interests with power in the State legislature. Jeffersonian influence is apparent in the title of the act itself. It is overly simplistic in Marxist terms, to interpret, as Markusen has done, the origins of such legislation, in particular its annexation provisions, as representing the imposition of suburban interests over and against those of the central city. Referring to the passage of such legislation in state legislatures before 1930, Markusen[61] says:

> "In general, it put the decision to join or not to join the central city in the hands of the residents of the annexable area, leaving the parent who had spawned the child helpless to participate in determining their joint future."

Incorporations, as they took place especially in the postwar period, were based on a strong sense of suburban interest versus central city interest, but incorporating jurisdictions, at least in the 1930's,

could legitimately claim that they needed city status to deal with problems of urban administration in a situation where the city of Detroit was reluctant to assume the expense of providing municipal services to outlying areas through annexation.(62) Detroit was not a "helpless parent" in 1930 and was content to see some children go their own way. Walker's concept of "selective use" more accurately reflects the way tradition and law were used in postwar suburbanisation. I will now say something about this.

In the opinion of the Executive Secretary of the present State Boundary Commission:(63)

> "City incorporations in Michigan since World War II have almost completely been a product of defence against annexation and/or competing incorporation efforts and fears."

In a phenomenon that has been widely condemned,(64) the resulting suburban jurisdictions (Table 7 and Map 8), often operating under a non-partisan managerial form of government reflective of their homogeneity (Table 8), have been able to include within their boundaries what suits them (tax base assets and preferred ethnic and income groups) and to exclude what is unwanted (other ethnic and income groups, undesirable business tax base in wealthy residential locations). School districts, in parallel to the political fragmentation in general units of government, were also strictly segregated and drew upon widely divergent local tax bases for their support. While school districts in Michigan consolidated at a rapid rate in the postwar period due to economy of scale factors, this was entirely voluntary.(65)

The residential exclusionary practices in South East Michigan have been openly admitted to in a report by the present Regional Council of Governments(66) - local zoning laws requiring large residential lots have tended to "effectively exclude lower-income households especially blacks and other minorities proportionately heavy in low-income households, from whom many upper and middle income white home buyers are anxious to separate themselves". In the late 1940's and 1950's,as mayor, Orville L. Hubbard openly campaigned that he had kept the negroes out of Dearborn.(67) In 1960 a sensation was created by the

CITY INCORPORATION IN WAYNE, OAKLAND & MACOMB COUNTIES

(by date of incorporation)



revelation of the techniques used in the wealthy Grosse Point suburbs to control the land use, life styles, and ethnic composition of that area.[68] In 1980, the Mayor of Birmingham stated that those who are to live in Birmingham should "earn their way" into Birmingham.[69]

The predatory attitude towards business tax base is exemplified by the following description of incorporation in Wixom:[70]

> "Wixom didn't exist as a governmental unit when Ford Motor Company officials began looking for a plant site in the area in the 1950's, bringing with them the stimulus to waken the drowsy hamlet....
>
> Now Wixom is Ford's largest assembly plant in North America and easily one of the largest auto industry plants in the world.
>
> John Lyon, the plant manager ... thinks Wixom officials have been "prudent" with their industrial windfall (Ford pays 82% of the city's taxes).
>
> Seeing the tax bonanza with Ford's arrival, leading citizens successfully promoted incorporation as a village in April 1957, and cityhood 13 months later."

In like fashion, the city of Dearborn had incorporated in 1927, cutting off the property tax revenue from the Ford River Rouge complex from the city of Detroit. And until very recently, Dearborn has consistently under-assessed residential property for tax purposes, drawing upon the income from the Ford plant.

Map 9 shows the broad grain of the spatial variation in the distribution of income in the tri-county region for 1959. Table 9 ranks selected jurisdictions based on 1969 data. One study[71] has shown for the Detroit region a high degree of internal homogeneity within such suburbs (measured by deviation from mean per capita income). Another study has criticised the Tiebout assertion of the allocative efficiency of metropolitan fragmentation specifically in relation to Detroit. Charles Tiebout, twenty years ago, in an article which has become a classic in the field of public finance,[72]

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME 1959



SOURCE: U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING, 1960

suggested that the consumer in "shopping" among different communities which offered varying packages of local public services and in selecting as a residence the community which offered the tax-expenditure programme best suited to his tastes, was ensuring a tendency towards optimality in local government services. The model can be objected to on the grounds that it takes income distribution for granted. The study which has attempted to apply the model in the Detroit region[73] found that it was inadequate "in that the mobility which it (the Tiebout model) postulates is not a general phenomenon but appears limited to upper and middle income groups".

Footnotes

1. Castells, Manuel **Theoretical Propositions for an Experimental Study of Urban Social Movements**, in ed. Pickvance, C.G. **Urban Sociology : Critical Essays**, Tavistock 1976 p.148

2. "Collective consumption" as defined by Castells refers to those goods and services provided through "consumption processes whose organization and management cannot be other than collective given the nature and size of the problems: eg. housing, collective facilities, leisure provision etc". Castells, Manuel, **Theory and Ideology in Urban Sociology** in ed. Pickvance C.G. Urban Sociology : Critical Essays op.cit. p.75. For a definition of the concept "reproduction of labour power" see the discussion of Walker later in this chapter.

3. Mollenkopf, John H. **The Postwar Politics of Urban Development** in ed. Tabb, William K and Sawers, Larry, **Marxism and the Metropolis : New Perspectives in Urban Political Economy**, Oxford University Press 1978, pp.118-119

4. Hill, Richard Child **Fiscal Collapse and Political Struggle in Decaying Central Cities in the United States** in ed. Tabb, William K and Sawers, Larry, op.cit. p.214

5. Harvey, David **Social Justice and the City**, Johns Hopkins University Press 1973, p.250

6. Hill, Richard Child, **At the Cross Roads : The Political Economy of Postwar Detroit**, Paper presented at a Conference on Urban Political Economy, University of California, Santa Cruz, Social Science Building, April 8-10, 1977 p.2

7. Michigan Statistical Abstract, 15th ed. Michigan State University, 1980 pp.555-557

8. Verway, David **The Michigan Economy** in Michigan Outlook, Vol.1 -- No.1, June 1982 p.1

9. For the early development of Detroit see Conot, Robert. **American Odyssey**, William Morrow and Co. 1974, Parts I-III

10. Ibid.

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12. Mattila, John, M. and Moor, Jr. J.R., **The S.E. Michigan Economy : Past, Present and Future**, Report prepared for Metropolitan Fund Inc. Detroit, August 1977 Table 7 p.25

13. Haber, W., McKean, E.C. and Taylor, H.C., op.cit. pp.17-18

14. Ibid., Part I

15. O'Connor, James, op.cit. especially Chapter 1

16. Bluestone, Barry and Harrison Bennett, **The Deindustrialization of America**, Basic Books, 1982, p.111

17. Conot, Robert, op.cit. pp.376-386

18. Georgakas Dan and Surkin Marvin. **Detroit I Do Mind Dying : A Study in Urban Revolution** St. Martin's Press, 1975, pp.35-36

19. Ibid., p.35

20. Hill, Richard, Child. **Exploitation and Discrimination in a Capitalist Metropolis : Is Detroit an Internal Colony?** Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, Chicago, Sept 4 1977, p.1

21. Ibid. p.8

22. Georgakas, Dan and Surkin Marvin, op.cit. p.42

23. Hill, Richard, Child **Exploitation and Discrimination in a Capitalist Metropolis**, op.cit. p.10 and p.13

24. Walker, Richard A. **A THeory of Suburbanization : Capitalism and the Construction of Urban Space in the United States** in ed. Dear, Michael and Scott, Allen, J. **Urbanization and Urban Planning in Capitalist Society** Methuen, 1981. pp.383-429 The following discussion is drawn from this article.

25. Ibid. p.389

26. Ibid. p.390

27. Ibid. p.390

28. Ibid. p.390

29. Ibid p.412

30. Ibid. p.391

31. Ibid. p.395

32. Ibid. p.396

33. Ibid. p.399

34. Ibid. p.399

35. Ibid. p.404

36. Ibid. p.409

37. Baran, Paul, A. and Sweezy, Paul M. **Monopoly Capital**, Monthly Review Press 1966

38. Weisskopf, T. **Sources of Cyclical Downturns and Inflation**, in ed. Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf, The Capitalist System, Prentice Hall 1978, p.449

39. Ibid. p.447

40. Walker, Richard A., op.cit. p.409

41. Harvey, David **The Urban Process Under Capitalism : A Framework for Analysis**, op.cit. p.116

42. Cooke, Philip **Theories of Planning and Spatial Development**, Hutchinson 1983, p.150

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44. Harvey, David **The Urban Process under Capitalism : A Framework for Analysis**, op.cit

45. Cooke, Philip op.cit. p.150

46. Walker, Richard A op.cit. p.408

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48. Sinclair, Robert **The Face of Detroit : A Spatial Synthesis**, Wayne State Univ., Department of Geography 1972

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50. Mowitz, Robert J and Wright, Deil S. **Profile of a Metropolis**, Detroit, Wayne State University Press 1962, Ch.7 **The Extension of the Lodge Expressway**

51. Ibid. Ch.8, **Harper Woods versus the Ford Expressway**

52. Glazier, Sidney **Detroit : A Study in Urban Development**, Bookman Associates Inc. 1965, Appendix B, p.130

53. Banfield, E.C. **Big City Politics**, Random House Inc. 1965, p.52

54. The UAW commentator Guy Nunn described in 1957 the "blockbusting" tactics of the Detroit Real Estate Board:
"The Real Estate Board pursues - and enforces - a policy which will in time spread the ghetto, block by block, until it becomes the entire heart of the city. As a Negro family moves a block away from the ghetto's former boundary, real estate agents go to work on the fears of the white residents in that block. The prospect of a double sale is created; a new home to the panicked white seller, an old one to another Negro. Block by block it works. No "jumps". Keep it tight, keep it in turmoil and turnover, keep it profitable, and keep it tightly in the hands of the Detroit Real Estate Board."

Quoted in Widick, B.J. **Detroit : City of Race and Class**

Violence, Quadrangle Books, Chicago 1972, p.144

55. For the most comprehensive guide to Michigan county government see: VerBurg, Kenneth et.al. **Guide to Michigan County Government**, Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan State University, 1972

56. For a discussion of the influence of the Jacksonian tradition in Michigan see: VerBurg, Kenneth, op.cit. pp.I-13 to I-14

57. For a discussion of the Jeffersonian tradition and origins of township government in Michigan see: VerBurg, Kenneth **Managing the Modern Township**, Community Development Lifelong Education Programs, Michigan State University, 1981, pp.1-18

58. **Report and Recommendations of the Citizens Committee of 99** The Michigan County Home Rule Act of 1966. Presented to the Wayne County Board of Supervisors, February 1968.

59. VerBurg, Kenneth. **Managing the Modern Township**, op.cit. pp.1-18

60. The following account of city powers is based largely on: VerBurg, Kenneth. **A Study of the Legal Powers of Michigan Local Governments**, Institute for Community Development, Continuing Education Service, Michigan State University 1969

61. Markusen, Ann, R. **Class and Urban Social Expenditure : A Marxist Theory of Metropolitan Government** in ed. Tabb, William, K. and Sawers, Larry, op.cit. p.101

62. Glazer, Sidney, op.cit. pp.108-109

63. Interview with Jim Hyde

64. See for example: Lowi, Theodore, J. **The End of Liberalism, The Second Republic of the U.S.**, 2nd ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1979. p.175. Also: Davidoff, Paul and Brooks, Mary E. **Zoning out the Poor**, in ed. Dolce, Philip C. **Suburbia, the American Dream and Dilemma**, Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976

65. The total number of school districts fell in Michigan from 5823 in 1945/46 to 712 in 1967/68 (Data supplied by Michigan Department of Education). It was not until 1973/74 that the State undertook a major push to equalize, through state aid, the per pupil budget in school districts. See: Budget Message of the Governor F.Y. 1973-74, State of Michigan, pp.12-14

66. **Land Use Problems in S.E. Michigan**, SEMCOG, May 1976, p.19

67. Widick, B.J. op.cit. pp.141-143

68. "For each person who wanted to buy in one of the suburbs involved, the local property owner's association and the realty board had an investigation conducted by a private detective. The detective filled out a standard form; for most people, 50 percent was a passing grade. The questions asked dealt with such things as level of education, place of birth, and church membership.

But the realtors also inquired into whether the family's life-style fitted that of the four Grosse Pointes or perhaps more closely resembled that of some cultural subgroup - in particular, whether the applicant spoke English without an accent, whether his friends were primarily from the mainstream of American culture rather than from an ethnic group, whether the men of the family dressed in conservative or flashy style, and whether they were swarthy or fair-skinned. Persons of, or descended from, certain cultural subgroups had to have more than 50 points: Italian-Americans, for example, had to have 65, and Jews 85. Blacks and Americans of Oriental descent apparently could not qualify at all."

Adrian, Charles R. and Press, Charles **Governing Urban America,** McGraw Hill, 5th ed. 1977, p.18

69. Detroit Free Press editorial, 30th Sept. 1980 **Housing : Birmingham is Hurting Itself over the Issue**

70. Hagman, Arthur A. ed. **Oakland County Book of History,** Oakland County, 1970, p.305

71. Markusen, Ann, , **The Economics of Social Class and Metropolitan Local Government,** PhD Thesis, Michigan State University, 1974, Ch.7

72. Tiebout, Charles, M. **A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,** Journal of Political Economy, 64 (1956)

73. Schlack, Robert F. **Residential Site Choice, Land Use Patterns and Local Public Service Provision : An Integrative Model and Econometric Study of the Detroit Metropolitan Area** PhD Thesis, Wayne State University, Detroit 1977, p.245

CHAPTER 3

TRANSPORTATION POLICY FORMATION IN DETROIT 1945-1960

(a) Overview

(b) The "Politics" of Detroit

(c) The Freeway Agenda

(d) The Urban Renewal Agenda in Detroit

(e) The Regionalist Dimension

(f) Public Transportation Issues

(a) Overview

In exploring the proposition that the broad postwar dynamic of transportation policy formation in Detroit is primarily related to class, Chapter Two developed a Marxist based perspective on economic relations within the Detroit region and argued that spatially the region can be strongly interpreted as primarily an expression of class relationships. This Chapter takes the analysis a stage further. It seeks at a certain level of abstration (it being outside the research agenda to consider every concrete expression of policy) to examine the pressures and constraints of a class based nature and within federal and state contexts, shaping transportation policy formation at local and regional levels of government in Detroit in the postwar period to about 1960. Chapters Four and Five adopt the same approach for the two other "policy climates" subsequent to 1960. Chapter Six then considers the overall strength of class as an explanatory variable in accounting for transportation policy formation and just how far a macro class analysis such as this can go in contributing to a planning theory which informs practice.

I consider transportation policy to 1960 around four major related themes. These are as follows:

(1) Freeway planning and construction - the general domination of the transportation policy agenda by this and the broad consensus it commanded.
(2) The urban renewal agenda of the city of Detroit conceived as complementary to the city's freeway agenda.
(3) The growing need to plan transportation and other activities on a regional scale conflicting with local government fragmentation and autonomy.
(4) The decline in public transportation and the failure of rapid transit to be seriously considered as part of a regional transportation plan.

(b) The "Politics" of Detroit

Before proceeding, some comment on the political composition of Detroit city government over the period is helpful. Here the non-partisan nature of local politics, deriving from the endeavours of the municipal reform movement in the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, is most important. In 1918, Detroit

adopted, under the 1909 Home Rule Act, a new city charter, abolishing the aldermanic ward system and establishing non-partisan at large elections and a strong Mayor form of government. This replaced former "Boodle City"[1] where "Detroit's ward houses were its saloon keepers and their masters were the brewers, competing private utilities and corporations lacking social responsibility". Other major Detroit business interests, however, endowed with "social responsibility", led a local reform movement to change a situation which was not in the interests of Detroit business as a whole. The city was henceforth to be "managed" along "civic" lines where partisan politics had no place.[2] (An ideology subsequently picked up by many of the emerging suburban jurisdictions.)

This has had important implications for the ability of organised Labour to influence city elections. During the 1940's, the Confederation of Industrial Organizations (CIO) made three major attempts (1943, 1945, 1949) to elect a Mayor of Detroit, failing each time.[3] While Detroit voted 70% Democratic, Mayors between 1940 and 1957 were conservative. Organised Labour's attempts to elect candidates were branded as efforts at "labour domination" - of constituting a limited and selfish interest trying to run the government of "all the people".[4] An observer in 1960 noted that since the 1940's the steam had gone out of Detroit municipal politics. No longer were ideological conflicts fought on a local scale. "Above all", he suggested:[5]

> "...it may be that the structure of non-partisan politics in Detroit has 'disciplined' or 'taught' the labour movement to conform to the peculiar rules of the non-partisan game. This has meant less aggressive behaviour, less overt attempts to control the government. It seems possible that labour has learned through repeated defeats to select its candidates carefully, making sure that they have a publicized record in government and that they fit into the non-partisn pattern of city politics".

(c) <u>The Freeway Agenda</u>

Attention is now turned to regional highway planning. As early as the mid 1920's, this was perceived generally in the region as a "necessity". A Master Plan of Thoroughfares" was agreed to in 1925 by the City of Detroit, Wayne and other surrounding counties.[6]

Already the old street system of Detroit was congested with automobiles. The 1925 plan forecast and planned for a dominant role for motorised transport in the region's circulatory system. This involved a major programme of right of way acquisition and street widening, much of which was carried out. Map 10 shows the basic radial and grid system proposed in the 1925 plan. Roads constructed included the 204 ft. wide Superhighways such as the expansive sections of Woodward, Gratiot, Grand River, Schoolcraft, Southfield, and Eight Mile Road. Elsewhere, where it was too expensive to widen the streets to 204 ft., store fronts were cut off and streets widened to 120 ft.

Twenty years later, this system of thoroughfares was under acute strain. In 1946, the Detroit City Plan Commission (appointed by the Mayor) published, as an integral part of the first Detroit Master Plan, a "Proposed System of Trafficways" for the city. The overwhelming "reality of everyday life", which forms the context for the plan, was that the city of Detroit was being strangled with automobiles. To quote from the report:(7)

> "... the automobile is chained to a medium that has never kept pace with its own development - it must gear itself to a system of roads largely inherited from a by-gone age, inherited and adapted piece-meal in a never-ending series of futile attempts to solve traffic problems ...
>
> Recognition of the deficiences of the 1925 proposals resulted in the trafficways plan of 1946. Developed as part of the Master Plan for Detroit the new scheme eliminates the defects of the older one and projects for Detroit the most advanced thoroughfare system in the world."

The proposed expressway system (Map 11), which was substantially unchanged 8 years later (Map 12), in addition to a major upgrading of the major and secondary thoroughfare system, was to be "no makeshift":

> "It serves the entire city, providing easy access to the business centre, residential districts, and most of our major industries, besides carrying through traffic across the city quickly and safely".(8)

DETROIT MASTER PLAN OF THOROUGHFARES 1925

SOURCE: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF MOTORWAYS FOR DETROIT. MICHIGAN STATE HIGHWAY DEPT. 1941

MAP11



SOURCE: PROPOSED SYSTEM OF TRAFFIC WAYS
CITY OF DETROIT, MASTER PLAN REPORT
NO. 4 OF A SERIES.
CITY PLANNING COMMISSION 1946

PROPOSED SYSTEM OF EXPRESSWAYS 1946



SOURCE: TRAFFICWAYS FOR 3 MILLION PEOPLE
DETROIT CITY PLAN COMMISSION AND DETROIT
STREETS AND TRAFFIC COMMISSION, OCTOBER 1954

Already by 1946 expressways were making their mark on the region. The Wayne County Road Commission (the road building arm of Wayne County government with funding coming directly from State gasoline and motor vehicle taxes) and the State Highway Department had completed two projects. The first, the Davison Limited Highway stretching east-west for one-and-a-half miles through the enclave city of Highland Park, had alleviated one of the most serious bottlenecks for Detroit traffic. Started in the summer of 1941, it was rushed to completion because of its importance to war industries and was opened in November 1942. The highway was hailed by the Wayne County Road Commission as one of the "pioneer highways of the world" and is "unique in that it provides non-stop highway travel directly through a solidly built-up and long established neighbourhood".(9) The second, the Detroit Industrial Expressway, also rushed to completion in 1944 because of the war effort, linked the border of Detroit and Dearborn with the Ford aircraft factory at Willow Run, in the process running past the Rouge Plant (Map 13). And in 1946, subsequent to the federal aid law of 1944, which for the first time earmarked federal funds for assisting highway construction within cities, a cross-town expressway (the Edsel Ford Expressway) and a north-south expressway (the John C. Lodge Expressway) were in the process of being launched into construction within the city of Detroit as the product of a tri-party agreement between the city, the Wayne Road Commission and the State Highway Department (Map 13).(10) By the mid 1950's, before federal Interstate Highway funds became available, both these schemes were well on the way to completion.

From the beginning of freeway construction in Michigan there was a strong belief, in important quarters, that this was essential to the general economic development of the state. It was a strong argument. The Michigan State Highway Commissioner in 1944 made a pitch to Congress in Washington for highways as "the basis of the nation's development". The following exerpt from his speech illustrates the key social investment(11) role highways were perceived as playing in Michigan's production process:(12)

> "One of the fundamental elements of the Michigan assembly line method is highway transportation. The raw materials are

MAP13



SOURCE: "MICHIGAN'S POSTWAR HIGHWAY NEEDS" STATEMENT OF CHARLES M ZIEGLER, STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSIONER ON HR.2426 AND S.971,, BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ROADS AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON POST ROADS. MAR.9, 1944

DETROIT INDUSTRIAL EXPRESSWAY AND PROPOSED EXTENSIONS 1944

fabricated in one plant, moved to another for the manufacture of parts and sub-assemblies, and finally arrive on the assembly line at the main plant to produce the finished product. The assembly line cannot be supplied from large stores of bulky parts. These parts must be transported on schedule to arrive just when they are needed. The motor truck is the ideal means of transport for this purpose. It can move materials from plant to plant even though they may be located miles apart. It has permitted the dispersion of the motor industry and the small subcontracting plants to the numerous locations throughout the state .... It is evident that Michigan industry depends on highway transport for operation and for the transportation of labour."

The point was not lost on the Michigan Good Roads Federation - an organisation representing those with an important interest in highway construction, including the Michigan trucking and road building industries and membership of the State Highway Commissioner.(13) A 1948 report of the organisation - "Highway Needs in Michigan" - states quite directly:(14)

"... highway transportation is a vital element in the automobile production process. The highway itself is as much a part of the assembly line as the cranes that lift motor blocks onto chassis at River Rouge or the conveyor belts that carry piston rings and gasoline tanks from stock room to production line at Pontiac."

It continues

"Because a well-developed highway system throughout the nation is essential to the economic health of the automobile industry, it is apparent that Michigan has much to gain by setting the pace in road development."

It is in the mid to late 1950's, however, that regional freeway construction in Detroit really took off. This followed passage of the federal Interstate Highway Act of 1956 which provided 90% federal aid for highways designated as part of the Interstate Highway System. Over the ensuing 25 years, over 40,000 miles of such freeways were constructed, 7,000 of those miles in metropolitan areas.

The process leading up to the passage of this legislation is a story in itself and has been documented elsewhere.[15] A strong case can be made for interpreting it as an agenda formed primarily in the interests of a major wing of Big Capital, namely the highway lobby - the auto manufacturers, petroleum, concrete, asphalt and other allied interest groups - that was not reticent in its efforts to "educate" the American public through a massive publicity campaign.[16] In 1982, a congressional task force pointed out that the reciprocal relationship of the Interstate programme, housing construction, auto sales and various ancilliary industries was the main engine of postwar economic growth.[17] This was identified, in the general debate surrounding passage of the Interstate programme, with the public interest. As Davies points out,[18] the sheer scale of funding could not help but colour the opinion of local politicians towards the scheme:

> "Local politicos, hard pressed to pay the rapidly rising costs of government, joyously received the financing formula that would have the federal government paying ninety percent of the urban freeway costs, leaving the state government the remainder! It is not every day that a financially troubled city can get a spanking-new transportation system virtually for free."

In 1955, Albert Cobo, Mayor of Detroit, came to Washington, described the Ford and Lodge Freeways and recommended more of the same to cure the congestion problems of Detroit and other cities.[19] The national urban planning fraternity was divided on the issue. Robert Moses, for example, a nationally prominent planner from New York City at the time, argued that freeways were the key to the revitalisation of blighted urban areas.[20] As early as 1941, the Michigan State Highways Department had taken this line in arguing the need for motorways in Detroit:[21]

> "Slum conditions develop in the backwaters left by unplanned urban growth and inadequate street facilities. A revampled street pattern will open up these blighted areas and fit them for more productive uses."

Other planners, such as Harland Bartholomew (credited as one of the

foremost advocates of comprehensiveness in urban planning), argued that mass transportation should be given first consideration in cities.[22] The strongest dissenting planning voice, however, over the '56 Act came from Lewis Mumford. He concluded:[23]

> "The most charitable thing to assume about this (legislation) is that they hadn't the faintest notion of what they were doing. Within the next fifteen years they will doubtless find out; but by that time it will be too late to correct all the damage to our cities and our countryside, not least to the efficient organisation of industry and transportation, that this ill-conceived and absurdly unbalanced program will have wrought."

Detroit politicians at this time, however, were quite firmly committed to freeways. In 1953 the city of Detroit, State Highway Department, Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Road Commissions, U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, and the Detroit Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission had co-operated in the preparation of the Detroit Metropolitan Area Traffic Study.[24] Under the direction of Douglas Carroll Jr., the "Carroll Plan" was completed in 1956 at a cost of three-quarter of a million dollars. It was one of the first major quantitative transportation planning studies in the United States. It has been described as "a highly significant pioneering effort to develop a highway plan by deriving patterns of travel from data on the traffic-generating capacities of various uses of land".[25] One of the major participants in these events sees in the impetus for the study an effort by the city of Detroit and the S.E. Michigan region generally, to put pressure on the State Highway Department to build more expressways in the region.[26] (At that time the State Highway Department was under the control of an elected Republican State Highway Commissioner with strong support in the more rural areas of Michigan). In any case it is clear that the Detroit highway agenda was not foisted on the region from Lansing or Washington but came from the bottom up as well as from the top down.

The Carroll study was clear as to its intent. It took an almost exclusive focus on highways for granted:

> "... specialized work and interchange of products are the key to the large metropolis and a condition of its existence. This can

occur only by means of the large daily movement of persons and vehicles.

The purpose of this study is to insure effective functioning of this movement by thoroughly understanding the nature of the movement and then by devising the most effective highway plan to serve it." (my emphasis)[27]

The report can be described as an example of "trend planning" presented within an implicit structural functionalist conception of society. By structural functionalist (cf Ch.1 pps.10-11) is meant a view which underplays the significance of conflict assuming its existence, if present, as functional to the existing social system as a whole. Consideration of conflict, existing or potential, is nowhere considered in the Carroll plan. It did not look beyond its taken for granted highway goals, derivative as they must be seen, of the dominant class pressures behind them. It accepted "the continuing spread of people more thinly over the land with consequent higher car ownership rates" and set about to facilitate the direction of the trend. It accepted the basic concept of Detroit as "a spread out city" in which "fixed facility transit lines" were unsuitable. A "review of the facts" led to the conclusion that a complete network of express routes was necessary to effectively "drain" existing thoroughfares and neighbourhoods of through traffic.[28] The result was a recommendation for the study area (an area taken to be a radius varying between 20 and 25 miles from the CBD) of almost 260 miles of expressways and 118 miles of connecting arterial routes (Map 14).[29]

Following the election in early 1957 of a Democrat, John C. Mackie, to the post of State Highway Commissioner on the strength of the urban vote[30] and following the Interstate Highway legislation, freeway construction in Detroit got into full swing. Within four months of taking office, the new Commissioner announced a ten-year expressway plan for the region involving 81 miles of new expressways, 73 of which were classified as part of the Interstate system and thus eligible for the "pot of gold" in the form of 90% federal aid.[31] This was substantially based on the Carroll study. The following year saw the publication of another transportation plan, this time for a more broadly defined Detroit region - a joint product of the DMRPC and a recently formed Inter-County Highway Commission. This plan, "Regional

DETROIT FINAL EXPRESSWAY PLAN 1955



DETROIT TRAFFIC STUDY AREA

Highways", covering an area of 2600 sq.miles (the counties of Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Monore, and eastern Washtenaw), provided for more of the same. It accepted the basic spreadout pattern of land use as "the element to which all other physical factors must be keyed". It used the Carroll recommendations as its "basic core" and added to it a system of modified expressways and regional thoroughfares "to provide an integrated highway system to serve the entire region" (Map 15). The sprawling economic arteries articulated in this and the other plans were rapidly taking shape by the early sixties. Map 16 shows freeways constructed as of 1965. If implementation had one major characteristic during this time, it was in general its uncontroversial nature. The State Highway Department in spear-heading implementation could point to the "interest of the majority of citizens of the metropolitan area".(33) The east side and the west side of the city of Detroit competed to be first on the agenda of works to alleviate their congestion problems.(34) Opposition tended to be localised to those most immediately affected. Construction rode roughshod over these interests in the inner city slum areas, and in this respect Detriot is no different from many other U.S. cities. A more "careful weighing of consequences" took place in middle and upper income residential areas.(35) Typically, negotiations with neighbourhood interests were led by political aides rather than planners; the latter, along with highway engineers, playing an advisory role (providing ideas on modified route locations, cantilevered structures to economise on space, etc.) in facilitating construction. Negotiators could wear down opposition with the "logic" of the freeway agenda as a whole. Given the general acceptance of this logic, it is hardly surprising to find regional capitalist interests (while taking a keen interest in route determination where their specific interests were concerned) taking a back seat at the regional level as far as the highway agenda as a whole was concerned. It was not completely absent, however. The presidents of Ford, Chrysler, and G.M. had founded in 1941 the Traffic Safety Association of Detroit, with many other companies joining subsequently. This body, recognising that "business and industry have an important stake in the safe and orderly movement of traffic in the Detroit area",(36) lobbied for more and better freeways, especially with regional and local government officials, under the banner that they reduced traffic fatalities.

DETROIT PROPOSED EXPRESSWAYS 1958

MAP 15



DETROIT METROPOLITAN AREA REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION

1965 TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
FREEWAYS & MAJOR ARTERIALS
(Talus 1969)



(d) The Urban Renewal Agenda in Detroit

From the very beginning an urban renewal strategy went hand in hand with the city of Detroit's commitment to a freeway agenda. It is impossible to understand the city's support for freeways without understanding its expectations from urban renewal. It is clear that city policy makers were aware in the fifties of the potentially detrimental longterm effects to "the city" of making the growing suburbs more accessible by automobile. And freeways were also directly removing property from the tax rolls. A 1958 city report talks of "the relentless economic competition from newly developed areas accessible to the automobile".(37) But in the same year, in response to the interview question - "In the long run, do you think the city will gain or lose by the development of expressways?" - seven out of the nine Detroit councilmen answered that on balance the city would gain.(38) This response becomes understandable when seen against the congestion problems of the city, the fact that people (including Detroit residents) wanted to drive cars and Detroit made them, and the fact that suburbanisation was happening anyway. Detroit, in fact, actually constructed the water lines and, to a lesser extent, the sewerage system which supplied a large proportion of the growing suburbs (Maps 17 and 18). The alternative was to see the suburbs construct their own less efficient systems. The suburbanisation process (while perhaps not its degree) was a given for city policy makers. In the fifties, downtown retail stores saw freeways as making them more accessible to suburbanites. Mayor Cobo predicted that the Detroit freeways - known in the fifties as "Cobo's Canyons" - would bring people back into the city.(39)

This optimism, though, owed much to the city's urban renewal agenda - the city's answer to suburban growth and competition. Since 1945, in fact, to the present day, transportation and renewal (latterly revitalisation and renaissance) have been inseparable policy issues.

The 1946 "Proposed System of Expressways", published by the city planning commission (Map 11), was accompanied in the same year by publication of the "Detroit Plan"(40) which actually embodied the central feature of federal urban renewal legislation three years later

DETROIT WATER SYSTEM AREA



SOURCE: 123RD ANNUAL REPORT FOR F.Y. ENDED JUNE 30 1975, CITY OF DETROIT, WATER AND SEWERAGE DEPT.

DETROIT SEWERAGE SYSTEM SERVICE AREA



SOURCE: 123RD ANNUAL REPORT FOR F.Y. ENDED JUNE 30 1975, CITY OF DETROIT, WATER AND SEWERAGE DEPT.

- land clearance by cities and sale at knock down prices for private development.

It is necessary to consider Detroit's renewal agenda against the background of this federal urban renewal legislation - the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 and subsequent amendments. This was in substantial measure a generalised response to the problems faced by cities such as Detroit. The federal programme was very much couched in terms of serious concern for the problems of low income families living in substandard accommodation (and this cannot be ignored), but in the words of one reviewer, was "ineffective and possibly even harmful" in so far as its stated purpose was concerned.(41) This record has been well documented elsewhere.(42) There were clearly other motives behind the legislation and these are not that mysterious. At the national level big city mayors and local officials were concerned with stopping the spread of poor neighbourhoods, putting the brakes on white flight and protecting the city's property tax base. Slum areas were a net drain on the city treasury. Shoring slum dwellers up in public housing was one way of stopping the spread of "blight", but the basic approach embodied in the federal legislation (given the "strong resistance to and lack of support for any form of shelter subsidy for low income groups")(43) was to subsidise private redevelopment of slum areas. These concerns fitted well with business concern for threatened central business district property values. Residential blight was often most acute in the early developed downtown areas. But given the pre-Kennedy conservative interpretation of an appropriate federal role (ie notions concerning the appropriate separation of public and private sectors), the rhetoric understandably tended to focus on the housing needs of the slum dweller. It was only gradually over the history of the federal renewal programme that the predominantly residential emphasis was relaxed in favour of greater concern for general "city betterment". Business interests were "increasingly in favour of restructuring blighted business and industrial properties".(44) Cities were given greater flexibility in protecting and enhancing commercial, industrial and institutional areas (especially universities and hospitals).

Mollenkopf,(45) in presenting a Marxist analysis of urban renewal,

argues that it represented:

> "Big Capital's progam of expansion of the suburban periphery and reorganisation and more intense development of the urban core (in order to) reinforce the command and control functions of the central city over the metropolitan area, the surrounding region, and even overseas territories."

He sees a "pro-growth coalition" composed of central-city politicians and bureaucrats, large corporations, CBD real estate and merchant interests, and the construction trades, pushing nationally for a strong renewal programme and likewise co-operating locally on downtown redevelopment.

Pittsburgh, as Mollenkopf describes it, provides a particularly striking example of corporate led urban renewal.(46) In that city, R.K. Mellon led regional capitalist interests in forming the Allegheny Conference on Community Development in 1943 to develop plans for what became the Golden Triangle, Pittsburgh's new CBD. Nearly every major city, as Mollenkopf points out, did develop during the fifties a corporate-based planning body interested in urban develop ment. But there is a danger of applying an over-generalised structuralist logic here. Mollenkopf includes Detroit's renewal efforts as part of this pattern. But this in fact over-estimates the strength and cohesiveness of Big Capital support there around the agenda of bolstering the central business district. What is significant in Detroit's case, it is argued, is in general the relative weakness, in terms of investment, of Big Capital attachment to the central business district - an altogether different context for planners and policy makers.

Looking generally at the urban renewal agenda as it established itself in Detroit during the forties and fifties, the lead seems to have been taken by the city administration with the private sector playing an important but strictly secondary role. This is in contrast, as shall be seen,to the post 1967 situation, when the private sector - when more than the central business district was threatened - was to play a more dominant role in the formation of a broader economic development agenda. But it is still against the city of Detroit's expectations from renewal - protection of the tax base, stemming the tide of middle

class flight, and enhancing the economic and service functions of the city (particularly in relation to the CBD) - that its embrace of the logic of the freeway agenda, strong in any case, must be seen. But the city of Detroit's urban renewal agenda, while strongly shaped by class processes, cannot be interpreted as standing rigidly to attention in the face of large corporate interests as suggested by Mollenkopf. I will consider separately the following aspects of Detroit's renewal agenda during this period:

(1) Housing renewal

(2) Commercial, service and "civic" renewal

(3) Industrial renewal.

(1) Housing Renewal: This was the focus of Mayor Jeffries' "Detroit Plan" of 1946, already mentioned, which was subsequently incorporated into a broader official Master Plan (the first such plan in Detroit), adopted by the city council in 1948. The expectation, held in the Master Plan and by city officials generally through the fifties, was that through renewal (whether full-scale clearance and/or redevelopment or through more moderate conservation measures), neighbourhood stability (ie containment of the black and poor, under the best proposals in improved housing conditions) and the containment of white flight could be achieved (the activities of the Detroit Real Estate Board not withstanding).

A 1958 City Plan Commission report[47] divides Detroit into three different housing areas - the old, middle and new city (see Map 5). The characterisation of Detroit renewal in this report, which was a major policy document, supports the above assessment. The middle-aged city (built between 1904 and 1933, covering 63 sq.miles with 180,000 dwellings - one-third of the city total) was determined to be "deteriorating". To quote:

> "It is these middle-aged neighbourhoods that are in need of both major public improvement and private rehabiliation to prevent them from turning into blighted areas. They are now undergoing racial change or will soon undergo this change: some of the white families are abandoning them for newer outlying neighbourhoods as the Negro families move into them from the older central core of the city."[48]

The report talks of the "paradox" of the middle-aged city that "can now offer its residents many of the advantages which the suburbs will not have for many years". But the "continued spread", it says, "of the physical deterioration in these areas is a menace to adjacent stable neighbourhoods" (my emphasis).(49)

Of the new city, containing 150,000 houses built after 1934, the report says:

> "Conservation in the form of minor improvements is the keynote to preservation of stability and improvement of living amenities ...."(50)

The old city, a compact area of 12 1/2 sq.m. built prior to 1904 and surrounding the CBD, was slated for more drastic renewal. It was originally built without the benefits of building codes and subdivision regulations - 21,000 dwellings in it were determined in the 1950 Census to be either badly dilapidated or to lack indoor plumbing. The report says:

> "Drastic action of wholesale clearance and rebuilding is needed in the community interest if the Old City is again to become a desirable place to live."(51)

A brief review of one major housing renewal project in the old city - the Gratiot renewal project - is illustrative of some of the dominant issues surrounding the reconstruction of urban space by the renewal and freeway agendas. In this project, protection of the CBD can be seen as blending with the goal of arresting the spread of "the slum". Gratiot, an area of 129 acres just to the east of the CBD, was 95% black in 1950.(52) It had been the area focused on in Mayor Jeffries' "Detroit Plan". Of Gratiot and the "Detroit Plan", Mowitz and Wright(53) concluded at the time:

> "What is clear is that those with the greatest economic stake in the downtown area's future - the banking, investment, retail-business, real estate, and building interests - took an active part along with city officials in developing this strategy for eliminating slums and for stemming the tide of public housing with all of its feared consequences for each of the groups involved in the decision."

The "Detroit Plan" favoured private redevelopment of the Gratiot site with government underwriting land acquisition and clearance. Some who worked on the plan foresaw private redevelopment for low rent housing as containing the black population and preventing them from migrating within the city. Other options which received consideration during the early discussions on Gratiot, were containment through provision of public housing on the site, combined with private redevelopment with the intention of attracting middle and upper income families to the site, thus curbing suburban flight.

Under the conservative minded Mayor Cobo (elected in the autumn of 1949), opposed to public housing, the proposal that first won through, was private redevelopment for a mix of middle-income and low-income families. The concerns of racial integration and provision of better housing for lower-income families were on the agenda along with containment and the desire to protect the CBD - they may have been secondary considerations (as shall be seen, they lost out in Gratiot), but it is misleading to ignore them. Mollenkopf,[54] for example, sums up the federal urban renewal legislation as follows:

> "Urban renewal was to throw a wall around a creeping blight, that is, the growing social problem of the minority urban poor, in order to preserve and enhance central city land values and contain poor neighbourhoods' influence."

Federal housing officials working with Detroit on the Gratiot project, were concerned to provide low rental accommodation for blacks.[55] Gratiot, however, shows how this goal was eclipsed by the other motivations behind the renewal project which Mollenkopf describes. But from the standpoint of understanding state policy formation, it is important not to ignore the housing goals of renewal altogether. Contrary to what one Marxist writer has suggested,[56] Gratiot was not conceived by the city administration as an effort to simply remove poor people and promote "a land grab to provide big business with subsidized property on which to build". There was no pent-up private sector demand for the Gratiot site as a location for commercial or industrial activity, even if the city had been considering the site for this purpose in the first place (which it was not). The use being considered by the city was residential. Overly simplistic and struc-

turalist Marxist theorizing it seems, can wrongly characterize the environment of planners, erroneously "reading off" deterministic outcomes to the class pressures and constraints shaping planning intervention. The history of the Gratiot project indicates that within such a context planners were still not without influence or discretion concerning the eventual resolution. The brief for the Gratiot redevelopment plan was the responsibility of the City Plan Commission and its staff (the nine Commission members appointed by the Mayor), the Commission at that time being under the chairmanship of Willis Hall, Secretary of the Greater Detroit Board of Commerce and a strong proponent of measures to protect the tax base of the city. The following comment has been made by Mowitz and Wright on the role of professional planners on the Commission staff:

> "They recognized the goal of rehousing former residents, but they wanted to accomplish this in a way which would maintain 'good planning' standards. These standards seem to defy explicit articulation, but they include population-density criteria as well as engineering and aesthetic considerations. The commission itself, which included by law an architect, civil engineer, structural engineer, real estate dealer, builder, attorney and physician, did not share all of the professional planners' values, but they tended to defend them."(57)

Two attempts to market the mixed development proposal (in 1952 and 1953) produced nothing which satisfied planning standards, and on the first bid there was actually no developer response at all.(58) Problems involved skepticism by builders over the chances of selling or renting to blacks and whites in the same area, and a certain amount of "idealism" by professional planners and architects with the Plan Commission in the face of the developers' need to cut corners and scale down construction costs to potential rents. In what can be seen as a precursor to many subsequent public-private development organisations, Mayor Cobo in 1954 appointed a Citizens Redevelopment Committee (to become a non-profit Redevelopment Corporation the following year) which took on the responsibility for planning and marketing the Gratiot site. Walter Reuther of the UAW, Walter Gehrke, Chairman of First Federal Savings and Loan, and Foster K. Winter, vice president of the J.L. Hudson Comapny, were members.(59) Contributions

MAP 19



PREDOMINANT FUTURE USE :

- COMMERCIAL/CIVIC
- INDUSTRIAL
- RESIDENTIAL
- WAYNE STATE UNIV. & CULTURAL CENTRE
- MEDICAL CENTRE
- 1958 EXISTING FREEWAYS
- PROPOSED FREEWAYS

SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM:
PARKINS, MAURICE, FRANK; "NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION - A PILOT STUDY" DETROIT CITY PLAN COMMISSION 1958 FIG.5 P.14

CONOT, ROBERT "AMERICAN ODYSSEY", W. MORROW AND CO. N.Y. 1974 MAP P.399

DETROIT URBAN RENEWAL AREAS

were received from a wide spectrum of regional corporations. Reuther had sent a telegram to the Mayor urging formation of such a corporation. The following is an excerpt:

> "It is economically stupid and morally wrong for an industrial community with the wealth, the power and the know-how of Detroit to tolerate the social cess-pools of our slums, which breed crime and disease."(60)

In the projected physical reconstitution of the metropolis, it seems, the existence of slums was an embarrassment to important sensitivites in those, the greatest benefactors of the "pact" between big Capital and Labour, ie. there was even pressure to eradicate slums for reasons other than protecting central business district property values or even protecting the general city tax base. In the event, the corporation, after attempting to market a plan for Gratiot as an integrated community with a range of income levels, was forced to accept a proposal from a developer that was geared towards those of upper-middle income. The majority of Gratiot residents were dispersed and ended up "living under slum conditions equal to, if not worse than, those they left".(61) The goals of containment (through improved private sector housing) and protection of the CBD proved to be incompatible.

(2) Commercial, Institutional, and "Civic" Renewal - the Central Business District: The Gratiot urban renewal project provides a useful bridge to the other major thrust of the city's renewal efforts during this period, which centred on bolstering those functions in which a comparative advantage was perceived over the growing suburbs. Linked to expressions of civic pride, embodying a notion of the "symbolic" importance of the city (factors too easily ignored in an overly deterministic analysis), this involved a concentration on enhancing the status of the central business district but stretching out also to include the proximinous educational, cultural and medical centre, clustered around what is now Wayne State University. Freeways to serve these areas were to come right into the heart of the city and make the maximum use of centrality (Map 19).

One can trace the principles of the scheme back to the City Master Plan of the immediate postwar period. Ladislas Segoe, nationally known planning consultant, was given the task of advising the Plan

Commission staff and aiding in the plan preparation.[62] Here he drew on his former work in Cincinnati in proposing a structural form for Detroit along the same lines.[63] In Cincinnati, as Segoe explained in 1947,[64] the plan was based on a "complete diagnosis of existing conditions, needs and future requirements of the whole metropolitan area and of each part, and the location of necessary facilities - for housing, shopping, industry, motorways, schools, recreation areas etc. - which were found to be most appropriate...". Segoe "viewed the fundamental problem as that of refashioning a structural form 'essentially of the last century' to fit the highly mechanised mode of living of the twentieth century ...".[65]

In the fifties, the renewal agenda began to take shape. A major programme of downtown public investment going back to the 1948 Master Plan came to fruition. Mayor Cobo's Civic Center Complex on the riverfront, at a cost of over $100 million, "was designed to stimulate private investment in the deteriorating downtown area and bring about a revitalisation of the heart of Detroit".[66] This complex included a new City-County Building and a massive Exhibition Hall and Convention Arena (Cobo Hall and Arena). Approximately $6 million of the total $54 million cost of the Hall and Arena was contributed by business and industrialists.[67] An additional $2.5 million was provided by the Ford family for construction of the Henry and Edsel Ford Auditorium - home for the Detroit Symphony Orchestra.[68] Willis Hall, Secretary of the Greater Detroit Board of Commerce, headed up a Civic Center Development Committee composed of "influential citizens" to help promote the Civic Center projects.[69] The following excerpt from a City Plan Commission report, concerning a CBD renewal site, gives an indication of the general thinking by the City on the "revamping" of the CBD:[70]

> "A high percentage of single persons ... and the resulting designation of "Skid Row" are one indication of the character of the Central Business District No.1 site. Studies showing the many transients in the area, low economic level, and low value of residential property have led to the decision that redevelopment is necessary. The location is ideal for general business use and will be further enhanced by expressway and civic center construction now under way."

Other urban renewal funds were spent in bolstering the "University City"/Cultural Centre area including the provision of cheap land for expansion.(71) A Medical Centre plan was designed to renovate an area in which many of the region's hospitals were located in order to stem the flight of hospitals to the suburbs.(72)

Business - and Big Business - in particular was certainly involved in the commercial/civic aspects of the renewal agenda. But it is important to put the nature of the involvement in perspective. The Civic Center Development Committee we have mentioned. Involvement was also through a number of other organisations. In the mid-fifties, Mayor Cobo had formed a Detroit Tomorrow Committee charged with "responsibility for saving the core city".(73) It was composed of representatives from business and organised labour and "the standard roster of distinguished citizens",(74) but it has been criticised for being too large to be effective and of being composed of "mere representatives of interests" rather than forming a body of decision makers geared for action.(75)

Around this time also, Walker Cisler, Chairman of Detroit Edison (a major regional utility company), pulled together a Mayor's Committee for Economic Growth. This included in its ranks Walter Reuther, Henry Ford II, and Joseph L. Hudson Jr. of the major Hudson's retailing company. (The title is perhaps slightly ironic, given that at this time the corporations of the latter two individuals were vigorously expanding their investments in the suburbs.) A judgement on this organisation by one close to the events is that it was "more ceremonial than substantial".(76)

In addition, under the Miriani administration a Committee on Commercial and Industrial Development was formed by Mayor and Council which pulled in business sector talent for the job of promoting the city - but generally from the lower corporate ranks.(77)

The picture in Detroit is not one of joint vigorous and united leadership by regional capital around a renewal strategy focusing on the CBD. CBD interests were certainly involved in the formation of the "Detroit Plan" which focused on the Gratiot project as has been seen. There was

corporate financial support for "civic" projects. The President of the Burroughs Corporation, Ray Eppert, with headquarters nearby, took a major interest in the medical/educational and cultural centre projects.(78) But on the whole, the lead in the "downtown agenda" was taken by the public sector concerned with the erosion of economic functions (jobs for city residents), tax base loss and a concern for civic image. The latter in particular was endorsed by the corporate sector. But while selective elements of regional capital (primarily banks and utilities) had some financial and economic stake in the CBD and an interest in protecting this, regional capital was not united behind a vigorous programme, carrying the city administration behind it, to promote the Detroit downtown through urban renewal. The lead, in general, was with the public sector, trying to drag private investment behind it. Despite the fact that with the Civic Centre complex and associated developments Mayor Cobo succeeded in "bonding the city to the limits of its capacity",(79) the investment response from the private sector was relatively weak and did not live up to city expectations. The $100 million of Civic Center public capital expenditure in the CBD was paralleled up to 1962 by $100 million worth of private expenditure on new banking, office, and utility company buildings, not forgetting a new bus station.(80) This is a mere 1:1 ratio. It included the Michigan Consolidated Gas Building completed in 1962. The utility companies, with major fixed investments in the city of Detroit, can be seen as having a particular interest in the viability of the city. As Vernon(81) pointed out, writing of the time, financial institutions gravitated towards central locations because of the importance of face to face contact in business negotiations. The National Bank of Detroit (traditionally handling G.M. business) did complete a new building in the CBD for its own use in 1959. A new Detroit Bank and Trust building (traditionally Chrysler's bank) was opened in the CBD in 1962 along with a new home for the First Federal Savings and Loan.(82) In the words of the present property manager of the latter bank:

> "Bankers and major law firms like to have their fingers on the pulse. They like to be close to the deal making and to rub shoulders in downtown restaurants and the private clubs."(83)

But this notwithstanding, the new structures which arose in Detroit at

PHOTOGRAPH NO.1

The HEART OF THE DETROIT CBD looking NW from the "REN CEN". The predominantly 1920's look of the built form is striking.

PHOTOGRAPH NO.2

Looking NNW from the REN CEN with the old City Hall in the foreground. Note the vacant lots and flatness of the topography.

this time (with the possible exception of the First Federal Building) were not the towering symbols of corporate hegemony found in other American cities. They exude the atmosphere of functional operations centres. The dominant building on the Detroit skyline at this time - the Penobscot Building - while occupied by the City National Bank , was (and continues to be) owned by an outside investor(84) - not a sign of symbolic committment by regional capital to the Detroit CBD.

But more importantly, there was no private building surge in Detroit. No speculative offices were constructed in the city at this time. Apart from the fact that the office building surge did not take place in the region as a whole till the sixties, two other factors are important in understanding this. Chicago is the financial centre of the mid-west, not Detroit, and regional corporate branch offices have tended to go there. Secondly, Vernon pointed out the insensitivity of many offices to the cost of space, embodying as they do the "prestige center of the enterprize". But the Detroit CBD was not a prestige commercial location. Detroit, a blue collar factory town, did not have a Riverfront Drive to match Chicago's Lake Shore Drive. Henry Ford completed his prestige World Headquarters in 1956 in Dearborn. And the strength of the CBD was not helped by the fact that the G.M. and Chrysler World Headquarters were built in the 1920's in the New Centre area two miles north of downtown and in Highland Park, respectively.

(3) Industrial Renewal Agenda: The main impetus for a programme of industrial renewal in the city of Detroit likewise seems to have come from the City administration, concerned especially with the maintenance of the tax base to finance services and with the preservation of jobs for city residents. (But the major economic development emphasis on jobs, even at the expense of tax base revenue through concessions, was to come later in the seventies, when the city became increasingly a repository for the unemployed.) The City was well aware of the fact that "large scale industry was interested in large sites composed of hundreds of acres which could only be found outside the city limits".(85) It decided to participate, at least in part, in this competition anyway. The major industrial renewal projects are shown on Map 19. One such project was centred on the

Corktown neighbourhood just west of the CBD. Here, for example, despite protestations from residents that it was not a slum, it was sacrificed, even through it was by no means the worst housing area in the city. Mayor Cobo had argued that the land was needed by wholesalers who would be forced to move to accommodate the Civic Centre project.(86) But certainly Corktown was not part of a regional Capital programme for the reorganisation of urban space in the core, and there were no commercial interests straining at the leash to develop the site.

(e) The Regionalist Dimension

Given development trends within the metropolis over this period, transportation policy demanded consideration at a regional scale. Yet given the emerging fragmented governmental structure of the region, this was something fraught with potential for conflict. This was to plague regional transportation planning especially in later years, when transportation policy became wrapped up with regional governmental issues generally, but it has its roots in this period. Plans, and those responsible for them, were sensitive to the latent danger. For example, from the City of Detroit, Master Plan Report, 1946:(87)

> "It is perfectly obvious that, in many instances, expressways and thoroughfares originating in Detroit will have to cross Highland Park, Hamtramck, and Dearborn, all independent municipalities. The co-operation of responsible officials is being sought to ensure continuity of the routes across these three cities."

The State Highway Commissioner in presenting his 10-year expressway plan for the Detroit region in 1957:(88)

> "The greatest single danger to the success of this program, as I see it, will be internal squabbles within communities themselves about legislation, or conflicts between neighbouring communities which are unable to agree on route selection."

"Regional Highways", Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission, 1958:(89)

"Co-ordinated, long-range planning is essential if the Detroit region is to avoid the uneconomic, piecemeal growth of the past. Such planning is particularly necessary in developing a future highway network. With the rapid outward spread and decentralized pattern of industrial and residential growth, major traffic desires and highway needs are not limited by municipal boundaries but must be dealt with on a broader, region-wide scale."

In tracing the history of regional approaches to governmental problems in Detroit, one notes the strong involvement from the beginning of major regional captialist interests. One can single out June 25, 1918 as an important date in the early beginnings of "regionalism", when the voters of the city of Detroit adopted a new charter, among other things abolishing the parochialism of the ward system and instituting "at large" city elections. The reform movement which led to this culmination had been spearheaded by the Detroit Citizens League, founded in 1912 by the automobile pioneer Henry M. Leland.(90)

The Detroit Board of Commerce as early as 1924 began pushing the concept of co-operative planning amongst the governmental jurisdictions in the emerging Detroit region, but the Board was, in the words of Ledyard Blakeman,(91) Executive Director of the postwar Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission, "the voice crying in the wilderness". The Board succeeded in getting a law passed by the State legislature in 1929, permitting two or more local governments to join together to form a Regional Planning Commission. However, in Blakeman's opinion:(92)

"Nothing came of this because over the years the communities who most needed to get together had built up local animosities that prevented their seeing the light."

This was a sign of things to come.

One mode of regional governmental organisation, dating from the 1930's was to set a precedent for postwar organisational forms - namely the creation in the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority (1939) of a special purpose regional authority with the mission of providing for regional recreation needs. A product of state enabling legislation

and local referendum, this organisation was headed by a board composed in the main of appointees of the participating counties (Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Washtenaw, and Livingstone), and also, through the specific nature of the delegated powers, was doubly cautious in the preservation of local governmental authority.(93) Other special purpose authorities were formed along similar lines in the postwar period, including, for example the People's Community Hospital Authority and the S.E. Oakland County Rubbish and Garbage Authority.(94) In addition, voluntary co-operative contractual agreements between local jurisdictions were popular (eg. concerning fire services).(95) But it was more than special purpose authorities and agreements that took their cue from the Huron-Clinton Authority. The general purpose regional governmental organisations that emerged were also structured such as to protect local autonomy by way of limited powers and the fore-closure of the option of region-wide elections. The two relevant organisations were:

(1) The Detroit Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission;

(2) The Supervisors Inter-County Committee.

I will consider them in turn.

In 1945, the Detroit Board of Commerce took a leading role in advocating passage of State legislation enabling the designation of areas in which there could be regional planning (Public Act 281 of 1945).(96) An organising committee was subsequently set up, headed by Ed Gushee of Detroit Edison, "including representatives of the various sections of the region plus labour, management, retail trade and other economic and social groups". With the injection of funds from State government and from a solicitation of Detroit area businesses, the DMARPC began operation in 1947. It was made up of 46 members, drawn, according to the rules established by the Gushee committee, from public officials (23) and from "civic, economic and social fields". It was no threat to any established interest. It has been described as:(97)

> "... something of a cross between an official agency and a citizen's council ... it appointed technical committees of experts, some from official agencies, others from private businesses and educational institutions, to study problems of land use, transportation, water supply, drainage, pollution, and

community services. The staff conducted research on the population, economy, and physical development of the region as a basis for the preparation of a long-term plan. But this commission laboured under two serious handicaps: it depended entirely upon the voluntary contributions of local governments and private corporations to finance its operations, and like other metropolitan planning agencies, public as well as private, it could rely only on voluntary co-operation to carry out its plans."

Another study in 1960 endorsed this view:(98)

"... the commission lacks real power. Its only weapon on such matters as water priorities, zoning, and so forth, is its informal network of contact with officials in city and county agencies ...

Some observers feel that Regional Plan's (abbr. for DMARPC - my addition) influence is being challenged by the formation of county and even township plan commissions, jealous of their jurisdictions and prerogatives."

The same writer refers to the frustrating situation faced by planners on the RPC staff:(99)

"... the planners over-intellectual, impatient refusal to face political realities ... They have the ideas but they rely on the hard sell much too much. You can't sell something to independent localities and their officials unless these people play a part. Technical brilliance is not enough."

As opposed to "planning" as the raison d'etre of the RPC, the Supervisors Inter-County Committee (SICC) was conceived as an "action" organisation.(100) The instigators here were Ledyard Blakeman, Executive Director of the RPC and Edward Connor, a Detroit Councilman and Chairman of the Wayne County Board of Supervisors - both in positions requiring them to struggle with regional level problems. Discussions between Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Monroe and Washtenaw counties led to the constitution of the SICC in 1954 (St. Clair joined in 1955 and legal status was given by the State in 1957). Seven members from each county made up the committee itself which was

serviced by a small staff. The idea was that the SICC would make recommendations to each individual County Board of Supervisors which would implement their segments of SICC plans. The RPC was conceived as the planning arm of the organisation. Sub-committees were appointed on various topics - sewage and waste disposal, water, recreation. The roads sub-committee was in fact constituted as the S.E. Michigan Inter-County Highway Commission made up of representatives of the RPC, County Road Commissions, the County Boards of Supervisors, and the State Highway Department. Deliberations here led to the "Regional Highways" plan in 1958 (cf. p. 97f). But while there was reasonable agreement on the need for a region-wide freeway agenda (with the State Highway Department there to prod this along), the relative weakness of the SICC in general was a pointer to future problems in gaining consensus on regional transportation policy. The following assessment of the SICC was made in 1960:(101)

> "... quite frankly the SICC avoids issues which are too controversial and which might endanger the carefully established working relationships in the six-county area. No effort, for example, has been made to reduce the present multitude of police departments. The certain opposition of the Sheriffs Association, local police departments, and suburbanites who want their own police department, would obviously be too strong ...
>
> All observers concede its accomplishments, but they argue that for an action organisation, its major achievements seem remarkably concentrated in studies, sponsoring legislation, improving relations within the region, and making recommendations. As one observer noted, there have been endless studies about an airport to the north-east of Detroit, but the whole area may well be built up before anything is done. Another critic stressed that the region lacks any institutional operating mechanism to solve most of its problems. There is no certainty that any county will do its share on a project. It is possible that it will do nothing at all or, taking advantage of its knowledge of the overall plan for regional development, will act to further its own interests at the expense of others."

One can see the friction, in other words, between the need for reasonably efficient management and planning of the emergent metropolis and the local class based interests of the constituent local governments.

While the issue was one of efficiency, more so than stability (which emerged in the sixties), and some sort of muddling through seemed possible, it seems that business interests were content to more or less accept the fragmented local government framework while nudging it in the direction of regionalist approaches (approaches made necessary on pragmatic grounds anyway). A brochure of the Area Development Division of the Detroit Edison Company said in the late fifties of the SICC:(102)

> "... there is no desire to superimpose another governmental layer on top of existing governments. Rather, the purpose and the unique value of the Supervisors Inter-County Committee is to fully utilize all the inherent strength of existing tools and agencies of government - to devise a means for putting them to work to their fullest capability." (emphasis original)

In 1958, however, with the formation of the S.E. Michigan Metropolitan Community Research Corporation, the groundwork was laid for a more interventionist approach by regional Capital in the sixties. SEMMCRC (mercifully renamed Metropolitan Fund Inc.) must be seen as a clear expression of the interest of regional Capital in regional planning and organisation. It was originally a product of a $900,000 grant from the Ford Foundation but broadened its financial support to include many other regional businesses. Funded primarily by business, it was governed by a board drawn from business, labour, government and university. Its staff in the beginning undertook research dealing with specific problems of the region, requiring co-operation among local governments. This role was subsequently to broaden out considerably.(103)

Given that the basis was being laid in these years for major future problems in regional organisation (including transportation), it seems appropriate to consider the reasons for the absence of federal and state intervention with respect to the "regionalist" issue in this

period. The overriding reason, of course, was that at this stage regional fragmentation was not causing major problems. The State Highway Department did not have much trouble in mobilising regional support behind a Detroit area-wide highway agenda. Polarisation between Detroit and the suburbs was to come later. At the federal level, concern with metropolitan development had been apparent in the Kestenbaum report to the President in 1955. This had advocated "the need for metropolitan-wide planning as a basis for future development" and challenged government and academia to provide "political invention" which might fill the void.(104) But, in general, the postwar period to 1965, Ghere has labelled as the "voluntary" period for regionalism, during which the federal role was limited.(105) Further reasons for the absence of state intervention (which is of particular significance given the constitutional subordination of local government to State government) would have to be sought in a number of factors. One of these is the weakness of the State party system where a strong separation of executive and legislative powers at state level militates against the imposition of party discipline, resulting in the replication of strong local interests in the State legislature. Rural dominance in the State legislature prior to reapportionment in the sixties undoubtedly contributed to a neglect of urban issues, not to mention the absence of focus which resulted from fragmentation within the executive branch of Michigan State government itself before constitutional revision in the sixties. These are matters to which I shall return later in considering the more interventionist state role in regionalist issues in the sixties and the limitations within which it occurred.

(f) Public Transportation Issues

Public transportation was to move towards the centre of the policy stage in the sixties and to move full centre in the seventies. In this period it was very much eclipsed, however, by the highway agenda linked as it was to the broader dynamic of suburbanisation. It will be considered here in relation to: (a) Mass Transit; (b) Rapid Transit.

By way of background it is worth stating that between 1947 and 1970, while the federal government spent $58 billion on highways, it spent merely 795 million dollars on urban mass transit - and most of this was in the sixties.(106)

Various private public transportation companies had merged in 1901 to form the Detroit United Railways Company. This monopoly proceeded to operate electric trolleys and railway cars, serving the city of Detroit itself and the surrounding tri-county area.(107) During the days of the old "inter-urban" system, it has been suggested that the concept of the city of Detroit as the centre of a three-county metropolitan region was in fact born.

> "Just as electrification and extension of the old horsecar lines made it possible for Detroiters who worked downtown to make their homes in outlying subdivisions, the interurbans made it possible to expand this trend to bedroom suburbs beyond the city limits."(108)

Following a long, drawn-out debate over municipalisation, the city portion of DUR (renamed Detroit Street Railways) was brought under the public ownership of the city of Detroit in 1922. The issue was one of the deleterious effects of monopoly control - poor service and high fares- voiced by passengers and major business interests alike. It had split major Detroit business interests - many being opposed to public ownership in principle.(109) There is a slight touch of irony in the support given to the municipalisation by Henry Ford, given that by the mid-twenties his Model T was having its own deleterious effects on public transport across the country. The legacy, however, was a city-run public transportation service.

Moving to the postwar period, the last Detroit streetcar was replaced by a bus on April 7, 1956.(110) The DSR had in fact long since staked its future on a bus system. In reply to rapid transit advocates, the DSR in August 1945 had submitted a report to the mayor and council, entitled: "DSR Modernization Program". It stated:(111)

> "The ultimate form of rapid transit will be by modern motor buses operating over the express highway network"(relating to the plan of expressways endorsed by the City Plan Commission the previous

year).

Streetcar lines were paved over in the city and have now virtually disappeared. The DSR (headed by a Commission appointed by the Mayor) fell strongly in behind the highway agenda, and by 1960 had built up a fleet of over 1,000 buses, providing the bulk of public transit service in the region. However, a strong gap was opening up between the city and the auto-dependent suburbs, which was to take on major significance in the sixties. The DSR operated in Detroit, but only in a few of the neighbouring jurisdictions. A number of private bus companies did operate in the suburbs and transported commuters to and from specified major points in the city, but the level of service was low.(112) Moreover, the overall importance of public transportation in fulfilling the region's needs was declining rapidly. In 1953 only 17% of all daily trips within the study area of the Detroit Metropolitan Area Traffic Study were made by means of mass transit.(113) In 1944 over 69% of passengers entering the downtown business district were carried by mass transit. Just twelve years later this percentage had declined to less than 40%. Correspondingly, during the same period, the percentage of passengers carried by private autos and taxicabs rose from just under 34% to over 60%.(114) Given the city's commitment to freeways and the dynamic of suburbanisation generally, these statistics hold no surprises.

What is perhaps a little surprising is that in the midst of the strength of the freeway agenda the city of Detroit did in fact have a Rapid Transit Commission (of between four and six members appointed by the Mayor and a director chosen by the Commission) which argued strongly for a rapid transit system for the city. One must go back somewhat in time to pick up the background to this. The first major consideration of rapid transit in Detroit actually dates back to 1914, when a proposal for subway construction on three principal routes (Woodward, Michigan, and Gratiot Avenues) was considered by the Detroit Council.(115) The Rapid Transit Commission was established with charter functions approved by Detroit voters in the early twenties.(116) While this indicates that rapid transit was being seriously considered, not much happened. The most concrete result was

the allocation of a central space in the "superhighways" which were constructed at this time for future rapid transit lines.[117]

Rapid transit in Detroit in the pre World War II period moved furthest towards actualisation in the 1930's.[118] The inferences which can be made concerning what happened are instructive in understanding the special circumstances pertaining to rapid transit as a policy issue in the postwar period. Following the release of funds for municipal projects by the federal Public Works Administration, the Detroit Rapid Transit Commission, with city administration approval, presented to the Detroit electorate in November 1933 a proposal for two rapid transit subway/surface routes in the city - a Woodward Ave and an East-West Crosstown link. Thirty percent of the cost was to be borne by outright federal grant, the remainder to be loaned by the federal government and repaid over a thirty year period from transit revenue. The construction and operational costs of the system were not, therefore, to be borne by the city taxpayers. The electorate approved the scheme by a better than 2/3 majority. However, this is as far as the scheme progressed. The State of Michigan Advisory Board to the PWA disapproved the subsequent application disputing its technical sufficiency regarding cost and revenue estimates. This refusal could stand further investigation. The question of taxpayers' liability for the loan in the event of a shortfall in transit revenue would have been an obvious consideration, but given the purpose of the PWA perhaps not an overriding one. The decision would have to be considered against other public works applications in Michigan which were approved. It is the opinion of a later director of the Rapid Transit Commission, however, that the project was "simply killed by the auto companies in Washington".[119] Given the purpose of the PWA (job creation) and the strong support for the project in Detroit, this view seems plausible. The coolness, if not overt opposition, of the Detroit auto companies to rapid transit in Detroit is in fact, as we shall see, supported by other evidence.

In 1953, Mayor Cobo revived the Rapid Transit Commission and made new appointments. In the opinion of the new director[120] the Mayor did seriously want to keep the option of rapid transit open for the city and had in mind a balance between the auto and mass transit - but he

did not have strong views on the matter of rapid transit and allowed the Commission to take the lead. It was the Commissioners who were outspoken on the issue. This was the time of the preparation of the Carroll transportation study. Mayor Cobo did not insist on an integration of rapid transit planning and highway planning, and in fact, there was none. The balance in terms of momentum and of resources for planning was unquestionably in favour of highways. The Commission produced a report and rapid transit plan in 1958, based on a monorail system which in sheer scale (Map 20) represented an alternative and challenge to highways in the city of Detroit rather than an attempt at balance.(121) In the late fifties it had the air of a voice crying in the wilderness. As the director recognised, by this time when a spread-out pattern of settlement was strongly establishing itself, it was more difficult to argue for rapid transit, which requires (and promotes) a more compact pattern and/or a strong feeder-line bus service to transit stations. And by this time, the Interstate Highway Act had increased the momentum for freeways further. By this time, too, Cobo had been succeeded as Mayor by Miriani, who was "downright cool" on the idea of rapid transit, putting his faith, as Cobo had come to do, in "Cobo's Canyons". (122)

The 1958 rapid transit report, however, was so prophetic in its forecast as to the consequences for the city without some form of rapid transit in place, that it bears some further reflection. To wit:(123)

> "The trend to private vehicles and away from mass transportation, in view of the great distance to be covered and the great need for speed, is bound to continue and result in depreciating effects in the downtown area nad other shopping centres along major streets. The need for rapid transit is incontrovertible here...
>
> Decentralisation of industry and commerce can be maintained at an acceptable economic and planning level by rapid transit. Otherwise, the entire property tax base of the city of Detroit will be vitally affected with the tax loss suffered in the downtown or other commercial areas to be spread among the remainder of the taxpayers. Rapid transit will, of course, increase property

1958 RECOMMENDED RAPID TRANSIT PLAN
DETROIT METROPOLITAN AREA

values along its route in addition to the central district. Rapid transit will also serve to help develop the metropolitan area along certain generally desired patterns of land use. The alternatives to rapid transit appear as a greater delcine in business and tax values within the city of Detroit, and the possible use of either an increased property tax levy or an income or payroll tax on residents or workers within its boundaries in the future. However, the factors described above seem sufficiently compelling to impress one with the real need that exists for rapid transit at present in the Detroit Metropolitan Area. To delay unduly may result in irreparable loss..."

Without a doubt, the preservation and stimulation of important property values for the sake of the entire community and the need for rapid transit become most vividly apparent in an examination of the downtown business district."

In view of such a strong warning, at the risk of repetition, it seems appropriate to ask again why the city administration during this time did not take more heed. There were, it seems two major competing (if unequal) views on the effects of freeways on the central city and CBD in particular. The first, represented by the views of the Detroit RTC (or at least the director as author of the report) just expressed, harkened to the view of Lewis Mumford (cf. p. 96). The second was bound up with the general attractiveness and dynamic of the freeway agenda as has been discussed as the basis for regional development. In this model the continued viability of the CBD necessitated service by the freeways. But there was an element of faith involved, certainly in the case of Detroit. Urban renewal in Detroit was based on a large dose of "faith". A report of the Michigan State Highway Department as early as 1941, for example, in arguing for "a comprehensive plan of motorways for Detroit", asked:(124)

"Will for instance, the provision of high speed, high volume motorways encourage and further the outward migration of population and values to fringe areas?"

The answer was uncertain:(125)

"The answer to that question is that the provision of such

arteries in themselves will not prevent such migration any more than the lack of them has prevented it in the past. The fact remains that if people are to reside within the city in sufficient numbers to support its institutions and services the intra-city areas must be made sufficiently convenient and attractive to induce them to stay there."

One should not, however, overlook the fact that, while at the national level there was in the fifties, as Mollenkopf points out, agreement by major corporate and municipal interests on the need for the Interstate Highway programme and urban renwal as the two basic instruments for transforming urban space, this came on top of major rapid transit systems already in place in many cities or completed in the fifties. There was not a universal reliance on freeways to service CBDs alone. The systems in Manhattan and Brooklyn, Philadelphia and Chicago had gone in around the turn of the century. Chicago completed a major additon in 1951 and Cleveland completed a 13 mile extension of its rapid transit system in 1955.(126)

The failure of rapid transit to establish itself in Detroit in the fifties, even in the face of dire warning, can be attributed, it is suggested, in particular to two factors:

(1) The relative weakness, as I have already noted, of the Detroit CBD (cf. pp. 109f; Cleveland as one may also note, has always sprouted major corporate headquarters - most notably Standard Oil - in its downtown business district.) This undoubtedly made the case for rapid transit less pressing, and made the argument that freeways were the priority and would in fact, combined with urban renewal, be enough to bolster the CBD without rapid transit more convincing to Detroit politicians.

(2) Division amongst CBD interests and regional capital on the issue. This is slightly more speculative. The Central Business District Association in Detroit had actually been formed in 1922 with one of its major aims being to lobby for a Detroit subway.(127) In the fifties, important downtown interests were represented on the RTC (Michigan Bell, Bank of the Commonwealth, E.J. Harris - owner of the Guardian and Book buildings).(128) But in the opinion of the RTC

director,[129] G.M. and Chrysler were opposed to rapid transit in Detroit. (The Ford Motor Company, which did have a representative on the RTC, was "sitting on the fence and hedgingits bets", given that at this time it was experimenting itself with rapid transit development.) The relationship between these corporations and their respective banks in the CBD (Manufacturers and Detroit Bank and Trust) also comes into play. The Detroit RTC did submit in 1961 a proposal to the newly created federal Area Redevelopment Administration (later Economic Development Administration) for a Woodward Avenue Rapid Transit line. In the opinion of the RTC Director, major reasons for the proposal's rejection were not only the lukewarm support of Mayor Miriani, but actual lobbying against by G.M. and Chrysler in Washington. Such behind the scenes maneuvering is difficult to trace, but the idea of opposition from the major auto companies to a subway as a mode of transportation in the Motor City is intuitively very plausible, given the possible symoblic impact on the demand for automobiles. Certainly as we shall see, the Big Three have never publicly come out in favour of rapid transit in Detroit. It is certain in any case that city of Detroit politicians at this time, before the economic demise of the city really set it, and when the prosperity of the region was so obviously tied to the auto industry (brought home painfully in the 1958 recession), would have a natural bias in favour of endorsing Detroit's own product.

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CHAPTER 4

TRANSPORTATION POLICY FORMATION IN DETROIT 1961-73

(a) Introduction

(b) The Riots of 1967

(c) Federal and State Context

(d) Economic, Demographic and Spatial Change

(e) The Freeway Agenda and Rapid Transit

(f) Public Transportation and the Establishment of SEMTA

(g) The Wider Regionalist Dynamic

(h) "Compensatory" Policies and the City of Detroit's Economic Development Agenda

(a) Introduction

In 1961 Jerome Cavanagh with 85% of the black vote defeated the incumbent Mayor of Detroit, Louis Miriani, who enjoyed the strong support of both business and labour groups.(1) Cavanagh had campaigned on the issue of the decline of the city of Detroit's fortunes in relation to the growing suburbs (including an expression of interest in rapid transit for the city)(2) and had tapped into "the discontent generated by the backwater of the urban economy".(3) In the 1969 mayoral election in a racially charged atmosphere, Roman Gribb won an extremely narrow victory over his black opponent drawing on the last of the white majority within the city.(4) And in January 1974, Coleman Young, almost inevitably, took office as Detroit's first black Mayor. It is thus particularly in relation to the dynamics of the move to black control that one must consider the transportation planning and policy framework from the early sixties to early seventies.

(b) The Riots of 1967

Standing out in the landscape of this period are the riots in Detroit in the summer of 1967. Since the potential for discord, which was actualised in extreme form in these events, was to influence subsequent transportation and related policy in the region rather dramatically and had even influenced it prior to the eruption itself, I will, therefore, pause for a moment to consider these events. The details have been chronicled elsewhere.(5) The immediate legacy in what the New York Times described as "the most costly Negro riot in American history"(6) included 41 dead, 347 injured, 3800 arrested and 5000 homeless. Damage estimates settled around the $45 million mark. The 1967 conflagration could not be written off as an aberatory blip caused by the tensions inherent in the resource scarce (particularly as regards housing) conditions of war time Detroit. In any case the black population in the city had more than quadrupled since its 150,000 mark in 1943 and represented approximately 40% of the city total as opposed to under 10% in 1943.(7) In 1951 an urban historian wrote of Detroit that "in no other urban community does the fact that he is a negro so little determine for him his residence, occupation,

recreation or educational opportunity".[8] Events in 1967 put paid to any such remaining illusions. Mollenkopf[9] has linked the wave of urban riots in America between 1964 and 1968 very strongly to the disruption caused by urban renewal projects and more generally the coalition of forces which supported the physical restructuring of urban space. While this was certainly an aggravating factor (the riots in Detroit started in the Twelfth Street area, part of the Wayne State University urban renewal project),[10] there is a danger in conceiving the dynamic of change too narrowly. The causes of the urban revolts were wide and deep. In summarising them the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders said afterwards:[11]

> "Race prejudice has shaped our history decisively; it now threatens to affect our future. White racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II. Among the ingredients of this mixture are:
>
> 1. Pervasive discrimination and segregation in employment, education and housing, which have resulted in the continuing exclusion of great numbers of Negroes from the benefits of economic progress.
>
> 2. Black in-migration and white exodus, which have produced the massive and growing concentrations of improverished Negroes in our major cities, creating a growing crisis of deteriorating facilities and services and unmet human needs.
>
> 3. The black ghettoes where segregation and poverty converge on the young to destroy opportunity and enforce failure. Crime, drug addiction, dependency on welfare, and bitterness and resentment against society in general and white society in particular are the result.
>
> At the same time, most whites and some Negroes outside the ghetto have prospered to a degree unparalleled in the history of civilisation. Through television and other media, this affluence has been flaunted before the eyes of the Negro poor and the jobless ghetto youth."

The Report mentions other "catalytic" factors including the "great judicial and legislative victories of the Civil Rights Movement"[12] (on July 23, 1963, a massive civil rights march led by Rev. Martin

Luther King took place in Detroit) and the police which had "come to symbolize white power, white racism and white repression" [13] (the Detroit revolt was sparked off by a police raid on an inner city "blind pig" illegal bar).

(c) Federal and State Context

I will return to the impact of the riots and the dynamic of transportation policy and its wider context shortly. Given the marked increase, however, of both federal and Michigan State government intervention into issues of metropolitan development and social policy which again reverberated in important ways on the dynamic of transportation policy in Detroit, it seems appropriate to make some general comments here at the start. Taking the federal role first, to quote from a report of the influential Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR):[14]

> "The period since about 1960 has been an era of dramatic, even drastic change in American federalism. The key fact, in a host of fields, has been the emergence of the national government as an important - sometimes even the senior partner in determining domestic policies, providing funds, or setting administrative standards".

Castells,[15] in attempting to ascertain the fundamental political impulse behind this development, sees the most enlightened fraction of the establishment coming together in the sixties to support a new reformist strategy which would "help to preserve the most precious advantage of U.S. capital: the stability of the exploitative social order".

> "... in the late fifties the most enlightened sector of the ruling class realised that the model of development required social reforms and that they had the political strength to carry their reforms out without any trouble. The purpose: to enlarge their social base, to increase their political and ideological legitimization, to modernize the economy by rectifying mechanisms of overexploitation that were only required by backward sectors of capital.... Yet the whole rationality of this strategy did

not convince a significant proportion of the American rulers, the implementation of their policies was not a structural necessity but the result of a political struggle (the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy election) that gave a narrow victory to a man who was at the same time the candidate of the Establishment and the hope of the over-exploited against short-sighted "middle America".(16)

It was an outlook and vision that can be seen as conducive to more widespread criticism of the model of metropolitan development, even before the eruption of urban violence which testified to the validity of the fears behind it. The inner cities, as Castells puts it, through the "Great Society" and "War on Poverty", became the "battle-ground of the new reformers".(17) The outlook came to embrace the symoblic importance of cities to "the most enlightened sector of the ruling class", to use Castell's term.(18) President Johnson proclaimed that 1966 could be the year that "set in motion forces of change in great urban areas which will make them the masterpieces of our civilisation".(19)

Echoes of this feeling - combining both a social and physical conception of "the city" - could be seen in a special issue of the journal of the National League of Cities - "Nation's Cities - published in April the following year.(20) It represented the thinking of a panel of 33 urban experts (including Mayor Cavanagh of Detroit and other Mayors, the Ford Foundation, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, representatives from universities, the American Institute of Planners and government generally). To wit,
on the social side:(21)

"All our urban institutions must work together to make tomorrow's city a place where each citizen will have a chance to achieve his own full potential in an atmosphere of freedom, opportunity, openness, community, and, let us hope, culture ....
There is no reason why our central cities should be abandoned to the poor and the disadvantaged, or why they should be stuck with so much more than their share of the problems of poverty and segregation."

And on the physical side:[22]

> "... there is no earthly reason why American cities should have to be dull or ugly or dirty or polluted or traffic-choked or expensive to live and work in.
> There is no reason why cities should sprawl far out beyond their boundaries to blight the countryside with leap-frogging and premature subdivision."

The AIP President added:[23]

> "Sprawl city ... is too wasteful because you duplicate your services, your streets, your utilities, all the civic functions people pay for in taxes. You spread them out thin; you use up your land. In the process you destroy the countryside and waste our heritage."

Lewis Mumford had pointed out the potential for such problems with the emerging metropolitan form ten years previously.[24] And in 1957 the editors of Fortune Magazine (which usually takes an enlightened Big Capital outlook on issues of the day), had actually sponsored a book on the aesthetic, environmental and efficiency problems of the "exploding metropolis".[25] But only in the sixties with chickens coming home to roost and with a more liberal political climate were such views more fashionable (even if not strong enought to undermine the freeway agenda in cities).

I turn now to some general considerations of Michigan State government and politics over this period. Until recently State governments in the U.S. have been relatively neglected as objects of study.[26] With the rise of a national economy and the expansion in the role of the federal government, especially since the New Deal, through its delegated constitutional powers over interstate commerce, international affairs and "the general welfare", attention has focussed there. But in matters of domestic management state governments have major powers.[27] As O'Connor[28] points out, however, at the state level one finds absent the far reaching avenues of collective monopoly capitalist power and influence present at the federal level:

"Businessmen, labour officials, professional groups, lobbyists, visit the State capital not to represent an abstract 'social order as a whole' but rather to advance the interests of industry, trade, or corporation."

The Michigan Manufacturers Association and Michigan Chamber of Commerce tend to restrict their interest in Lansing to matters of a fairly direct impact on business. The closest to what might be termed a more broadly socially conscious monopoly capitalist organ of influence is the Citizens Research Council of Michigan which will be touched on later.

In general terms the tenor of Michigan politics can be characterised as derived from the definition of problems and issues thrown up by a heavily industrialised and moreover highly unionised economy.

Michigan has been the most heavily unionised state in the country.(29) In the postwar period, conservative rural and Republican party bias in the State Senate until reapportionment in the sixties not withstanding, the centre of Michigan politics swung sharply to the left. Envigorated by strong union input - in particular from the UAW - G. Meenen Williams won the Governorship for the Democrats in 1948. He has been credited with giving respectability to socially activist government "pulling Michigan and despite all the screaming and yelling of the ox-cart era legislature - into the twentieth century".(30) When George Romney won the Governorship back for the Republicans in 1962 he pulled the Republican party - heavily dominated by big business and the auto companies in particular - into the centre with him. In the 1964 Presidential election Romney "accepted" but did not endorse Goldwater as the Republican candidate.(31) Governor Milliken on taking office in 1969 continued the moderate, middle of the road approach for the Republicans and James Blanchard, a moderate Democrat, defeated a Republican candidate considerably to the right of Milliken to win gubernatorial office in 1982. Roots in the automobile industry have been common to both parties:(32)

"Both Republican and Democratic party organisations, from precinct to county to state level, were to a considerable extent staffed, and on key issues guided, by men prominent in the auto-

motive industry, with Republicans drawing heavily from management ranks and Democrats similarly supported by labour. This was unique to Michigan."

The degree of moderation in Michigan politics, however, should not be overstated. Organised labour cannot get too ahead of the attitudes of its members. In 1972 George Wallace won a 51% victory in Michigan in a racially charged campaign heavily coloured by anti-busing hostility especially in Detroit.(33) In the words of one reviewer of the Michigan political scene:(34)

"In a sense, the UAW is a victim of its own success ... most UAW workers are property owners, own homes in suburbs, snowmobiles, vacation land in northern Michigan ... it is not certain that the UAW's one million plus members, many of them comfortably middle class, really want a program of militant political action for social change ..."

The relationship here at the State level to the political fracturing I have described in S.E. Michigan, is an important one as regards understanding the policy milieu surrounding transportation issues (and many other issues) in Detroit. S.E. Michigan accounts for one half of the population represented in the State legislature - and that fracturing is projected to the State level with the Michigan legislature being in important ways a legislature for S.E. Michigan. The projection of regional level antagonisms to the State level is accentuated by the fact that in Michigan, State legislators rely heavily on their own staffs and fund raising to obtain office. Thus when elected to a large extent they feel independent of party discipline, which is difficult to maintain.(35) A survey of Michigan legislators has led to the following assessment:(36)

"A few of the legislators indicated that responding to the needs of the state, rather than limiting themselves to their own local constituents, was of great importance; however, that view was rare. Essentially, the legislators focused their efforts on the passage of good legislation and on meeting the needs of their constitutents."

According to the same survey of legislators, the major conflicts felt in the legislature were liberal versus conservative allegiances, conflicts between cities and rural areas, cities and suburbs, Detroit and the rest of the state and between the legislature and the Executive.(37)

The view has been expressed that since reapportionment in Michigan in the mid sixties,(38) the city of Detroit has traded rural indifference for suburban hostility - that while the rural legislator may have been ignorant of city problems, the suburban legislator represents those who have often left the city as an act of choice and resent inner city problems.(39)

Some other general points in relation to State government require appreciation in order to understand its role in relation to the dynamic of regional transportation policy in Detroit during this time. They all relate in one way or another to problems of co-ordination in state policy making. Firstly, although this has diminished in the last 20 years, there is the matter of fracture within the Executive function itself. Before adoption by the electorate of a new constitution in 1963 there were over 120 agencies and departments making up the Executive branch. The new constitution established a limit of 20 departments.(40) In addition, before constitutional revision, in the Jacksonian tradition, the Governor shared executive authority with a large number of elected officials including the Director of the Michigan Highways Department. While the new constitution much strengthened the position of the Governor, necessary to manage a much expanded State role, the Governor still has only indirect appointive power through Commissions in the important State departments of Education and Natural Resources (in addition, the Attorney General and Secretary of State continue to be elected independently). The Governor only obtained the authority to appoint the director of the renamed Michigan Transportation Department in 1978. Even more significant for this research focus, is the bias against comprehensive physical planning by State government in Michigan - comprehensive in both the sense of supra-local areawide approaches imposed by State government on local governments without their consent and, linked to this, difficulties in co-ordination

between various dimensions of physical planning in Michigan (sewers, transportation, housing, land-use etc.) by State government. When in October 1962 the State of Michigan accepted a $752,000 grant from the federal government to engage in limited comprehensive physical planning, it was only after the Governor's staff had creatively juggled with existing statutory authority to enable the executive branch to accept and spend the grant. Governor Swainson knew that a request to the legislature for broader legislative authority would be turned down.(41)

In 1937, in the New Deal days, the Michigan legislature had established an official Michigan Planning Commission, not only to act as a screening committee for federal aid programmes but with broad powers concerning the co-ordination of physical planning in the state. It was, as laid down in the legislation (PA218 of 1937), "to act as the State's official agency for co-ordinating agencies and programs relating to public works, land, water control and other areas". The Commission was abolished in 1947 and replaced by a Department of Economic Development. The legislation accomplishing this is interesting because it exhibits the strength of hostile feeling that the Commission had engendered. It says (PA302 of 1947):

> "... this act shall in no way re-establish the work of the Michigan Planning Commission."(42)

Roman, in reviewing the evidence, casts the 1947 decision in the atmosphere of "anti-planning hysteria" linked to a "strong reaction against the New Deal ... Legislators whose philosophy was basically against state and federal planning used the opportunity to kill planning per se".(43) Staff members of the new Department of Economic Development were instructed by their Director to avoid even the mention of "planning". Free market ideology can be seen combining here with strong local interests united behind the notion of local autonomy. In that stronger comprehensive physical planning powers would increase executive power in relation to the legislature, Jacksonian ideas regarding the over-concentration of power also come into play. Jumping ahead slightly, the strength of "localism" and the suspicion with which the legislature can look upon accretions to executive power were certainly factors in the unravelling, within 3-4

years, of the Programme Budget Evaluation System introduced by Governor Milliken in 1973.(44)

(d) Economic, Demographic and Spatial Change

In exploring regional transportation policy proper during this period, it is useful to start by locating it with respect to economic, demographic and spatial changes in the region during the sixties and early seventies. A central question to keep in mind here is why, when the hoped for beneficial effects of freeway construction on the city of Detroit did not materialise (this was a period of large-scale construction), was a more active stance against freeways not taken by city policy makers?

The overriding economic feature of this period was economic growth in the "affluent" or "consumer" society. Between 1961 (the year of Cavanagh's election) and 1973 (the year of Young's election) the total of wage and salary income in Michigan in real terms had increased by 78%. Per capita income in Michigan in real terms had increased by 52.5%.(45) And per capita income levels in the Detroit region in the early seventies were considerably above that for Michigan as a whole.(46)

The economy of the Detroit region was, despite strong growth in service employment (Table 1), still heavily tied to manufacturing (37.4% of the workforce versus 27.3% for the U.S. - Table 1) and especially to the manufacture of transportation equipment where Detroit, compared to the nation as a whole, had a location quotient of 12.97 in 1970.(47) In 1973, U.S. production of motor vehicles achieved a record level of over 12½ million vehicles. This was up drastically from levels hovering around the six and seven million mark in the late fifties and beginning of the sixties.(48) Table 10 shows the distribution of 1973 motor vehicle production in the United States. Michigan accounted for one third of the total (three times that of its nearest rival Missouri) and the Detroit region itself for almost one-quarter divided amongst the Big 3 automakers. Despite the far flung multi-national interests of the Big 3 (Table 11), Detroit

deserved its title of "the Motor City". The unemployment level in the Detroit region tended to fluctuate considerably more than the national average (Table 12), given the volatility in demand for major consumer goods, but it is not difficult to appreciate how it could be generally accepted that the surge in prosperity in the Detroit region (and indeed in the nation as a whole where one job in six has been linked directly or indirectly to the automobile industry)[49] was closely bound up with the success of the auto industry.

The physical focus of the region's economic growth, however, was in the suburbs. The city of Detroit suffered a massive decline in its economic base over this period. The city proportion of regional employment declined dramatically in the manufacturing, retail, wholesale and service sectors between 1962 and 1972 (Table 3A) and this represented not just a major increase in employment in the suburbs but a major reduction in the absolute number of both firms and persons employed in these sectors within the city itself (Table3B&3C). Table 13 shows the change in the real value of taxable property in the city of Detroit and balance of Wayne County between 1959 and 1969. The figures are quite staggering. The balance of Wayne County's taxable base increased by 82% moving from being considerably less than half of that of Detroit to being somewhat more. Meanwhile the taxable base of Detroit declined in real terms by well over $2 billion - a decline of 31%. The decade of the sixties did see the construction of almost 3 million sq.feet of office floorspace in the city but this was outstripped by the over 5¼ million sq.feet that sprang up in the suburb of Southfield (Table 14). Unemployment in the city of Detroit tended to be higher than in the rest of the region - in fact inflating regional statistics (which include Detroit), leading to an understatement of the divergence in official statistics (Table 12). It has been estimated that in 1967 the unemployment rate for whites within the city of Detroit was 2.7% while for blacks it was 9.6%.[50]

Table 4 and Map 21 provide a summary of percentage population change in the Detroit region 1960-1970. While the 7 county region grew by approximately 700,000 most of this was concentrated in the balance of the core counties (Wayne, Oakland, Macomb but excluding the city of Detroit) which grew by almost 600,000 - an increase of over 28%. The

PERCENTAGE POPULATION CHANGE IN SOUTHEASTERN MICHIGAN 1960-70



Source: U.S. Census of Population.
Note on Procedures: Due to boundary changes the following procedures have been followed in plotting Population Change:

1. Where a village has incorporated as a city, village and city population data are directly compared.
2. Where the whole or remaining portion of a township has incorporated as a city, township and city census data are directly compared.
3. Where part of a township has incorporated as a village or city, city & village areas are combined with the rest of the township.
4. Annexations involving less than 500 people are ignored. For annexations over 500 the annexing and annexed jurisdiction are combined.

population of the city of Detroit fell by another 150,000 to give a 1970 figure just over the 1.5 million mark (Table4A). White exodus and black in-migration had increased the minority population of Detroit from 29% in 1960 to 44.5% in 1970 (Table 6). And black suburbanisation had made no major inroads (Table 6, column 7). The sixties saw fourteen more city incorporations (Table 7) and by the beginning of the seventies this particular form of defensive ploy had more or less run its course. Sterling Heights in Macomb County, which incorporated in 1968 (Table 7) particularly stands out, in that from a population base of 14,600 it added over 46,700 people in 10 years - the fastest rate of growth (320%) of any jurisdiction during this time. In doing so, it still registered a minority population of only 0.5% in 1970 (Table 6). Many more people in 1970 were living and working in the suburbs, and significantly the percentage of people living in Detroit but working outside the city jumped to over 31% from 17% between 1960 and 1970 (Table 5). And in terms of the spread of the built environment in the core area during this time, by the mid and late sixties development from the Detroit area was merging with development from Pontiac and Mount Clemens. The areas between the "spokes" or corridors which are identifiable on the 1955 land use map (Map 4) were "filling up" and forming a solid mass around the city of Detroit and much of the outlying area.(51) By the mid sixties quite an elaborate network of freeways was taking shape in the region (Map 16). It is specifically to an examination of the transportation policy agenda during this time that I now turn. The broad nature of the argument advanced is that, particularly, given the rift that was opening up between Detroit and the suburbs, the agenda can only be understood in relation to a "regionalist" agenda being pushed especially by Big Capital in the area and also in relation to the economic development agenda of the city of Detroit in tandem with various federal and State programmes of "relief", problematic in nature, aimed at the city and its inhabitants. The agenda must be seen as cast in this broader light before the riots but especially so afterwards. It is inside this context that one must locate the work of planners. I will consider the freeway agenda and public transportation agenda in turn.

(e) The Freeway Agenda and Rapid Transit

I start with a simple inventory of construction over the period. Maps 14 and 16 provide a comparison of the operational network in 1955 and 1965. Given the long lead times in major construction projects of this sort, much of the actual construction took place in the early sixties. Maps 22 and 23 indicate construction in the region and in downtown Detroit 1965-69.(52) The major additions within the city of Detroit during the sixties were completion of the I-75 segments north through the city to Pontiac (the Chrysler freeway), northeast from the city's border to the Ambassador Bridge (the Fisher Freeway), and a connection looping the CBD and joinging the Lodge and Chrysler freeways (also part of the Fisher freeway). By the beginning of 1974, when Young took office, the freeway system in downtown Detroit was largely complete. The last link in I-75, from the Ambassador Bridge and tying into the CBD loop, was in service by 1970 (Map 23). Construction in 1970 was well advanced on the Jefferies freeway - I-96 - a 22 mile stretch northwest and west out of Detroit through Livonia into western Wayne County.(53) About half of the I-96 mileage within the city of Detroit was open by 1974 with work well underway on the rest (Maps 23 and 24).

The rationale behind the freeway agenda in Detroit in the sixties can be seen through an examination of the major transportation planning study which took place during those years - the Detroit Transportation and Land Use Study (TALUS). The actual organisational form which the study took, indicated problems inherent in regional planning and organisation generally in Detroit - no regional planning body existed with sufficient resources and organisational ability to take it on. The study, which officially got under way in July 1965,(54) was technically carried out under the auspices of the Detroit Metropolitan Regional Planning Commission but was structured as a self-contained project with its own staff, accounting system and policy making body drawn from County Road Commissions and Boards of Supervisors, the city of Detroit, State and federal government and from the big Capital organisation Metropolitan Fund Inc. The major organisational impetus came from the State Highway Department responding in particular to the Federal Highway Act of 1962, which required a "continuing,

1969 TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
FREEWAYS & MAJOR ARTERIALS



MAP23



Pre 1965

1965–1969

Post 1969

FREEWAYS IN DOWNTOWN DETROIT BY DATE OF CONSTRUCTION

1975 COMMITTED HIGHWAY NETWORK (Talus 1969)



comprehensive transportation planning process" as a condition of continued receipt of Federal Aid Highway funds for urban and metropolitan highway projects. Interim funding was provided by the Metropolitan Fund, with the actual $3.6 million budget for the study proper ("the most ambitious planning project ever undertaken in the Detroit region")(55) relying on a combination of federal, state and local sources (the counties and the city of Detroit).

The TALUS Study Design(56) stated that the project was designed to:

> "1. Produce a coordinated plan to guide future land use and the development of a balanced transportation system - including mass transit, highways, rail, water and air facilities - to serve the needs of the 1990 Metropolitan Region, and
>
> 2. Develop a planning process and structure which will assist in the implementation of the plan and continue to make the evaluations, refinements, adjustments and projections necessary to keep the plan current."

The TALUS study was driven by the concept of growth - both in terms of population and the economy. It had the confidence to state when published in 1969:

> "As our productivity rises, distribution, rather than production of consumer goods, becomes the problem"(57)

It forecast a 57% increase in the 7 county SEMCOG regional population from 4.4 million to 6.9 million in 1990. This would be accompanied by a projected 66% increase in jobs, a doubling of total trips and a trebling of total household income.(58) The study, on the basis of assumptions and a plan making procedure which shall be examinedin a moment, accepted the trend towards a "spread out" region. It called for an addition to the 1965 network of 153 miles of new freeway by 1975 (which included existing commitments of the State Highway Department - Map 24) and an additional 194 miles between 1975 and 1990. The recommended 1990 freeway network is shown on Map 25. This was in addition to improvement and construction of 670 miles of major regional arterial roads by 1990.(59)

1990 ASSIGNMENT NETWORK
FREEWAYS & MAJOR ARTERIALS
(As Proposed By Talus 1969)



TALUS argued for the development of 9 "metrocenters" in outlying parts of the region. These would be:

> "... Deliberately conceived and carefully planned communities ranging from 25,000 to 100,000 in population, providing commercial, cultural and educational activities within or close by, and offering a variety of housing types to accommodate a wide range of households in different life cycle, income and ethnic groupings."(60)

The report recommended a major upgrading of the region's public transit system.(61) It supported the consolidation of the region's existing bus systems (paralleling a major initiative here by Metropolitan Fund). It recommended that "detailed and serious consideration" be given to an 81 mile rapid transit system (Map 26).(62) But public transportation was not seen as competing with the automobile:(63)

> "The recommended (public) transportation improvements are designed to provide increased mobility for those people who are either primarily or entirely dependent on public transportation. The recommended system is designed to provide access from low-income and high unemployment and sub-employment areas to places where jobs exist now and where jobs can be expected to be located in the future; to provide better access to recreation and regional facilities from areas such as those, and to provide increased mobility for the young and the old .... However, the extent to which trips will be diverted from the automobile is speculative, and it is unrealistic to try to justify a major investment in public transportation on the basis of providing significant relief of highway congestion or substantial reduction of highway demands."

While transit travel constituted 5% of total trips in the region according to TALUS calculations, this was forecast as falling to 3% of total trips in 1990.(64) Other recommendations concerned the provision of other infrastructural investments (water, sewers) and recreational open space. The report contains many statements alluding to the special importance of the problems of Detroit:(65)

TALUS (1969) PROPOSED RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM



"... the most critical problems are those of the people who live in Detroit and other central cities of the region".

It refers to the goal of the

"... achievement of an integrated society, which provides residential opportunities throughout the region for people in differential racial, social and economic groups".

The plan aimed

"to be reasonably sensitive to what is happening in the region and to what people want".(66)

It stated:

"The general goal is 'to improve the quality of the environment'. Somewhat less generally, it is our goal to enable the individual to fulfill himself, to enable individuals and households to select from a variety of residential locational and housing type alternatives, to provide a region which is characterized by diversity, difference, opportunity; a region which increasingly becomes a more attractive and satisfactory place in which to live, work, recreate and visit".(67)

There was no question, however, that a major expansion of the regional freeway network was taken as a given. The following extract is again taken from the goals section of the report:(68)

"The first requirement in order to meet total travel demands within the Detroit Metropolitan Region is an extensive and effective highway system. This requires a complex of freeways, major arterials, and collector and distributor roads. Construction, programming and planning of regional freeways in the Southeast Michigan area is already well advanced. The plans to carry these to completion and supplement the system must be strongly supported."

As far as the plan making methodology can be inferred from the report, it involved the feeding of transit demand assumptions via computer modelling into four or five stylized land use and transit plans which could be subsequently refined, based on such results. This formed the

basis of discussions especially at the county level with planners and with "citizen involvement".

> "... sectoral decisions on the land use directions were based on the most relevant combinations of public policy that were applicable and relied heavily on county level critique and feedback".(69)

Successive refinements followed, using "evaluation and feedback". The process used

> "... the planners knowledge and judgement to create desirable land use configurations and supporting transportation systems, given the goals which the region's policymakers chose to pursue."

The planner had the

> "... role of interpretation between generalized goal statements and the specification of preferred spatial distribution of activities".(70)

Whatever the social idealism of the planners who worked on TALUS happened to be (significantly the project was started before the 1967 riots and finished afterwards), there can be little doubt that the actual impact of TALUS was to provide a rationale for freeway construction and little else - this was the only aspect tied to the assurance of substantial implementation, supported as it was by the County Road Commissions, State Highway Department and backed up with federal interstate funding. TALUS represents the last carte blanche given to highway planners in the Detroit region. On implementation generally TALUS stated (despite the explicit emphasis on implementation as inherent to the project in the Study Design):(71)

> "... there must be a program designed to assure implementation of the plan. Otherwise, TALUS will have been an expensive exercise in futility".

The racially balanced "metrocenters" never developed. Concerning the downtown Detroit "core", the report stated:(72)

> "A variety of environments are to be provided within the core. A system of neighborhoods would be developed whereby the individual will be able to effectively identify with their surroundings. A

system of quiet parks and open spaces are planned where residents can find solitude within their intense environment precluding a need for escape."

Such "empty" recommendations are typical of the report which assumed that with enough resources and will (although not specifying where they were to come from) the interests of Detroit and suburbs were reconcilable in a consensual whole which included first and foremost a major expansion of the regional freeway agenda. The report contained no fundamental reappraisal of Detroit's relationship to the suburbs in the actual model of development which was unfolding, as opposed to an idealized one which planners held up as possible, but without specifying the concrete steps to getting there. The weighty responsibility of implementation was primarily allocated to the newly created Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments (pp.157f):

> "Implementation of the Plan requires that SEMCOG staff and officials have the information required to respond to regional issues; and that they be willing to take positions where appropriate. A lengthy and expensive process has been required to get from an awareness of the need for regional planning to a regional Plan. Unless the point of view which the Plan represents is articuilated, there is not much likelihood that it will be implemented to a significant degree."(73)

Although a massive rapid transit system, as has been indicated, was advocated, it is hard not to regard this as yet another piece of elaborate, idealistic window dressing to make the basic freeway agenda more palatable, especially to the city of Detroit. The TALUS director was not a strong supporter of the proposal. He is careful in interview to point out that TALUS only said that "detailed and serious consideration" be given to a rapid transit system. This it does. Yet in other sections of the report, rapid transit is referred to as an integral part of the total transportation plan.(74) The report expresses ambivalence, to say the least. On balance, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the proposal was put forward simply as the TALUS director says, as an idea for consideration - that if the affluent society could afford it then "what the heck". The decision belonged elsewhere:

> "A public investment of this magnitude, however large a proportion might be borne by Federal and State grants, requires careful evaluation. At some point in time, if these recommendations are to be carried to implementation, the electorate will make the decision and will weigh the anticipated benefits against the predicted costs."(75)

Ultimately the report said, "the decision will depend on the availability of funds".(76) The former Director of the Detroit Rapid Transit Commission certainly did not take the reference to rapid transit in TALUS too seriously:(77)

> "It is my impression that rapid transit was incorporated into the TALUS report simply because of the '67 riots. The real objective was highways".

The structural functionalist packaging then of TALUS must be seen as even more stark than in the Carroll plan. While conflict is recognised it is simply swept into the spurious harmonious whole of the plan which thus provided a mantle of legitimacy for those interests which were capable of realization. The structural functionalist underpinning of TALUS must be sought, it is suggested, not in any deliberate attempt to deceive but in the ability of dominant interests to present themselves as generalizable ones thus framing the context for planning action and in the idealist strain in planning which lends itself to an uncritical acceptance of such generalization.

It is understandable that the city of Detroit would not wish to be excluded from participation in such a major planning exercise as TALUS, the bias towards freeways notwithstanding. But why did the City administration not take a more active stance against freeways in the city of Detroit during this time and in favour of some form of rapid transit as mentioned in Cavanagh's electoral campaign in 1960? In the words of the city controller in the Cavanagh administration, the mayor was "sour on freeways".(78) He points out that much freeway construction in Detroit was "programmed in" and contracts signed before Cavanagh took office. Yet the right of way acquisition for the Jefferies freeway - I-96 - took place primarily after the 1967 riots, in the latter part of the Cavanagh administration and the early part

of Gribb's tenure.[79] Rapid transit was not totally ignored by Cavanagh's administration.[80] While the Rapid Transit Commission became defunct, the former director acted in an advisory capacity to the Mayor. Ideas were presented to the City Council, before 1967, on one occasion for a rapid transit line in the "downriver corridor" to serve the Rouge complex and other industrial areas and on a later occasion for a Woodward corridor line. Both schemes could have been expected, in varying degress, to attract and bolster commercial functions within the city and to keep more Detroiters living in the city. But such efforts did not get past the preliminary discussion stage and nothing happened. The issue of rapid transit was to languish until taken up by Mayor Young early in his administration. The link between the City of Detroit's acquiescence in freeway construction in the sixties and "Great Society" optimism before the riots is an important factor in this. In addition a certain "loss of the reins" or "policy drift" has been remarked of the Cavanagh administration after the riots of 1967.[81] One can but speculate whether a push for rapid transit by the city administration at this time, supported by the rhetoric of TALUS, might have had some chance of success in Lansing or Washington. It was a time, for bold gestures. But the overriding fact of life faced by the city was the strength and overall success of the model of metropolitan development which incorporated freeways as an integral part of its dynamic. The riots did not change this but led, to an increased effort to find ways to preserve it. Other factors to bear in mind include the fact that in the sixties the spread out pattern of development was well established and downtown business interests were even weaker. It was harder to justify rapid transit on revenue grounds and to argue its necessity in servicing the commercial functions of the city. The relative lack of federal and state resources still pertained and the city of Detroit's own financial position had considerably worsened. Some of these factors will be touched on again but attention is now turned to the non-rapid transit public transportation issues of the time and especially to the establishment of SEMTA - the Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority - which was to figure strongly in regional transportation policy in the seventies.

(f) Public Transportation and the Establishment of SEMTA

In the establishment of SEMTA one can discern a very clear lead taken by regional Capital in Detroit in structuring the region's transportation system - a lead which was more "progressive" than the "state of play" at federal and State levels generally. In April 1966, the Metropolitan Fund Inc. contracted with a well known New York City firm of engineers and planners to inquire into the future role of mass transportation in the Detroit region. The main recommendation in the subsequent report was the need for a regional governmental transportation agency "empowered to plan, finance and operate (or contract for the operation of) a mass transit system".(82) A Metropolitan Fund policy statement on the report published in July 1967 said:(83)

> "The most reasoned thinking throughout the nation is currently that a 'balanced' transportation system balanced between both private and public transportation facilities is necessary to most efficiently utilize a region's economic and human resources and reduce the costs of the high individual mobility so necessary to our way of life".

If the backbone of the region's transportation system was highways (the main thrust of TALUS) it was being clearly recognised by MF that it was not enough. TALUS, written after the riots, in arguing for a major upgrading in public transportation, made a strong link to the matter of regional "equity" and implicitly stability:(84)

> "Public transportation, can be a key element in resolving a basic problem of the region-inequity in the distribution of income by increasing accessibility to employment opportunities. Public transportation can also aid in improving the quality of life for people by providing access to regional and local facilities and services for people who are dependent on public transportation for their mobility. The recommended transportation improvements are designed to provide increased mobility for those people who are either primarily or entirely dependent on public transportation".

The main factors behind the initiative taken by MF would seem to be based on narrower economic grounds. Real concerns were being

expressed in the mid-sixties to the Detroit Chamber of Commerce from employers simply concerned with the ability of their employees to get to work. Employers were dependent on many workers without access to a car, both where the family had no car, or one car only and two or more workers.(85) The reverse commuter from Detroit to the suburbs had grown in importance and, compared to the inward commuter, tended to have less access to an automobile.(86) And transportation between suburban locations was also a problem. The bulk of public transit in the region was by bus.(87) This included the city - owned Detroit Street Railways (DSR) which carried 88% of the total public transportation passengers, three major private enterprise suburban operators (Great Lake Transit, Metropolitan Transit, and Lake Shore Coach Company) and a number of smaller private operators serving the fringe of the city and some outlying cities and towns.(88)

Both the adequacy of existing service and its financial stability were in question. The DSR had suffered an all time low passenger volume in 1964 and since then had suffered recurring deficits.(89) The condition of the private companies was mixed. DSR had few suburban destinations, and suburban operators, such as they were, mostly provided service from the residential areas to the Detroit CBD and to suburban commercial locations. The result was particularly disadvantageous for those with low skills and/or unemployed living in the city:(90)

> "... nearly all suburban workplaces and even a few City work places are not accessible from the core by bus within one hour and/or less than two transfers. In fact, nearly one half of all low skill jobs within the SMSA are inaccessible from the core by bus within one hour, the majority of which are located outside the City .... For nearly one-third of the core resident black male unemployed, access to the vast majority of suburban workplaces and many City workplaces is limited by their dependence on public transportation; thus, these workers find themselves cut-off from the supply of jobs they need."

The Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority established by Public Act 204 of 1967 was a response to these concerns. It was charged as follows:(91)

"To plan, acquire, construct, operate, maintain, replace, improve, extend and contract for public transportation services and facilities".

The initial draft of the legislation was in fact the work of the Detroit Chamber of Commerce which carried the thrust of the lobbying work in Lansing.(92) (The MF by virtue of its tax exempt status under the IRS code was prohibited from such an overtly active role). Initially the authority was governed by a 9 member board - 6 appointed from lists submitted to the Governmor by member counties(93) and 3 by the Governor directly. In 1971 the newly created SEMCOG acquired the right to appoint six of the board members - regarded as important by MF to encourage a co-operative regional outlook.(94) At the beginning the organisation has been described by its present General Manager as somewhat of a "paper tiger".(95) SEMTA's total budget from federal and state sources from inception in July 1967 until June 1969 was slightly over $200,000.(96) The organisation did not make a major claim on state and federal transportation resources until after the acquisition of private bus lines in the early 1970's. Part of the delay was, of course, organisational but until that time, with the environmental issue becoming much more prominent, major state and federal resources did not exist. The dominance of the auto-complex led monopoly capitalist highway agenda may be seen as still paramount, but with the "cracks" and initial responses (at least in Detroit) appearing at the regional and local levels. Public transporation in Detroit was to take centre stage in the seventies and into the eighties, and I will consider later the changing nature of State and federal transportation policy in that context. But one comes now to broaden the focus somewhat. In like manner, as I related regional transportation policy to the wider context of "the regionalist agenda" and the urban renewal or "economic development" agenda of the city of Detroit in the fifties, I will pursue the same themes in this period. They are themes, in relation to which the dynamic of regional transportation policy in Detroit (and particularly the policy stance of the city in relation to the dynamic) must be understood. The matter of regionalism will be considered first.

(g) The Wider Regionalist Dynamic

The major intervention by regional Capital which resulted in the establishment of SEMTA illustrated in a major way problems involved in regional functioning due to the spatial distribution of inequities in access to transportation resources. The regional scope of SEMTA was an attempt to deal with this problem. The Detroit riots of 1967 illustrated the more serious problems associated with the existence of major inequities in the region and their concentration within the city of Detroit. In March 1971 there were 130,088 recipients of Aid for Dependent Children (ADC) in Detroit compared to 67,330 in the balance of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties, an 8.6% rate in Detroit compared to 2.5% in the rest of the SMSA. While Detroit had only 36% of the population of the tri-county area, it had 71% of all those receiving welfare.(97) And adding to the "flight" of business and people to the suburbs, according to the attitudinal surveys in the city and region, was the crime problem attendant on the spatial concentration of relative disadvantage. The overall crime rate in Detroit in 1968 was 6,024 crimes per 100,000 population, compared to the suburban tri-county rate of 2,079 - a Detroit rate nearly triple that of the suburbs. In 1970, Detroit recorded 550 homicides - one every sixteen hours. In a 1969 city-wide survey of Detroit households, one out of every five families claimed to have been a victim of one or more crimes during the preceding year.(98)

The worsening budget situation of the city from the mid sixties onwards (a deficit in fiscal year 1967 of $11 million with a projection for 1968 of $20 million)(99) demonstrated the growing fiscal inequities in the metropolitan governmental structure. But perhaps nothing illustrated more the potential for conflict in the formation of regional level policy (arising out of labour divisions in the consumption and reproductive spheres) than the furore over federally ordered school busing in the region in the early seventies. This was to make regional governmental policy formation even more difficult.(100)

In 1970, when blacks represented 64% of Detroit students, the Detroit School Board (covering just the city of Detroit itself) had adopted a

plan to increase integration by redrawing attendance areas. A furious reaction occurred and the State legislature killed the plan, holding that all students be sent to schools nearest their homes. This was followed by the intervention in 1971 of US District Judge Stephen Roth who ruled that Detroit area schools had been intentionally segregated. He ordered busing not only within the city of Detroit but cross-district busing for Detroit and its predominantly white suburbs. In giving this decision, Roth observed that during the years following the 1967 riot, the city of Detroit suffered the most rapid and dramatic exodus of whites of any large northern city school system. In July 1974 the US Supreme Court struck down Roth's cross-district busing order. The court held that while de facto segregation was a reality, intent to segregate had not been proven. A Detroit only desegration plan was set up and busing started within the city of Detroit in January 1976. But for three years the spectre of cross-district busing hung over the Detroit region. In the opinion of the former executive director of Metropolitan Fund, this "had more impact on the perception of 'regionalism' than anything in memory. People made a connection between regionalism and regional cross-district busing".(101) Livingston and Lapeer counties, both outside the area covered by the Roth busing plan, experienced major population growth between 1970 and 1975 - 32% and 17.7% respectively - much above any other S.E. Michigan county.(102) The former MF director attributes a good deal of this to the Roth Plan.

Attention is turned now to the nature and limitations of attempts to moderate the problems inherent in the metropolitan fracture I have described. Whilst within "sympathetic" federal and state contexts, the lead was taken directly by regional Capital in Detroit itself. I will consider the overall federal context firstly, followed by the regional and state level responses.

By the mid sixties, as Ghere puts it,(103)

> "The impact of specific Federal programs which placed relevance upon areawide planning activities on the metropolitan regional levels had begun to vitalize the feeble condition of the voluntary regional council.
>
> In short, national legislation and programs were being designed

to induce metropolitan areas to plan comprehensively through establishing areawide planning procedures as mandatory prerequisites for Federal program funding".

And in the decentralisation thrust of the "New Federalism" of the Nixon administration,(104) when it was becoming apparent that the country could not be run from Washington, the structure and performance of state and substate government took on added significance. The structure of metropolitan government was a subject in which, at the federal level, the influential big capitalist Committee for Economic Development took a major interest. In a 1966 report which introduced the term "New Federalism" (to emerge three years later in a speech by President Nixon), CED noted that local government was ill-equipped to fulfill its role in the federal system and recommended the reduction, through consolidation, of the number of conflicting jurisdictions and competing tax units:(105)

"The bewildering multiplicity of small, piecemeal, duplicative, overlapping local jurisdictions cannot cope with the staggering difficulties encountered in managing modern urban affairs. The fiscal effects of duplicative suburban separatism create great difficulty in provision of costly central city services benefitting the whole urbanized area. If local governments are to function effectively in metropolitan areas, they must have sufficient size and authority to plan, administer, and provide significant financial support for solutions to area-wide problems".

Picking up on these themes, regional Capital in Detroit had disclosed tentative proposals for metropolitan government in the Detroit area the previous year - an intervention which resulted in 1968 with the creation of the present Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG). Two bodies instrumental in this endeavour were Metropolitan Fund Inc. and the Citizens Research Council of Michigan which, as I have mentioned already, have come closest to representing collective large capitalist interests in Michigan and the Detroit region along the lines of, for example, the Committee for Economic Development and Council on Foreign Relations at the national level. Metropolitan Fund was reconstituted from the former Southeastern Michigan Metropolitan

Community Research Corporation in the early sixties. It was energised by a renewed concern for regional issues. It drew about 80% of its funding from big business - 10 to 15 corporations; the UAW was a major contributor and small business contributions made up most of the rest.(106) The 65 member Board of Trustees included "the principal leaders of the educational, governmental, industrial-commercial and labour segments of the community".(107) The organisation described itself in the following terms:(108)

> "Metropolitan Fund, Inc., is directed by the top private and public leadership of Southeast Michigan to accomplish, through research, the physical and social goals for a better metropolitan way of life ...
>
> The functioning of the Fund involves three basic processes:
> 1. The financing of research to identify metropolitan needs and aspirations and to suggest necessary alternative policies and action probrams.
> 2. The communicating with citizens concerning these research endeavours and resultant findings to assure and strengthen the democratic process necessary for action.
> 3. The assembling of leadership support to implement action programs to attain approved community aspirations."

The Citizen's Research Council has had virtually the same contributors and high powered board members as Metropolitan Fund. Whereas Metropolitan Fund openly lobbied for certain policies, CRC characterises itself as a research organization first and foremost. In the words of CRC it is "an independent, non-partisan, privately supported governmental research organisation founded in 1916. The aim of the organisation is to promote the choice of sound policies in the field of public affairs; their effective and economical administration; and responsive and responsible operations at all levels of government".(109)

On the occasion of the 11th annual meeting of the Supervisors Inter County Committee on June 10th 1965, the Metropolitan Fund formally disclosed its ideas for the future of metropolitan government in Detroit. With a $1 million grant secured by Henry Ford II from the

Ford Foundation,[110] the MF over the previous year had contracted with the Citizen's Research Council for the production of a research report entitled "Governmental Organisation in Metropolitan S.E. Michigan". A MF policy committee then made recommendations based on this "objective" research. Several months were spent in individual presentations of the recommendations and refinement of their content with "literally hundreds of knowledgeable experienced leaders in every segment of the region's society".[111]

In general terms the problem addressed in the exercise was the basic stability and efficiency of the metropolitan region as a locus for accumulation. Thomas Reid, Director of Civic and Governmental Affairs for Ford Motor Company and a Trustee of MF, presented the MF plan to the SICC group as one which would "enable the local units of government in our six-county region to meet the regional needs of the people of the area, and to meet them in an efficient, economical and responsible manner".[112] In the words of Kent Mathewson, President of MF, to the same meeting:[113]

> "Few, if any, major problems affecting our public sector today can be resolved by individual local governmental units working independently of one another. Metropolitan Fund believes that the governments of our six-county region must make a concerted effort to come to grips with a host of area-wide needs such as mass transit, crime, poverty, sewage and refuse disposal, more effective education for all and the equitable distribution of fiscal resources to meet these opportunities for greater economic and social development in our region."

Existing organisations - the SICC and DMRPC - were too weak. SICC represented only one type of local government, the county. And planning activity vested in the DMRPC was divorced from SICC, the action oriented organisation. There was no regional agency with authority to co-ordinate the activity of special purpose area-wide authorities.[114]

The programme outlined by MF was composed of 5 elements:[115]

1. The creation of a state boundary commission which would examine future petitions for incorporation and annexation and provide "a more

rational basis for incorporation and annexation decisions". As Reid of Ford put it:[116]

> "True, the creation of a boundary commission at this late date would not do anything to repair the damage that has already been done in fracturing the governmental structure in southeast Michigan. It would, however, be of great help in preventing further fragmentation and proliferation of governments and in insuring that future incorporations and annexations will not result in governmental units too small in size or too inadequate in tax base to be able to carry their governmental responsibilities."

2. The limitation of special purpose authorities "so that further fracturing of local government may be avoided".[117]

3. The passage of state legislation to enable county home rule in the region. The executive fragmentation in county government I have discussed. County home rule (ie determination by the county electorate of the organisation of county government) was seen by MF as "a device designed to structure county government so that counties can successfully provide regional or at least sub-regional services as popularly based, responsible municipal-type governments".[118]

4. The expansion of co-operative agreements among local governments and the voluntary functional transfer of responsibilities, where necessary. (In 1966 the responsibilities of Detroit's Welfare Department were transferred to Wayne County. Without this in the words of State Representative William Ryan, "Detroit would have been a welfare case itself".)[119] In the words of Reid again, regarding interlocal agreements:[120]

> "Here we have an unfettered opportunity to demonstrate that intelligent men, aware of the benefits of joint and co-operative action can put aside the obstacles created by lines on a map and can work together for their mutual benefit."

5. The creation of a voluntary metropolitan council of governments with direct representation from each of the areas taxing jurisdictions - cities, townships, villages and school districts in addition to counties. Metropolitan Fund saw the purpose of the new body as follows:[121]

> "... the primary purpose of the council of governments is to serve as a forum for discussing, evaluating and proposing, or initiating solutions to the problems of the metropolitan area. In carrying out this purpose, the council might involve itself in three types of activity, namely regional planning, promoting of legislative programs, and providing technical assistance necessary for co-operative local government action".

It is clear that Metropolitan Fund in formulating and lobbying for its proposals made the basic decision to work through the existing local governmental structure. MF did not believe that a new metropolitan government was "politically practical". It regarded a "compulsory union" as an "unlikely event".(122) It was careful to point out that its proposed new council of governments was not envisioned as rendering line services of government or of being "coercive in any way". "It should be a voluntary association of local units of government and not itself be a unit of government. Its power should be persuasion and technical staff assistance".(123)

Metropolitan Fund continued to take the leadership role in carrying the idea for a new council of governments through to fruition. In co-operation with the SICC, by September 1965, a "Committee of 100" - composed of elected and appointed officials from local governments in the region had been appointed to hammer out a proposal for the structure of the new organisation. MF provided staff support and the CRC research back up. The consensual backing for the proposal was being carefully put together. A detailed proposal was forthcoming in June 1966 covering the counties of Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, St. Clair, Washtenaw, and Monroe.(124) Subsequently elected leaders of the approximately 400 local jurisdictions involved were contacted and encouraged to support the proposal. Prospective members of the new organisation convened on May 4, 1967 and began the process of moving from proposal to actual organisational structure. "The structure ultimately developed and adopted by the interim group was basically similar to that found in the report of the Committee of 100."(125) The Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG) was formally created on January 1, 1968. "Until that time the Metropolitan Fund had done all the work".(126) The SICC was disbanded and the Detroit

Metropolitan Area Regional Planning Commission became the SEMCOG planning division.

SEMCOG's powers were limited. It could not legislate, tax or bond and did not provide direct services to citizens. Its structure was careful to be deferential to the sovereignty of member units, and strove to mould a "regional" organisation out of a membership of local governments as opposed to elected regional representatives.(127) A General Assembly met four times a year and an Executive Committee met monthly. Most governments had one vote in the General Assembly. (Detroit and the counties had additional seats - Detroit had two seats for example, and Wayne County had six). Under certain circumstances voting would take place on the basis of four voting blocs comprising delegates from counties, cities and villages, townships, and school districts. The system was "designed to assure that representatives of any one or two segments of SEMCOG cannot dominate the organisation".(128) Membership of the thirty-one member Executive Committee was by designation for the City of Detroit and the counties and from election by the respective voting blocs for the rest. Wayne County was automatically entitled to four members, for example, and the city of Detroit to two. The Chairman of SEMCOG was elected by the entire General Assembly for a one-year term.

Under an Executive Director, five major divisions were established (later abolished in favour of a programme structure) in the areas of Planning, Public Safety, Education, Social Services and General Government Services.(129) I will consider SEMCOG's record later. one may note, however, certain early problems faced by the organisation which give insight into its general operation. These concern membership and financing. SEMCOG failed to achieve the level of membership originally anticipated. As of June 1970, 105 governments had chosen to become members - less than one-third of those eligible.(130) While with county membership SEMCOG could claim to cover most of Southeast Michigan, "participation by medium-sized cities in the region was particularly weak".(131) Macomb County (1970 pop. 625,309) in particular was a problem - it formally withdrew from SEMCOG in February 1972.(132) Its major jurisdictions Warren (1970 pop. 179,260), Sterling Heights (1970 pop. 61,365), St. Clair Shores (1970

pop. 88,083) and East Detroit (1970 pop. 45,920) had never joined. Essentially a newly developed blue collar county, Macomb was suspicious of SEMCOG. Of the decision by Macomb County to withdraw from SEMCOG, a Detroit News editorial writer said:(133)

> "There is a fundamental reason why. Within Macomb County is a widely held fear of takeover. By whom? Well, perhaps by Detroit, the blacks, the poor, somebody. If we let Them tell us how to build our sewers, the reasoning goes, next they'll seize our schools and eventually rule our lives." (emphasis original)

Mel Ravitz, SEMCOG Chairman, had described in May 1970 how the regional organisation was subject to considerable "cross criticism".(134)

> "A large and very diverse group of citizens in the region erroneously believe that SEMCOG is another governmental layer, designed now, or for the future, to smother the autonomy of the cities, townships, villages and counties. It is ironic that there are two opposing segments in this group of SEMCOG critics. One segment consists of suburbanites who condemn SEMCOG for being, or seeking to be, the instrument of the central city, Detroit, in maintaining dominance over the region ...
>
> The other segment critical of SEMCOG is a number of inner city black leaders, who believe that SEMCOG is an instrument of white suburbanites insidiously conniving to assume control of Detroit just at that point in history when black city political leadership is about to emerge."

In the face of such underlying suspicions, the SEMCOG strategy under its first executive director, Robert Turner, and under Chairman Mel Ravitz, was to proceed with caution and sensitivity. Turner's (who resigned May 1972) approach was to "smooth out controversies".(135) Ravitz was described as "as anxious to avoid confrontations as President Buchanan was".(136) Of SEMCOG in general the same critic said:(137)

> "... the people who created SEMCOG keep ducking the hard issues. They want to smooth ruffled feathers and they fear the rumor-mongers. They prefer to talk in the planning idiom of surveys,

computer printouts and demographic trends."

Despite State and federal and considerable private sector support for SEMCOG (in June 1968, for example, the Ford Foundation made a $150,000 grant to Metropolitan Fund for regional programmes including SEMCOG activities and in conjunction with the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce $75,000 was raised from the private sector in 1971 to match a federal grant for the development of a regional solid waste disposal plan),[138] the lagging membership problem caused a serious cash shortage for SEMCOG in 1971. While this was overcome for 1972 by a substantial increase in county contributions, bringing the local contribution for 1972 up to $367,000 from $200,000 in 1971,[139] the immediate cash crisis was resolved by an injection of $200,000 in private sector funds. A private sector solicitation followed a breakfast meeting to discuss SEMCOG's needs on July 29, 1972 which was hosted by Walker Cisler, Chairman of the Board of Detroit Edison.[140] Forty business leaders were in attendance. The group was supportive and by mid-August letters signed by Cisler, Ravitz (SEMCOG's chairman) and Edward Cole, President of General Motors, were sent to 167 major firms in S.E. Michigan. The raising of the money illustrates again the interest of regional capital in the need for regional governmental structures and planning. SEMCOG's budget, however, remained heavily tied to State and especially federal support. Of the total $1.7 million budgeted for 1972 approximately $1.25 million was projected to come from federal and state sources.[141]

The admitted failure in Detroit of a regional private sector response to the events of the summer of 1967 had added an impetus to the search for regional governmental solutions by the private sector. Immediately following the riot, Mayor Cavanagh and Governor Romney had called upon the major power holders in S.E. Michigan to respond to the crisis. The result was the formation of the New Detroit Commitee (later New Detroit Inc.), an essentially Big Capital organisation (despite nine black committee members out of 39) drawing in support from organised labour, political leaders and other important community figures (churches, universities, etc.). The presidents of the Big Three automakers were all on the board as was Walter Reuther, President of the UAW. Joseph Hudson Jr., president of the regional

department store chain bearing his name, was the chairman.[142] Hudson was also at the time chairman of the Board of Trustees of Metropolitan Fund which acted as a co-ordinating agency for the New Detroit Committee until it got on its feet. This was a power group of the first order. After at least symbolically taking up the cudgels to rebuild a New Detroit out of the ruins of the riot (through hard core employment programmes, inner city recreational and educational activities, etc.), a Progress Report,[143] however, as early as April 1968 made it clear that the main responsibility for dealing with the situation lay with the public sector. "The private sector" in the assessment of one reviewer,[144] "decided to take a limited, less ambitious and more circumscribed role .... They did not leave the local scene, but they structured for themselves a 'limited posture' ". Further:

> "This limited and circumscribed role should be understood as essentially peacekeeping. New Detroit from the corporate perspective, is a powerful adjunct to the public order system. They make the Black 'militants' a part of that peacekeeping machinery".

A $10 million annual budget was reduced to $2.9 million in 1970 and $2.5 million in 1971.[145] This was despite the fact that in the Committee's own assessment: "In no respect has a single urban problem or a single basis for alienation and bitterness been completely overcome. In no respect has a single opportunity for future improvement been fully exploited".[146]

The Progress Report pointed to the need for massive federal assistance targeted to the city of Detroit,[147] but the other main platform in the report was the advocacy of regional or metropolitan wide solutions to "urban" problems. To quote:[148]

> "Local government structure in southeastern Michigan - as in all other metropolitan areas - is a patchwork of entirely dissimilar constituencies in which parochialism and independent action continue to frustrate full cooperation in coping with problems which affect the entire region. Thus, one unit of government is powerless to end discriminatory practices in another despite the fact that it may suffer seriously from the discontent and the

hatred which such practices breed.

> Most urban problems can be defined more accurately as regional problems. Pollution, congestion, crime, poverty, blight, all ignore the boundary lines of individual communities and affect all of the people in the metropolitan area. It follows that a regional approach is essential to the solution of these ills and that a regional agency - such as the newly formed Southeastern Michigan Council of Governments - is therefore necessary".

In 1970 the Metropolitan Fund and the Committee for Economic Development joined forces to promote the idea of metropolitan government "with teeth" in the Detroit area. In 1970 CED had published a report entitled "Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas".(149) A two tier system of government for metro areas was recommended in which truly "regional" responsibilities would be assigned to the upper tier. "Uncoordinated area-wide special districts, fragmented by function", were described as "no better than governments fragmented geographically. They do not permit a genuine regional approach to problems that are genuinely regional; nor do they create a system of decision-making and power sharing capable of dealing with political conflicts".(150) The report questioned the degree to which federal and state aid and programmes could be effective in dealing with the problems of cities operating as they were, within the confines of the existing local governmental system.

On October 29, 1970, the CED brought its prescription for metro governmental reform to Detroit. A seminar on the subject of the CED report, jointly sponsored by Metropolitan Fund and CED, was held in Detroit's Cobo Hall.(151) Local trustees of CED who were closely involved in the endeavour included Walker Cisler, Chairman of Detroit Edison and Metropolitan Fund Trustees, Richard Gerstenberg, a Vice Chairman of General Motors, and Robert Semple, President of Wandotte Chemicals Corp. The seminar, largely an educational exercise, went over, by this time, well trodden themes. John Dempsey, the Governor's Special Assistant for Urban Affairs, was in attendance and stressed the over-riding need for the one ingredient that would make CED's proposals work - a sense of "community" in S.E. Michigan. He pointed

out that the State of Michigan would not (more truly could not) impose a solution unless there was a "movement from below". He was not optimistic:(152)

> "CED has told us one way they think we might go. The problem is, they haven't told us how to get there. I don't think Washington is going to tell us and I don't think Lansing is going to tell us and I know the City of Detroit is not going to tell us and I even fear that SEMCOG is not going to tell us".

Given the reproduction of regional divisions in the State legislature which we have discussed, Dempsey had reason to be cautious concerning the ability of State government to impose or even encourage stronger regional government in Detroit. Liberal Republican gubernatorial administrations since the mid sixties, however, with a broader electoral base, have attempted to nudge the Detroit region in this direction, but with limited success. In the present period under consideration, it proved impossible, even in the crisis atmosphere following the 1967 disturbances, to obtain enabling legislation in the State legislature for SEMCOG considered satisfactory by the Metropolitan Fund. SEMCOG, in fact, ended up operating under the relatively weak legislation for regional planning commissions.(153)

The same special session of the Michigan Legislature in 1967 which refused broader operating legislation for SEMCOG did pass two laws facilitating increased intergovernmental co-operation at the local level: the Urban Co-operation Act (P.A.7 of 1967) and Intergovernmental Transfer of Functions and Responsibilities Act (P.A.8 of 1967). However, the Governor's Special Commission on Urban Problems, reporting in January 1968, pointed to the obvious weakness of reliance on voluntarism:(154)

> "A basic weakness of joint agreements is that they are practical only when the immediate local interest of each participating unit is not likely to be in conflict with the broader area-wide interest. Since the agreements are voluntary, when such conflicts appear likely, governmental units probably would not choose to participate in an agreement, or if already participating would withdraw".

Public Act 191 of 1968 established a State Boundary Commission which followed a report by a study commission set up by Governor Romney. MF, as has been seen, advocated this two years previously. The Boundary Commission is more noteworthy for what it cannot do rather than for what it can do. Under PA191 the Boundary Commission looks more comprehensively at requests for city incorporation and consolidation. (Previously this was a relatively automatic decision based on population and density). It considers, for example, the probable future need for services. But in S.E. Michigan the major post World War II wave of defensive incorporations had largely run its course. The Boundary Commission was given no authority to recommend changes in the existing configuration of political boundaries.

The controversial issue of annexation was avoided in the 1968 Boundary Commission legislation - no compromise had been possible by Governor Romney with town-ship interests anxious to protect their local autonomy against state level intervention. That the state should have the power to decide annexation issues between cities, overriding any local objections, did not even make it on to the agenda. PA219 of 1970 gave the BC limited power to decide on annexation proposals, over local objections from a township losing territory, when the area to be annexed contained less than 100 people. In other cases, a favourable vote in the township losing territory was a prerequisite for any change. Cities were still completely immune from any annexation without their consent and the city of Detroit by this time was almost completely surrounded by cities. Measured against such limited powers, the title State Boundary Commission was almost a misnomer.

Relying on Executive power only, Governor Romney in 1968 by Executive Directive (No1968-1), designated a statewide set of geographical planning regions. The intent was to encourage a regional approach to policy making by local governments in Michigan generally (this was becoming increasingly important in securing federal funding for various activities) by directing state agencies to adopt the regional boundaries (not all of which were served by a Council of Governments or Regional Planning Agency) in both planning and programme management. The idea was to lead by example. The SEMCOG area was the designated

region for S.E. Michigan.[155] It seems that there was a feeling in the Executive office of the Governor that a certain degree of state administrative efficiency could be traded off for a strengthening of regional problem solving at the local level in general. A 1970 report by the Office of Planning Coordination in the Executive Office (which had the main responsibility for developing the state "regionalist" policy) stated:[156]

> "... it should be noted that the use of state regions will not be an unmixed blessing. The regions are not ideally suited to every regional service delivery system and some inefficiences may result from their use."

SEMCOG was keen on the idea and was to "strongly urge that state departments and agencies observe the designated regional area in their various programs and planning".[157]

However, without a truly "regional constituency", a regional approach to planning and administration faced an uphill battle. An ACIR investigation in 1972 concluded that Michigan State departments, faced with the choice of "thinking regionally" and fulfilling their functional responsibilities, preferred to work with substate administrative districts of their own creation or with their local general purpose counterparts. To quote:[158]

> "State agency officials interviewed did not reflect a strong commitment to use RPDAs (Regional Planning and Development Agencies) for administrative or service delivery purposes ...
>
> Most state line agencies use their own substate districts or regions. State agencies have not made significant use of the SPDR (State Planning and Development Regions) for policy, planning, programming, and administrative purposes. Nor do they have a policy to guide their relationships with general purpose RPDAs. Some agencies do rely upon RPDAs to help satisfy Federal planning requirements. However, the general preference is to rely upon functional agencies of local general purpose government or special purpose multi-jurisdictional entities".

Indeed Governor Milliken, on coming to office, conscious of the need for pragmatism, refused to designate SEMCOG as the official

comprehensive health planning agency to receive federal dollars for S.E. Michigan. Neither was a direct linkage required between SEMCOG and the new health planning agency which was established outside of SEMCOG's framework.(159)

Efforts by Michigan Governors to obtain state funding for regional councils during this period proved equally difficult. Governor Romney had first raised the idea in 1966. Included in his 1967/68 Executive Budget was $150,000 to "initiate a program of grants to support multi-county planning bodies for the purpose of devising areawide development programs which will complement local and State programs". But even this modest proposed appropriation was turned down by the legislature.(160) The legislature in 1972, at the request of Governor Milliken, did appropriate $750,000 for regional councils with the understanding that this financial support would be on-going. Milliken had added to the strength of his case, it seems, by appointing a Governor's Commission on Local Government in October 1970 to recommend changes in the Michigan local governmental system.(161) The Committee report in March 1972(162) argued in addition to the strengthening of county government for strong general purpose regional planning organisations receiving state funding. In the opinion of one Commission member, Kenneth Verburg of Michigan State University, the Lieutenant Governor, James Brickley, as Chairman of the Commission and John Dempsey, also commission member and Director of the State Bureau of Programs and Budget, were "given their marching orders by Governor Milliken to come back with a strong rationale for regional planning organizations. This was the main agenda."(163) The Milliken proposal as moulded by the legislature contained the proviso that there would be a forfeiture of State grant funds:

> "... for failure to approve a Federal or State grant to a local unit of government on the basis that the local unit ... is not a member of said regional or planning organisation".(164)

The Appropriations Act restrictions, according to the ACIR investigation, were necessary to counter fears of legislators who did not want to be associated with any effort that could be construed to foster "super or metro government".(165) The spectre of state administered regional organisations had been held out by Governor

Milliken as a threat; for example:(166)

> "Local units of government have been encouraged to establish, and participate in, multi-county general purpose planning organizations. The alternative to deal with concerns that transcend local boundaries is to have state government (the level of government with authority beyond local boundaries) attempt to solve areawide problems, with perhaps ad hoc consultation with affected local units. This alternative, however, would weaken local government by centralizing more authority in state government."

But in the context of Michigan politics the idea of State imposed "regionalism" is almost a complete non-starter. A State report in 1970 was quick to dismiss the option. State administered regional organisation, it stated, would have a fatal disadvantage. They "would have no policy or political ties to the region served and could not effectively represent the regional interest ... Direct administration of regional programs by the state or federal government is neither desirable nor feasible".(167)

Issues concerning inequities in regional fiscal resource distribution in Detroit inevitably surfaced at the level of State government during this period. (The State is the level of government with constitutional power to deal with such matters.) Despite "progressive" gubernational leadership, the limits on the possible were still severely constrained by growing tension between Detroit and its suburbs. In 1962 Governor Swainson vetoed a bill sponsored by a suburban Detroit legislator which would have prohibited the city of Detroit from levying its newly enacted city income tax on suburban commuters working in the city. This decision was to deprive Swainson of much needed votes in Oakland, Macomb, and Wayne County outside Detroit in the election which he lost to Republican George Romney later that year.(168) Later in 1964 the opportunity was taken by the legislature with the adoption of a general law permitting selected Michigan cities to levy an income tax (PA 284 of 1964) to reduce the Detroit non-resident rate to 0.5%. And in 1968 through the State legislature (PA 307 of 1968) the resident rate was raised to 2% but the non-resident rate was kept at 0.5%.(169) The legislature, in other words, was

giving to Detroiters the privilege of taxing themselves but was not keen to extend the tax burden to the suburbs. The same principle was apparent in 1970 when the State legislature (Public Act 198) permitted the city of Detroit to adopt a tax on the users of electricity, gas and intrastate telephone service.(170)

A study in 1972 calculated per capita local taxes paid as a percentage of median income for Detroit and the suburbs. This demonstrated a figure of 2.44% for the suburbs and 4.15% for Detroit residents, yielding a tax equity gap of 70.1%.(171) Not only was there a growing relative concentration of disadvantage within the city of Detroit in the sixties with consequent higher demands on municipal fiscal resources, but to compound this, a study using 1966 data quantified net subsidies to various suburban jurisdictions from the city of Detroit.(172) The Detroit Institute of Arts and Detroit Public Library, for example, while supported by Detroit funds, provided substantial services to non-residents. The study showed that most suburban jurisdictions received annually from $6 to $9 of net subsidy from Detroit per capita. (Birmingham $12.58, Dearborn $6.72, Grosse Pointe Park $6.78, Allen Park $6.52.) And while Detroit was taxing itself more heavily, a study of the Detroit region by the Survey Research Centre of the University of Michigan concluded that "intra-urban tax differentials do make a significant difference in location decisions of businesses".(173)

An effort by Governor Milliken early in his administration to ease the problem of regional inequities in access to education resources met with only mixed success. Milliken's initial proposal was to make the finance of primary and secondary education a totally state responsibility. Despite the fact that the State had been making funding contributions to local school districts for some time, this was to a major extent based on a dollar amount per pupil in all districts with only some allowance made for the financial health of the various school districts. Primary and secondary education was based primarily on the local property tax. The inequity caused by different amounts of property tax base was as much as $400 per pupil between districts exerting the same amount of local tax effort.(174) In a November 1972 election, a constitutional amendment on the issue

of state financing was defeated (1.8 million to 1.3 million).[175] This was a year when school integration and busing were also major issues. In 1973, however, under directions from the Michigan Supreme Court to alleviate financial inequities for school financing, Governor Milliken secured passage of what he called "the most significant school aid bill every adopted in Michigan".[176] While rich school districts could choose to pay more for education, every district was guaranteed a certain minimum funding per pupil.[177]

One cannot leave the "regionalist" theme without a brief consideration of two major planning studies (at least in terms of effort) which took place during this time. Both are notable in the degree (one more conscious of it than the other) to which the model of physical, social and economic development which they proposed was divorced from the limitations on action inherent in Detroit's metropolitan government structure and the actual model of metropolitan development in Detroit generally. They will be considered in turn.

1. Regional New Town Design - A Paired Community for S.E Michigan 1971

In 1970, Metropolitan Fund sponsored a "Paired New Town" feasibility design study for S.E. Michigan.[178] Additional funds were provided by the federal government and the Kresge Foundation. A team of planning consultants worked intensively to produce a proposal for a "paired" new town in the region. An "out-town" component, 20-40 miles outside the city of Detroit and comprising about 75,000 people, would be linked by rapid transit to a smaller in-town component, within the city of Detroit, of 25,000 people. This new town would share a common local government with delegated powers and responsibilities from existing local governments, although this relationship is only outlined at a very conceptual level. The new town components would share, in addition, common design principles, amenities, services, and community facilities and a common educational system. The goal was to "deal forthrightly and honestly with the issues of race and economic class" and with the "myth of urban - suburban independence".[179] The proposal looked forward to balanced and integrated "whole" communities as part of a planned urban growth strategy.[180] A public development authority was envisioned as constructing the new town or at least that part for which private investors could not be found. The "vision"

behind the concept is illustrated in the following:[181]

> "Citizens would have the choice of living "in-town" if they prefer a more vibrant urban experience, or "out-town" on a more wooded, pastoral setting. In either setting however, residents would be inhabitants of one community, sending their children to the same school system, voting for the same town officials, using the same recreational facilities, and most of all, sharing the same values and aspirants for the achievement of the good life."

The Executive Director of Metropolitan Fund at the time saw the project as an attempt to lead or at least influence public opinion.[182] As such it is important to point to this constraint on the brief given to the planning consultants predisposing them to a superficial structural functional view of society and the tendency towards "unreflective goal setting" substituting for analysis identified by Cooke (cf pps10-11). One suspects that the idealist strain in planning theory would have reinforced this tendency. Mel Ravitz, Chairman of SEMCOG, in criticising the report, brought a sense of reality. In addition to pointing out that the plan "would have to be duplicated many times locally to resolve our basic problems", he pointed out that:[183]

> "... under existing conditions of strong suburban hostility toward black people and a deep condescension toward poor people, I consider the "new town" concept unrealistic and impractical. Neither the majority of white people residing in the suburbs want or will permit the creation of racially and class balanced "new towns", nor do the majority of black people residing in central cities want to diffuse their political strength by entering into a "new town" agreement that would remove them from even a small amount of their developing power base in the central city. Indeed, until we end racism and our negative attitudes toward the poor, our urban growth will unfortunately continue to be shaped by these factors, rather than by a rational determination of what is best for all people in terms of space, social relationships and economics."

The same Executive Director of the Metropolitan Fund, in retrospect, in fact, thinks the project led to "a net loss of consciousness

raising - some suburban communities reacted very strongly to being considered as potential sites for the out-town component of the scheme".(184)

2. Emergence and growth of an Urban Region - The Developing Urban Detroit Area. Vols 1-3, 1966-1970.(185)
In January 1965, a five year planning study, which demands attention due to its sheer scale, got under way to "research into the growth patterns, potentialities and future requirements of the Urban Detroit Area".(186) It was sponsored by the Detroit Edison Company under the chairmanship of Walker Cisler and the main work was carried out by the Greek planning consultancy of Doxiadis Associates. Cisler, as an administrator of the Marshall Plan, had known Constantinos Doxiadis, by then an internationally known planner specialising in ekistical analysis, since post war reconstruction days in Europe.

The impetus for the study undoubtedly had its roots to a large extent in the economic stake which Detroit Edison, as the main supplier of electrical energy in the area, had in the region. Utilities are one of the least mobile of capitalist enterprises. There was a clear material interest in growth but also in the protection of existing fixed investments. (The area utility companies - Michigan Consolidated Gas, Bell Telephone and Detroit Edison - all have their headquarters downtown.) The study was intended to provide a framework for future planning by the major utility. The quite grandiose nature of the objectives, however, can be traced to the "visionary" zeal of Cisler who envisioned an urban way of life "conducive to human happiness and fulfillment".(187) As put by Doxiadis, the project was concerned with the "grave" questions : "Where is our city going, what can we do for it?" It was seen as part of an endeavour to "try to create a better future for Detroit".(188)

Defining the research area as broadly to reach across into Ontario, down into Ohio and north and east to Lansing, Saginaw and Port Huron, the study located Detroit as part of an emerging Great Lakes megalopolis with two other focal points in Chicago and Cleveland - Pittsburgh. While admitting that megalopolitan development involves a "functional interconnectedness involving multiple ties of transport-

ation, communication, economic and social links and contacts",[189] the study based its tentative definition of the Great Lakes megalopolis on the cartographical plotting of various types of data - population density, median value of owner occupied houses, percentage employed in manufacturing, aggregate income by SMSA, etc. This is illustrative of the project's whole approach. It is static in the sense of considering discrete "snap shots" in time and it is based on the implicit assumption that bringing the maximum information and data together will lead to mastery of "the problem". The 3 volume study comprising almost 1200 pages proceeded from an inventory of existing conditions and their analysis through projections of future alternatives to the elaboration of "a final best alternative for the physical development of the area"[190] (alternative 120 out of 140 considered). This alternative proposed a new twin urban centre to Detroit on the St Clair River in the vicinity of Port Huron. It was seen as growing to 1 million in population. It "would relieve the pressures now exerted on Detroit and permit revitalization and remodelling of its suffering and declining central areas".[191] The analagous comparison of the region to an "organism" is one repeated throughout. It is beyond present scope to comprehensively critique ekistic methodolgy. However, some things, in the context of the Detroit study, are apparent. The study was completely divorced from the real dynamics of the region's economy and political structure. No new town was ever built or seriously contemplated. The data presented are always "snap shot" manifestations of underlying phenomena which are related to the central but superficial concept of "spatial needs" ("the forces which create human settlements").[192] The region, a manifestation of these "spatial needs", is regarded as an organism which can be related to ideal notions of desirable urban form. From this perspective, areas of "disease" can be plotted in the city of Detroit which represent deviations from the ideal spatial pattern. The study was not taken very seriously by the city of Detroit. In the words of the city comptroller of the time, Mayor Cavanagh regarded it as "somewhat of a boondoggle".[193] Ewen, from a Marxist perspective, engages it must be suggested, in top down structuralist theorizing in arguing that the Doxiadus plan be seen as a corporate blue print with Fascist undertones for the future physical development of the Detroit region. This will be considered in Chapter Six when the pitfalls of

structuralist theorizing in general as applied to Detroit are summarized (cf pps288-91). One notes here, however, that while it seems unlikely that planning methodology was determined by the needs of capital in this case (ie. there is still a place for the eccentricities of ekistical analysis) the framing of the context and brief by capitalist interests (the vision of Cisler interpreting capitalist interests as generalizable ones) made only certain types of methodology appropriate.

(h) Compensatory Policies and the City of Detroit's Economic Development Agenda

In the previous chapter I considered the transportation policy of the city of Detroit in the 1950's in relation to the city's physical renewal and economic development agenda. This relationship is important again in the sixties. But it must be seen in conjunction with the core of federal and state "urban policy", as the term emerged during this time, ie. various compensatory policies designed to ameliorate economic inequity and in particular its spatial concentration within cities such as Detroit as the post-war model of metropolitan development unfolded. Such policies merge with more general "Great Society" attempts to "rectify mechanisms of over-exploitation", as Castells puts it[194] and it seems unnecessary, even impossible, to draw too rigid a boundary between "urban policy" and more general social policies introduced during the sixties and which had this intent (AFDC, Medicare, Medicaid, etc.). Attempts by State government in Michigan to effect redistribution in regional resources have been touched on already. Given the inequities then in the model of metropolitan development and the limitations on the regionalist agenda of State and federal government and Big Capital locally, the city of Detroit's expectations from its economic development and renewal agenda during this period, while important, are not enough to explain its tacit approval (while not outright promotion as in the fifties) of freeway construction within the city.

The period must be considered pre and post the riots of 1967. It has been remarked that the experience of the Cavanagh administration was one of dashed hopes.[195] A close aide of Cavanagh considers that after the riots "the mayor lost heart".[196] But the Cavanagh administration started out with optimism that the federal programmes and reforms of the "Great Society" combined with the economic growth of the sixties "lifting all boats" (including the city and its residents) would secure acceptable modifications to the postwar model of regional development including as it did a major commitment to freeways. Cavanagh, an Irish Catholic, had close links to the Kennedy White House and was a close advisor to the President on "urban policy". He was a "ground floor" shaper of federal policies such as

Model Cities which were to target federal assistance to cities like Detroit.(197) Other causes of optimism at the start of the Cavanagh administration were the fact that the imposition of the city income tax had temporarily alleviated Detroit's fiscal strain.(198) And, planned during the Miriani and Cobo years, a number of new buildings did open in the Detroit CBD in 1962 - the American Natural Resources Building, the Detroit Bank and Trust Building, and First Federal Savings and Loan.(199) It should also not be forgotten that Cavanagh as Mayor still sat atop a fluid electoral base in the city made up of a majority of whites who, while perhaps having to pay higher city taxes, were not that disaffected from the model of metropolitan development which included the commitment to freeways.

The events of July 1967 brought home the depth of disaffection among blacks from this model. The Report of the National Advisory Commission on the disorders (cfp133)supports such a view. A pessimism concerning the way forward is reported to have descended upon Cavanagh from this time on.(200) The city's economic development agenda had been a disappointment. The Cavanagh administration inherited the previously designated urban renewal areas, but, given the general lack of demand for central city sites, there was an absence of major new designations. Cavanagh continued the Mayor's Committee on Commercial and Industrial Development organised by Miriani. This drew in lower level participation from the business sector and the committee at maximum had four staff people. This contrasts with the large scale city development organisations of the seventies which are discussed in the following chapter, but the legitimacy for a more direct public sector relationship with the private sector in economic development was established during these years. Of particular importance here was the creation by Cavanagh of the Detroit Metropolitan Industrial Development Corporation (DEMIDCO). This was subsequent to passage of federal legislation in 1961, supported by Kennedy, establishing the Area Redevelopment Administration (to become the Economic Development Administration in 1965). The ARA was empowered to make loans and grants to eligible areas (determined on the basis of unemployment) for economic development. Federal dollars were not to be given indiscriminately to firms meeting certain criteria and locating in these areas as in British regional policy, but in a programme more

limited in scope, were to be channelled through Local Development Corporations. LDCs were to be non-profit "quasi public" bodies with major representation from the private sector. They were to use their discretion and promote through financial assistance specific development projects. DEMIDCO was the Detroit LDC.(201) With board membership including Walter Reuther, the Ford and G.M. Presidents, and top executives from major utility companies (the Co-ordinator of the Mayor's Committee on Commercial and Industrial Development was also one of the 25 board members), DEMIDCO may be seen as a federally encouraged precursor in Detroit of the "public-private partnership" ideas of the seventies. Many Detroit banks were "lukewarm", however, in support of government intervention in the private loan market - an impediment which DEMIDCO had to face.(202)

The main project of DEMIDCO was a relative disappointment. DEMIDCO participated in the financial arrangements for the Pontchartrain Hotel - the city of Detroit's first new downtown hotel in 35 years. Situated on a prime site opposite Cobo Hall and originally planned as two towers with approximately 1,200 rooms, the hotel, when completed had only one tower with 427 rooms.(203)

The general record of office construction in the city from the mid-sixties to early seventies in comparison to the growth in suburban Southfield (Table 14) was quite anemic.(204) The State of Michigan and Detroit Recorders Court opened new buildings. The Manufactures Bank opened a new headquarters building of unassuming character in 1969 and a headquarters building for Michigan Bell Telephone got underway in the same year. In 1971 the Burroughs Corporation, having decided to remain in the city, opened a large new World Headquarters building in the New Centre area north of downtown (surrounded by the stable neighbours of General Motors on the north and Wayne State University on the south and east) and Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the major health insurance company, opened a major new office building, rising like a lonely outpost on the eastern edge of the CBD. 1971 also saw the opening of the Edison Plaza building on the north-western boundary of the CBD. Strongly encouraged by Walker Cisler, who committed Detroit Edison to a 30 year lease with the development company, this was the first in any way speculative major office

building in Detroit since World War II. And for a considerable time after opening, the Edison Plaza was a "white elephant with many floors standing empty".(205)

The general economic decline in the city of Detroit in the 1960s has been mentioned already. While corporations were joining New Detroit, they were simultaneously pursuing developments in the suburbs. In the latter part of the sixties the Budd Company decided to move its automotive division headquarters from Detroit to suburban Troy. The Kresge Company and Standard Federal Savings and Loan decided to do the same.(206) The biggest planned suburban development, however, was by Henry Ford. A realty arm of the Ford Motor Company - Ford Motor Land Development Corporation - was formed in 1970 to develop 2,360 acres of Ford owned land in Dearborn and Allen Park. The resulting development, for which ground was broken also in 1970, is built around the Ford World Headquarters. It has mushroomed into "a multi-faceted community of office buildings, a major regional shopping centre, headquarters for major national companies, restaurants and rental apartments and condominiums".(207)

The period of the Gribbs administration in Detroit, covering the four years from January 1970 to December 1973, was not one of policy innovation but can be characterised as a holding period in the transition to black control. It was in particular marked by tough law and order policies. In the mayoral election of 1969 voting took place on very strict racial lines.(208) In a polarised city Gribbs acquiesced in the further right of way acquisition for, and construction of, the Jefferies Freeway.(209) It must remain an open question, though, whether a policy stand by Cavanagh for some form of rapid transit in Detroit after 1967 - an attempt to make a reality of some of the rhetoric in TALUS - would have met with some success. The Jefferies Freeway could have been a "bargaining chip" - a general tactic used by Coleman Young in the seventies. Towards the end of his administration Cavanagh did request the former director of the Rapid Transit Commission to draw up another proposal for a Woodward Avenue transit line. The director, however, did not know the nature of Cavanagh's motivation, which was not explained to him, or in fact what became of the document which he prepared.(210) We can surmise,

perhaps, that the thought at least was on the Mayor's mind.

By the time Coleman Young took over as Mayor in 1974 the city of Detroit was becoming more dependent not just on federal but on state assistance. This fitted into the decentralisation thrust of Nixon's "New Federalism" which attempted to pull in State and local government more solidly behind nationally established social goals. The following assessment in 1967 by Richard Goodwin, advisor to President Kennedy, goes to the heart of the matter:(211)

> "The issues involved in decentralisation are remote from the old struggle over states' rights and big government. Those struggles centered on the question of whether any effort at all should be made to solve social problems through collective action and public resources. Decentralisation, however, assumes that this question is resolved affirmatively, and sees the issue as one of structure and organization."

In the same year the Committee for Economic Development strongly critiqued the performance of State governments in relation to urban problems:

> "Federalism cannot operate successfully without competent and effective government institutions <u>at all levels</u> (emphasis original) ... few state governments have sought to collaborate with their major cities - or with other local units - in meeting critical local necessities. Many states have been more active in seeking new types and larger amounts of federal aid than in modernizing either their own revenue systems or those of their local units."(212)

The same report makes a thinly veiled threat by quoting Governor Evans of Washington:(213)

> "State governments are unquestionably on trial today. If we are not willing to pay the price, if we cannot change where change is required, then we have only one recourse. And that is to prepare for an orderly transfer of our remaining responsibilities to the federal government."

In January 1968, the "Governor's Special Commission on Urban Problems", established by Romney in December 1966 and chaired by James Wright, President of Federal - Mogul Corporation, made its report and admonished the State of Michigan for over-reliance on federal government:

> "In past years, the State's urban areas, lacking resources of the magnitude necessary to deal effectively with their (urban) problems, have turned primarily to the Federal government for assistance."(214)

In 1967, as the culmination of a "battle" which had been going on for many years, Governor Romney succeeded in piloting a state income tax proposal through a recalcitrant Michigan legislature (the state had previously relied on the sales tax and other revenue sources).(215) The need to target financial assistance to Detroit and other "distressed" urban areas may be seen as blending with the need to finance growing state expenditure generally (in particular due to a major absolute and relative increase in public welfare expenditures from 10.7% of State expenditure in 1962 to 22.6% in 1972 - many of the beneficiaries, of course, in the city of Detroit.)(216)

A portion of the new income tax receipts was earmarked (as "state revenue sharing") for localities on a per capita basis.(217) This provision, over the four Detroit fiscal years of 1968-1971, brought in an additional $18 million to the city.(218) But it was not enough to deal with a mounting Detroit fiscal crisis which thrust itself into state level politics. In 1970 Governor Milliken persuaded the legislature to make a $5 million grant to Detroit to be used for police and fire protection. A serious problem was again in the offing however, in that the soon to be released 1970 Census data would show a major decline in Detroit's population which in turn would translate into reduced state revenue sharing payments. The 1971 Revenue Sharing Act, which was pushed by Governor Milliken in the legislature in the light of this impending fact, was hailed by his administration as a major step forward in targeting state fiscal assistance to Detroit. This introduced local "tax effort" as a formula factor, in addition to population, in sharing the state income tax and other revenues with localities. Since Detroit taxed itself

heavily, its total state revenue sharing payment almost doubled between 1971 and 1972 - from $22.8 million to $43.3 million.[219] The principal of aid to local governments dependent on how hard they taxed themselves was, however, rolled back somewhat by legislative action in 1972. "Tax effort" was supplemented by "tax burden" - a measure including the property taxes of overlapping governments, the county, school district and special districts. The main beneficiaries of this change not surprisingly were townships and suburban cities having relatively low property taxes for their own municipal purposes.[220]

Footnotes

1. Conot, Robert op.cit. p.448

2. Interviews with Dr John Perentesis and Dr Bernard Klein

3. Conot, Robert op.cit. p.448

4. Widick, B.J. op.cit. p.207

5. See in particular:
   (a) **Report of the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders,** Bantham Books, 1968, pp.84-108
   (b) Conot, Robert op.cit. pp.523-543
   (c) Widick, B.J. op.cit. pp.166-185

6. Quoted in Widick, B.J. op.cit. p.198

7. See Glazer, Sidney op.cit. p.107 and Table 6 in Appendix 1

8. Miller, Raymond C. **Detroit - A Symbol of the New America,** in Inside Michigan Vol.1, No.1, July 1951 p.36

9. Mollenkopf, John H. op.cit. pp.141-142

10. Conot, Robert op.cit. p.530

11. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, op.cit. pp.10-11

12. Ibid. pp.10-11

13. Ibid. pp.10-11

14. Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, **The Federal Role in the Federal System : The Dynamics of Growth - A Crisis of Confidence and Competence,** Washington D.C. July 1980 p.4

15. Castells, Manuel **The Urban Question : A Marxist Approach,** MIT Press, 1977 p.395

16. Ibid. p.396

17. Ibid. p.396

18. Ibid. p.396

19. Quoted in: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, July 1980, op.cit. p.11

20. Nation's Cities, Special issue **"What Kind of City do we want?",** April 1967

21. Ibid. pp.20-21

22. Ibid. pp.20 and 24

23. Ibid. p.24

24. Mumford, Lewis op.cit. pp.244-256

25. Editors of Fortune, **The Exploding Metropolis**, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958

26. Stollman, Gerald H **Michigan State Legislators and Their Work**, University of America Press 1979 pp.1-2

27. The Committee for Economic Development has characterized state powers as follows:
"Many vital matters are within state jurisdiction. States have broad regulatory powers over persons and property. They charter corporations, control the terms of business contracts, license trades and professions, grant land titles, protect private and civil rights, regulate utilities, and set the legal framework of family organization through marriage, divorce, support and adoption legislation. Authority to limit the uses of land and other property in order to abate water and air pollution or other dangers to the public health resides in the states. Building codes and zoning plans rest on state powers. The manner of use or failure to exercise these powers should not obscure their existence.

In the daily exercise of their sweeping authority, state and local governments manage the bulk of civil government operations in the United States. Universal public education is mandated, regulated, and largely financed by them. Higher education is also heavily state supported. Highways are constructed mostly by the states. Vast hospitals and institutional networks, including those for mental health and corrections, are under state management. The administration of criminal justice depends primarily on state courts and in increasing measure on state police. About half the states manage public welfare programs directly, the other half through their local units."

Modernizing State Government, Committee for Economic Development, Washington D.C. 1967, p.12

28. O'Connor, James op.cit. p.83

29. In 1974 38.4% of Michigan employees were members of national unions (excluding employees in agricultural establishments). West Virgina came second with 38.2%. Bluestone, Barry and Harrison Bennett, **Capital and Communities : The Causes and Consequences of Private Disinvestment**, Progressive Alliance, Washington D.C. 1980 Table 28 p.189

30. Peircie, Neal, R. and Keefe, John **The Great Lake States of America - People, Politics and Power in the Five Great Lakes States**, W.W. Norton & Co. New York 1980 p.191

31. Ibid. p.191

32. Stieber, Carolyn **The Politics of Change in Michigan**, Michigan State University Press 1970 p.6

33. Peirce, Neal, R. and Keefe John op.cit. p.182

34. Ibid. p.183

35. Stollman, Gerald H. **Michigan : State Legislators and Their Work,** University Press of America, 1979 pp.44-47

36. Ibid. p.47

37. Ibid. pp.89-90

38. In June 1964 the U.S. Supreme Court in Reynold Vs. Sims declared that both houses of state legislatures had to be based on a standard of population to satisfy the 14th Amendment.

39. Stieber, Carolyn op.cit. p.88

40. For changes brought by the new Michigan Constitution see: Pollock James K. **Making Michigan's New Constitution 1961-1962,** George Wahr Publishing Co. Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1962

41. Roman, William C. **State Planning in Michigan,** unpublished Masters Thesis, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1964 pp.1-61. Also interview with Marv Tableman, aide to Governor Swainson.

42. Quoted in Roman, William C. op.cit. p.7

43. Ibid. p.7

44. The fact that the State bureaucracy and budget with entrenched interests and constituencies is geared to incremental change was a factor in the demise of PBES. And the sheer organizational problems were considerable. However in the words of one senior budget analyst: "the greatest point of resistance was with legislators concerned with the impact of the budget on their districts and who often turned the new budget document over to their aides in anger". Interview with Dr Richard Willits. For details of Michigan's PBES initiative see: **A Guide to Michigan's Program Evaluation System,** State of Michigan, 1973

45. State of Michigan, **Economic Report of the Governor 1974,** Table VI, p.19

46. In 1971 the per capita income for Michigan was $4,355. For the Detroit tri-county area it was $4,824. **Michigan Statistical Abstract,** 16th Edition, Michigan State University, 1982

47. Mattila, John M and Moor Jr. J.R., **The S.E. Michigan Economy : Past, Present and Future,** op.cit. Table 7, p.25

48. **Michigan Statistical Abstract,** 17th Edition. Wayne State University, 1983. Table XVI-I p.484

49. This is an oft quoted statistic: See for example: **The U.S. Automobile Industry, 1980, Report to the President from the Secretary of Transportation,** Washington D.C. 1981 p.1

50. **Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,** op.cit. pp.140-141

51. For a description see: SEMCOG, **Land Use Trends in S.E. Michigan,** Detroit, Michigan, 1976, pp.19-20

52. **Detroit Regional Transportation and Land Use Study (TALUS)** Preliminary Plan, 3 volumes. Southeast Michigan, 1969, Vol.2, p.VI-A-1 and p.VI-A-2, Fig.VI-A-1.

53. Dedication Ceremonies for the Fisher Freeway, September 17, 1970 (not ascribed to any source)

54. The following description of the project is drawn from TALUS Vol.1, op.cit. pp.I-1 to I-8.

55. Ibid. p.I-3

56. Ibid. p.I-4

57. Ibid. p.III-1

58. Ibid. p(i)

59. Ibid. p(ii)

60. Ibid. p(i)

61. TALUS, Vol.2, op.cit. Chapters V and VI

62. TALUS, Vol.1, op.cit. p(ii)

63. Ibid. pp.III 4-5

64. TALUS, op.cit. Vol.2, p.V-C-44

65. TALUS, op.cit. Vol.1, p.III-7

66. Ibid. p.III-3

67. Ibid. p.III-3

68. Ibid. p.III-3

69. TALUS, op.cit. Vol.3, p.IV-B-8

70. Ibid. p.IV-B-2

71. TALUS, op.cit. Vol.2, p.VIII-1

72. Ibid. p.IV-C-12

73. Ibid. p.VIII-15

74. Ibid. p.V-C-43

75. Ibid. p.V-C-42

76. TALUS, op.cit. Vol.1 p.III-5

77. Interview with Dr John Perentesis

78. Interview with Dr Bernard Klein

79. Information supplied by Route Location, Michigan Department of Transportation

80. Interview with Dr John Perentesis

81. Ibid.

82. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas (New York) **A Study of Public Transit in the Southeast Michigan Six-County Region**, A Research Project by Metropolitan Fund Inc., Detroit, July 1967, p.6

83. Ibid. Introductory Policy Statement by Metropolitan Fund, p.xii

84. TALUS, op.cit. Vol.1, p.III-4

85. Interview with Jack Steiner, Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce

86. In 1960, there were an average of 366,000 daily trips from home to work between Detroit and the suburbs. Of these, 37% or 135,000 were trips by Detroiters to suburban work places; 63% or 231,000 were trips by suburbanites to work places in Detroit.

    By 1965, the total number of home-to-work trips between Detroit and the suburbs had increased to 433,000. Work trips by suburbanites into Detroit increased to 234,000 and constituted 54% of the total; trips by Detroit residents to suburban work places increased by almost half, to 199,000 and constituted 46% of the 1965 total.

    TALUS, op.cit. Vol.2, p.Vi-B-10

87. The Grand Trunk Western Railroad provided four in-bound and four out-bound trains daily for commuter service via the Woodward Ave. corridor but rail commuting service in total in the region was "insignificant". Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas, op.cit. p.3

88. Ibid. p.10

89. TALUS, op.cit., Vol.1, p.II-B-49

90. Shanahan, James L. **Spatial Isolation and Job Opportunities for Low Skill Residents in the Core of the Detroit SMSA.** PhD Dissertation, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1972 pp.131-132 and p.112. Shanahan defines "the core" as roughly a 24 sq.mile area surrounding the CBD.

91. Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority (SEMTA), "SEMTA is ...", Detroit, undated, p.6

92. Interview with Jack Steiner, Detroit Chamber of Commerce

93. Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, St.Clair, Washtenaw and Monroe, Livingston joined in 1974

94. Interview with Donn Shelton, Executive Director of Metropolitan Fund.

95. Interview with Gary Krause, Director of Transportation Planning for SEMTA (now General Manager of SEMTA)

96. Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority, Annual Report, 1978, p.29

97. Meyers, Edwards M and Musial, John J **Urban Incentive Tax Credits, A Self-Correcting Strategy to Rebuild Central Cities,** Detroit City Plan Commission, April 1972, p.29

98. Ibid. p.36

99. New Detroit Committee, **Progress Report,** April 1968, Detroit, p.130

100. The following account of busing in the Detroit region draws heavily upon: Rzepka, Marianne and Franklin, Stephen **Races are still apart in Detroit Schools,** in Ed. McGehee, Scott and Watson, Susan, Blacks in Detroit, a reprint of articles from the Detroit Free Press, Detroit, December 198o

101. Interview with Donn Shelton, Executive Director of Metropolitan Fund.

102. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-25, No.670, Issued May 1977

103. Ghere, Richard K, op.cit. p.18

104. We will consider Nixon's New Federalism shortly

105. Committee for Economic Development, **Modernizing Local Government to Secure a Balanced Federalism,** A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee, Washington, July 1966 p.44

106. Interview with Donn Shelton, Executive Director M.F. Included in the largest contributors were the Big 3 automakers, the utility companies, major banks, Hudsons and Winkleman the retail concerns; Burroughs and Bendix.

107. Metropolitan Fund Inc., **Regional New Town Design, A Paired Community for S.E. Michigan,** February 1971, p.iv

108. Ibid. p.iv

109. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, **Southeast Michigan Regionalism,** in Ed. Mathewson Kent, The Regionalist Papers, 2nd Ed., Metropolitan Fund Inc., Detroit, 1978 p.83
In 1916 the organization was formed as the Detroit Bureau of

Governmental Research. It conducted studies of regional governmental problems in the twenties and thirties. In the early 1950's its name was changed to Citizens Research Council of Michigan reflecting its increasing statewide orientation.

110. Interview with Donn Shelton, Executive Director of M.F.

111. Remarks by Kent Mathewson, President of Metropolitan Fund Inc. at the **Governmental Organization Conference and 11th Annual Meeting of the Supervisors Inter-County Committee**, Detroit, June 10, 1965

112. Remarks by Reid, Thomas, ibid.

113. Remarks by Mathewson Kent, ibid.

114. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, Southeast Michigan Regionalism. op.cit. p.88

115. Citizens Research Council Michigan, **Press Release and Related Information on Governmental Organization for Metropolitan S.E. Michigan**, Detroit, June 1965

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.

119. Interview with State Representative William Ryan

120. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, Press Release and Related Information, op.cit.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid. Remarks of Thomas Reid, Ford Motor Co.

123. Ibid.

124. Committee of One Hundred, **Final Report of the Committee of One Hundred, A Proposal for a Voluntary Council of Governments in S.E. Michigan**, Detroit, June 1966

125. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, Southeast Michigan Regionalism, op.cit. p.90

126. Interview with Donn Shelton, Executive Director of M.F.

127. Southeast MIchigan Council of Governments, **The COG Camera**, SEMCOG Newsletter, Special edition, Detroit, June 1970

128. Ibid.

129. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, Southeast Michigan Regionalism, op.cit. p.92

130. Southeast Michigan Council of Governments, the COG Camera,

op.cit. p.3

131. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, Southeast Michigan Regionalism, op.cit. p.92

132. Livingston County with the much smaller population of just under 60,000 in 1970, joined SEMCOG in 1972. Ibid.

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135. Tschirhart, Don, **Troubled Four Years Ends for Departing SEMCOG Chief**, Detroit News, April 7, 1972

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143. Ibid.

144. Graves, Helen, M. **New Detroit Committee/New Detroit Inc. A Case Study of an Urban Coalition, 1967-1972**, PhD Dissertation, Wayne State University, Detroit, 1975, p.122 and pp.630-631.

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150. Ibid. p.88

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162. State of Michigan, The Governor's Special Commission on Local Government Report, 1972

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193. Interview with Dr Bernard Klein, aide and city comptroller under Mayor Cavannagh

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CHAPTER 5

TRANSPORTATION POLICY FORMATION 1973-1984

(a) Introduction

(b) The Changed National Economic Context

(c) Detroit and Industrial Restructuring in the Auto Industry

(d) The State of Michigan - Economic Development Scramble 1973-1984

(e) Intraregional Economic, Demographic and Spatial Change

(f) Transportation Policy Formation

(g) The Regionalist Dynamic

(h) Detroit's Economic Development Strategy

(a) Introduction

Past chapters have presented the argument that the broad dynamic of transportation policy formation in Detroit can be understood primarily in terms of the development of class relationships. Derivative concepts employed (the reproduction of labour power, intra class cleavages etc) have been, therefore, at a fairly macro level of analysis. The use of such concepts does not imply an insensitivity or lack of appreciation to the fact that planners or other policy agents can be subject to other pressures and constraints with a less direct relationship to class or that they behave in ways that are subjectively meaningful to themselves. We have been wary in particular of top down structuralist Marxist theorizing as applied to Detroit. At the present time, however, when structuralism has fewer adherents (cf pps.282-83) and where studies of more limited scope are the order of the day (cf page 301) it seems necessary to stress the continued usefulness of attempts to theorize the macro level process attempted by structuralism. The challenge would seem one of susceptibility to recognising a class pattern to events (where perhaps more than one pattern would have been possible) rather than a simple class determination. In this vein the present chapter presents a continued class pattern to transportation policy formation in Detroit. The latter it is argued, must be understood over the last ten years as fundamentally related to two major factors:

1. Tensions inherent in the post-war model of metropolitan development leading eventually to a breakdown in consensus on transportation issues.
2. Significant underlying economic changes in the model of development itself; most notably, heightened capital mobility (the Sunbelt/Frostbelt cleavage and "the new international division of labour") and a breakdown of the "Pax Americana" as represented most starkly by "Reaganomics".

The two major themes pursued in considering transportation policy against the above factors are the "regionalist" dimension (metropolitan governmental fracture) in an atmosphere of even more intense economic competition and the economic development agenda of the city of Detroit itself, in relation to which transportation policy

(most notably the commitment of the city to a rapid transit system) has been conceived.

(b) The Changed National Economic Context

This is dealt with firstly in general terms and then more specifically in the next section in relation to Michigan and Detroit. The general discussion is built around: (1) the pressure to curb the growth of the federal budget even before the Reagan administration (cities such as Detroit could not count on increasing federal largesse) and (2) the breakdown in the seventies, with all that is entailed in it, of the "Pax Americana".

As Brand[1] puts it, "... the 1970 recession had generated high unemployment without moderating collective bargaining settlements - proof that worker militancy is not in any mechanical sense deterred by unemployment". The effect of an expanded "social safety net" was at work here and was also, undoubtedly, directly a factor in greater overall levels of unemployment in the seventies as compared to the sixties (Table 12). But more importantly, following the demise of the wage-price controls initiated by President Nixon in 1971, during the Ford and Carter administrations the control of inflation (ie. the generation of confidence that continued investment would be profitable) was pursued as a policy goal at the expense of employment. The instruments were monetary policy and increasingly fiscal restraint. Budgetary expansion was opposed in 1979 by President Carter's Council of Economic Advisors on the grounds that it would "heighten expectations of inflation".[2] This is because incurring deficits to finance domestic or military spending was by the mid to late seventies, even with much productive capacity lying idle, no longer an easy policy option - it had to be seen in relation to possible expansionary effects on the economy, rise in employment and consequent pressure on profits which again would fuel inflation. And the expectation that this would occur was enough itself to fuel inflation. Harrison[3] in this regard points to the "limits of Keynesianism" - that while it can alleviate difficulties in the realisation of surplus value (through expansionary policy), "it can do

nothing to ease problems in its production'. A policy report in 1979 by the Committee for Economic Development noted that the most significant change in the pattern of federal expenditure over the previous twenty years had been "the rapid increase in domestic transfer payments and federal expenditures through grants-in-aid to state and local governments". Noting in particular the "expansion of social programs during the 1960's and 1970's", the report pointed out that federal spending for domestic transfer payments and grants-in-aid had increased from 5.4% of GNP 1957-1959 to 12.7% 1977-1979.(4) But, as ACIR pointed out the following year, this trend was already changing. Taking into account the Carter proposals for fiscal year 1981, the real purchasing power of federal aid to states and localities would have declined for three successive years.(5) Given the attention which has focussed in the seventies on the views of James O'Connor concerning state expenditure, it is appropriate to consider this for a moment. O'Connor(6) argues that there is constant pressure on the state within present monopoly capitalism in the U.S. to assume more and more "costs of production" (whether social capital or expense expenditures as he defines them).(7) This expansion of the state (more infrastructure, more education, more R&D, etc.) in fact is a condition for the expansion of monopoly capital. But because large monopoly sector corporations and unions strongly resist state taxation to finance this expenditure, O'Connor argues that there is "a tendency for government expenditures to outrace revenues" and hence a tendency towards "a fiscal crisis of the state".(8) While O'Connor himself recognises that there is no "iron law"(9) involved, there would seem a danger of interpreting this "tendency" too rigidly. The efforts by the Carter administration to pare back growing budget deficits is probably best interpreted as a need to control inflation (and its deleterious effect on profit expectations and hence investment) - not simply in terms of the inability of government to finance the expenditure per se (whether via taxes or indirectly through the burden of inflation).

Other structural changes in the U.S. economy of the seventies and eighties with a major bearing on the context for transportation policy formation in Detroit (integrated as it was more than ever for the city during this time with an economic development programme) can be

related to what Bluestone and Harrison have called the breakdown of the "Pax Americana".[10] The competition between "Frostbelt" and "Sunbelt", which matured in the seventies to the point where Business-week in 1976 referred to the "second war between the states", was an important first chapter in this.[11] A consideration of some data is instructive here. Manufacturing employment in the U.S. increased by only slightly over 1% between 1970 and 1977, but within this relatively stable national pattern, regional shifts were quite substantial. Between 1970 and 1977 the Northeast and Midwest lost 742,000 manufacturing jobs (a decline of almost 6.5%), while the South and West gained more than 958,000 (an increase of over 12%). The real source of job growth in the U.S. in the seventies, however, was in services (a 32% increase of almost 3.7 million jobs). In this the "Frostbelt" lagged substantially behind, with an increase of approximately 1.4 million being eclipsed by an increase of 2.2 million in the South and West.[12] While in 1970 more than half of all non-agricultural jobs were in the Northeast and Midwest, by 1977 the scale had tipped to the South and West.[13]

Behind this locational shift (which took not so much the form of physical relocation of existing plants, but rather a redirection of new investment),[14] Bluestone and Harrison have argued in a major study of the phenomenon, has been two major and interrelated factors: the desire to escape higher wage rates and the very presence of unionization itself. They quote Donovan Dennis, Vice-President of FANTUS corporation, a major plant-location consulting firm, who was asked to name the single most important determinant of plant-location. He responded: "Labor costs are the big thing, far and away. Nine out of ten times you can hang it on labor costs and unionization".[15]

It is against this background that a consultant's report in 1977, commissioned by the Michigan Department of Commerce and focussing on the potential for co-operation between Mid-west states in economic development, concluded that "all states devote substantial resources to inducing industrial growth and there is considerable feeling that a state of unremitting and irreversible competition exists in the field".[16] Yet the harsh irony in this is that the mechanisms used in the interstate economic "warfare" - less stringent regulatory

climate, more favourable workman's compensation and unemployment rates but especially state and local government tax concessions - do not figure strongly in the locational calculus of companies.[17] Based on an extensive review of the evidence, Bluestone and Harrison conclude: "Corporations first choose a site based on general economic conditions and then attempt to manoeuvre the political climate to fit its needs" (emphasis original).[18] The consultant's report to the Michigan Commerce Department, mentioned above, could "not deny that state efforts on occasion result in single plant locations that bring several hundred (or thousand) jobs and considerable investment" but in general concluded that "there is little evidence that they (the Midwest states studied) are inducing much of their growth from outside their borders".[19]

In answer to the question then, why states engage in such competition, Kanter comments that state officials are "afraid to be critical of state business subsidies". Many of them, according to her experience, believed that subsidies worked in an indirect manner, communicating to the business community that a state is "pro-business". To be against them was a gamble states were not prepared to take.[20] This becomes even more understandable when one considers the attention and publicity given by state level business associations to the "business climate". The poor Michigan "business climate" (taxes, regulation, and other government imposed costs of doing business in Michigan) has been an ongoing rallying point of the Michigan Manufacturers Association. Bluestone and Harrison in fact argue that the effort spent by business in lobbying for improved business climates seems "out of all proportion to the potential dollar savings",[21] and they advance the hypothesis that what is primarily involved is a direct and indirect attack (through revenue reductions) on the "social wage" with increased worker insecurity and hence malleability for the production process (the "social wage" defined as "the package of non-wage benefits which governments provide to workers in order to maintain their health and purchasing power when they are unable to work").[22] Markusen[23] makes the general point that the structure of American federalism is well suited to the ability of business to play off one state against another:

"The intergovernmental allocation of responsibilities and

resources, especially in the areas of tax, welfare, and labor policy, have allowed regional differentiation to flourish in ways that are functional for capital. A labor policy that has left questions like right-to-work, workman's compensation, and health and safety issues up to the states has permitted the more conservative dominated states to prevent unionization in the South and to undercut Northern unions by attracting industry away from high wage areas. Similarly tax and welfare policies left to the discretion of the several states have resulted in competition that tends to discourage high tax and welfare levels, with industrial relocation among the states as the disciplining force. On the other hand, where competition among states would hurt capital (eg. trade policy, banking policy) functions are centralized at the federal level."

If the "war between the states" in the seventies was putting the post-war "pact" between Capital and Labour under strain, by the end of that decade the relationship could be seen to be breaking down altogether. The Iranian oil shortfall in 1979 and the subsequent switch in consumer preference towards smaller, fuel-efficient cars, produced especially by the Japanese, may be seen as bringing matters to a head. The issue was one of the performance of the U.S. economy in general. Since 1973 there had been virtually no growth in real GNP per capita in the U.S.(24) This could not be simply attributed to the rise in energy costs. Other industrialised countries more dependent on foreign oil had maintained better productivity and more rapidly rising living standards during this period.(25) That the economic dynamic, based on suburbanisation and the automobile, had lost some of its momentum was recognised by a Congressional committee in 1982, (cf. page95)but as to the most fundamental factor behind the sluggishness of the American economy there was general agreement among business analysts (though by no means agreement on the solution): the failure of the American economy to adequately respond to the challenge of foreign competition. In a special issue in June 1980, entitled "The Reindustrialization of America", Businessweek pointed to the "precipitous loss of competitiveness of the last 15 years, of which this year's wave of plant closings across the continent is only the most vivid manifestation".(26) It stated that "even business shared

some of the blame for this decline".[27] But it was clear that Labour would have to accept a new realism. The "illusion that the pie to be divided up would never stop expanding" would have to be dispelled.[28] The heightened "industrial restructuring" which has been taking place in the United States over the past five years will be examined shortly in relation to the automobile industry which has particular significance for Michigan and Detroit. But in general terms, integral to the process, is the importance of "new technology" as embodied in goods and services produced and in the mode of their production. On both these fronts the future for job creation is uncertain. Alvin Toffler,[29] for example, foresees major future job growth in the U.S. based on biotechnology, space and marine technology and the computer industry. Goddard[30] points out that "the prospect of a technologically led revival of employment opportunities where the emphasis switches to the introduction of totally new products and services" (a new impulse to the capitalist engine) cannot be discounted. But the following recent assessment by Weiss of "high technology" and the future of employment in the U.S. probably best sums up the record so far:[31]

> "... (the) common case is that of modest to substantial direct job growth, but massive indirect job loss. The production of new information-processing, communication, and other technologies is leading to a virtual revolution in the organization of work and society. Such changes involve a vast retooling and restructuring of all forms of employment (as well as consumption) in terms of both geographic location/organization and social division of labour."

Weiss points to the Businessweek prediction in August 1981 that 25 million current jobs would be eliminated in the U.S. in the following two decades due to the introduction of new technologies.[32] In the emerging restructured economy Weiss sees "an important segment of the middle of the U.S. job structure vanishing, in the sense of relatively well-paid, stable, skilled manufacturing-related employment", and a gulf emerging, with the "deskilling" effect of new technology, between two main categories of employment: top well-paid professionals versus much lower paid unskilled labour, which in many instances, especially in manufacturing production, is vulnerable to competition from even

lower paid foreign labour.[33] Indeed, heightened capital mobility, facilitated by new technology, necessitates an understanding of industrial restructuring at an international level. In this regard Cohen refers to the

> "... new international division of labour ... a system for production on a world scale in which even greater numbers of people are integrated into activities carried on by large international producers of goods and by international firms which service these producers. Both the work process and the facilities used to produce goods and services are organized according to the demands of firms operating in a world market.
>
> "... in perhaps its most profound impact, the NIDL has integrated qualitatively different types of laborers with very different levels of work experience, highly varied types of social backgrounds and vastly divergent histories of labor organization into corporate organizations which operate on a world level."[34]

To be sure, Barnet and Muller[35] published their masterful account of the "Global Reach" of multinational corporations ten years ago. What is increasing, however, is the ability of such corporations to integrate and control production at a world scale. As Bluestone and Harrison put it:

> "Satellite-linked telex communcations and wide-bodied cargo jets provide a technical environment that has allowed production to become far more spatially 'footloose' than ever before. The linking of communications systems to computers permits central management to coordinate worldwide operations at lightening speed..."[36]

And importantly they add:[37]

> "The capital mobility option provided by the new technology has shifted the fulcrum of bargaining power in favour of capital to an unprecedented degree."

Gough,[38] in relation to the British context, has pointed to the ideological content of "Thatcherism" in mediating economic crisis. He

warns against any "crudely functionalist interpretation".[39] Likewise "Reaganomics", it can be argued, must be seen as an ideological response (a possible response amongst several that have been articulated) to the central problem of bolstering the profitability of American capital in the face of foreign competition. Summing up the Reagan economic programme, Bluestone and Harrison declare that "capital has unilaterally ended even lip service to the great postwar social contract".[40]

> "To reindustrialize America, the federal government is insisting on creating a 'good business climate' in the United States through extreme cuts in corporate taxes, drastic reductions in the government's guarantee of the social safety net, and the virtual deregulation of the public sector."[41]

Bluestone and Harrison argue that only if "Reaganomics" supply-side tax incentives are seen in relation to the cuts in social wage expenditures with the aim of "discipling" labour and in relation to deregulation, does the whole programme "make sense". Tax cuts, they point out, deprive the government of the means with which to finance the social safety net.[42] The general approach had been articulated in a major publication of the Committee for Economic Development, entitled "Redefining Government's Role in the Market System", in July 1979. It concluded that "government is placing increasingly excessive demands on the private sector and that the results are decreased productivity and increased inflation ... The political system, with its goals of improving public well-being and achieving greater equality, is exerting more and more pressure on the economic process, which emphasises efficiency."[43]

One platform in the "Reaganomics" programme of particular relevance to present concern is the "New Federalism" agenda (or more accurately "New Federalism Mark II"), since it has meant a drastic cut in federal grants-in-aid to states and localities.[44] As opposed to the Nixon brand of new federalism where the issue was essentially one of state and local administration of programmes based on federally established goals and funding the Reagan philosophy, as announced in its fully fledged form in 1982,[45] envisaged a major return of responsibilities (including AFDC and food stamp programmes) and their funding to states

and localities. This prompted the major business journal "Fortune" to ask: "Who will care for the poor? Reagan's federalism would thrust responsibility for them onto the states. But some things in our society only Washington should do."(46) Likewise Businessweek, the other major business journal in the U.S., had serious reservations about federal cutbacks in aid to state and local governments at a time when they were being "crowded out" of financial markets by the borrowing demands of the private sector and especially the escalating demands of the federal government itself. Businessweek's concern, expressed in a Special Report in October 1981, was that the Reagan programme for economic growth would ultimately stumble because the necessary public investments in physical and human capital would not be forthcoming to support it. Almost as if directly supporting the thesis of O'Connor, the report stated:

> "It is perfectly true that the private sector has carried the responsibility for economic growth throughout the history of this nation. But at virtually every stage of the nation's history, growth was dependent on a balance between private and public investment. ... there is no reason to believe that this histocial necessity for balanced investment has come to an end."(47)

Again, almost as if sounding the alarm, "Newsweek" in August 1982, declaring that "our dams, bridges, and water systems are rapidly falling apart", carried as its cover story the dramatic declaration: "The Decaying of America".(48)

The Reagan economic programme has in other words spurred a major debate over the principles of national economic policy in America. The major "reformist" alternatives which have been articulated and which are in the process of finding a home in the Democratic party, are probably most closely associated with the prescriptions of Businessweek,(49) and the writings of Reich,(50) Thurow,(51) and Rohatyn.(52) It is beyond present scope to consider these in depth. But in general drawing particularly upon Japanese and German experience, they all involve the recognition of the interdependency of the public and private sectors and the need to "hitch" government support very directly behind the goal of improving the international competitiveness of American capital. The vehicle is a new "industrial

policy" incorporating a new "social contract" with labour based on co-operation in industrial restructuring involving certain guarantees of security rather than the conflict inherent in the disciplining approach of Reaganomics. It is this debate over "Corporatism" and Reaganomics that forms an important part of the context for economic development and linked to this transportation policy in Detroit in 1985. Other major contextual factors necessary to "situate" economic development and transportation policy formation in Detroit include:

(a) The current industrial restructuring in the automobile industry as if effects Detroit, and
(b) The economic development agenda of State government as it has emerged over this period.

In the following sections these will be considered in turn.

(c) Detroit and Industrial Restructuring in the Auto Industry

The American automobile manufacturers since 1979, with the public's major shift in preference towards smaller, fuel-efficient cars, have been brought sharply up against the harsh reality of foreign competition and the technology, organisation, and labour relations on which it was based. Consequent industrial restructuring in the industry is still very much in progress and it centres around:

(a) Major product changes, ie. more aluminium, plastics, and electronics, a switch to front-wheel drive etc., and most importantly increased standardisation at a world-scale; and

(b) The interconnection of new production technology (especially automation and robotics) and new organisational relationships - including the multi-sourcing of components, new inventory control systems, competitive alliances between American and foreign companies, and the use of the "new international division of labour" with calls for more realism and responsibility (including wage restraint and even "rollbacks") from American workers.(53)

Changes over the past five years have been dramatic. The U.S. auto-industry lost $4.2 billion in 1980 and $1.3 billion in 1981.(54) In 1980, with over 11 million motor vehicles produced (as against just over 8 million in the U.S.) Japan surpassed the U.S. in total vehicle production.(55) Table 15 shows the dramatic decline in motor vehicle production in the U.S., Michigan and Detroit region between 1978 and 1982. With the Japanese import penetration capturing 30% of the American car market,(56) the 1.35 million fewer vehicles produced by Detroit in 1982 was not simply attributable to any cyclical downturn in the American economy. Most dramatic of the difficulties faced by the American manufacturers were the troubles of the Chrysler Corporation (which had suffered from a particular lack of foresight in management)(57) saved only from bankruptcy by major federal government intervention in the form of a $1.5 billion loan guarantee in December 1979. Chrysler employment in Michigan actually fell by almost half (from 80,000 to 42,500) between 1979 and 1981,(58) and the major brunt of this, in terms of plant closures, was borne by the city of Detroit, where Chrysler had 15 out of its 21 facilities in the metropolitan area in May 1980.(59) Excluding the major closure of the Chrysler

assembly plant in the enclave city of Hamtramck in 1979, between May 1980 and March 1983, Chrysler had closed, or had scheduled for closure, seven major facilities out of its total of fifteen within the city of Detroit - including its Lynch Road assembly plant.(60)

Table 16 shows the dramatic fall in employment and rise in unemployment in the Detroit region between 1978 and 1982. Wage and salary employment (excluding the self employed) declined by almost one-quarter million - this overwhelmingly reflecting a decline in manufacturing employment and especially declines in transportation equipment and metals. Based on a review of structural change in the automobile industry, a report from the U.S. Secretary of Transportation to the President in January 1981 projected "the potential loss of roughly 500,000 manufacturing jobs in the next ten years, almost all of them located in a handful of states and cities of the industrial Northeast and Midwest".(61) At the beginning of 1981, the U.S. automakers were planning to spend $70 billion in an investment programme over the following five years to produce the smaller, fuel efficient cars demanded by the market.(62) While G.M. with access to greater resources planned a major programme of new plant construction in the U.S., Ford and Chrysler have concentrated on the revamping of existing facilities. Indications, so far, from the nature and spatial allocation of these resources, while not entirely pessimistic for the Detroit region, indicate that the prediction of the U.S. Department for Transportation may be reasonably accurate. Amongst the U.S. automakers, Ford and G.M. are moving towards the concept of a "world car" - a vehicle to serve all markets. The advantages include economies of scale due to standardisation of components and the greater flexibility and control provided over labour by the parallel or multi sourcing of components.(63) U.S. auto manufacturers, it is predicted, will be importing 15% of their components from overseas in 1990.(64) Yet the American manufacturers are not leaving North America. About $50 billion (70%) of the current $70 billion wave of reinvestment by the auto companies will be located in North America(65) and the bulk of this is in the Midwest.(66) With the exception of Chrysler, assembly plant closures and "mothballing" have taken place at the periphery of the automotive heartland - in California, New Jersey, and Georgia.(67) The major reason for this

locational emphasis lies in the continued existence of a vast automobile supplier network in the Midwest linked, as is happening, to a switch by the U.S. auto companies to the "kanban" or "just-in-time" Japenese inventory control system which cuts significantly down on the need for working capital aggravated as it is by high interest rates.(68) It is very likely, therefore, that Michigan's share of U.S. vehicle production will continue to exceed 30%.(69) The associated employment prospects, however, for Michigan and Detroit are less encouraging. Vehicle downsizing is one factor which will result in a permanent loss of demand for the products of Michigan's foundry, steel, forgings, and stamping industries. And smaller engines will shrink the market for piston rings, bearings, and other machine parts made in Michigan.(70) The increased use of electronic components, aluminium, and plastics will tend to favour southern suppliers.(71) But perhaps above all is the impact of automation. The investment by the auto producers in the U.S. is highly capital intensive as opposed to more labour intensive investments in locations such as Mexico and Brazil.(72) Stonier(73) has advanced the interesting thesis that:

> "One of the major questions to arise by the end of the 1980's will be that the Third World whose competitive advantage was enhanced by the availability of cheap labour, will find itself in an increasingly disadvantaged position as the new capital intensive, automated equipment produces goods more cheaply than the cheap manual labour of the Third World."

While this may be true, the impact of automation on job loss in the U.S. auto industry will be substantial. Jobs may be kept in the U.S. and Michigan, but there will be less of them. A major Delphi forecast of the industry has estimated that total employment of the U.S. vehicle manufacturers will permanently drop by almost 20% (a loss of 200,000 jobs) in the decade of the eighties. The loss in jobs among U.S. auto suppliers was projected at 400,000.(74) The U.S. Department of Commerce has estimated a permanent loss, from the 1978 peak, of 150,000 jobs involved in the manufacture of vehicles and components in Michigan by the autumn of 1985.(75) Recent figures for employment and unemployment in the Detroit region do not contradict this assessment (Tables 12 and 16). On this basis many of the 115,000 jobs lost in the region in metals and transportation equipment as measured against

1978 will not be replaced (Table 16).

In 1984, with a national unemployment rate in July of 7.4%, the signs were that Reaganomics was "working". From November 1982 through March 1984, the U.S. economy generated nearly 4 million new jobs.(76) The stimulatory effect of tax reductions and large federal budget deficits - part of the Reagan package - have given an obvious boost to spending power. But "Business Week" (July 1984) has pointed to a more underlying factor:

> "There are many reasons why the U.S. has surpassed Europe in creating jobs, but they boil down to a single theme - European rigidity. The American economy has shown a flexibility that has yet to appear across the Atlantic ...
> America's adaptability manifests itself on many economic and social fronts. Perhaps most important, wages in the U.S. have proved they can go down as well as up. During the 1980-1982 recession, union givebacks resulted in declining income. And in the present recovery, wage hikes have been at historic lows."(77)

Other factors included by "Business Week" in greater American "adaptability" consist of the ability to fallow workers on a short-term basis witout severance payments and especially lower unemployment benefits which decrease the worker's ability to "hold out" before taking a lower paying job.(78)

Data Resources Inc. in 1984 predicted that while total manufacturing jobs in the U.S. would increase by approximately three-quarters of a million between 1985 and 1990, the major growth would be in the broadly defined service sector.(79) With the arrival of 1985, however, the Michigan and Detroit unemployment rates remain stubbornly high and the preponderance of new job growth is located primarily in the South Atlantic states and the Pacific Southwest.(80)

(d) The State of Michigan - Economic Development Scramble 1973 - 1984

Transportation policy formation at the local and regional levels during this time, linked as it was to economic development issues, took place within the important context of State economic development policy. One must give this some consideration.

A general perception existed at the level of State government, even before the "auto collapse" at the beginning of the 1980's, that, firstly, all was not well with the Michigan economy and, secondly, that something should be done about it. Concern went beyond the traditional awareness of the pro-cyclical nature of an economy heavily based on durable goods and the advantages which would accrue from greater diversification. As the Michigan Economic Action Council, established in the midst of a recession in 1975 as a joint effort between Republican Governor Milliken and a Democratic legislature, put it in its report in 1976:

> "We must first of all see to it that the next dip in our economy is not as steep as the one we just experienced, and we must see to it that the Michigan economy grows over the long run. Even as we begin to climb out of the recession, it is clear that there is much unused human capacity available in the Michigan economy. Unemployment, while recovered from the 14.4% that it reached in February 1975, is still at 10.2% in April 1976".(81)

Michigan unemployment in the 1970's, as can be seen from Table 12, was consistently above the national average. In 1976, the State actually established, in the Commerce Department, an Office of Michigan's Changing Economy. In defining the problem it set out to address, the office referred to "a deceleration in long-term growth"(82) in Michigan. The automobile industry was becoming "mature", ie. suffering from a developing saturation of consumer demand, and technological improvements were eroding jobs. But Michigan was not generating new firms and new industries (particularly services) sufficiently to prevent a secular rise in unemployment. Michigan between 1969 and 1974 lost considerably more jobs due to the closure of firms than it gained consequent to the opening of new ones.(83) In short the problem:

"Michigan is not generating and nurturing the new firms that can provide future growth and diversification for the state's economic base."

And, in short, the recommended solution:

"Michigan must seek to attract growth industries that will complement its industrial base and that offer independent growth opportunities and the potential to attract service industries."(84)

Lest Michigan's status in competition with the "Sunbelt" and other states be forgotten (an unlikely event), the FANTUS Corporation, a leading industrial location consulting firm, had published a report in 1975 ranking states according to their "business climate". The report placed Michigan last.(85) Figure 1 lists the major business financial incentives of a direct nature initiated by the State of Michigan from 1973 to 1983. Only since 1973, in the words of Fantus, has there been "a consistent effort to broaden the role of State government in supporting business expansion".(86) The efforts of State government in this regard are quite inseparable from the efforts of local governments. Suffice it to note in this context that many of the economic development initiatives outlined on Figure 1 (property tax abatement policy, local economic development corporations, tax increment financing) transpose the battleline in the economic development scramble to the local level. The "battle" for jobs and tax base has been waged, as shall be examined in conjunction with transportation policy formation, in a most vociferous manner at the local level with localities competing amongst themselves with ammunition provided by the State. Since 1980 the economic development scramble in Michigan has intensified. The competition with the Sunbelt is far from over. Business Week in June 1981 in yet another special issue, this time entitled "America's Restructured Economy", pointed out that the South and West with its lower labour costs was still a favoured location for new investment, especially in labour intensive high technology industries such as computers and electronic components. It was concerned that with the South and West "winning the inter-regional battle for economic resources" the American economy was "threatening to create a nation divided into regions of haves and have nots".(87)

FIGURE 1

MAJOR BUSINESS FINANCIAL INCENTIVES OF A DIRECT NATURE IMPLEMENTED BY THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 1973-1983

A. TAX INCENTIVES

1. Revenue Bond Financing
   - Economic Development Corporations Act (PA338 of 1974). This Act permits the formation by local governments of Economic Development Corporations which are authorised to sell tax-exempt revenue bonds, the proceeds of which enable the financing of industrial or commercial projects (acquisition of land, buildings and equipment) at less than market interest rates. Repayment is by the firm receiving assistance. While the issuance of revenue bonds by local governments in Michigan was previously authorised by PA 62 of 1963, this had been limited to industrial projects and also involved a more public and formal investigative process including state level approval. As of December 1982 the State of Michigan had 333 EDC's of which 114 were in S.E. Michigan. Membership of EDC Boards is from the private and public sectors.

   - State Job Development Authority (PA 301 of 1975) Localities not wishing to engage in the administrative process of revenue bond financing themselves may make use of the Michigan Job Development Authority.

2. Property Tax Abatement
   - PA 198 of 1974. This Act allows cities, townships and villages to offer property tax abatements for up to 12 years on new and renovated industrial facilities. 50% of the property tax can be abated in the case of a new facility. In the case of renovation the property tax is frozen at the old level. As of 1982 virtually no major new industrial development took place in Michigan without the use of PA 198.

   - PA 255 of 1978. This permits cities, townships and villages to grant property tax abatement to commercial enterprises along the same lines as to industrial ones under PA 198.

   - PA 438 of 1976. This Act originally permitted only the City of Detroit to offer property tax abatement on new downtown rental housing. Subsequently it has been expanded to all cities levying an income tax - Pontiac, Highland Park and Hamtramck in S.E. Michigan as of 1983.

3. Tax Increment Financing
   - Downtown Development Authority Act (PA 197 of 1975). This Act allows cities, townships and villages to establish "Downtown Development Authorities" with boards containing public and private sector participation. The major characteristic of such DDA's is their ability to engage in "tax increment financing". This involves the devotion of projected increases in future tax revenues from increased assessed valuation in defined downtown project areas to repayment of debts incurred in making public improvements to those downtown areas. Revenue bonds are issued in anticipation of future revenue. Monies are earmarked from the public purse, in other words, for the purpose of bolstering downtowns. As of December 1982 Michigan has sprouted 62 DDA's of which 18 were in S.E. Michigan.

   - Tax Increment Financing Authority Act (PA 450 of 1980). This Act represents TIF writ large. It extends the TIF concept beyond downtown areas. Cities are empowered to designate economic development project areas and to earmark increases in tax revenue in those areas exclusively for public improvements in those areas which assist economic development. As of December 1982 27 TIFA's had been established statewide, 9 in S.E. Michigan.

4. Other Tax Incentives
   - 100% capital acquisition deduction as part of the new Michigan Single Business Tax introduced in 1975.

   - Abolition of property tax on business inventories (1975).

B. LOANS AND GRANTS

1. State Economic Development Authority (PA 70 of 1982)
   - Scheduled in 1984 to be incorporated into a broader "Michigan Strategic Fund" which will also co-ordinate other economic development programmes, the Michigan EDA was established by PA 70 of 1982. MEDA is empowered to make loans for industrial projects at below market interest rates to firms lacking the necessary credit rating to obtain revenue bond financing. Under certain conditions working capital loans can be made for projects in "distressed areas". MEDA can also provide loan insurance to firms, grants to local governments for public improvements necessary for economic development (roads, sewers, etc) and grants for high technology research. Finance for MEDA is provided by a bond issue backed by state oil and gas royalities and lease revenues from state owned land.

2. Public Pension Fund set aside for Economic Development
   - PA 55 of 1982 earmarks a portion of certain public pension funds within Michigan (including the State Retirement Fund) for venture capital equity and debt investments in small businesses.

3. Michigan "Small Cities" Programme
   - Responsibility for administration of the federal Community Development Block Grant programme for smaller jurisdictions was asssumed by the State Commerce Department in 1982 under the "New Federalism" policies of the Reagan Administration. Federal funds previously directed to housing rehabilitation are now, under state discretion, directed to loans and grants for business and for public improvements (industrial park development etc.) related to economic development.

C. REDUCTIONS IN THE MICHIGAN SOCIAL WAGE

1. Workmans Compensation
   - Bills signed into law in December 1981 in addition to reducing benefits tightened the definition of disability under Michigan Law. The changes were expected to save Michigan businesses between $300 million and $400 million annually.

2. Unemployment Compensation
   - Tightening of eligibility requirements including the total elimination of benefits for voluntary quits and misconduct charges. (1980)

In June 1981 a new director also took office in the Michigan Department of Commerce. The following excerpt from an inspirational memo to his staff gives a flavour of the mood which in general was present in State government and which was no less to be found at local levels of government.

> "The mission of this department has always included economic development in its broadest sense. In the past, our efforts to encourage development have at times been frustrated because they had to compete with other public issues for the attention of the Legislature, the various departments and the Executive Office. Today, and for the foreseeable future, economic development (again, in its broadest sense to include community development, consumer-oriented and regulatory activities) is accepted by all as the first priority of state government. The structural changes taking place in Michigan economy require this department to take the lead in finding innovative and practical solutions to the problems of job creation and job retention. We will not be able to excuse our lack of performance on the grounds that other issues - such as environmental protection - make it impossible for our ideas to be heard. In many ways economic development is the 'only game in town ' ..." (emphasis original)[88]

The response from State government in addition to simplifications in the regulatory climate for business has been on two major fronts: on the one hand cuts in the Michigan "social wage"[89] (Figure 1 p.214f) and on the other hand the rudiments of what might be called a state "industrial policy" involving a more participatory relationship with the private sector. The latter consisting of direct private sector loans and grants (Figure 1), and the establishment of Biotechnology and Robotics Institutes at Michigan universities[90] involves an effort to pick economic "winners" but also has involved the bailing out of possible "losers".[91] Given the modest scale of such resources (the Michigan Economic Development Authority was capitalised in 1983 with a bond issue of $50 million, the Michigan Small Cities Program devotes roughly $20 million per annum to economic development - measured against say the $500,000,000 required to construct and equip a modern auto assembly plant independent of site preparation)[92] and moreover the absence of a national industrial

policy, a climate in which business is still able to play off state against state, the potential for success of such initiatives, measured against the seriousness of Michigan's economic problems, cannot be judged too optimistically. Such is the state climate for local economic policy making in Michigan in the 1980's.

(e) Intraregional Economic, Demographic, and Spatial Change

Going further to frame the context for regional transportation policy this section will consider intraregional locational aspects of economic change in addition to demographic and general physical spatial change over the period. In particular I will consider this in relation to the phenomenon of "exurbanisation". In 1980, the New York Times observed that "the nations population, industry and commerce, once clumped together in the cities, are being broadcast far and wide in a movement that has called for the commitment of vast new resources and has made the nation more dependent on automobiles as energy becomes scarce and costly".(93)

In terms of industrial location, I have discussed the increasing "generalization of capital", as facilitated by technology, at the global level. At the regional level also, as Storper points out, Capital also manifests its independence from any one spot.(94) There is greater flexibility in locational decisions. This flexibility has resulted in general in the U.S. (and in Britain) in greater absolute or relative manufacturing employment growth of peripheral non-metropolitan areas relative to metropolitan core areas.(95) The causes cited in the academic literature have been peripheral deglomeration economies, land costs, and labour costs. Of these, peripheral labour cost advantages are the most frequently mentioned.(96) In looking at recent trends in industrial location in the Detroit region, one is hampered, at time of writing (February 1985), by the fact that the 1982 U.S. Census of Business has still not been published. The 1977 U.S. Census (Table 3) shows a continuing and significant decline in manufacturing jobs and firms within the city of Detroit between 1972 and 1977 (declines of 15% and 18.5% respectively)

measured against increases of 10.5% and 18% in the balance of the core counties. In the context of very modest increase in the region as a whole, the city's share of regional manufacturing employment fell from over 33% in 1972 to under 28% in 1977 (Table 3A). A study by Mattila and Kurre in 1977 demonstrated that the city of Detroit was not generating enough new industrial establishments to offset deaths (establishments going out of business or leaving the region) and the migration of establishments to other parts of the region. Significantly, the latter overwhelmingly consisted of migration to other parts of the core counties - Oakland, Macomb, and the balance of Wayne.(97) Substituting for the 1982 Business Census, Table 17 shows the real change in the value of industrial property in the Detroit region between 1976 and 1982. Inside a regional context of zero or even "negative" growth, the city of Detroit and the balance of Wayne County (which includes the older "downriver" industrial areas such as Ecorse, River Rouge, and Wyandotte) have experienced sharp declines. In the space of six years, Detroit has lost one-third of its industrial tax base. Whilst Oakland and Macomb counties experienced an increase in industrial value of $643 million (and subsequent construction of a new General Motors assembly plant in Orion Township illustrates the attractiveness of the periphery of the built-up area here), this was outstripped by an increase of $882 million in the non-core SEMCOG counties of which the growth in St. Clair is particularly striking. In 1977, Mattila and Moor characterised the outlying SEMCOG counties as performing a "primarily residential function for the highly industrialized core".(98) In the 1980's, while 80% of the region's industrial tax base is still in the core counties (Table 17), such a characterisation is becoming more questionable.

Table 3 shows change in employment and number of firms in the retail, wholesale and service sectors in Detroit and the region between 1972 and 1977. Across the board the story is one of dramatic decline in the city and increase in the balance of the core area. It is unlikely that the 1982 Census of Business, when published, will show a reversal of this trend. Office construction in Oakland County in the seventies (even allowing for the construction of the "Renaissance Center" in Detroit) far outstripped, as Table 14 shows, construction in the city. Indications are that this has continued into the 1980's.(99) The

extension of the Lodge and Chrysler freeways out of the city of Detroit, in place by the end of the 1960's, and passing through Southfield and Troy respectively, were followed by major office building booms in these jurisdictions.(100) With the closure in 1983 of the major Hudson's department store in downtown Detroit, things also looked no more optimistic for the city on the retailing front.

Turning to demographic trends, the decade of the 1970's saw a slight decline in the population of the SEMCOG region (Table 3). The reasons reside in a declining birth rate (a fall to less than two children on average per woman)(101) and increased net out-migration. The latter, running at an average of 35,000 per year through the 1970's in the Detroit SMSA,(102) can be attributed, in part, to job growth in the Sunbelt - "a gradual reversal of the traditional pattern of young men and women ... migrating into Michigan in search of employment in the automobile related industries".(103) It can also be attributed to exurbanisation within Michigan. In the U.S. generally, non-metropolitan areas are growing faster in population than metropolitan ones.(104) Michigan, especially with the strong population growth of the northern lower peninsula, is no exception.(105) The causes of this generalisation of labour in space are complex. It involves more than the rural retreat of retirees and is certainly linked to the generalisation of capital in space discussed previously. A general dissatisfaction with metropolitan living in Detroit and romantic attachment to the "pastoral pleasures of rural living" are factors noted by demographers studying Michigan.(106) The relative stability of the population level in the Detroit region, however, cloaks major internal changes in its distribution. The city of Detroit's population declined by over 310,000 between 1970 and 1980 (Table 4A) to stand at just over 1.2 million. If net migration only is considered, Detroit lost almost 400,000 people over the decade.(107) This exodus, while a small increase in black suburbanisation did take place, was again overwhelmingly white, leaving Detroit a city with a two-third minority population in 1980 (Table 6). As is also strikingly apparent from Table 6 and Map 27, the 1970's saw a more general loss of population in the older core metropolitan jurisdictions and major growth of the regional periphery. The extent to which this can be attributed to the increase in black suburbanisation in the core areas

PERCENTAGE POPULATION CHANGE 1970-1980



SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION

bordering the city of Detroit rather than simply the attractiveness of newer property in Detroit's rural fringe, must be somewhat speculative. However, as pointed out before, Livingston county, the one SEMCOG county not covered by the Roth busing plan in the first half of the seventies, has shown the strongest percentage growth over the decade. Map 28 shows the extent of the continuously built up urban core region in 1980 with suburban development forming a clear and unbroken belt exceeding ten miles in girth around the city. The broad grain again of Detroit's fiscal and income disadvantage at this time in relation to the tri-county core is illustrated on Maps 29 and 30 respectively.

(f) Transportation Policy Formation

So far in this chapter in attempting to locate transportation policy formation with respect to class I have concentrated on important features of Capital/Labour relationships over the period with a particular emphasis on the process of capital accumulation and associated federal and state responses. While one must still consider state and federal contextual factors pertaining more narrowly to transportation policy, attention shifts now to regional and local level transportation policy formation proper. This section proceeds to construct an overview of such policy, but for a full understanding it is necessary to integrate this with the "regionalist" and economic development dynamics or themes within the region which are considered in the final two sections of this Chapter.

As remarked earlier, the past decade has been marked by an almost complete breakdown in regional consensus between Detroit and the suburbs over transportation policy. This has applied to freeways (with a strong anti-position taken by the city to further construction) but especially, with the major surge in construction over anyway, to public transportation policy issues. The period has been marked by major conflict and even impasse over level, type, organisation and location of public transportation service. This has been linked especially to considerations of finance (who pays) and who

MAP28



SOURCE: CITY OF DETROIT PLANNING DEPARTMENT

DETROIT REGIONAL PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT 1980

MAP29

DETROIT TRI-COUNTY PROPERTY TAX BASE★ PER CAPITA 1981



★ STATE EQUALIZED VALUATION (APPROXIMATELY 50% OF THE MARKET VALUE OF PROPERTY)

DETROIT TRI-COUNTY INCOME PER CAPITA 1977

MAP30



SOURCE: DATA SUPPLIED BY MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

wins and loses in the competition for economic development. Firstly, however, the state and federal context.

Widespread critique of the auto-complex led highway construction programme, as has been seen dates back to the characterisation of "urban" problems in the 1960's. The federal Housing Act of 1961 had provided a very small amount of funding for local public transit which was increased in the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. But it was not until the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970 that provided for $10 billion in capital grants over a 12 year period that "real" federal dollars became available. And only in 1974 through the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act, in the wake of the energy crisis, did federal funding become available for operational costs of transit systems.(108) The following comment by an analyst of the capital grant progamme of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (created in 1965) in the early 1970's before the energy crisis, shows federal concern for the "urban" problems of congestion, inequality, and detrimental effects (urban form and aesthetics) rooted in the post-war model of metropolitan development.(109)

> "The program was explicitly intended to produce certain external benefits: reduction in traffic congestion and atmospheric pollution, increased mobility for the poor, the young and the elderly; and incentives for the creation of compact transit-oriented urban patterns of the New York - San Francisco type in contra-distinction to cities of the low density, automobile-oriented sort, such as Los Angeles and Houston".

When the federal Department of Transportation under the Carter Administration announced in November 1979 its explicit "urban transportation policy objectives", energy conservation stood alongside the above more long standing concerns ("... projects supporting energy intensive or dispersed, sprawl development should be discouraged...") in addition to a strong awareness of resource constraints.(110) With more fuel conscious driving depleting income to the Highway Trust Fund and with resurfacing, restoration, and rehabilitation ("3R work") making increasing claims, it was becoming more difficult to justify new freeway projects on simple financial grounds.(111) General budgetary restraint was also a considration, but under the urging of

Congress did not prevent increased funding for transit in the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978.[112]

The Reagan Administration has not been able to entirely "roll back the clock" in urban transportation planning. Under a non-interventionist ideology and budget cutting drive, public transit was an initial and major casualty with plans for the eventual elimination of operating subsidies altogether.[113] As a major business journal put it, the administration had "set out to put an end to the free ride in America".[114] This ideological preference for the operation of market forces in the field of urban transportation may be seen as linked to a wider repudiation of the role of government in addressing the "urban" problems previously identified which in turn was linked to the condition of American Capital at the beginning of the eighties. While the Reagan Administration, however, may have a predisposition in favour of highways (and has reinstated previously cancelled Interstate projects),[115] public transit support in Congress in 1982 ensured that roughly a 20% portion of the 5c increase in the federal gasoline tax, effective in 1983, would be allocated to transit and particularly the continuance of a certain level of operating assistance after all.[116] This "revenue enhancement" measure amidst general budget cutting in 1982 was in fact necessary to bail out the Highway Trust Fund suffering under the factors mentioned. The condition of the nation's highways, the backbone of the nation's surface transportation, could not be ignored. While public transit does in the 1980's, drawing on the urban considerations we have mentioned, have a strong constituency which is represented in Washington,[117] it is nevertheless true that public transit funding is much tighter under Reagan and is likely to remain a target in future efforts to reduce the federal deficit.

In considering transportation policy formation by the State of Michigan over this period, it is useful to distinguish analytically between the role of the State in its intervention into and mediation of regional level transportation policy formation and more general level state transportation policy. The latter is the focus here, with the former considered in relation to regional policy itself. In general terms the period may be characterised as one in which a

liberal Republican Governor (latterly a Democratic Governor) pushed for a "balanced" transportation system in Michigan but within the constraints imposed by a state in which, with around five million registered passenger vehicles and one million commercial vehicles,[118] the road lobby is very strong. The most prominent members of the latter include the Teamsters, the Michigan Trucking Association, the Michigan Road Builders Association, the Associated Petroleum Industries of Michigan, the County Road Association, the Michigan State Building and Construction Trades Council, the Michigan Farm Bureau, the Michigan Townships Association, and the Michigan Association of Counties.[119] The Michigan Department of Transportation has traditionally reflected the interests of this lobby and in fact was only renamed such - formerly being known as the State Highway Department - in 1978. Only in this year also, through constitutional amendment, did the Governor acquire direct appointive power over the Director of the Department. In 1976, the Detroit Free Press in an editorial referred to the "near-total domination of this state's transportation efforts by the highway interests". It continued:[120]

> "The planners and the officials of the Highway Department, dedicated though they may be, are infused with a bias that has been built in over years of spreading asphalt and concerete across this State."

A Governor's Special Commission on Transportation reported in 1966 that: "Public transportation is an important part of an integrated system in an urban area".[121] The Governor's Special Commission on Urban Problems, reporting in 1968, recommended that the state should "encourage public transportation improvements within urban and metropolitan areas".[122] Up to January 1973, however, the total all-time state expenditure on public transit was $2.3 million.[123] The "breakthrough" came after heavy lobbying by Governor Milliken with the state's road interests, who "knew the public transit issue would not go away",[124] culminating in PA 327 of 1972. This "transportation package" increased the state gasoline tax by 2c (from 7c to 9c per gallon). Of this 25% of the increase in revenue was earmarked for public transportation. The following comment by Milliken in March 1973, in describing the reform, echoes concerns for the environment, inequality, congestion, aesthetics, and urban form found in federal

government. (Had the speech been written after the Middle East oil embargo in October of that year, no doubt it would have reflected a concern for energy conservation also, as state policy subsequently came to do.)[125]

> "The demand for a balanced transit system is based on both the inadequacy of the present day automobile/truck-oriented system and the anticipated constraints that an environmentally conscious society will place on its transit system. Almost one-fourth of American households have no car available to them and many more have access to an automobile for only a portion of the day. Total reliance on the automobile for personal transportation not only makes cities impassible for hours every day during peak commuting times, but gives over valuable land to streets and parking structures; expressways, streets and parking lots comprise almost three-quarters of Detroit's central business district."[126]

The 1972 reform brought in $21 million for state-wide mass transit in fiscal year 1973-74 of which 40% was allocated to operating grants for the Detroit area's bus systems - part of what Milliken called "the limping, run down system we found across the state in 1971".[127] The $21 million was, however, regarded by Milliken as "relatively insignificant: relative that is to the scope of the problem".[128] Subsequent "transportation packages" in 1978 and most recently in 1982 have increased funding in Michigan but it remains a "poor cousin" to highways. Piloted by Milliken through the state legislature, these settlements have involved drawn-out confrontations between transit and highway forces, with transit struggling each time to again claim a greater share of the <u>increase</u> in funds accruing largely from further increases in the state gasoline tax.[129] Under pressure from Milliken, but also due to shrinking revenues from greater fuel efficiency and the demands of repair and reconstruction, the Michigan Department of Transportation has since 1977 scaled back its plans for new highway construction. And this to an extent has defused the freeway debate in Detroit.[130]

I turn now to regional and local level transportation policy formation itself. In most general terms, regional transportation

policy has become unstuck on the fragmented structure of the metropolis (the regionalist dynamic) and linked to this the hitching of city transportation policy by Detroit's Mayor to an economic development agenda, the broad contours of which have been shaped by regional Capital, and which is centered in particular on efforts to bolster the service and commercial functions of the Detroit CBD. The approach in the remainder of this section will be to firstly describe the major regional transportation policy issues and cleavages and secondly to consider more fully how these realities have affected the response of planners working for SEMCOG and SEMTA, the two governmental bodies with region wide transportation planning responsibilities.

Regional conflict during the tenure of Mayor Young has centred on the issue of whether or not the city of Detroit should construct a rapid rail transit system in the Woodward corridor - the so called "subway issue". Linked to this has been the question of merger of SEMTA and the Detroit Department of Transportation to create a truly regional transportation authority. Mayor Young has made city agreement on a merger conditional on construction of the subway, but apart from the "bargaining chip" aspect, the issue highlights city concerns over the allocation of regional public transportation resources, primarily bus related, generally. I shall return to these issues shortly, but firstly one takes up the matter of regional freeway construction.

Map 31 illustrates the present Detroit freeway system. A simple comparison with Maps 24 and 25 shows that not only have TALUS' plans for 1990 been unimplemented in rather dramatic fashion, but that parts of the network which TALUS regarded as in the pipeline for 1975 remain unbuilt today. The role of regional planners in this will be considered presently. Two major factors, however, stand out. Firstly, tightening resource constraints and the demands of maintenance and reconstruction, and secondly, the role of "urban" considerations in federal and state policy seen in conjunction with a strong anti-freeway stance by the city of Detroit on the grounds that freeways facilitate sprawl, would drain further economic vitality from the city and where constructed within the city, would involve unacceptable social disruption.(131) Past freeway construction is seen by

1983 TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
FREEWAYS & MAJOR ARTERIALS



Detroit's Mayor - all too obvious now with the benefit of hindsight - as part of a dynamic which through economic and residential dispersal and differentiation has led to preponderous regional concentration of disadvantage within the city of Detroit. The city, in particular, has thrown its weight against two major freeway projects which at the beginning of the 1980's were still, with suburban support, under consideration in one way or another by both SEMCOG and the State Department of Transportation.(132) The first, strongly supported by the Oakland County Road Commission because it would service development already in situ(133) and which has led to much speculative land purchases along its proposed route,(134) involves an extension of I-275 north through Oakland County to join with I-75 in Springfield township and a north-western extension of the Lodge Freeway to join with the extended I-275 in Commerce township. (The project elements as foreseen by TALUS for construction by 1975 are illustrated on Map 24.) In 1980, the Detroit City Council with the support of the Mayor invoked the Carter Administration's Community Conservation Guidelines requiring a federal analysis of the impact of the I-275 portion of the project on urban sprawl and the central city.(135) It seems unlikely, though, that the project will proceed.(136) A second major project has, in the words of a state transportation planner, been "stymied" by Detroit.(137) This is the Davison/Mound project - a proposed east-west joining of the Jeffries and Chrysler freeways within the city of Detroit through an extension of the Davison expressway and a major extension north paralleling Mound Road through Warren and Sterling Heights to connect with M53. On economic development grounds the latter two jurisdictions are strongly in favour.(138) The one regional freeway project to which Detroit has given its eventual blessing - a completion of the major east-west regional link in the form of I-696 just north of Detroit (dotted line on Map 31) - has in the words of the director of transportation planning for Semcog been used by Mayor Young as a "political football and bargaining tool".(139) The latter was considerably helped by the fact that the Detroit Zoo lay in the path of the proposed route. Detroit's agreement in 1981 came in fact with an insistence from the federal Secretary of Transportation that the project "should be very closely integrated with the proposed light-rail transit line linking the northern suburban communities with downtown Detroit".(140) Design

features associated with the project were federally mandated to accommodate a future light-rail system.(141)

I turn now to the major cleavages within public transportation policy formation. Here there exist major and sharp splits along intra-class lines over who benefits and who pays. To set this in perspective, it must be remembered that in America in the 1980's almost as many people walk to work as use public transit. Despite the "euphoric boost in ridership during the late 1970's" and before the effect of Reagan funding cuts, in 1981 only 6% of American commuters took the train or bus to work.(142) The dominance of the automobile in Detroit area commuting is illustrated in Table 18c. Around 95% of workers in the two major suburban counties of Oakland and Macomb in 1980 used some form of auto transport in their journey to work. In Wayne County, which includes the city of Detroit, the figure is lower at 89%. Transit ridership in general can be seen (Tables 18a and 18d) to have continued its decline in the mid-1970's, thereafter making modest gains. Under a vigorous expansion programme (Table 18b) SEMTA ridership has displayed consistent growth before being curtailed by a 20% cut in service(143) due to federal operating subsidy cutbacks in 1982 (Table 18a). The bulk of regional transit passengers - approximately 85% in 1982 - are still carried by the Detroit Department of Transportation operating about 800 line haul buses wholly within the city limits and under a city ordinance preventing the pickup and delivery of SEMTA passengers anywhere other than in downtown Detroit - displaying a friction between Detroit and SEMTA to which we shall return. The dominance of the auto, however, sets the tenor for regional debates on transit. The increase in auto ownership has continued (Table 18d) and the proportion of total daily transit trips in relation to total daily person trips has most probably in 1980 (judged in relation to the increase in daily vehicle miles of travel and decline in daily transit trips) declined from the figure of 4.6% pertaining in 1965 (Table 18d). Most importantly, though, the transit dependent population is concentrated within the city of Detroit. To quote the SEMCOG regional transportation plan in effect in 1978:(144)

> "The exodus of middle and upper income families from central cities has left areas with large concentrations of low income people. Such people, often unable to afford automobiles, are and

will continue to be, dependent on public transit."

In general terms, the Detroit suburbs have a strong disposition in favour of improved roads over improved transit. A Detroit News article in 1977, for example, reviewing suburban opinion, referred to the "thousands of disgruntled citizens who hound Oakland, Wayne and Macomb authorities because they're tired of bouncing into potholes, pummeling ruts, splashing along poorly drained lanes and careening along high-crowned, choppy streets and congested, unpaved roads."(145) Again in general terms, this predisposition over the past ten years has led to less than enthusiastic suburban support for public transit to begin with. This has been reflected in the defeat of a ballot proposal in 1974 which would have permitted the State of Michigan to issue $1 billion in general obligation bonds to put public transit "on its feet"(146) and in the general difficulty which SEMTA has had in raising local tax revenue for transit. The suburbs, however, have been vociferous in demanding a "fair share" of whatever transit resources are available and (and this is the nub of the Detroit/ suburban division) have been especially wary and outright hostile to any scheme which would commit suburban resources (or entail the foregoing of State and federal transit resources) to a regional public transportation system perceived to benefit in the main the city of Detroit. Since the Mayor of Detroit has insisted on a Detroit "subway" as part of any future major expansion of regional transit and since this is perceived as doing just that, it must dominate one's attention.

Firstly, however, one notes the friction over the operation of bus service in the region as currently existing. While SEMTA was perceived in its legislative terms of reference as becoming the regional public transportation authority, in actuality as has been pointed out, the bulk of service is still provided by the separate Detroit Department of Transportation providing service within the city of Detroit. SEMTA, however, regarded by federal and State government as the agency responsible for the overall organisation of regional transit, votes through its Board transit funds to Detroit under a "purchase of service" agreement. This Detroit allocation has been the subject of sometimes bitter dispute between SEMTA and Mayor Young and

illustrates Detroit's fears for its interests should its bus system be taken over by SEMTA which has by virtue of population a built-in suburban majority on its board. SEMTA moves to do just that dating back to 1975 have been thwarted by Mayor Young. The city has insisted, and this has been accepted by Governors Milliken and Blanchard, that merger of its transportation system with SEMTA is conditional upon the construction of a rapid rail subway system within Detroit. It is this sticking point to which attention is now turned.

The Young Administration in Detroit has since its earliest beginnings in 1974 and 1975 linked the development of public transportation in the city to an economic development or urban revitalisation agenda which places major emphasis on increasing jobs and tax base concentrating in particular on bolstering the commercial and general vitality of Detroit's downtown. The two transit mechanisms, for which Mayor Young has lobbied hard in pursuit of this objective, are the construction of a "people mover" or fully automated monorail system by SEMTA in the Detroit CBD and the construction of a rapid rail subway system in the Woodward corridor running outwards to the suburbs. The people mover project has admittedly been relatively uncontroversial. The concept is to link the major activity centres in the rather fragmented Detroit downtown and thus provide a measure of cohesion. By improving circulation it is hoped to "stimulate economic revitalization".(147) Construction, escaping Reagan budget cuts, commenced in late 1983. The proposed route of approximately three miles is shown in Map 32 and a diagrammatic representation of the proposed "new look" Detroit CBD is shown in Fig.2. The origins of the project can be traced to strong advocacy of the idea by the Detroit Central Business District Association and support by Metropolitan Fund in the early 1970's.(148) A feasibility study by the State Department of Transportation ensued in November 1973 and the project was suggested, along with other possible regional people mover locations, for consideration in the SEMCOG regional transportation plan adopted in 1975. Following the strong expression of interest by the federal Urban Mass Transportation Administration in 1977 in the concept, indicating that federal financial support for such a project in Detroit might be forthcmoing, the project was most actively pursued by Mayor Young. By a vote of 12 to 1 in favour the SEMTA board in May



DPM ALIGNMENT, STATIONS, & MAJOR ACTIVITY CENTERS

SOURCE: SEMTA, DOWNTOWN PEOPLE MOVER, DETROIT, MICHIGAN. DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, MARCH 1980

ROUTE OF DETROIT PEOPLE MOVER



FIG 2

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION
OF THE DETROIT CBD

SOURCE: Reduced from a colour original produced by the City of Detroit, Department of Planning.

1980 produced regional agreement on a plan. The people mover project, however, represents a relatively small fraction of the regional transportation resources to which Detroit's Mayor has laid claim. The major demand for a Detroit subway on which regional consensus has floundered and which has cost at least in excess of $500 million in foregone federal regional capital transit assistance and probably much more, has been costed at between 500% and 700% of the $114.5 million cost (1979 prices) of the people mover depending on the balance between surface and sub-surface rail being considered.(149) The suspicion must be raised that, especially given the fact that the Detroit people mover is expected to be fairly self-supporting in operating expenses from fare-box revenue, and given the animosity over the subway issue, the people mover project is partially a palliative offered to a particularly demanding and vociferous Mayor.

A chronological review of the Detroit "subway saga" will be presented followed by a consideration of the major issues. In December 1975, when SEMTA began an "alternative analysis" of possible public transportation futures open to the region to the year 1990, Mayor Young had already made it clear that merger of the Detroit Department of Transportation and SEMTA was conditional upon a rapid rail subway system in the city. The idea of an elaborate rapid transit system in combination with a major expansion of the regional bus system, had in fact, in general terms after almost two years of work before Mayor Young took office, been advocated publicly in 1974 by SEMTA and SEMCOG but in a document which did not deal in concrete terms with the actual financing of projects or nature of transit technology.(150) (Map 34.) How much this idealistic speculation of planners influenced the Mayor's thinking at an early stage must in the absence of further investigation remain speculative but it is difficult to imagine that it did not have an impact. The "alternative analysis", however, was to be specific and to deal with the harsh matter of financial feasibility. The task was given an impetus by the commitment in 1976 of $600 million by the Ford Administration to a regional transit system in Detroit if regional consensus on a plan could be obtained and if such a plan contained as a major goal the economic revitalisation of the city of Detroit.(151) That regional consensus might well be an insuperable stumbling block was indicated by a change in

the selection procedure for the SEMTA board also in 1976. Previously with a total board membership of 9, SEMCOG had appointed to six positions. Public Act 266 of 1976, however, in expanding the board to 15 members, reduced in the face of opposition from SEMCOG's Executive Director[152] (but not the actual member units of government) the appointive power of SEMCOG to 3 members only. The future board was to be appointed much more directly by city and suburbs.

In May 1977 the SEMTA board, by a vote of 9:4 of those present, approved a "preferred" mass transit alternative for the region incorporating a light rail subway system (as opposed to a more heavy rail system favoured by Mayor Young) to run on Woodward and Gratiot Avenues.[153] This attempt at compromise, however, soon fell apart in a storm of suburban criticism.[154] The Oakland and Macomb County Boards of Commissioners had already endorsed an alternative Oakland County Road Commission plan placing its emphasis on expanded bus service. Attacks on the SEMTA strategy were forthcoming from members of all these organisations. The chairman of the Macomb Board of Commissioners declared that his county would pull out of SEMTA "if all that money is dumped into a subway".[155] On top of the commitment of capital resources, the subway was projected to incur an annual operating deficit in excess of $100 million.[156] While the chief elected official in Oakland County, the County Executive, had given an initial tenative acceptance of the SEMTA decision,[157] in November he had reversed his position. Clashing publicly with Detroit's Mayor, he stated:[158]

> "We must demonstrate that our transit strategy is based on realism, sound business judgement and a serious commitment to the needs of all our citizens, not just those who happen to live within the Detroit city limits. Detroit's subway plan over-emphasizes subways and under-emphasizes the common sense goal of moving people throughout our region".

In March of 1978 it was Mayor Young, insisting on a minimum of 8½ miles of subway on Woodward but stopping short of Detroit's northern boundary, who was publicly airing the idea of pulling Detroit out of SEMTA.[159] This was followed in the same month by a meeting of 23 State House Representatives whose constituencies fell within the remit

of SEMTA which in the words of the experienced capitol correspondent of the Detroit Free Press "shook a figurative, but collective, anti-subway finger in Mayor Young's face". Summing up the consensus of the meeting, Representative John Maynard of St. Clair Shores stated:(160)

> "If the thought is to shove that subway system down our throats, there's not going to be any transportation system at all."

In April it was the turn of the Oakland County Board of Commissioners by majority vote to threaten to withdraw from SEMTA - a move which was averted by the intercession of Governor Milliken.(161) SEMTA during this time was continuing an environmental evaluation of the previously stated preferred option of the board in addition to equal consideration of various other competing options. The board in other words reserved the right to reverse its previous decision. Mayor Young awaited the results of SEMTA's "scientific determination"(162) while by December the U.S. Transportation Secretary warned that if regional agreement was not forthcoming the commitment of federal capital support, in the face of competing claims from elsewhere, might be lost.(163)

In April 1979 the SEMTA board for the second time reached a compromise, by a vote of 10:5, on a mass transit plan for the region.(164) While the dissenting suburban five would agree to no sub-surface rapid rail at all, the compromise, as nurtured by Governor Milliken,(165) involved a light rapid rail system from the Detroit CBD to 6 Mile Road in Detroit (Highland Park's northern boundary line) with only the section to Grand Boulevard to run sub-surface (roughly 4 miles up the Woodward corridor from the Detroit CBD and taking in the commercial and institutional hub of the city). The system would, contrary to the 1977 agreement, not run on Gratiot at all (federal funding constraints exerted their influence here) and would stop within the Detroit city limits with much slower surface rail taking over from elevated rail at 6 Mile. Again, however, this agreement has proved transitory and has come to nothing. In late 1979 and early 1980 city/suburban conflict again reasserted itself in the State legislature over the appropriation of State funds to carry out preliminary engineering work on the subway proposal. Although, with strong lobbying by Governor Milliken, the money was eventually

appropriated, the suburban House Representative from Grosse Pointe Farms perhaps summed up a good deal of suburban feeling in stating:

> "The subway is still a controversial question ... We still can say no to a subway once the engineering is done. This will not end the question".(166)

In November 1980, the Detroit Free Press in an editorial noted that:

> "... some of the old foes of underground rail have drawn renewed hope from the election of Ronald Reagan ... How many times does this battle have to be refought?"(167)

Whereas previously suburban interests were cognisant of the federal emphasis on central city economic revitalisation in transit planning and in federal urban policy generally, the election of Reagan undoubtedly removed a great deal of this pressure on regional policy formation. In January 1981 a SEMCOG review panel voted 5 to 4 to withhold its endorsement of federal grant funds for preliminary engineering work on the subway. Voting against Detroit representatives on the panel were representatives from the Monroe and St. Clair County Boards of Commissioners, the City of Farmington Hills, Bloomfield Township and Plymouth Township.(168) Mayor Young subsequently blamed the decision on "racism and bigotry by suburban politicians seeking favour with their constituents".(169)

With federal budget cuts under the Reagan Administration, the prospects for a rapid rail system in Detroit remain pessimistic in any case. Intimating that perhaps the moment had passed, the General Manager of SEMTA just prior to his resignation in October 1981 summed up his experience of the regional impasse over the subway and merger of SEMTA and the Detroit Department of Transportation thus:(170)

> "It's been the most frustrating thing that I've ever had to deal with in my life ... the continual debate over the Woodward Avenue light rail system and the merger of the two systems - and they are tied together .... The debate here is centered on: Do you want to make an investment in a single corridor like Woodward - that's several hundred million dollars - in a city that is declining, that is depopulating? Or do you want to take that money and spread it around the region? And the debate goes on ... The outlook is not all that great."

Reviewing the breakdown of regional consensus over the subway issue, the division within the reproduction of labour power over appropriation and allocation of resources to serve regional public transportation needs stands out quite clearly. Very much just below the surface of suburban rhetoric, however, is also an awareness of the economic development implications of a Detroit subway - the main rationale on which the city of Detroit bases its case. A consultant's study commissioned by Detroit and published in 1977 estimated that between $1.2 billion and $1.9 billion of additional office, retail, housing, hotel, and industrial development would be generated in the city over a 12 year period depending on which rapid rail proposal then under consideration was in fact adopted. A follow-up study the following year put the estimate at up to $1 billion over an 18 year period for just a Woodward line.(171) In an increasingly competitive intra-regional scramble for economic development, the following conclusion of a consultant's report commissioned by SEMTA would not be lost on Detroit's suburbs:(172)

> "If the region is defined as the City of Detroit, the attraction of growth to the transit corridors from the suburban areas of the seven-county region would appear to be new economic development responding directly to the effect of transit on the region's attractiveness. In fact, these manifestations of growth are actually only land use impacts, changes in the intra-regional location decision. (emphasis original)
>
> It is quite appropriate to consider the impacts rail transit might have on urban development within the city boundaries. If the objective is to reinforce urban development patterns, based on its impact on land use patterns regionally, transit may represent an important factor in an effective strategy. It would be misleading to the regional constituency, however, to fail to indicate that transit's impacts may focus urban development and concentrate the location of business and commerce, but it is unlikely to increase the entire region's share of the nation's future growth."

While the city of Detroit has staked its transportation future on the economic development benefits of a subway system and while this has been at the centre of the breakdown in regional transportation

consensus, there is no guarantee (despite the projections of consultants) that if implemented, a Detroit subway would bring the success (in terms of ridership and spin-off development) hoped for by the city. Absent radical restrictions on automobile and parking within the city (almost inconceivable in the prevailing competitive regional economic environment and with the absence of effective state and regional land use policies) the argument has been made by Oakland and Macomb county officials that "few suburbanites will want to drive to Eight-Mile Road (Detroit's northern boundary), leave their car in a parking lot and then take a subway to downtown Detroit, when they can get there faster by car over Detroit's freeway network".(173)

Detroit suburbs are, therefore, against a subway because it might succeed and also because it might fail. The possibility of the latter is further attested to by the fact that in 1980 only about 16% of those living in the suburbs actually worked in the city of Detroit (Table 5).

Commenting on the concept of subway construction in Detroit, Melvin Webber (Director of the University of California's Institute of Urban and Regional Development) commented in 1976:

> "There's no question that Detroit would be a poor area for such a system. Detroit is very much laid out like Los Angeles; spread out on a grid. Most of the destinations are scattered. Detroit hasn't got a big downtown like Chicago, and it isn't about to get one ..."(174)

And the equity effects of a subway are not that clear cut. City of Detroit legislators in Lansing have openly recognised that a subway will, in the main, not provide transportation for city residents but serve suburban commuters going from their homes to work in the city. William Ryan (the longest standing State Representative from Detroit), while supporting a subway on economic development grounds, has commented that his constituents would likely use a subway only to go to the State Fairgrounds (situated on the northern Woodward Corridor).(175) In general then, given the problematic nature of the benefits to Detroit residents there is reason to suspect that the advocacy of a subway by Detroit's mayor is less directly related to

class pressures (ie there are other processes at work exerting influence) as compared to Mayor Cobo's advocacy of freeways in the 1950's when class pressures were quite overwhelming. To take this speculation further, to inquire for example, if planners could possibly have persuaded Mayor Young to seek instead a dial-a-ride system for the city, would require a more micro level of analysis - one that is complementary to more macro type analysis in the construction of a theory of planning. This is a theme which is taken up in the concluding chapter.

Attention is now turned to a consideration of the production of transportation plans associated with the regional conflicts so far described. I will consider both SEMCOG and SEMTA - the two regional agencies with area-wide transportation planning responsibilities, the former responsible for strategic level transportation planning in general, the latter concerned with the specifics of public transportation planning. I will firstly examine SEMCOG.

In June 1975 the SEMCOG General Assembly adopted a "Regional Transportation Plan for Southeast Michigan" with a time horizon to the year 1990.(176) The plan differed considerably from TALUS with more emphasis on the need for public tranportation (a projection of 7.5% for transit trips as a proportion of the region's total trips by 1990 as compared to 3.6% from TALUS forecasts)(177) and a major scaling back of planned highway construction. Publicity for the draft version of the plan stated:(178)

> "SEMCOG's Transportation Plan says, in essence, that our present regional road network - in terms of new rights-of-way - is virtually fully developed. We need few new roads. Rather, a regional highway development program must emphasize expanding, rebuilding, maintaining, and improving existing freeways and road networks."

The plan proposed the addition of only 65 miles of new freeway added to the existing regional system of 670 miles. Emphasis shifted to the "upgrading of nine arteries (117 miles in all) to the status of regional majors". On the public transportation front the plan proposed five "high level" transit corridors (rapid surface rail and

subway) comprising 62 miles and 186 miles of "intermediate level" transit (rapid bus service on bus only lanes). This would connect with a much expanded local "feeder" transit network (comprising 3287 route miles) and with five people mover locations.(179) The freeway network and high level public transit lines proposed in the plan are illustrated on Maps 32 and 33 respectively. SEMTA planners participated in the generation of the public transportation element of the SEMCOG plan and SEMTA officially took a major role in publicising the final transit product.(180)

Given the review of transportation planning issues which has been conducted already, it becomes easier to understand the marked change in emphasis between TALUS and the SEMCOG plan. Whilst formally the same methodology pertained in both cases (the establishment of goals and objectives and the evaluation of alternative strategies), the nature of the situation around which plan making coalesced had changed. The 13 goals and associated 45 objectives of the SEMCOG plan, developed by planners and accepted by the SEMCOG General Assembly,(181) express concern for environmental quality, energy conservation and other "urban" issues (the transportation needs of the disadvantaged, economic impact of transportation proposals in spatial terms, and the minimisation of neighbourhood dislocation). In general terms, these concerns were rooted in problems associated with the pertaining model of post-war metropolitan development and were not developed in isolation from State of Michigan and federal urban policies in the 1970's. The decline in birth rate itself from the 1960's made a TALUS-like profusion of freeways more untenable. (It is interesting to note here that the director of transportation planning for SEMCOG - subsequently appointed SEMCOG Executive Director - maintained in interview that, even after allowing for the higher birth rate assumptions of TALUS, the projections of future traffic volume used in TALUS to justify such massive freeway expansion, just "did not stand up when subjected to critical evaluation by SEMCOG". In his opinion TALUS was a "rationalisation for a compilation of highway dreams" dominated by a "why not" attitude to construction in the policy environment of the 1960's).

Returning to the SEMCOG plan, there is little doubt that the

SEMCOG 1990 TRANSPORTATION PLAN (1975): FREEWAY AND REGIONAL MAJORS

Summary



SOURCE: SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE 1990 TRANSPORTATION PLAN FOR THE S.E. MICHIGAN REGION. SEMCOG. JUNE 1975

PROPOSED SEMCOG AND SEMTA RAPID TRANSIT NETWORK (1974)



SOURCE: PROPOSAL FOR A MASS TRANSIT SYSTEM TO SERVE SOUTH-EASTERN MICHIGAN SEMTA 1974

fundamental conflict around which it was formed was the intensifying polarity between Detroit and its suburbs, rooted as it was in the process of accumulation and divisions within the reproduction of labour power. This was the rock upon which the general land use, environmental and energy conservation goals of SEMCOG were to flounder. A basic freeway network already in place and absent any real regional or state land use policy, suburban development was to make such urban goals seem little more than lip service. A degree of "hedging" or equivocation in the highway element of the SEMCOG plan through the designation of controversial potential freeway routes as "study corridors" (the Northwestern freeway extension and Davidson/ Mound corridor, for example - Map 33) is indicative of the competing interests which SEMCOG planners had to straddle. The transit element, through the sheer scale of its proposals, illustrates another response. While the TALUS transit proposals could be labelled marginal and unrealistic, the SEMCOG ones fit the description of integral and still unrealistic. It seems that acceptance of the plan by the SEMCOG General Assembly was obtained at the cost of the grand and idealistic nature of the proposals - a massive increase in intermediate and local bus service region wide with no less than 6 high level transit corridors. The plan noticeably contains no prioritization of projects. Suburban interests could, therefore, presumably vote for the plan as a whole on the basis that suburban interests were reasonably represented and that, as the plan itself states: "The 1990 Regional Transportation Plan proposes those facilities which would provide a <u>desirable</u> level of service." (my emphasis).[182] The experimentation with idealistic transit futures by SEMTA and SEMCOG planners between 1972 and 1974 (cf. p. 229) in as much as it encouraged and fuelled Mayor Young's claim to a Detroit subway can be seen as included almost as a necessity in the general transportation plan adopted by SEMCOG in 1975. The structural functionalist underpinnings by this stage and associated "extravagency" in the transit proposals, would seem pressed on planners by the fundamental lack of cohesiveness in SEMCOG, the regional planning organization. As opposed to TALUS where there was a strong link between the implicit structural functionalism and dominant highway interests the link in the SEMCOG plan, it is suggested, was between a structural functionalist orientation and the need to paper over the strains and

cracks in a tenuous status quo. In both cases the selection of methodology by planners cannot be seen in isolation from the respective pressures influencing the choice.

In 1981 work began on revising the SEMCOG long range transportation plan incorporating a year 2000 time horizon. Using the previously adopted goals and objectives, initial concentration has been on five major regional transportation corridors converging on the Detroit CBD. New freeway construction, under the additional pressure of unavailability of finance, was noticeably absent from the preliminary output of this process (the recommendations endorsed by the SEMCOG Executive Committee in 1982)[183] with concentration on capacity improvements on freeways and the use of bus only lanes. It appears that the same idealistic approach still pertains in the realm of public transportation, however, with recommendations for a major four-pronged rapid rail transit system terminating in the Detroit CBD (Map 34) when the city of Detroit would probably settle for half of the route miles on any of these transit corridors.

Following the early participation by SEMTA in the generation of the transit element of the SEMCOG transportation plan, SEMTA planners and officials were hastily brought down to earth by the pressing realities of regional conflict and their activities have subsequently centred around efforts to achieve an operational consensus on transit planning. The deepness of the divisions, however, go beyond the ability of planners and other SEMTA officials to reconcile them with some "magical" transit scenario. The SEMCOG Long Range Transportation Plan is far removed from the operational day-to-day reality of SEMTA transportation planners - a reality which has in its turn exerted a major impact on planning methodology. Planners have been openly involved in a process of attempted practical conflict resolution informing that process at the political level through the provision of a range of options and assessment of their consequences. This would make an interesting micro level research study in itself. In general terms what is clear, however, from observation of the neutral tone of option presentation to the SEMTA board and from interview with the General Manager of SEMTA (formerly director of transportation planning for SEMTA), is a recognition by planners of the political nature of

SEMCOG RAPID TRANSIT PLAN (1982)



YEAR 2000 TRANSPORTATION PLAN
PHASE I CORRIDOR RECOMMENDATION

- Freeway High-Occupancy Vehicle Lanes
- Light Rail Transit
- Arterial Roadway Widenings
- Curb Bus Lane/Reversible Center Lane

EXISTING FREEWAYS
FREEWAYS UNDER CONSTRUCTION
ARTERIALS

TOWNSHIP CITY Village COUNTY

north 1:300,000 0 5 10 15 Kilometres 0 5 10 Miles

SOURCE: TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LONG RANGE ELEMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN. SEMCOG MAY 1982

the transportration choices facing the Detroit region. SEMTA planners and other officials have to a degree distanced themselves from the conflict recognising that resolution is a matter primarily for politicians. The SEMTA General Manager, in interview, pointed to his public statements on the matter which express the opinion that if the objective of transit planning is the movement of people in the region then a bus only system is probably best, but that if the economic revitalization of the city of Detroit is included then a rapid rail system is required. The choice is left to the Board and the conflict, as has been seen, has failed to be resolved. The general methodology pressed on planners and arising out of the political irresolution which they face conforms closely to the recent "role of the expert" which Reade(184) has advocated (perhaps abstracting too much from the constraints on methodology in practice) as a guide to planning practice in general. "Experts" as opposed to "professionals" according to Reade "appreciate fully that the actual decisions made must rest on political values quite as much as on the technical understanding which they themselves provide. (They) are more likely to express their advice in the conditional form - 'if you want X, then it is necessary to do A, B, and C.'" This is in fact what SEMTA planners are presently doing.

To complete an understanding of regional transportation policy formation, one must turn in the remaining two sections of this Chapter to a general consideration of regional governmental fragmentation in Detroit and to the economic development agenda of the city of Detroit.

(g) The Regionalist Dynamic

The period under consideration has in general seen no lessening of local governmental cleavages within the Detroit metropolitan area and an intensification, under Detroit's black Mayor, of fracture between city and suburbs. This it is argued must be seen as linked to the changing fortunes of the region in the overall process of capital accumulation which has been discussed and associated intensification of divisions within the reproduction of labour power. I will touch on a number of factors here which characterise the present situation.

One notes firstly the intense degree of economic competition among local governments in the region for "jobs and tax base" using mechanisms supplied by state government. At the beginning of 1983, in the absence of any co-ordinated regional economic strategy, there existed in excess of 100 Economic Development Corporations in the SEMCOG region competing with the city of Detroit (Table 19). This was supplemented by 17 competing Downtown Development Authorities and 8 Tax Increment Financing Authorities. (For the functions of these bodies and description of their incentives see Fig.1,p.214f). The degree of competing and extensive use of industrial property tax abatement (with total number of regional awards standing at 750 at the beginning of 1983) is illustrated on Table 17. This was supplemented (also as of January 1983) by 100 regional commercial property tax abatements of which the city of Detroit accounted for 23. The intractability of this regional fracture exhibited itself in a number of other important forms:

(i) The failure of an attempt by Metropolitan Fund to institute stronger regional governmental structures.

(ii) The failure of an attempt by Governor Milliken to achieve the adoption of a regional property tax sharing plan.

(iii) Opposition by Mayor Young to the creation of a County Executive position in Wayne County government.

(iv) A move by townships in the region to protect themselves from annexation.

(v) And most importantly the record of achievement of SEMCOG itself.

I will consider these in turn.

In the words of the Executive Director of Metropolitan Fund, "SEMCOG did not complete our work".(185) At the beginning of 1972, M.F. launched two parallel projects with the ultimate aim of realising more effective regional government in Detroit.(186) The first involved work which led to the "spawning" by M.F. a year later of a group funded by the parent organisation and called "Regional Citizens". It was described by M.F. as "an ongoing citizen organization seeking to develop a sense of regional consciousness in S.E. Michigan".(187) Membership of the new organisation was thrown open to all "regional citizens" of S.E. Michigan who were "interested in improving his or her knowledge and understanding about metropolitan issues and in contributing his or her citizen skills to their solution". The open invitation to join continued:

> "An important ingredient in the regional concept is the creation of a regional constituency ... the recognition by individuals like yourself that they are citizens of a Southeastern Michigan regional community, in addition to their more local citizenship alliances. We invite you to join with us in this process, by becoming a Regional Citizen."(188)

The organisation was basically to be a conscious-raising "talking shop" with a major emphasis, as the bye-laws indicate, on "television and mail communication".(189) On the need for a regional constituency, a Metropolitan Fund report, introducing the "Regional Citizens" organisation, stated:(190)

> "'The city' became the 'central city' and it is, even literally, at war with its suburban neighbours. The central city and suburbs fight for tax revenue, for the business and industrial base which produces much of that revenue, for the population which provides the very life blood of civic existence. The suburban citizen views with anger and hostility any attempt by 'the city' to retain claim to his allegiance, or to his bank balance. He denies any need of or for 'the city' and wishes it would, 'go away and leave us alone' in suburbia.
>
> He denies any part in creating the city's problems. He denies too, at least in his own mind, any need for the city ... despite his use of its recreational and cultural facilities, its zoo, its

water system and waste disposal system, its transportation and traffic systems and the many amenities which exist only because of the scale of urban development of which it is the core, the variety of major sports, symphony orchestra, art museum, etc.

The city and its subrban ring are much farther apart than the thin boundary line which marks their literal separation. They are apart and growing more so."

The other major M.F. initiative also launched in early 1972 involved the generation of proposals for strengthened regional government in Detroit. Research papers on various aspects of the subject were commissioned which fed into the deliberations of a M.F. "Regional Governance Policy Committee" drawn from the M.F. Board of Trustees. In introducing the recommendations of the committee, the president of M.F. in 1974 stated:(191)

"Presently the urban condition of the metropolitan regions of our nation is critical. The urban condition of Southeastern Michigan, for example, is characterised by nearly one thousand murders in the year 1973 ... with more than seven hundred in a single jurisdiction; by distressingly high unemployment, seemingly endemic, particularly in certain groups and locales; by inefficient use of energy due to ineffective or non-existent planning; by public transportation inadequate or unavailable at a time of great need; and by a spread-city continuing unabated because of a most profilgate use of land."

What comes through strongly here and in the rationale for a "regional constituency" is concern again (as there had been behind the establishment of SEMCOG) for regional integration, or more specifically the deleterious effects of the lack of it, on the efficiency and stability of the Detroit region as a locus of accumulation.

The recommendations of the M.F. policy committee called, as an interim measure, for direct election of half of the SEMCOG representatives in a much reduced General Assembly (the rest to be appointed by groupings of cities, townships and counties). This reconstituted SEMCOG would

serve as a charter commission in drawing up a plan for a much more powerful regional governmental agency in which local membership would be mandatory and in which policy decisions would be binding on sub-regional units of government.(192) Legislation based on the M.F. proposal was introduced into the State legislature in 1975 and failed abysmally to gain support. Support was forthcoming neither from the suburbs or from the city of Detroit. As the Detroit Free Press put it:(193)

> "The politicians who now control SEMCOG have stuck their heads in the sand and have issued a knee-jerk statement of opposition to the idea. True, it may have flaws and perhaps could be revised but it desreves more serious consideration and support than the wave-of-the-hand dismissal it has received from SEMCOG."

Of the original M.F. proposal the Chairman of SEMCOG as an M.F. Board member included a statement of dissent following the recommendations. It simply stated:(194)

> "The creation of a new level of government is unnecessary and undesirable. Greater support for the present voluntary association of managing regional affairs is necessary."

A State Senator from Macomb County bluntly stated:(195)

> "... residents in my area think regionalism means being sucked into Detroit's crime, money and racial problems. All I'm saying is the people I represent don't want it. They're fearful of it. They're afraid of losing things they've worked hard to get."

(It bears pointing out that in 1975/76 the spectre of cross-district school busing still hung over the Detroit region.) In a region as a whole where over 80% of the population was white, a Detroit Councilman summed up the position of the city:

> "It has been the city's experience that in regional authorities such as the Huron Clinton Metropolitan Authority the people of Detroit have been getting the short end of the stick."(196)

One Marxist writer has seen in the efforts of M.F. an attempt by corporate capital in the Detroit region to eradicate democracy and to bring local government more directly under its control:(197)

> "The ruling class has long understood that its capacity to rule is dependent on its capacity to control those who govern. It is far easier to control officials who are far removed from local and direct constituencies (and for whom winning an election will require thousands of corporate dollars, and obligations, for campaign expenditures) than it is to control local officials who more accurately reflect the working class base that elected them."

This assessment seems much too conspiratorial and certainly over-romanticises the working class nature of local democracy in South-Eastern Michigan. The activity of M.F. was rooted in concerns for stability and efficiency in the region as a locus of accumulation but is best seen perhaps as involving a somewhat idealistic assessment of possibilities for change given the competitive economic roots of regional governmental division in the process of accumulation and the reproduction of labour power.

In interview the Executive Director of M.F., while expressing disappointment with the results of "Regional Citizens" (by the late seventies a "paper only" organisation) and the legislative initiative, pointed out that membership of SEMCOG did increase by 20% following the push for regional government and suggested that some local governments may have seen SEMCOG as a way of warding off that possibility. He pointed to the value of "extreme positions". Macomb County, however, has still stubbornly refused to join.

Other manifestations of metropolitan fracture are not hard to find. In 1976 with the support of Governor Milliken a "tax base sharing" bill was introduced into the Michigan legislature. Based on the St. Paul/Minneapolis experience,(198) the bill would have required local governments in S.E. Michigan to pool and share 50% of future increases in business property tax receipts.(199) Even this relatively modest proposal (based on half of an increase and excluding the residential property tax base) met with the same fate as the proposal for regional government other than the support in this case from the city of Detroit.

Animosity between city and suburbs was again starkly apparent in the unsuccessful opposition of Mayor Young to the reform proposals for Wayne County government put to the Wayne County electorate in 1981. While Wayne County suffered from a severe degree of executive fragmentation bordering on administrative and financial chaos, Young objected to the concentration of power and responsibility involved in the creation of an elected County Executive who would have the potential to become a powerful political rival.(200) As the State legislature's Black Caucus put the matter, "a blue-eyed Caucasian county manager would rally suburban whites into a political force to overshadow and oppose the wishes of Detroit's hugh black voting bloc."(201)

On another front was the matter of annexation. Since Public Act 359 of 1947 Michigan townships meeting certain conditions were permitted to adopt their own local government charter. Prior to 1978 there were four such "charter townships" in S.E. Michigan. Following legislative changes in 1978 (PA's 242 and 591) providing such townships with virtual immunity from annexation, in January 1981, in the space of little over two years, the number of charter townships within the SEMCOG region had increased to 19.(202)

Antagonisms have had major impact on the work of SEMCOG. Regional autonomy and fragmentation during this period has continued to render SEMCOG relatively ineffectual. In addition to transportation SEMCOG has prepared regional plans covering land use, housing, water quality, and recreation and open space. It is beyond my scope to review all of these, but given the important context it provides for the formation of transportation policy, I will focus on land use. SEMCOG's "Land Use Policy Plan"(203) as adopted by the General Assembly in 1977 has been ineffectual as a regional plan due both to the nature of its contents and the lack of a regional means for implementation. The content is both general and the result of considerable compromise. The plan emphasises, for example, the need "to strengthen and improve utilization of the central core and sub-cores of the region"(204) and the need to "guide urban development in such a manner as to avoid unnecessary and excessive utilization of the region's natural resource potential".(205) However, the document is carefully labelled "Policy

Plan" and the following disclaimer on the accompanying land use map indicates a strong degree of indeterminacy:(206)

> "This map does not constitute policy in itself, but serves only as a graphic interpretation of the plan text. Due to limitations of scale, the map is highly generalized and should not be used for site-specific determinations of Council policy. For such purposes references should be made to the relevant portions of the plan text (equally generalised - my addition), as well as to the many detailed sources which identify the physical, economic, and social characteristics of particular areas." (ie always an examination on a case by case basis - my addition).

Generalisation itself was a form of compromise, but a more concrete version of the latter is the opinion expressed in interview by the chief SEMCOG planner responsible for the sewer policy input to the land use plan that the SEMCOG sewer proposals (as adopted in 1976) provided for one-quarter million acres of new sewered land in excess of population forecasts and in excess of that necessary to remain within the spirit of SEMCOG's expressed urban policy goals.(207)

It is on the implementation side, however, that the SEMCOG land use plan falls down entirely. Reliance on co-operation from local governments is almost total. SEMCOG has had the obligation to comment on a broad range of projects involving federal funds (the so-called "A95 review process") but negative reviews have been rare (less than 0.5% of total projects between January 1974 and June 1979).(208) More importantly, privately funded development in general is possible anywhere in the SEMCOG region if compatible with state and federal law and permitted by the constituent local governments in question. The frustration of the Executive Director of SEMCOG at the inability of his agency to control development in the absence of a state land use policy is apparent in the following exerpt from a memo to State government in 1980:(209)

> "Prior comments by SEMCOG have raised concern over the lack of a coherent, comprehensive state land use policy plan which is essential to rationally guide development in the State ... To date, we have not seen development of a State land use policy."

State and federal funding suppport for SEMCOG has in recent years declined considerably. The annual State regional grant to SEMCOG declined progressively from $215,000 in 1978/79 to $101,000 in 1982/83.(210) A major stable federal regional funding source - the so-called "HUD 701" comprehensive land use planning programme - declined considerably under Carter and has been abolished under Reagan. The former federal administrator of HUD 701 funds in Michigan suggests that regional funding amidst general budget cutting has been particularly vulnerable because of a perceived lack of "value for money" and the absence of a strong constituency for such funding.(211) By 1980, as described by the now former Executive Director of Metropolitan Fund, "things in the organization were at a low ebb".(212) Some financial contributors were becoming "lukewarm in their support".(213) The following year actually saw a major reconstitution of the organisation under the new name of Metropolitan Affairs Corporation. Over 50% of the new and halved Board of Directors was still drawn from major regional capitalist interests(214) but the scale and scope of the new organisation differs from Metropolitan Fund. "MAC" is housed in the same building as SEMCOG and the full-time Metropolitan Fund staff (which actually had been reduced in 1980 to one professional from a previous total of seven) has been replaced by a contractual agreement with SEMCOG. Of this agreement the new MAC President (a major regional retailer) stated:(215)

> "The private sector of Southeastern Michigan retains its interests in, and participation in, issues and problems of regional significance. The organization's main goal will be working with the public sector to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of services at the regional level."

There is no doubt that the new organisation in the face of limited progress in the 1970's sees itself as fulfilling a more limited role. The present local governmental system in S.E. Michigan is tolerated at least for the moment.

(h) Detroit's Economic Development Strategy

That the city of Detroit's stance on public transportation issues (especially its stand on the subway) has been integrated with its economic development agenda is something which has been stressed. I have described already in general terms the deteriorating economic fortunes of the city during this time and the climate of regional economic competition in which it took place. Prior to a consideration of the city's economic agenda itself I will say something about the motive force "to do something" provided by Detroit's fiscal crisis and the federal and state "urban" policy context within which city economic development policy was formulated.

Detroit's underlying fiscal problem has stemmed from the fact that in a city dependent for approximately 60% of its expenditure on local revenue sources(216) and already taxing itself heavily, the base upon which such taxes are levied has continued to be eroded without corresponding drop in the need for services. Between fiscal years 1976/77 and 1980/81, a time of major inflation, Detroit's property tax base remained virtually static(217) and on a per capita basis in 1981 was the lowest in the tri-county region (Map 29). At the beginning of the 1980's with major restructuring and labour shedding taking place in the regional economy and hitting Detroit particularly hard, city income tax receipts, even unadjusted for inflation, began to fall substantially.(218) Crisis points were reached in 1975/76 and in 1980/81, with a projected city deficit for fiscal year 1975/76 of $103 million(219) and an accumulated deficit in June 1981 of $132 million.(220) The response by the city has been on the one hand to cut back costs through service reductions, lay offs and attempts to hold the line on public employee wage demands. (At the end of 1980 the city in fact employed 20% fewer people than when Mayor Young took office in 1974.)(221) On the other hand the city has sought additional revenue sources. In 1976 assistance came in the form of the instigation of a yearly state grant or "equity package" to Detroit - a centre piece of Governor Milliken's "urban policy" - and permission given to Detroit by the State legislature to levy a special tax on city garbage collection. In 1981 with federal budgetary cut-backs and a state budgetary squeeze attendant on the changed fortunes

of Michigan's automotive economy, assistance came in the form of a 1% increase in Detroit's income tax for residents and suburban commuters alike. At time of writing, in early 1985, with the city of Detroit proposing a major hike in the city's utility taxes to hire back 700 laid off police officers, the signs are that even this major "fix" has now worn off. This fiscal deterioration has been accepted by Detroit's Mayor as a major rationale (alongside the need to create jobs) for the city's economic development agenda. The "Mayor's Task Force on City Finances" reporting in 1976 on the city's budget crisis regarded economic development as the long term solution. Itlooked to:

> "... the revitalization of the city of Detroit, the strengthening of its economic base, the provision of more jobs for its citizenry, and a greater realization of its growth potential".(222)

It recommended the establishment of an Economic Council composed of "the city's major financial, industrial, commercial, mercantile, labour and other related organizations working in close concert with city government" (223) to study the matter. Subsequently formed later in 1976 this organization spawned the present leading city of Detroit economic development agency - the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation. In this context one must point out the irony of property tax abatements as part of a strategy to combat city fiscal distress.

In turning to an overview of federal and state "urban" policy I consider federal policy first. In a memo to President Carter in January 1978 the secretary of the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development defined the three major "urban" problems in the U.S. as:(224)

> "... the continued decentralization of population and businesses; the increasing fiscal and social service disparities between central cities and suburban neighbours; and the continued centralization of minorities and the poor in the central cities."

These concerns for equity (and implicitly stability), and for the environment and resource utilisation (the waste of energy, infrastructure and farmland inherent in urban sprawl in addition to aesthetic deterioration) pervaded the "National Urban Policy"

announced by President Carter in March 1978.[225] They may be seen as arising very directly out of the particular American model of accumulation and labour reproduction in Detroit and other older metropolitan regions of the country. While the administration was not without some successes in addressing "urban" equity issues,[226] federal budget problems quickly stifled any hope of major new expenditures. On the contrary, the following year President Carter's budget message proposed cuts, for example, of 25-40% in federal expenditure on housing programmes.[227] Certain federal agencies under the Carter urban policy did find themselves obliged to conduct "urban impact assessments" for major new policy initiatives.[228] Under this concept, finding "especially persuasive expression" by the Rand Corporation,[229] such assessments were to include policy impact on "population size and distribution" and were to be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget. While this policy did have some success in limiting urban sprawl,[230] in the words of one commentator, "for the big cities, the federal policy comes about a quarter of a century and several Administrations too late".[231] Land use planning responsibility in any case (whether exercised or not) still remained lodged at the state level, a fact which in Michigan gave little solace to the city of Detroit. Neither was solace forthcoming for Detroit in the urban policy of the Reagan Administration announced in 1982.[232] Given the administration position that "the foundation for the Administration's urban policy is the Economic Recovery program",[233] in the discussion of "Reaganomics" and accompanying "New Federalism" I have covered the ground here already. Urban policy has been incorporated into economic policy in general. The dramatic impact of Reagan budget cuts on Detroit is shown in Table 20. Perhaps not surprisingly Mayor Young labelled the Reagan urban policy as both a "fraud" and "no policy at all".[234]

Reflective of the liberal orientation Michigan politics and not prepared to leave black voters in Detroit to the Democrats, the "urban" concerns expressed by the Milliken Administration (and the Democratic Blanchard Administration which took office in 1983 is of the same orientation) reflected closely those expressed by Carter. In a major policy speech in 1976 Milliken expressed the roots of such concern. The concern for equity was linked quite explicitly to

concern for urban stability:[235]

> "How many times have I heard it said: 'Let downtown Detroit die. Let downtown Flint, Saginaw and Bay City die. Let them all die'.
>
> What these people don't understand is that their pleasant suburbs will be next to die, and the economic and social chaos that would follow would also jeopardize the quality of life on our farms and in our resort towns."

On the matter of the environment and imperfections in metropolitan resource utilisation Milliken stated:

> "It seems strange to me that in an era when preservation of our resources is of such great concern that so many people are willing to throw away our most valuable resources - our cities.
>
> We can never afford to build them again, once they are gone. And I believe that we cannot afford, in this new Age of Limits, to live in such a decentralised and wasteful manner."

Such policy concerns run through a number of major gubernatorially initiated reports[236] but while certain achievements on both scores can be credited to the Milliken Administration, there were important limitations on what the city of Detriot could expect from state action. Measures introduced to compensate for urban inequalities during this period of Milliken's tenure did include State anti-redlining legislation and a neighbourhood improvement programme of the State Housing Development Authority. The "Detroit Equity Package", a major new annual State cash injection to Detroit's treasury, instituted in 1976 amidst a city budget crisis, illustrated, however, the constraints on gubernatorial compensatory initiatives aimed at Detroit. The measure was deliberately conceived by Milliken not as a "bail out Detroit" package but as state assistance to Detroit for the provision of services with regional and even statewide benefit - the operation of the Detroit Institue of Art, Detroit library and Historical Museum (a package worth almost $25 million in fiscal year 1983).[237] Suburban Detroit and "outstate" (non-S.E. Michigan) support for a diversion of "their" tax dollars on equity grounds to Detroit alone was judged by Milliken as unlikely.[238] As it was, the

city of Detroit found itself having to resist pressures for regional or state administration of such institutions. On this the Mayor was quite graphic:(239)

> "There are those who say the solution to our problem is to turn over our Zoo, our Parks, our Art Institute and Historical Museums, to some Regional or State Authority. These are the accumulated treasures of generations of Detroiters. These are, quite literally, the jewels of our city.
>
> Now it is proposed that we give them away - for free - for the promise that they will be kept polished. The answer is no.
>
> The answer to Detroit's problems is not the dismantling of the city."

To put matters in perspective one must point out that at the beginning of the 1980's welfare payments by the State of Michigan were still amongst the most generous in the country.(240) State budget pressure, however, attendant on Michigan's changed economic fortunes was putting this record under strain. Such problems made Milliken's proposal in 1980 for a state fiscal aid programme to Michigan's most "distressed" local governments (involving a proposed $30 million to Detroit)(241) a non-starter and no long term adjustment to the distribution formula of the State General Revenue Sharing programme was forthcoming in 1980 as in 1970 to make up the loss in revenue to Detroit consequent on its reduced 1980 Census population.(242)

Turning to the matter of metropolitan efficiency and environmental considerations, the promotion of public transit and dampening zeal for freeway construction during Milliken's tenure was at least partially due to these factors (the equity question was also important). But State government did not grasp the nettle of the assumed prerogative of local government (tied to ideologies of free enterprise and local autonomy) in land use planning - a factor which one has seen was not lost on the Executive Director of SEMCOG and was certainly not lost on the Mayor of Detroit.

To conclude this chapter one is in a position to consider the economic

development agenda of the city of Detroit with a particular emphasis on its relationship to city transportation policy. I will consider in turn the development of the agenda, the interests behind it and finally an assessment of its success.

A key feature in the development of Detroit's economic development strategy under Mayor Young has been the major involvement of corporate capital. This is something for which the Mayor takes credit in engineering. The city's first published "Plan for Urban Economic Revitalization", which appeared in 1975,(243) refers to how "Mayor Coleman A. Young called together a coalition of business, labour, industrial, community and government leaders to develop a program for economic revitalization of the city."(244) It would be more appropriate to say, however, that the private sector had already thrust itself full square into the centre of agenda formation. The key organisation here was the formation in November 1970 of the major power elite organisation Detroit Renaissance Inc. - an

> "... organization of top leaders of the top corporations in the Detroit area pledged to commit their personal talents and some of their corporate clout to effect a physical and economic revitalization of the city of Detroit ..."(245)

> "The Renaissance members' strategy was this: Concentrate on developing businesses in downtown Detroit. Start on the river-front, using the most attractive land. Make downtown an attractive place to work and live. As activity grows, money would spin out into other areas of the city."(246)

The first and by far the major project of Detroit Renaissance has been the building of the Renaissance Center, which now dominates the city skyline, on the downtown Detroit riverfront. The "RenCen", designed by the architect John Portman (designer of the Atlanta Peachtree Center), formally opened in April 1977 at a cost of $337 million.(247) It is 73 storey cylindrical hotel surrounded by four 39 storey octagonal office buildings. These structures, with a gleaming glass-walled exterior, sit on the corners of a four level podium. The latter contains restaurants, retail and speciality shops. The President of Detroit Renaissance indicates that when he took his job

PHOTOGRAPH NO.3

The Detroit "Renaissance Center" with Jefferson Ave. in the foreground.

PHOTOGRAPH NO. 4

Renaissance Center Phase II: The Rockefeller Towers.

PHOTOGRAPH NO.5

The Detroit River looking SW towards the Ambassador Bridge and the "downriver" jurisdictions of River Rogue and Ecorse. The site of the riverfront apartments complex (now built) is visible beyond Cobo Hall and the Joe Lewis Arena.

in 1971 a consensus had been reached by the organisation to sponsor a major project on the riverfront. In his words:[248]

> "By the time I arrived it had been decided that the top priority of Detroit Renaissance would be a project of such scale that it would change the image of downtown Detroit as a place that had had a net outflow of investment for 25 years.
>
> Beyond that the project had to be so impressive to the eye that everyone would say, 'Hey, something important is happening in downtown Detroit'. Because it was to begin the renaissance of the city, it had to take place on the riverfront where Detroit started in the first place. And finally, it had to be of such magnitude that it would cause other new investments downtown.
>
> We didn't think new office buildings would have great impact if they were just scattered around downtown along with a new hotel. We needed to have a physical mass."

Henry Ford II took the leading role in conceiving and realising the project. Of the total $337 million, $137 million of a direct equity investment was made by the Ford Motor Company and 50 other partners and members of Detroit Renaissance. Ford invested $81.6 million, General Motors $12 million and Chrysler $1.5 million. The vast majority of the other partners gained all or a substantial part of their business from the auto industry. The balance of $200 million for construction was raised by loan from a consortium of seven Detroit and 21 other banks. National Bank of Detroit, major Detroit bank for General Motors, and whose chairman was a co-chairman of Detroit Renaissance, arranged the loan and committed the largest single amount. Permanent long-term mortgage financing for the $200 million came primarily from the Ford Motor Company and the insurance industry. The bulk of the latter was provided by Aetna Life & Casualty and John Hancock - both major suppliers of insurance services to Ford.

In putting together the city's economic development agenda Mayor Young has "courted" the private sector, but Detroit Renaissance amply illustrates - despite some cajoling by Henry Ford II in pushing the RenCen project - the willingness of corporate capital to be involved.

Some commentators reviewing the evidence in fact argue that "Detroit Renaissancehas been the moving force behind much of the planning that has become city policy".(249) The creation in 1978 of the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation has in fact given the private sector a very direct and leading role in the devising and implementation of Detroit's development strategy. Formed as a non-profit but private development corporation, and drawing its leadership and board of directors primarily from the private sector and Detroit Renaissance in particular,(250) the organisation has been charged by the city of Detroit with "the delivery of 'nuts and bolts' kinds of technical and financial assistance to existing urban businesses and to devise and implement a variety of new industrial and commercial economic development projects".(251) Operational funding of the organisation is from a combination city of Detroit, State of Michigan and business sources. Backed up by guarantees, mainly from the larger corporations on the Growth Corporation board, the organisation has access to a line of credit ($5 million in 1980) shared by all seven Detroit banks. The Growth Corporation, a private development organisation, actually provides the staff for the public non-profit city EDC and DDA organisations established under State enabling law for specific purposes (Fig.1,p.162) and in which there is major private sector participation already. While the Mayor of Detroit is chairman of the Board of Directors of the city EDC and DDA, the chair and vice-chair of the Growth Corporation are filled by major corporate representatives. Through Detroit Renaissance, the Growth Corporation and other subsidiary development organisations, the private sector is at the very heart of city economic development policy formation - to such an extent that the boundary between public and private sectors in Detroit has become blurred.

The broad contours of the economic agenda pursued by Detroit's Growth Corporation and that of the city generally are based on the encouragement of industrial and commercial development, the promotion of the city as a residential location for middle and upper income groups and in particular a focus on "rebuilding downtown". The city of Detroit's plan for the future of downtown expresses the following goals:(252)

"Downtown

- will continue to be the financial center for the region
- will remain the focus of cultural, civic and convention activity for the metropolitan region
- will continue to grow as an important regional retail center
- will concentrate on offering greater employment opportunities
- will have a transportation network which facilitates movement in and out of the city and permits efficient intra-city circulation
- will concentrate on a variety of activities in one general locale to create a 24-hour living, working and entertainment center
- will encourage the development of new residential communities."

The overall strategy indeed does not seem dissimilar from that expressed in Detroit's urban renewal agenda of the 1950's excepting the disillusionment with freeways, the greater urgency in the situation, much greater involvement of the private sector and absence of racist undertones in the city's housing goals. From the standpoint of regional Capital, concerns for regional stability, usually described as the exercise of corporate "social responsibility", are certainly at work. The protection of investments in, and the functional necessity of the CBD, are as formerly also at work. Downtown is still a "deal making" centre where face to face contacts are important. Banks, major law and accountancy firms are still located there. Another related factor must be seen, however, as coming to the fore during this time: the symoblic importance of "the city". Here one picks up on a thesis advanced by Castells. He suggests that the

> "... defence of the city centre against the social degradation of its environment ... cannot be explained only in functional terms."

Theatres, concert halls, museums, places of high class commerce and entertainment in city centres, Castells argues

> "... is a keypoint of the self-definition of (an economic and cultural) elite. The luxury buildings that rise so full of pride

in the place of the demolished slums would have no explanation without this analysis."(253)

References to the symoblic importance of the city can be readily found in federal and State of Michigan pronouncements on urban policy.(254) At the beginning of the seventies when indeed the question could be seriously raised whether private capital was prepared to write off the city of Detroit, the "RenCen" project must fundamentally be seen as a symbolic committment by regional Capital to the city. When the Detroit Grand Prix (a venue recently arranged by Detroit Renaissance) is relayed to international television screens it is the towering corporate structure of the "RenCen", around which the course is designed, that forms the dominant symbol for "Detroit".

Against the background of the economic and fiscal deterioration of the city, which I have described, the pragmatic concerns of the city administration under Young have been with employment generation and municipal tax base improvement. In an interview with Studs Terkel in 1980, Young put his position on tax concessions to business and the city's economic policy generally quite plainly:(255)

> "Some say this (tax concessions) is subsidizing business. I say it's the name of the game. As long as we live in a society which pits workers in Mississipi against workers in Michigan, we have to make concessions to keep our plants ...
>
> I realize the profit motive is what makes things work in America. If Detroit is not to dry up, we must create a situation which allows businessmen to make a profit. That's their self-interest. Ours is jobs. The more they invest in Detroit, the more their interest becomes ours. That is the way the game is played in America today. I don't think there's gonna be a revolution tomorrow. As a young man I thought it. I think the revolution's for someone else."

On the disproportionate amount of public resources devoted to downtown the Mayor has taken the position that "that's where we are able to get the maximum investment of private funds for our dollars".(256)

It would be incorrect, however, to assume total correspondence between the economic development "vision" for the city held by the city administration and by the private sector.(257) It is unlikely that Detroit Renaissance is committed, as is Mayor Young, to a Detroit rapid transit system to anchor, bolster and serve a downtown commercial resurgence. Here one must take issue with the view expressed by Hill(258) that rapid transit was, because of the impossibility of providing requisite parking space, "a key element in the equation determining the success or failure of Renaissance Center". A large number of those interviewed were of the opinion that the auto companies, whose business is selling cars, were either cool on the idea or downright against it. The leader of the city of Detroit's downtown development team expressed the opinion that the Big Three and Detroit Renaissance were "neutral" on the idea.(259) The director of transportation planning for SEMCOG summed up the attitude of the auto companies on the issue as involving "an ambivalence with a conservatism that leans towards the auto".(260) The President of the Detroit Chamber of Commerce expressed the view that "if the Big Three had been for a rapid transit system it would have been built years ago".(261) The director of the Citizens Research Council did not see a subway as crucial to the downtown development agenda and pointed out that multi-storey and below-ground parking would amply handle demand.(262) The director of Civic and Governmental Affairs for the Ford Motor Co. (the former director of TALUS) regarded a Detroit subway as "excessive expenditure for the returns".(263) And finally the President of the Detroit Central Business District Association holds the opinion that(264) at least one of the Big Three (although choosing not to be more specific) is emphatically against any subway. This view was based on the fact that when the CBDA board was voting on the issue the head of one of Detroit's large banks disclosed to the Association President that, while supporting a subway personally, he had chosen to absent himself, rather than register a favourable vote in opposition to the view of his largest depositor - one of the auto companies.

I conclude with a brief assessment of the prospects for Detroit's economic development agenda. On the industrial front the general picture is one of continued concentration of the region's disadvantaged within the city in the face of the attraction of Capital

not just to the suburbs but to the Sunbelt and overseas. This is within the context of the foreign challenge to American Capital, the emergence of new technology industries and the increasing international division of labour which new technology has made possible. Divisions within the reproduction of labour power remain unmitigated as the economic climate in Detroit pits worker against worker and local government against local government in a frantic scramble for jobs and tax base. It is a scramble in which other regions of the U.S. in the present economic recovery are coming out on top. The North American auto industry is recentralising in the Midwest but the order of the day is labour shedding and a preference in industrial location generally for suburban and exurban locations. The recent and drastic decline in the city of Detroit's industrial tax base I have commented on already. The equally drastic lengths to which the city administration was prepared to go to keep jobs and tax base within the city is revealed in the clearance in 1980/81, at a cost of $200 million to federal, state and local government, of a 465 acre swathe of land, mostly within the city of Detroit, to accommodate a new G.M. assembly plant.(265) While the task involved the displacement of a neighbourhood of 3,400 people and demolition of over 1,100 buildings, the offer of the plant to the city was regarded by G.M. as a "progressive" gesture by a "hometown" company.(266) More generally, however, Detroit could not hope to be that "lucky". The collective concerns expressed by bodies such as Detroit Renaissance are strained by the harsh realities of market forces. In its struggle to survive, Chrysler's executives, for example, admitted no particular loyalty to Michigan or Detroit and Chrysler's chairman openly boasted of his ability to play off state against state in making investment decisions.(267)

Turning to the downtown development agenda the economic "shot in the arm" which the city has hoped for has fallen far short of expectations. It cannot be disputed that downtown Detroit - in particular the riverfront area - is more vital and "alive" than ten years ago. Major public investments financed with city funds have included a $31 million Civic Centre (Hart) Plaza and amphitheatre between the RenCen and Cobo Hall(268) and an investment of $46.6 million in the Joe Louis Sports Arena west of the Civic Centre and home of the 1980 Republican

party convention.[269] The small "Greektown" restaurant district is thriving and a number of new bars have opened downtown. Yet downtown Detroit still displays a lack of strength as a location for commerce and non-rent subsidised private housing - critical elements in the city's plans for a "24 hour living, working and entertainment center" and the spin-offs hoped for in terms of jobs and tax base. On the office front the two major developments within the city have been completion in 1981 of Phase II of the RenCen, a 21 storey, 580,000 sq.ft., twin tower office building just east of the original complex, a $65 million project of the Ford Motor Land Development Corporation and Rockefeller Center Inc., and completion in 1982 of the 385,000 sq.ft. New Center One building in the vicinity of the G.M. headquarters a few miles north of downtown and in which G.M. will be a major tenant.[270] But, as in the past, there has been no major speculative office boom in the city. Table 14 illustrates the degree to which office construction in suburban Southfield and Troy outstripped that in the city of Detroit in the 1970's. In the 1980's, coming on to the Southfield market in 1983 were the 350,000 sq.ft Travelers Tower and the first phase of the two-building 500,000 sq.ft Galleria Officenter complex. In 1982 Troy added 600,000 sq.ft of new office space, half of it in the major new 15 storey City Center tower. Birmingham and Bloomfiled Hills in 1982 brought fourth close to 600,000 sq.ft. of office space on to the market.[271] Detroit on the contrary rather than "taking off" as an office centre, saw in January 1983, the RenCen (which has been accused of acting as a magnet in drawing tenants from other downtown office space rather than acting as a catalyst)[272] default on its mortgage and stop paying property taxes. Under a rescue plan holders of the mortgage assumed part ownership.[273] And leasing of Phase II of the RenCen in 1982 proceeded at a "snail's pace".[274] Various obstacles it would seem stand in the way of the office component of what the former President of Metropolitan Fund has referred to as the desired "Manhattanization" of Detroit.[275] Detroit, as opposed to Manhattan or Chicago, and as indicated before, does not have the same reservoir of businesses to whom the special advantages of city centrality and/or prestige is important. And lacking the same strong tradition as a prestige office location it is increasingly difficult to establish it. Southfield is now a prestige location for office development. TRW Inc., for

example, taking advantage of information technology, recently transferred many "back-office" functions (more mundane labour intensive operations) into cheaper accommodation removed from its prestigious Southfield building.(276) The RenCen in Detroit, it is also worth pointing out, has exhibited an obvious physical ambivalence towards its surroudings. As if hedging its bets a two-storey berm along the front of the centre creates an air of detached aloofness. As the dean of the architecture school at the University of Michigan has commented: "Some think it's a fortress for whites to work in while the rest of the city goes to hell around them".(277)

Retailing and housing objectives in Detroit's downtown agenda have been closely related and also the focus of some considerable disappointment. To convince developers and investors that an atmosphere of "urban chic" in Detroit, as in Baltimore for example,(278) will attract shoppers away from suburban shopping malls and towards a planned downtown "urban mall" has as yet proved impossible. Establishing downtown apartment living by young urban professionals (who would make downtown shopping development less of a risk), in the absence of such a tradition, is equally difficult. In January 1983 Hudson's department store, the existing anchor store in city plans for its proposed downtown shopping Cadillac Center, closed its doors.(279) The store had been running at a loss for some time. Despite the active participation of J.L. Hudson, the company chairman, in the activities of Metropolitan Fund and Detroit Renaissance, a market based, hard commercial decision was paramount. Detroit's hopes in inching towards a "critical mass" of activities which will launch a downtown "take-off" fall to a large extent back on heavy publicly subsidised luxury apartments - the 350 unit Trolley Plaza which opened in 1981(280) and the 700 unit Riverfront West complex (on a prime riverfront location and still requiring massive public subsidy) which opened late 1984.(281) Even if the agenda, however, does launch itself eventually (which seems uncertain), the question raises itself as to whether the best the more regionally disadvantaged in Detroit can hope for is greater opportunity to secure low paying service sector jobs (cooks, waiters, shop assistants, cleaners, etc.) servicing such a downtown revival.

Footnotes

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129. For the 1978 package see: McDiarmid, Hugh, **Lobbies Agree on Transit Package,** Detroit Free Press, 10th February 1978. For the 1982 package see: Davies, William, G. **Transportation Survival Package** of 1982, Michigan Municipal Review, March 1983, pp.39-47. The state gas tax was raised to 11c in 1978 and to 15c in 1982.

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    While the M275 project was subsequently reinstated for consideration by the Transportation Commission it will probably never be built. The latest State Transportation Plan prepared by the Commission in 1982 and with a time horizon to 1990 states: "The major emphasis must be the protection of the existing system and users. This can best be accomplished through the retention of "essential" services and through the maintenance of existing facilities". State of Michigan, Department of Transportation, **Michigan State Transportation Plan 1982-1990, Executive Summary,** November 1982

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250. Major corporate Board members include: William Agee, Chairman, The Bendix Coroporation; James Aliber, Chairman, First Federal Savings and Loan; William Bailey, President, First Independence National Bank; Rodkey Craighead, Chairman, Detroit Bank and Trust Co; David Easlick, President, Michigan Bell Telephone Co.;

Max Fisher, Chairman, United Brand Co; Henry Ford II, chairman, Ford Motor Co; Joseph Hudson Jr, Chairman J.L.Hudson Co; Meese, William, chairman, Detroit Edison Co; Paul Mirabito, Chairman, Burroughs Corp; Thomas Murphy, Chairman, General Motors Corp; Lynn Townsend, former Chairman Chrysler Corp; Dean Richardson, Chairman, Manufactures National Bank of Detroit; James Roche, former Chairman General Motors Corp; Arthur Seder, Chairman, American Natural Resources Co; Robert Surdam, Chairman, National Bank of Detroit; Alfred Taubman, Chairman The Taubman Co; Stanley WInkelman, Chairman, Winkelman Stores Inc. In 1979 James Roche and Lynn Townsend were Co-Chairmen of the Board and Arthur Seder (Jr) was Vice-Chairman and Chairman of the Executive Committee. Information supplied by Detroit Economic Growth Corp.

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"I think we stand at a turning point in history. If, a hundred years from now, this nations experiment in democracy has failed, I suspect that historians will trace that failure to our own era, when a process of decay began in our inner cities and was allowed to spread unchecked throughout our society.

But I do not believe that must happen. I believe that working together, we can turn the tide, stop the decay, and set in motion a process of growth that by the end of this century can give us cities worthy of the greatest nation on earth".

Quoted as introduction to the **White House Press Release on Carters Urban Policy**, March 27, 1978. Governor Milliken in a major speech in 1976 recognised that "our cities have always been the great centers of our economic and cultural life" (my emphasis) Milliken, William, **Co-operation Key to Saving Cities**, op.cit.

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257. The agenda has not gone unchallenged from the Left. See: Russell, Jack and Luria, Dan, **Rational Reindustrialization - An Economic Development Agenda for Detroit**, Widgetripper Press, Detroit, 1981

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279. Hansell, Betsey and Jackson, Luther **A Look at the Future without Hudsons's,** Detroit Free Press, December 5, 1982

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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

1. Introduction - Restatement of Research Task
2. Class as an Explanatory Variable - the Dangers of Structuralism
3. Reflections on the Local and Regional State in Detroit
4. Implications for Planning Theory
5. Reflections on the Research

1. Introduction - Restatement of Research Task

In admitting that empirical research of a case study nature can be a chastening experience in dispelling grand theoretical pretensions one is in good company. The empirical research of Castells in the Dunkerque region of France was apparently a salutory one[1] and in his most recent empirical work Castells admits of "the reluctance of the social sciences to accept the reality of their underdevelopment as sciences" and in comparison with the natural sciences the "primitive state of our knowledge and of our methods".[2] Castells' reorientation may be declared innocent of the "grotesque intellectual fashion for self-criticism"[3] which his "intellectual brother"[4] Poulantzas so strongly castigated. Rectifications to social theory Poulantzas argued only make sense in the course of concrete analyses:

> "Those who have still not learnt this, those who give themselves the luxury of continually 'self-correcting' their eternal preliminary remarks (preambles) without giving themselves the means to do so, that is, without ever having been capable of producing even the shadow of a concrete analysis, these people will never learn anything."[5]

The development of Castells' theoretical schema has taken place in the context of empirical research - in the process of confrontation with case study material. One's own starting position, drawing especially on Thompson's critique of Althusserian epistemology, encompassed an awareness of the pitfalls of structuralist Marxism but was still centrally concerned with exploring the usefulness of class relationships as an explanatory variable in understanding transportation policy formation in Detroit. The conclusions of this research endeavour in which one was theoretically forewarned but not necessarily forearmed (ie in which theoretical "gaps" often led to questions rather than answers) is the subject matter of this chapter. I start by restating again the research agenda and method.

The research tasks were as follows:

(a) To consider the hypothesis that class relationships are primary (ie of over-riding importance in forming the framework of constraints within which policy was formulated) in understanding transportation

policy formation at regional and local governmental levels in Detroit in the postwar period.

(b) To consider the veracity of relevant existing Marxist interpretations relating to transporation policy formation in Detroit with particular attention paid to possible over-theoreticism and structuralism.

(c) On the basis of the tenability of the hypothesis advanced to consider the role of physical planners in transportation policy formation and to consider the implications for a theory of planning.

Physical planners, especially those involved in transportation planning were defined pragmatically. No attempt was made to lay down rigid demarcation lines between the activity of planners and other policy agents and between physical planning and other policy areas. Such refinements seemed more appropriate to a "finer grained" study looking at transportation policy over a much shorter period. The basic starting point in theorizing "the state" was Poulantzas' characterization of the state as a social relation between classes.[6] This view seemed flexible enough to accommodate the notion of class based constraints and pressures operating upon the state and the instrumentalist thesis of Miliband.[7] Within this perspective the specificity of the local and regional state in Detroit was approached in terms of the "uniqueness of local class relations". Three basic structuring concepts run through the study: accumulation of capital, class struggle between Capital and Labour, and intra-Labour conflict, deriving out of the basic Capital/Labour antagonism, in the consumption and reproductive spheres of social life. These ideas were introduced in Chapters One and Two. In terms of basic research philosophy, that adhered to cleaves strongly to the ideas articulated by E.P. Thompson in his rebuttal of Althusserian Marxism.[8] It is an approach broadly endorsed now by such as Saunders,[9] Sayer,[10] Cooke[11] and by Castells in his most recent work.[12] It is a method of conjectual hypothesis formation brought to "the evidence" tentatively in the manner of a research question.[13] It is a tool with which to interrogate the evidence. The test of the fruits of ones confrontation with the evidence is whether ones theory building stands up through not being

disproved by contrary evidence. Thus conceived, social research takes on the exploratory nature of a journey with lessons learnt along the way. The aim of the research is to understand and not necessarily to predict as is the goal of some positivistic hypothesis testing approaches. Somewhat ironically given the (on his own admission) "flawed theoretical formalism"[14] of his earlier work, the general thrust of such an approach has been championed of late by Castells. Some of the language could almost be mistaken for extracts from Thompson's "Poverty of Theory" essay. To wit:

> "the most useful concepts are those flexible enough to be deformed and rectified in the process of using them as instruments of knowledge." [15]

Castells advocates the asking of "research questions" posed at a "very general and tentative level". A "provisional theoretical framework" is modified in the course of the research during which new questions arise. The result as Castells puts it is that "as in all the best social research, we cannot say what is true, but what it makes sense to say without being false".[16] Almost as if apologising for this more "messy" approach as contrasted with the "artifical paradises of the grand theory" in his earlier work,[17] Castells adds: "this research design is not the rationalization of an accidental experience".[18] To this one might add that, given as Castells admits the "under-development of the social sciences as sciences",[19] in those more frustrating moments when doubt reigns supreme, it only appears that way.

The conclusions of the research will be reviewed in the following sequence. I will start with a consideration of the general utility of class as an explanatory variable and the associated dangers of a "structuralist" interpretation of social events. Through an appreciation of the limits inherent in such a macro level approach concerning what we can say about state behaviour this leads on to an explicit focus on the local and regional state in Detroit itself and more specifically the role of planners and lessons for planning theory. The chapter concludes with some self-criticism of the research and some reflections on the work with the benefit of hindsight.

2. Class as an Explanatory Variable - the Dangers of Structuralism

The first comments must be positive ones. Class behaviour arising quite directly out of divisions and conflict within the "sphere of production" where goods and services are produced would seem to explain quite well the "macro dynamic" of transportation policy formation in Detroit in the postwar period. By this one does not mean that all events stand rigidly to attention in the face of the grand concept of class conflict but there is certainly a discernible class pattern to the unfolding of the transportation policy agenda looked at in broad terms. On the one hand the basic notion of capital accumulation (and various subsets of capitalist interests), on the other the category of Labour (with intra-Labour conflict including that of race subsumed under the general organizing concept of "the reproduction of labour power" - the exact nature of the link to the sphere of production in the case of race being left albeit somewhat indeterminant) and the tension of the mutually defining conflict between them, work reasonably well in organizing the evidence brought to bear on the investigation. A recap is in order.

Three postwar transportation policy climates were identified. The first was characterized by general enthusiasm for freeways in the region. Freeways were seen by city of Detroit politicians and planners as the solution to important city problems (congestion, lack of attraction as an economic location) and as complementary to the city's urban renewal agenda. The period was one of increasing economic competition between Detroit and the emerging suburban political jurisdictions, but there was a reasonable degree of regional consensus on transportation policy issues. The following period, roughly covering the time from the early 1960's to the assumption of control by Coleman Young, Detroit's first black mayor in 1974, saw this consensus begin to break down. The freeway agenda it was argued was part of a more general dynamic of metropolitan development that in this period was subject to developing crisis of which the "riots" in 1967 were the most dramatic manifestation. The third period, bringing one to the present, has been marked by an almost complete absence of regional consensus on transportation policy. Freeways have been characterized by politicians and planners as the cause of many of the

city of Detroit's problems and now public transportation, in particular a rapid transit system, has been heralded as the key to the city of Detroit's economic regeneration.

In presenting this progression of events I have interwoven the transportation policy agenda itself with what I have called the "regionalist" agenda (the existence or otherwise of governmental mechamisms in the Detroit area to deal with issues of a supra-local significance and the existence in general terms of those issues themselves) and the economic development issue (primarily local concern with jobs and tax base).

Using the "tools" identified the bones of the argument have been as follows:

1. In the immediate postwar period the Detroit region enjoyed a favoured location with respect to the geographical circulation of surplus value. The postwar "settlement" between big Capital and Labour provided a reasonably stable basis for future accumulation in the region but one in which the rewards to Labour were quite unequally distributed. In particular blacks bore the brunt of the inherent instability of the capitalist accumulation process, advantages undoubtedly accrued directly to capital through the "superexploitation" of black labour and it is no contradiction, given the competitive nature of the capital accumulation process to see racial discrimination as also rooted in the short term material interest of white labour. The dynamic of suburbanization, representing the increased generalization of capital accumulation in space and which, facilitated by the freeway agenda, acted as an "engine" for expanded accumulation, mapped out divisions within the reproduction of labour power, deriving very directly from the sphere of production, on the metropolitan spatial plane. As such the model of metropolitan development, aided and abetted by the particular interests of property capital, carried the potential for its own fracture. The recognition of this potential led to regional Capital (primarily the larger elements) in general in Detroit becoming involved in the regionalist issue at an early stage. Given the relative weakness, however, of the Detroit CBD, to begin with, the response of the private sector to

Detroit's urban renewal efforts as linked to its transportation plan in the 1950's, was less than enthusiastic. A rapid transit system for the city, which might have transformed the future composition of downtown quite drastically, was virtually ruled out of court in Detroit in the 1950's, not only because of very lukewarm support if not outright opposition from the auto companies, but undoubtedly because the city and region psychologically saw the future of the "Motor City" as tied to the automobile.

2. The 1960's saw a major push by regional Capital in Detroit for cohesive regional governmental structures when metropolitan fracture was becoming more serious. This bore results in the establishment of SEMCOG. A working regional consensus, on transportation policy, at least until the riots of 1967, was still made possible by the expectations concomitant on the buoyant economic climate and increasing federal largesse stemming from the "enlightened" big Capital electoral victory of Kennedy over Nixon in 1960. The unbalanced nature of the Detroit transportation system with destabilizing inequities in access to transportation resources and direct detrimental effects on business efficiency led to the direct intervention of regional Capital in Detroit into transportation policy formation in the mid 1960's predating a major public transportation push by federal government in the seventies. The result was the establishment of SEMTA.

3. Since the assumption of black political control in Detroit in the early 1970's an outcome of the directly class related nature of divisions mapped out by the suburbanization dynamic, and consequent upon Capital having a more problematic attachment to the region as a whole (represented firstly by the new "war between the states" and latterly by what can be called a new phase for American capitalism as a whole - intense foreign competition and the breakdown of the "Pax American" in the form of Reaganomics, alongside the possibilities inherent in the New International Division of Labour) the economic battlelines have galvanized in Detroit between city and suburbs. In an atmosphere of intense intra-regional economic competition consensus on regional transportation policy has almost entirely broken down. Most significantly, despite a major federal level commitment of

resources to the Detroit area in the mid-seventies for an upgrading of the regions public transit system including a rapid rail component (federal policy at this time informed by an awareness of the limitations on equity, efficiency and envirionmental grounds of over-reliance on an auto based system) city/suburban agreement was impossible to achieve. The city of Detroit has continued to link economic regeneration and transportation policy, specifically a subway for the city. Under the Reagan budget cutting axe and free market ideology hopes for the latter have collapsed. Despite an organizational commitment by regional Capital to the city's economic future in the form of the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation (understandable not just in terms of public relations but in terms of the need for stability in a metropolis where, despite the enhanced potential for capital mobility, regional Capital still has a major commitment) and the symbolism of the economic albatross of the Renaissance Center (testimony to the fact that even Capital needs a sense of place) hard private investment dollars are a rarer commodity. The city of Detroit is in a competitive struggle for its economic life. The bulldozing of a neighbourhood of 3,200 people in Poletown to accommodate a new General Motors assembly plant demonstrated the lengths to which the city administration was prepared to go to compete with its metropolitan neighbours. It is an environment in which regional Capital has pragmatically decided to "back pedal" on the issue of stronger regional governmental mechamisms to induce regional cohesiveness.

Overall then, there is a strong class related pattern to the dynamic behind the development of transportation policy in the region. Class would seem to be of over-riding importance. There is a danger, however, which I have endeavoured to illustrate, that the type of processes understood with reference to "class" as the major structuring concept can be erroneously treated as reified "structures" devoid of human agency or become the elements of an idealized theoretical system. In both cases, whether structuralist explicitly or implicitly, concepts can proceed in the mind to trace on a life of their own leading itself to error and into whose assumed unfolding the complexities of more detailed events are made to fit. The subject of how far such abstract theorizing as I have discussed can take us in

understanding more detailed events is one to which I shall return in a review of state behaviour in Detroit and the role of planners. I recap first on some structuralist misreadings of events in Detroit.

Standing accused are Markusen,[20] Ewen,[21] Mollenkopf[22] and Hill.[23] Markusen, for example, noting the effects of home rule legislation, as passed by state legislatures in the prewar period, in facilitating metropolitan fragmentation in the postwar period, in a functionalist way attributes the origin of such enabling legislation, in particular its protection from annexation provisions, as rooted in the imposition of suburban interests over and against those of the central city:

> "... it put the decision to join or not to join the central city in the hands of the residents of the annexable area, leaving the parent who had spawned the child helpless to participate in determining their joint future."[24]

City incorporations as they took place especially in postwar Detroit were based on a strong sense of suburban interest versus central city interest, but incorporating jurisdictions, at least in the 1930's, could legitimately claim that they needed city status to deal with problems of urban administration in a situation where the city of Detroit was reluctant to assume the expense of providing municipal services to outlying areas through annexation. Detroit was not a "helpless parent" in 1930 and was content to see some "children" go their own way (although not all, as in the costly incorporation of Dearborn cutting off the tax revenue of the Ford Rouge complex). The identification of an important tendency, in other words, (ie the balkanized metropolis which did develop at the central city's expense) is marred by its presentation in an idealized way.

Ewen likewise, would seem to project an overly idealized notion of the motivations of corporate Capital, as working through Metropolitan Fund, in pushing for much stronger regional governmental structures in the seventies. Ewen sees here a move by Capital to eradicate democracy and to bring local government more directly under its control. In analysis she states:

> "The ruling class has long understood that its capacity to rule is dependent on its capacity to control those who govern. It is

far easier to control officials who are far removed from local and direct constituencies (and for whom winning an election will require thousands of corporate dollars, and obligations, for campaign expenditures) than it is to control local officials who more accurately reflect the working class base that elected them". (25)

I argued that this view seems much too conspirational and certainly over-romanticizes the working class nature of local democracy in S.E. Michigan. The activity of Metropolitan Fund in advocating regional government with teeth in the seventies was rooted in concerns for stability and efficiency in the region as a locus of accumulation but is best seen perhaps as involving a somewhat idealistic assessment of possibilities for change (even Capital can be naive sometimes) - albeit based on an appreciation of the value of extreme positions in forcing more marginal change - given the competitive economic roots of regional governmental division in the process of accumulation and the reproduction of labour power. Ewen, in developing her theme of the assumed need for top down corporate governmental control and planning of the Detroit region, is perhaps at her most bemusing in suggesting that the Doxiadus urban planning project of the late sixties be seen as possessing fascist undertones. To quote:

"The imperatives of the corporations, which mean rationalizing markets, controlling labor supplies, building efficient and cheap distribution and transportation networks, require that their plans for the next thirty years not be jeopardized by the whims and wills of local constituencies who just might decide that what was good for General Motors was not not good for Sarnia, Jackson, Roseville, Inkster or Ecorse. If a structural characteristic of fascism is the merger of the state apparatus with that of monopoly capital on the condition of the destruction of potential power exerted by other constituencies, particularly those representing the working class, then it is in the planning for the UDA that the specter of fascism takes on an eerie reality. The study by Doxiadus a privately financed study for the benefit of one of the largest corporations in the Detroit area (Detroit Edison), claims to have laid the plans for electricity in the Detroit area to the year 2000. Because electrical supplies and

service can determine to a large extent where and how things do develop, there is, at a level, a fait accompli involved. The alternatives in the Detroit area are clearly defined by the agencies of the ruling class and the definition of what is necessary is clearly that defined by corporate capitalism."[26]

A more probable reading of the Doxiadus exercise as was suggested, one that is lost in the quite stratospheric theoretical projections of Ewen, is that Walter Cisler, chairman of Detroit Edison, considering himself a social visionary (rather naively setting out to make the future albeit in the image of corporate capital) indulged the idealist planning methodology of his friend Doxiadus whom he had met during their Marshall Plan days together in Europe, in an exercise which far from being a corporate Capital blueprint for development in the urban Detroit area, was never really taken too seriously by those with an understanding of the actual realities of the operative model of metropolitan development in Detroit. In the words of Mayor Cavanagh it was "somewhat of a boondoggle".

With a similar desire to include everything within a bold theoretical sweep, Mollenkopf[27] includes Detroit within corporate led urban renewal efforts to protect central business districts in the 1950's and 1960's. However, I have argued that this is to grossly over-estimate the strength and cohesiveness of Big Capital support in Detroit around the agenda of bolstering the CBD. What is significant in Detroit's case is the relative weakness, in terms of investment of Big Capital attachment to the CBD - an altogether different context for planners and policy makers. Likewise Hill[28] accepts Mollenkopf's argument as applied to Detroit and without seeming to examine the actual detail of events relating to the Gratiot urban renewal project in Detroit in the fifties interprets it as "a land grab to provide big business with subsidized property on which to build".[29] However, as I have indicated, there was no pent-up private sector demand for the Gratiot site as a location for commercial or industrial activity even if the city of Detroit had been considering the site for this purpose in the first place (which it was not). The use being considered by the city was residential. The idea of a corporate logic from which city of Detroit policy can almost be "read off" is one which also seems to

infuse Hill's analysis of events in Detroit in the 1970's and 1980's. Hill's most recent contribution to an understanding of economic policy formation in Detroit is replete with reference to the term "profit logic" implying that state policy necessarily has taken the course which it has.[30] Thus Hill argues that a Detroit rapid transit system was not only supported by Detroit's mayor but by corporate capital as well. The reason given is that rapid transit was, because of the impossibility of providing requisite parking space, a "key element in the equation determining the success or failure of Renaissance Center".[31] Using extensive interview sources it was disputed whether such a total correspondence between the economic development vision for the city held by the city administration and by the private sector can be sustained. State policy formation would seem not quite so simple. A discussion of the local and regional state in Detroit and the role of planners will provide a forum for consideration of the more general question of how far abstract Marxist theorizing of the type I have engaged in, can take one in understanding concrete events.

3. Reflections on the Local and Regional State in Detroit

In his recent review and assessment of the life's work of Nicos Poulantzas, Jessop[32] places paramount importance on the contribution which Poulantzas made to understanding the state as a social relation - the idea that "the state is the material condensation of a relation of forces between classes" and that the state "helps to constitute the balance among class forces and does not simply reflect it".[33] This is in contra-distinction to "crude instrumentalism which considers the state as a neutral tool which is equally accessible to all class forces and equally applicable to all purposes".[34] It is not a view, however, at variance with the notion of the state as the crystallization of forces based on past conflict but which can nevertheless be an "instrument" subject to "capture". It is such a notion of the state as a class relation as was used in the present consideration of transportation policy formation in Detroit. It is one which has stood up well. The fragmented governmental form of the Detroit region maps out very explicitly important intra-class divisions revealing that the state certainly does not exist passively

to be captured. Important class relations of the state are "given away" by geographical boundaries rendering an "unpacking from within" that much easier. The long standing activities and primary role of regional Capital in Detroit in working for the establishment of regional governmental structures is testimony to how instrumental pressures in one time period can become embodied in the institutional/ structural woodwork of another.

The criticism of Saunders[35] that Poulantzas presented a reductionist view of the state in which everything was reduced too directly to class relations and in which the concept of "relative autonomy of the state" was in fact a cover for a crude functionalist reductionism to class interests,[36] has been addressed by writers endeavouring to build upon the fundamentally sound insight (the state as a relation) which Poulantzas still has to offer. As a backdrop to one's research conclusions on how planning intervention by the state might be theorized one notes in particular the recent work of Cooke[37] in the planning literature who endorses Urry's projection of a mediating role for a Gramscian concept of civil society operating between the state and productive relations. It is not incidental that one commentator on Gramsci claims that "perhaps he went further than any other Marxist thinker in recognising the force of ideas in producing historical change, as well as seeing the impossibility of establishing any precise correlation between economic circumstances and intellectual developments".[38] As the editors of Gramsci "Prison Notebooks" point out, Gramsci "did not succeed in finding a single, wholly satisfactory conception of 'civil society' or the state" but there is an important usage in his work where he puts the position that "between the economic structure and the state with its legislation and its coercion stands civil society" with the state as "the instrument for conforming civil society to the economic structure".[39] Cooke, taking this as a starting point, generalizing across "civil society" divides it into the spheres of circulation, reproduction and popular struggle. The sphere of circulation is very directly linked to the sphere of production. It is the realm of market exchange and distribution incorporating most importantly conflict over wage levels in the labour market.[40] The sphere of reproduction covers issues pertaining to the reproduction of both Capital and Labour. On the former score are

included decisions such as whether Capital should divest itself from a particular region or sector and the matter of the maintenance of capitalist social relations generally. The reproduction of labour power subsumes "that area of daily life outside the workplace".[41] It involves actual consumption decisions, for example, and pulls in conflict over the provision of collective consumption goods. The sphere of popular struggle involves "state versus people struggles". It groups together "those struggles, which were previously squeezed uncomfortably into class analyses of social conflict or ignored altogether" (eg. ecological movements in Marxist analysis). Popular struggle, Cooke argues "is linked with struggle in the sphere of reproduction in the final analysis, but is characterized by its defensive, non-class basis rather than the more traditional offensive, class-based political struggle in the sphere of reproduction".[42] The essential point to grasp, with implications for a theory of planning, is that any simple characterization of the relationship between the state and class is considered invalid. Cooke conceives of "individual subjects in civil society who may mobilize around a variety of collective interests and bases of identification such as: status, occupation, gender, religion, language, region, ethnicity or nationality as well as class relations of production".[43] The spheres of reproduction and popular struggle are seen as "both expressive of the attempts of individuals to find bases of collective identification which are not co-terminous with their position in the relations of production".[44] This would seem to strike a note of harmony with the work of the mature Poulantzas who having broken before his death with the Althusserian notion of structural class causality conceded "that the state is not exhausted by its class significance and political forces are not exhausted by class movements".[45]

This problematising of state actions in relation to class is something to which I return in the context of recent reformulations of Marxist research methodology and the limits of such "grand" theory itself. Concerning one's own approach, however, towards the local and regional state, while not articulated within a concept of civil society it has, nevertheless, centered on the spheres of production, circulation (the market) and reproduction (Capital concern for continued accumulation and Labour consumption cleavages). These I have tied very directly

to class and the model at a general level does, I have argued, explain the macro dynamic of transportation policy formation. If one had been studying, however, the introduction of handicapped provisions on SEMTA buses, for example, this might more appropriately have belonged in the sphere of popular struggle. It is clear, however, that one's subject matter has not revolved around pluralistic consumption conflicts suggested by Saunders[46] as forming the basis for study of the local state. Yet even given the class based nature of local and regional process with which I have grappled, the specificity of the local state in terms of "the uniqueness of local class relations"[47] proved difficult to tie down. Where does local and regional process stop and state and federal process begin? This is, of course, the comment of Martlew[48] in his criticism of a "layer cake" view of the state. Thus, for example, it is difficult to disentangle the role of federal government (and the activities of the Committee for Economic Development), state government and the role of Metropolitan Fund in the creation of SEMCOG (although the "spade work" of M.F. appears crucial). While federal and state process can be theorized at an abstract level certain interventions crucial to regional and local process (the pledge of $600 million by President Ford, for example, to the Detroit region for public transportation) have to be introduced almost exogenously without full explanation of their origin. That said, it still does seem meaningful to talk in terms of a certain unifying distinctiveness to local and regional process based not on a preponderant concern with labour reproduction issues to the neglect of accumulation à la Saunders but on the particularly internecine nature of the conflicts over both these issues. One related point is in order before moving on to a consideration of the role of planners and implications for planning theory. To wit, it was not always a clear cut matter in deciding what to include and what to exclude in dealing with local process itself. A decision had to be made as to what appeared to constitute the most pertinent factors relevant to understanding transportation policy formation at a certain level of abstraction - a choice between pursuing the dominant theme and getting lost in detail - detail, however, which may well be necessary to understand policy at a greater level of specificity. Thus, for example, the administrative rationalization of Detroit city government and the "strengthening of

the mayor's role as chief administrator and policy leader"[49] which became operational in 1974 subsequent to a charter revision was not considered, even though, for example, it did create a consolidated city transportation department (merging the Detroit Street Railways Commission, the Streets and Traffic Commission, the Aviation Commission and the inactive Rapid Transit Commission). One was conscious in other words of prioritizing and being selective in looking for a class pattern to events within the "complexity of the concrete".[50]

4. Implications for Planning Theory

The focus has been upon a substantive area of state policy, namely transportation policy formation, rather than upon a search for planning as a distinctive mode of decision making. Nevertheless, I have not ignored the role of physical planners - individuals working for or in government and bringing amongst other things, including prescriptive ideas, a certain substantive knowledge to decision making concerning the production, design and spatial articulation of the built environment - within this broader state process. Given the still ubiquitous use of the term "planning" it is important in other words to be clear on the nature of the object one is trying to theorize. I will order the conclusions around the following themes:

(a) The robustness of the notion of "physical planning" intervention by the state and the associated input of planners, as an object for theorization.

(b) The ideological content of planning activity which has been considered.

(c) The strengths and limitations of the approach, based as it is upon a macro approach to theorizing, for the construction of a more adequate theory of planning and future research directions indicated by the analysis.

One must conclude that the term "physical planning" risks an overly narrow identification of the terrain with which planners have been involved and have grappled. Planners to a greater or lesser extent (and in regional and city of Detroit government to a greater extent) have been oriented towards influencing urban and regional social, economic and political processes over space. The terms urban or regional development planning (with transportation planning as one component part) probably better reflects the expansive nature of the social reality with which planners have been engaged. I. have linked transportation planning intervention to the politics of the economic development and regionalist dynamics in particular and to the work of planners involved with these issues. Class conflict has been the over-riding integrative concept. Such a Marxist analysis which has taken a historical and contextual approach to understanding planning action suggests that as an object for theorization urban planning intervention by the state must be seen as a contingent intervention. Its form is changeable and related to changes in the wider political economy. Such a view contrasts sharply with the idealistic strain still strong in urban planning thought which sees certain rationally arrived at principles as having an eternal character.[51] Through the case study it is clear that planning intervention has changed in Detroit and been modified drastically contingent upon class relationships as they have developed and changed. One has described, for example, the demise of public transportation in Detroit, its revitalization in the form of SEMTA and the present financial predicament under the Reagan administration; likewise the switch from a freeway agenda by the city of Detroit to a downright hostile freeway stance and the advocacy of sub surface rail; likewise the move towards at least some attempt to control urban sprawl by SEMCOG. (That planning actions within a Marxist perspective cannot equally be seen as simply derivative of "immanent laws of capitalist development" or of certain "class conjunctures" is a subject to which I will turn shortly.)

Turning the attention now to the "ideological wrapping" in which planning intervention has been presented in Detroit this has in general been some variant of the rational generic planning model. This model, in relation to the underlying dynamic of transportation

policy formation which has been discussed, would seem to be debilitating in terms of enabling planners to understand critically the nature of their role and the nature of their scope for independent manoeuver. It would seem to facilitate the rationalization of the status quo at snap shot instances of time in the process "buffeting" planners around in the general dynamic of process without adequate theoretical moorings in terms of understanding their own intervention.

What Paris calls the "central ideology of planning"[52] - that within the context of its application, rationality is deemed capable of arriving at "correct" planning decisions thus obscuring the real workings of the space economy - has been powerful in Detroit. Even Mayor Young in 1978 felt compelled to appeal to a "scientific determination"[53] from SEMTA to prove the case for a Detroit subway rather than basing the claim simply on grounds of fairness and equity. At the regional transportation level in Detroit "the central ideology" has presented itself in a structural functionalist guise.[54] By this one means it has been implicitly based on a theory of society which regards all sub-system parts, even if appearing to be in conflict, as, nevertheless, related to the continued survival of the system or structure as a whole. The continued functioning of parts of the social system, even if appearing to be in conflict is, therefore, a starting point for prescription, not something subject to serious interrogation. One must concur with Cooke that this approach towards understanding society cannot avoid conferring legitimacy and can lead to "unreflective goal setting"[55] substituting for analysis as divergent interests are sweeped into the harmonious whole of a planning document. Cooke labels structural functionalism as an "inappropriate vehicle for city and regional planning".[56] To this one must reply that a structural functionalist outlook may be a very appropriate vehicle of planning intervention (for certain interests) if it also serves the function of containment of conflict and legitimation for the intervention. This has been so in Detroit. Cooke bypasses the difficult question of how far planners are free to choose in different circumstances their own methodology. There have been important pressures on planners in Detroit to adopt such an approach irrespective of their own prescriptive professional leanings. There can be no doubt that the Carroll and Talus regional transportation plans in the fifties and

sixties played a major role in legitimating an agenda of extensive freeway construction as the backbone of transportation policy for Detroit city and region. A structural functionalist outlook in planning, perhaps not unrelated to the climate of the times - the postwar settlement between Capital and Labour - was a useful vehicle in this regard. Just how far this outlook was determined by class factors is another matter raising the question of the autonomy of planning methodology from class pressures but the analysis leads one to stress the importance of contextual factors in shaping methodology. The taken for granted nature of the Carroll highway goals[57] and the decision to go with the trend echoes Cooke's charge of "unreflective goal setting" attendant on a structural functionalist outlook. But the reason for this must be sought first and foremost, it would seem, in the ability of highway interests, rooted in a class dynamic, to appear as generalizable ones rather than in the adoption by planners of an "inappropriate vehicle".

The TALUS report, published in 1969 when the cracks in any notion of regional harmony were all too apparent still clung to a structural functionalist approach. Goals such as the following were typical:

> "... achievement of an integrated society, which provides residential opportunities throughout the region for people in differential racial, social and economic groups".
>
> "The general goal is 'to improve the quality of the environment'. Somewhat less generally, it is our goal to enable the individual to fulfill himself, to enable individuals and households to select from a variety of residential locational and housing type alternatives, to provide a region which is characterized by diversity, difference, opportunity; a region which increasingly becomes a more attractive and satisfactory place in which to live, work, recreate and visit."[58]

As one has argued the report assumed that with enough resources and will (although not specifying where they were to come from) the interests of Detroit and suburbs were reconcilable in a consensual whole which included first and foremost a major expansion of the regional freeway agenda. The report contained no fundamental

reappraisal of Detroit's relationship to the suburbs in the actual model of development which was unfolding, as opposed to an idealized one which planners held up as possible, but without specifying the concrete steps to getting there. The plan, however, I. have suggested provided convenient "packaging" for a strong highway agenda the resources for which were available. The structural functionalist underpinning of TALUS it was argued must be sought not in any deliberate attempt to deceive but in the ability of dominant interests to present themselves as generalizable ones thus framing the context for planning action and secondarily in the idealist strain in planning which lends itself to an uncritical acceptance of such generalization. One suspects on the basis of interview evidence that the director of the TALUS project indulged the idealism of planners and did not himself have a commitment to the plan's rapid transit proposals.

In the present public transportation proposals of the SEMCOG Regional Transportation Plan one finds structural functionalist idealism, at least on the surface,[59] at its most extreme. Superficiality of analysis (avoidance of dealing head on with conflict in an openly conflict laden situation) and the projection of an unrealistic harmonious whole (a massive increase in intermediate and local bus service region wide with a major four pronged rapid rail system terminating in the Detroit CBD when the city of Detroit would probably settle for half of the route miles on any of the transit corridors) would seem forced upon planners in an effort to achieve some degree of compromise or working consensus, however illusory, acceptable to the SEMCOG General Assembly. The methodology of SEMTA planners, however, in response to the problem of obtaining a more short term workable and practical consensus on transportation policy in the face of bitter conflict, has been one of explicitly recognising the political nature of the judgements involved and seeking to aid the process (so far unsuccessfully) of political resolution.

At the present time when Marxist analysis is undergoing critical reappraisal, the case study of Detroit using Marxist categories supports the usefulness of class in understanding the relationship between planning intervention (and the ideological nature of its severely circumscribed rational presentation) and changes in the wider

political economy. It is important to insist, in other words, on not throwing out the baby with the proverbial bathwater. This is a strength of the research contribution. But there is a danger to which the analysis has been sensitive through its suspicion of structuralism, that broad or macro concepts can be expected to do too much in explaining the detailed nature of concrete events. This is a limitation of the approach in terms of the construction of a fuller theory of planning, including a normative aspect, within a Marxist perspective. The analysis suggests that while the broad contours of transportation policy formation in Detroit fall into a class pattern (ie class conflict has primarily influenced the configuration of choices facing planners), the implementation of specific policy choices even at the level of the broad dynamic of policy and certainly at the level of less strategic interventions cannot always be reduced to a rigid determination by class. That the city of Detroit adopted a freeway agenda as the key element in its strategic transportation policy in the fifties seems very directly determined by the considerations of class which have been reviewed. The fixation by Mayor Coleman Young on a subway for Detroit in the seventies and eighties would appear more difficult to regard as so determined. I have disagreed with Hill who takes such a deterministic view.(60) One is compelled to ask the question, for example, whether Mayor Young would have latched onto the sticking point of a Detroit subway so quickly and steadfastly if the idea of a regional rapid transit system had not been touted so strongly by SEMCOG and SEMTA planners in the early seventies.(61) At a less than strategic level it seems quite certain, for example, that planners possessed a fair degree of influence or discretion over the Gratiot urban renewal project in the 1950's.(62) Thus the question presents itself whether more market realistic design standards early on would have made an integrated housing development on the site more likely instead of the upper-middle income project which finally emerged. Or, with the recent Poletown project in Detroit,(63) just how much discretion did planners have in selecting the site and in the subsequent relocation the outcome of which was the displacement of 1,300 families? While the research agenda limits us to being speculative on such issues what is clear is the need for planning theory construction at various levels of analysis. While Marxist grand theory is useful it can be but one element (albeit a

crucial one) of a planning theory which informs practice. The critique of structuralist Marxist approaches (not negating, however, the strength of macro Marxist concepts) leads one to agree with Saunders[64] on the necessity of recognising that state actors in mediating structural influences behave in ways that are meaningful to themselves and with Dunleavey who points to the need for "mediating frameworks to connect macro-theory with specific policy issues".[65] Likewise Ham and Hill call for "good empirical studies to link the macro and micro levels of explanation"[66] in relation to state policy, drawing in relevant work from organization theory and public administration to throw greater light upon the micro level in particular. Recent research work of Healey[67] and Underwood[68] has incorporated such a view in the attempt to develop "middle range" theory to explain the operation of the British land use planning system. The signs are that a revised "Marxist" approach to analysis is emerging which carries the possibility of producing a fuller developed theory of planning which can also guide practice. While this is in its early stages there is no doubt that the climate of Marxist scholarship has changed radically in the eighties during the period when the work here was conducted. The general approach (although not always with adequate acknowledgement of its source) around which a coalescing seems to be taking place is the empirical tradition of British Marxist historiography - an approach to understanding "real" processes in the social world involving retrospective conjectural hypothesis formation, accepting that while evidence is theory laden it is not theory determined, that as Castells' puts it "the most useful concepts are those flexible enough to be deformed and rectified in the process of using them as instruments of knowledge",[69] and which seeks to produce knowledge which accepts lack of falsification as the condition of its validity. It is a humbler approach. Andrew Sayer[70] in formalizing such a revised approach to Marxist research in general conceives higher and lower orders of process which are subject to theorization. Lower level process is conceptualized as working within the constraints of more macro and dominant process and its theorization is treated as "not the sole prerogative of Marxism".[71] Such theory is, however, needed to explain the "concrete" form which the working out of higher level process takes. The parallel to Saunders' call for the specification of

"counterfactuals" is obviously strong. All levels of theory are needed to understand "the muddy waters of the concrete ... the combination of many diverse forces or processes".[72] In fact a Gramscian approach towards the capitalist state is not incompatible with the theorization of macro level process influencing state behaviour at arms length from class factors. While the danger exists for the uncritical importation into a Marxist framework of what may be without some re-evaluation incompatible theory construction, as applied to planning theory, planning intervention can no longer be dismissed as simply derivative of the balance of class forces as expressed through the state. It becomes a subject for theorization in its own right. One's own research points to the continued strength of macro Marxist concepts in this endeavour but I have not always been able to deal with the crucial question for planning theory construction of <u>just how far</u>, by class and other factors, the intervention of planners has been constrained. The task for planning theory construction within a Marxist perspective would appear to be, through research at various levels of theory, the development of the ability to generalize across different planning interventions in order to throw light upon expectable constraints on planners action (including methodological constraints) and planners relative freedom for manoeuvre in the pursuit of certain ethical objectives. In relation to the latter, the American planning theoretician Forester[73] recommends that the activity of planners should be a "democratizing practice" - that while "at every level we find a political economy of attention ... a dynamics of power and distortion jeopardizing democratic participation and autonomy" planners should nevertheless "point to, anticipate and work to counteract such influences ... clarify, reveal and communicate to citizens actual possibilities of life-enhancing, emancipatory actions"?[74] Such exhortations, however, to be useful in guiding practice, must be coupled with more sophisticated theory dealing with the constraints on planning intervention recognised as a contingent intervention. As such planning theory itself, it seems should be a contingent body of theory, reviseable in the light of the changeable nature of practice.

5. Reflections on the Research

Two major criticisms could be made of the research: that it has not sufficiently considered the more micro level aspects of policy formation with their importance for a theory of planning and that it has not developed counterfactuals in the manner thought appropriate by Saunders. Considering the former, there seems little doubt that if a theory of planning (including a prescriptive component) is to be developed within a Marxist perspective this is a direction in which research is needed and indeed in which research of late has proceeded.[75] The underdevelopment of this aspect here must be accepted as a limitation (although one which was recognized) inherent in the task attempted. The recent study by Starkie,[76] for example, of road and traffic policies in post-war Britain, in analysing the role of politicians, civil servants and interest groups in policy formation explicitly takes as given "secular trends in the economy" and "forces of circumstance".[77] Starkie's approach, in other words, is limited by a cursory examination of macro factors which I have endeavoured to bring under consideration in the case of Detroit and which one must conclude are of the utmost importance in theorizing planning intervention provided that they are not expected to stand alone in explaining the "complexity of the concrete". More serious perhaps is the possible accusation that one has not always stopped to develop counterfactual statements - to elaborate disconfirming instances which would enable falsification of the research. In defence one must say that theory building must start somewhere. One's focus was on the broad nature of the postwar dynamic of transportation policy formation in Detroit (ie. involving the pitching of the analysis at a certain level of abstraction). To explicitly and consistently develop counterfactuals of the sort thought necessary by Saunders would have involved so many excursions into the realm of the "concrete" as to make the original research task impossible. The theoretical arguments are in other words provisional pending supplemental research. It is difficult to image how it could be otherwise. To say this is not to admit to the possession of a licence for whimsical theoretical invention. There is an empirical, observable basis to the theoretical ideas put forward (even if not always descending to the complexity of the most concrete) and in the confrontation between theory and "facts"

a sensitivity to the dangers of structuralism ensured an awareness of the limitations on what could be said with confidence.

Another matter deserves mention. Recent criticisms of structuralist Marxism have been primarily in the realm of theory. The research presented here is best conceived as an attempt to bring macro Marxist theorizing to bear as an understanding of transportation policy formation in Detroit (ie in a case-study context) with a realization of the dangers inherent in structuralism. Macro theory, in other words, most certainly has a place in the construction of a theory of planning and in explaining other phenomena if it's limitations are recognized. The corollary, of course, is that more micro level theory must also be approached within an awareness of its explanatory shortfalls. An explicit recognition of the limitations at both levels of theory construction would seem necessary to enable dialogue to take place between them.

FOOTNOTES

1. Saunders, Peter; **Social Theory and the Urban Question**, op.cit. p.176

2. Castells, Manuel; **City and the Grassroots**, op.cit. p.339

3. Jessop, Bob; **Nico s Poulantzas - Marxist Theory and Political Strategy**, Macmillan, 1985, p.362

4. Castells, Manuel; **City and the Grassroots**, op.cit. p.x

5. Quoted Jessop, Bob; **Nico s Poulantzas - Marxist Theory and Political Strategy**, op.cit. p.363

6. cf. Ch.1 pps35-40

7. Ibid.

8. Thompson, E.P.; **The Poverty of Theory**, op.cit.

9. Saunders, Peter; **Social Theory and the Urban Question**, op.cit.

10. Sayer, Derek; **Marx's Method - Ideology, Science and Critique in Capital**, Harvester Press, 2nd ed. 1983

11. Cooke, Philip; **Theories of Planning and Spatial Development**, op.cit.

12. Castells, Manuel; **City and the Grassroots**, op.cit.

13. cf. Ch.1 pps.20-30

14. Castells, Manuel, **City and the Grassroots**, op.cit. p.340

15. Ibid. p.340

16. Ibid. p.341

17. Ibid. p.340

18. Ibid. p.340

19. Ibid. p.339

20. Markusen, Ann, R. **Class and Urban Social Expenditure : A Marxist Theory of Metropolitan Government**, in ed. Tabb, William K et.al., Marxism and the Metropolis : New Perspectives in Urban Political Economy, New York, Oxford University Press 1978

21. Ewen, Lynda, Ann; **Corporate Power and Urban Crisis in Detroit**, Princeton University Press, 1978

22. Mollenkopf, John H. **The Postwar Politics of Urban Development**, in ed. Tabb, William K. et.al., Marxism and the Metropolis, op.cit.

23. Hill, Richard Child, **At the Cross Roads : The Political Economy of Postwar Detroit**, Conference on Urban Political Economy, University of California, Santa Cruz, April 1977

    Also: **Crisis in the Motor City : The Politics of Economic Development in Detroit** in ed. Fainstein, S.S. et.al., Restructuring the City : The Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, Longman, 1983

24. Markusen, Ann, **Class and Urban Social Expenditure : A Marxist Theory of Metropolitan Government**, op.cit. p.101

25. Ewen, Lynda Ann, **Corporate Power and Urban Crisis in Detroit**, op.cit. p.243

26. Ibid. pps.247-248

27. Mollenkopf, John H., op.cit.

28. Hill, Richard, C. **Crisis in the Motor City : The Politics of Economic Development in Detroit**, op.cit.

29. Ibid. p.94

30. Hill, Richard C.; **Crisis in the Motor City**, op.cit.

31. Hill, Richard C.; **At the Cross Roads : The Political Economy of Postwar Detroit**, op.cit. p.35

32. Jessop, Bob, **Nico s Poulantzas - Marxist Theory and Political Strategy**, op.cit.

33. Ibid. pps.336-337

34. Ibid. p.337

35. Saunders, Peter; **Social Theory and the Urban Question**, op.cit.

36. cf. Ch.1 pps.35-40

37. Cooke, Philip; **Theories of Planning and Spatial Development**, op.cit. especially Ch.8

38. Joll, James; **Gramsci**, Fontana, 1977, p.85

39. Hoare, Quintin and Smith, Geoffrey, Nowell (ed); Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, op.cit. pps.207-208 Gramsci stressed that one must not underestimate ruling class hegemony over civil society which can reassert itself even if the bourgeois state is captured. Ibid.

40. Cooke, Philip; **Theories of Planning and Spatial Development**, op.cit. p.235

41. Ibid. p.199

42. Ibid. p.203

43. Ibid. p.191

44. Ibid. pps.191-192

45. Jessop, Bob; **Nico s Poulantzas**, op.cit. p.341

46. Saunders, Peter; **Social Theory and the Urban Question**, op.cit. Ch.8 cf. Ch1 pps.38-39

47. Cooke, Philip, **Theories of Planning and Spatial Development**, op.cit. p.186 cf. Ch.1 pp.39-40

48. Martlew, Clive; **The State and Local Government Finance**, op.cit. cf. Ch.1 p.39

49. Citizens Research Council of Michigan, **The Proposed Detroit City Charter - In Brief**, Council Comments, No.869, Detroit, October 1973, p.3

50. Sayer, Andrew, **Abstraction : A Realist Interpretation**, Radical Philosophy, No.28, Summer 1981, pps.6-15, p.15

51. Cooke, Philip; **Theories of Planning and Spatial Development**, op.cit. p.10

52. Paris, Chris in (ed) Paris, Chris, **Critical Readings in Planning Theory**, op.cit. p.10

53. cf. Ch.5 p.231

54. cf. Ch.1 pps.10-11

55. Cooke, Philip, **Theories of Planning and Spatial Development**, op.cit., p.97

56. Ibid, p.100

57. cf. Ch.3 pps.96-97

58. cf. Ch.4 p.147

59. It is doubtful if SEMTA planners take the SEMCOG Long Range Transportation Plan too seriously. cf. Ch.5 pps.238-239

60. cf. Ch.5 p.258

61. cf. Ch.5 p.229

62. cf. Ch.3 pps.103-106

63. cf. Ch.5 p.259

64. Quoted in Ham, C. and Hill, M. **The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State**, op.cit. p.186

65. Ibid. p.187

66. Ibid. p.189

67. Healey, Patsy, **Local Plans in British Land Use Planning**, Pergamon Press, 1983. "... to understand the operation of any public programme requires close observation of the practices of those public agencies involved in carrying it out ... the insights gained from this type of investigation need to be absorbed and reinterpreted in terms of the structural explanations being put forward by the 'political economists'" ibid. p.xiv

68. Underwood, Jacky, **Town Planners in Search of a Role**, Occasional Paper No.6, School for Advanced Urban Studies, Bristol, University of Bristol, 1980

69. Castells, Manuel, **City and the Grassroots**, op.cit. p.340

70. Sayer, Andrew; **Abstraction : A Realist Interpretation**, op.cit.

71. Ibid. p.10

72. Ibid. p.6

73. Forester, John; **Understanding Planning Practice : An Empirical Practical and Normative Account**, Journal of Planning Education and Research Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning, Cincinnati, Vol.No.2, Winter 1982

74. Ibid. p.66

75. For example: Underwood, Jacky; **Town Planners in Search of a Role**, op.cit; Healey, Patsy; **Local Plans in British Land Use Planning**, op.cit.

76. Starkie, David, **The Motorway Age : Road and Traffic Policies in Postwar Britain**, Pergamon Press, 1982

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APPENDIX I - TABLES

TABLE 1

INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED RESIDENTS DETROIT TRI-COUNTY REGION

1940, 1950, 1960, 1970 & 1980

MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUP	1940	%	1950	%	1960	%	1970	%	1980	%
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Mining	5,818	0.7	10,797	0.9	8,410	0.6	9,412	0.6	7,972	0.48
Construction	33,669	3.2	57,458	4.8	53,588	4.0	67,810	4.3	56,548	3.42
Manufacturing	414,370	48.3	559,898	46.9	541,418	40.7	587,981	37.4	519,265	31.4
Transportation Equipment	(268,961)	(31.3)	(338,515)	(28.4)	(252,487)	(19.0)	(271,797)	(17.3)	-	-
Transportation, Communications, Utilities	47,869	5.6	78,455	6.6	79,192	6.0	87,398	5.6	103,245	6.24
Wholesale Trade	19,642	2.3	34,706	2.9	42,917	3.2	65,698	4.2	67,555	4.09
Retail Trade	130,075	15.1	180,084	15.1	195,638	14.7	246,027	15.7	276,193	16.7
Fire Insurance, Real Estate	29,970	3.5	39,019	3.2	51,011	3.8	73,552	4.7	92,371	5.59
Professional & Related Services	54,061	6.3	82,856	6.9	146,347	11.0	253,483	16.1	332,431	20.1
Other Services	87,844	10.2	97,546	8.2	109,136	8.2	115,863	7.4	127,106	7.69
Public Administration	29,299	3.2	39,028	3.3	49,782	3.7	63,729	4.1	70,952	4.29
Not Reported	8,509	1.6	13,497	1.1	51,296	3.9	-	-	-	-
TOTAL EMPLOYED	859,846	100.0	1,193,344	100.0	1,328,735	100.0	1,570,953	100.0	1,653,638	100.0

SOURCE: U.S. Census of Population, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Michigan, various years

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT IN SELECTED INDUSTRIAL GROUPS FOR US, MICHIGAN AND DETROIT REGION 1960-1980

	1960 %	1965 %	1970 %	1975 %	1980 %
U.S. : Manufacturing	31.0	29.7	27.3	23.8	22.4
Mich: Manufacturing	41.2	41.0	36.0	31.4	29.0
Detroit SMSA: Manufacturing	43.0	42.1	36.7	32.3	29.3
Mich: Motor Vehicles & Equipment	13.2	13.6	11.2	10.2	9.7
Mich: Metals (primary & fabricated) and non-electrical machinery	14.1	14.7	13.2	10.7	10.1
Detroit SMSA: Motor Vehicles & Equipment	16.2	16.2	13.5	12.7	11.3
Detroit SMSA: Metals (primary & fabricated) and non-electrical machinery	15.9	16.2	14.7	11.9	11.1

The 1973 definition of the Detroit SMSA is used for years 1970-80 (ie Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Lapeer, Livingston and St Clair counties) For 1960-65 the present SEMCOG area is used (ie all the previous counties, excluding Lapeer and including Washtenaw and Monroe.

Source:
(1) Michigan Employment Security Commission - Research and Statistics Division
(2) Mattila, J.M., Moor, J.R. Jr., The S.E. Michigan Economy : Past, Present and Future Study prepared for the Detroit Metropolitan Fund, August 1977, Table 6 p.21
(3) "Employment and Earnings", U.S. Department of Labor, April 1982

TABLE 3A

CITY OF DETROIT SHARE OF TRI-COUNTY REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT FOR SELECTED EMPLOYMENT SECTORS 1948-1977

Year	Manufacturing	Retail	Services	Wholesale
1948	60.3	72.6	N/A	90.1
1954	53.5	63.3	N/A	76.8
1958	50.5	54.4	75.3	74.1
1962	40.6	43.4	65.8	68.6
1967	35.8	38.2	60.5	57.9
1972	33.4	28.5	46.7	44.5
1977	27.9	19.1	33.3	32.3

Source: U.S. Census of Manufacturers, Retail, Services and Wholesalers, various years.

TABLE 3B

NUMBER OF FIRMS IN DETROIT CITY
AND DETROIT TRI-COUNTY REGION
1958-1977

	Manufacturing	Retail Trade	Wholesale Trade	Services
Detroit Region				
1958	6,468	30,742	5,231	17,921
1963	7,023	29,337	5,643	19,925
1967	7,100	26,534	5,644	19,581
1972	7,126	28,885	6,027	21,156*
1977	7,524	28,277	6,019	23,895*
City of Detroit				
1958	3,363	16,942	3,806	10,627
1963	3,370	14,206	3,628	10,233
1967	2,947	11,496	3,095	8,815
1972	2,398	9,768	2,392	7,336*
1977	1,954	6,914	1,657	5,243*
Balance of Region				
1958	3,105	13,800	1,425	7,294
1963	3,653	15,131	2,015	9,692
1967	4,153	15,038	2,549	10,766
1972	4,728	19,117	3,635	13,820*
1977	5,570	21,363	4,362	18,652*

*Legal services, dental laboratories and architectural, engineering, land surveying services subtracted out for comparability with previous years' totals.

Source: City of Detroit Planning Department, Data Co-ordination Division, Report No.315A, May 1980; US Census of Manufacturers, 1977

TABLE 3C

NUMBER OF PERSONS WORKING IN DETROIT CITY AND DETROIT TRI-COUNTY REGION 1958-1977

	Manufacturing	Retail Trade	Wholesale Trade	Services
Detroit Region				
1958	405,035	173,200	61,635	58,321
1962	493,913	165,817	65,008	71,061
1967	584,500	196,795	77,373	87,285
1972	539,400	220,041	75,770	104,219*
1977	550,100	254,062	76,722	111,572*
City of Detroit				
1958	204,409	94,500	45,722	51,089
1962	200,586	72,149	44,615	46,838
1967	209,700	75,329	44,753	52,832
1972	180,400	62,811	33,691	45,307*
1977	153,300	48,457	24,772	37,099*
Balance of Region				
1958	200,626	78,700	15,913	7,232
1962	293,327	93,668	20,393	24,223
1967	374,800	121,466	32,620	34,453
1972	359,000	157,230	42,079	58,912 *
1977	396,800	205,605	51,950	74,473*

*Legal services, dental laboratories and architectural, engineering, land surveying services subtracted out for comparability with previous years' totals.

Source: City of Detroit Planning Department, Data Co-ordination Division, Report No.315A, May 1980; U.S. Census of Manufacturers, 1977

TABLE 4A

POPULATION GROWTH IN 7 COUNTY S.E. MICHIGAN REGION
1930-1980

	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980
Wayne	1,888,946	2,015,623	2,435,235	2,666,297	2,670,368	2,337,240
Oakland	211,251	254,068	396,001	690,603	907,871	1,011,793
Macomb	77,146	107,638	184,961	405,804	625,309	694,600
L/ston	19,274	20,863	26,725	38,233	58,967	100,289
St Clair	67,563	76,222	91,599	107,201	120,175	138,802
Washentaw	65,530	80,810	134,606	172,440	234,103	264,748
Monroe	52,485	58,620	75,666	101,120	119,215	134,659
City of Detroit	1,568,662	1,623,452	1,849,568	1,670,144	1,514,063	1,203,339

Source: U.S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Michigan Population Reports 1930, 1960 and 1980

TABLE 4B

POPULATION GROWTH IN MICHIGAN, TRI-COUNTY REGION, REMAINING SEMCOG COUNTIES AND CITY OF DETROIT 1930-1980

	Michigan	Tri-County Region(1)	Remaining SEMCOG Counties(2)	City of Detroit	City as % of Tri-County Region
1930	4,842,325	2,177,343	204,852	1,568,662	72
1940	5,256,106	2,377,329	236,515	1,623,452	68
1950	6,371,766	3,016,197	328,596	1,849,568	61
1960	7,823,194	3,762,360	418,994	1,670,144	44
1970	8,879,862	4,199,931	532,460	1,514,063	36
1980	9,262,078	4,043,633	638,498	1,203,339	30

(1) Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties
(2) Livingston, Washtenaw, St. Clair, Monroe

Source: U.S. Census of Population for 1930, 1960 and 1980; Michigan Statistical Abstract 14th ed. 1979 p.9 Table I-1

TABLE 4C

POPULATION GROWTH IN BALANCE OF WAYNE, OAKLAND AND MACOMB COUNTIES(1)
1930-1980

	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980
Wayne Oakland Macomb	2,177,343	2,377,329	3,016,197	3,762,704	4,203,548	4,043,633
Detroit	1,568,662	1,623,452	1,849,568	1,670,144	1,514,063	1,203,339
Balance of Wayne, Oakland & Macomb	608,681	753,877	1,166,629	2,092,560	2,689,485	2,840,294
Absolute increase in balance of Wayne, Oakland & Macomb over previous years	--	145,196	412,752	925,931	596,925	150,809
% increase in balance of Wayne Oakland & Macomb over previous years	--	23.9	54.8	79.4	28.5	5.6

(1) These counties minus the city of Detroit which is part of Wayne County.

Source: U.S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Michigan Population Reports, 1930, 1960 and 1980

TABLE 5

PLACE OF WORK BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE
DETROIT REGION 1960-1980

Living in City of Detroit

	1960	%	1970	%	1980	%
Working in Detroit	460940	77.3	317421	59.6	214762	54.4
Working outside Detroit	102283	17.2	167492	31.4	115641	29.3
Place not reported	33388	5.6	47441	8.9	64304	16.3

Living in Suburbs*

	1960	%	1970	%	1980	%
Working in Detroit	230997	33.0	160374	17.4	198634	15.8
Working outside Detroit	446973	63.9	711012	77.5	949908	75.5
Place not reported	21357	3.1	46400	5.1	110391	8.8

*Balance of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb

Source: Southeast Michigan Community Profiles : 1980 Census. SEMCOG January 1983; Michigan Employment Security Commission, Annual Manpower Planning Report Fiscal Year 1975. Table 10

TABLE 6

SEMCOG Cities with Population Greater than 10,000 in 1980: Population Change and Selected Data

	Population 1950	Population 1960	%change in Pop.50-60	% Minority 1960	Population 1970	% change in Pop.60-70	% Minority 1970	Population 1980	% change in Pop.70-80	Income Per Capita 1977
ALLEN PARK	12,329	37,494	204.1	0.5	40,747	8.7	0.6	34,196	- 16.08	$ 7,936
DEARBORN	94,994	112,007	17.9	0.1	104,199	- 7.0	0.4	90,660	- 12.99	8,230
DEARBORN HEIGHTS	20,235	61,218	202.5	NA	80,069	30.8	0.4	67,706	- 15.44	7,215
DETROIT	1,849,568	1,670,144	- 9.7	29.2	1,514,063	- 9.3	44.5	1,203,339	- 20.52	5,689
ECORSE	17,948	17,328	- 3.5	33.3	17,515	1.1	38.8	14,447	- 17.52	5,367
GARDEN CITY (a)	9,012	38,017	321.8	0.2	41,864	10.1	0.4	35,640	- 14.87	6,234
GROSSE POINTE FARMS	9,410	12,172	29.4	0.9	11,701	- 3.9	0.6	10,551	- 9.83	15,790
GROSSE POINTE PARK	13,075	15,457	18.2	0.5	15,585	0.8	0.5	13,639	- 12.48	12,506
GROSSE POINTE WOODS	10,381	18,580	79.0	0.1	21,878	17.8	0.1	18,886	- 13.68	10,095
HAMTRAMCK	43,355	34,137	- 21.3	14.5	27,245	- 20.2	12.5	21,300	- 20.47	5,922
HARPER WOODS	9,148	19,995	118.6	0.1	20,186	1.0	0.3	16,361	- 18.95	7,945
HIGHLAND PARK	46,393	38,063	- 18.0	21.4	35,444	- 6.9	56.9	27,909	- 21.26	6,014
INKSTER	16,728	38,997	133.1	34.7	38,595	- 1.3	44.9	35,190	- 8.82	5,740
LINCOLN PARK	29,310	53,933	84.0	0.1	53,984	- 1.8	0.4	45,105	- 14.87	6,864
LIVONIA	17,534	66,702	280.4	0.2	110,109	65.1	0.4	104,814	- 4.81	7,558
MELVINDALE	9,483	13,089	38.0	0.5	13,862	5.9	0.8	12,322	- 11.11	6,716
RIVER ROUGE	20,549	18,147	- 11.7	32.4	15,947	- 12.1	32.4	12,912	- 19.03	5,464
RIVERVIEW	1,432	7,237	405.4	0.1	11,342	56.7	0.5	14,569	28.45	7,417
ROMULUS	12,311	15,233	23.7	NA	22,879	50.2	NA	24,857	8.65	5,878
SOUTHGATE	10,382	29,404	183.2	0.1	33,909	15.3	0.6	32,058	- 5.46	7,184
TAYLOR	18,848	49,658	163.5	NA	70,020	41.0	0.5	77,568	10.78	5,971
TRENTON	6,222	18,439	196.4	0.2	24,127	30.8	0.3	22,762	- 5.66	7,319
WAYNE (a) (b)	9,409	16,034	70.4	0.1	21,054	31.3	0.8	21,159	0.50	6,498
WESTLAND	NA	NA	NA	NA	86,749	NA	3.1	84,603	- 2.47	6,349
WOODHAVEN	NA	NA	NA	NA	3,566	NA	0.5	10,902	205.72	6,475
WYANDOTTE	36,846	43,519	18.1	0.1	41,061	- 5.6	0.4	34,006	- 17.18	6,504
BERKLEY	17,931	23,275	29.8	0.2	22,618	- 2.8	0.4	18,637	- 17.60	6,882
BIRMINGHAM (a)	15,467	25,525	65.0	0.4	26,170	2.5	0.5	21,689	- 17.12	11,501
CLAWSON	5,196	14,795	184.7	0.3	17,617	19.1	0.4	15,103	- 14.27	6,692
FARMINGTON	2,325	6,881	196.0	0.1	13,337	93.8	0.2	11,022	17.35	9,364
FERNDALE	29,675	31,347	5.6	0.4	30,850	- 1.6	0.7	26,227	- 14.99	6,635
HAZEL PARK	17,770	25,631	44.2	0.2	23,784	- 7.2	0.5	20,914	- 12.07	5,776
MADISON HEIGHTS	NA	33,343	NA	0.3	38,599	15.8	0.5	35,375	- 8.35	6,430
NOVI	NA	6,390	NA	0.3	9,668	51.3	0.4	22,525	132.99	7,409
OAK PARK	5,267	36,632	595.5	0.5	36,762	0.4	0.6	31,537	- 14.21	7,691
PONTIAC	73,681	82,233	11.6	17.0	85,279	3.7	27.5	76,715	- 10.04	5,341
ROYAL OAK	46,898	80,612	71.9	0.2	85,499	6.1	0.4	70,893	- 17.08	7,802
SOUTHFIELD	NA	31,501	NA	0.2	69,285	119.9	0.7	75,568	9.07	10,439
TROY	NA	19,402	NA	0.2	39,419	103.2	0.5	67,102	70.23	8,668
FARMINGTON HILLS	11,234	26,692	137.8	NA	48,933	83.3	NA	58,056	8.64	9,655
EAST DETROIT	21,461	45,756	113.2	0.1	45,920	0.4	0.3	38,280	- 16.64	6,637
FRASER	1,379	7,027	409.6	0.0	11,868	68.9	0.3	14,560	22.68	6,642
MOUNT CLEMENS	17,027	21,016	23.4	11.7	20,476	- 2.6	16.7	18,806	- 8.16	6,707
ROSEVILLE	15,816	50,195	217.4	1.5	60,529	20.6	1.4	54,311	- 10.27	6,075
ST CLAIR SHORES	19,823	76,657	286.7	0.3	88,093	14.9	0.5	76,210	- 13.49	7,039
STERLING HEIGHTS	6,509	14,622	124.6	NA	61,365	319.7	0.5	108,999	77.62	6,819
WARREN	43,380	89,246	109.2	0.2	179,260	100.9	0.5	161,134	- 10.11	6,655
ANN ARBOR (a) (b)	48,251	67,340	39.6	6.5	100,035	48.6	9.0	107,316	7.28	$ 6,869
YPSILANTI	18,302	20,957	14.5	22.6	29,538	40.9	20.4	24,031	- 18.64	5,287
PORT HURON	35,725	36,084	1.0	4.5	35,794	- 0.8	5.7	33,981	- 4.99	5,275
MONROE (a)	21,467	22,968	7.0	4.0	23,894	4.0	4.2	23,531	- 1.52	6,665

(a) Includes annexation of more than 500 people 1950-60.
(b) Includes annexation of more than 500 people 1960-70.

Note on procedures: Corresponding township or village population data has been inserted, where possible, when the geographic area did not exist as a city.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. General Population Characteristics, Michigan 1950, 60, 70 and 80; and Current Population Reports (Series P-25), 1980.

TABLE 7

CITIES IN THE TRI-COUNTY AREA BY INCORPORATION DATE

	Year of Incorporation		Year of Incorporatio
Detroit	1806	Harper Woods	1951
Pontiac	1861	St Clair Shores	1951
Wyandotte	1867	Lathrup Village	1953
Mount Clemens	1879	Memphis	1953
Highland Park	1918	Walled Lake	1954
Hamtramck	1921	Northville	1955
Royal Oak	1921	Keego Harbour	1955
River Rouge	1922	Madison Heights	1955
Lincoln Park	1925	Northville	1955
Farmington	1926	Troy	1955
Dearborn	1927	Fraser	1956
Ferndale	1927	Allen Park	1957
Pleasant Ridge	1928	Trenton	1957
East Detroit	1929	Warren	1957
South Lyon	1930	Southgate	1958
New Baltimore	1931	Southfield	1958
Plymouth	1932	Wixom	1958
Berkley	1932	Roseville	1958
Huntington Woods	1932	Riverview	1959
Garden City	1933	Wayne	1960
Melvindale	1933	Gibraltar	1961
Birmingham	1933	Dearborn Heights	1963
Bloomfield Hills	1933	Inkster	1964
Grosse Pointe	1934	Rockwood	1964
Center Line	1936	Orchard Lake Village	1964
Utica	1937	Flat Rock	1965
Clawson	1940	Woodhaven	1965
Ecorse	1942	Westland	1966
Hazel Park	1942	Richmond	1966
Oak Park	1945	Rochester	1967
Belleville	1946	Taylor	1968
Sylvan Lake	1947	Sterling Heights	1968
Grosse Pointe Farms	1949	Novi	1969
Grosse Pointe Park	1950	Romulus	1970
Grosse Pointe Woods	1950	Farmington Hills	1973
Livonia	1950		

Source: Data supplied by Michigan Department of Commerce, Office of Community Development

TABLE 8

Semcog Cities with population greater than 10,000 in 1980:

Form of Government (as of Feb. 1978)

	Mayor/Council	Council/Manager
Allen Park	X	
Dearborn	X	
Dearborn Heights	X	
Detroit	X	
Ecorse	X	
Garden City		X
Grosse Point Farms		X
Grosse Point Park		X
Grosse Point Woods		X
Hamtramck	X	
Harper Woods		X
Highland Park	X	
Inkster		X
Lincoln Park	X	
Livonia	X	
Melvindale	X	
River Rouge	X	
Riverview		X
Romulus	X	
Southgate	X	
Taylor	X	
Trenton	X	
Wayne		X
Westland	X	
Woodhaven	X	
Wyandotte	X	
Berkley		X
Birmingham		X
Clawson		X
Farmington		X
Ferndale		X
Hazel Park		X
Madison Heights		X
Novi		X
Oak Park		X
Pontiac		X
Royal Oak		X
Southfield		X
Troy		X
Farmington Hills		X
East Detroit		X
Fraser		X
Mount Clemens		X
Roseville		X
St. Clair Shores		X
Sterling Heights		X
Warren	X	
Ann Arbor		X
Ypsilanti		X
Port Huron		X
Monroe		X

SOURCE: Michigan Municipal League. Technical topics No32 (revised). Appendices A & B. Feb. 1978.

TABLE 9

SEMCOG CITIES WITH POPULATION GREATER THAN 10,000 (1980)
CLASSIFIED IN DESCENDING ORDER ON THE BASIS OF 1969
PER CAPITA INCOME

HIGH INCOME (> $5550)
Grosse Pointe Farms
Grosse Pointe Park
Birmingham
Grosse Pointe Woods
Southfield

UPPER MIDDLE INCOME (> $3770)
Farmington
Farmington Hills
Troy
Oak Park
Dearborn
Harper Woods
Royal Oak
Allen Park
Ann Arbor
Trenton
Livonia
Berkley
Novi
St Clair Shores

LOWER MIDDLE INCOME (> $3200)
Ferndale
Sterling Heights
Woodhaven
Warren
East Detroit
Riverview
Lincoln Park
Southgate
Melvindale
Mount Clemens
Monroe
Madison Heights
Frazer
Wayne
Clawson
Wyandotte
Westland
Hazel Park
Roseville
Hamtramck
Garden City
Taylor

LOWER INCOME (> $2800)
Detroit
Romulus
Inkster
Highland Park
Port Huron
Ypsilanti
River Rouge
Pontiac
Ecorse

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Series P-25, No.670, May 1977

TABLE 10

1973 Production of Motor Vehicles (cars, trucks & buses) in North America and Detroit - Selected Locational Data

Area \ Data	Number of Vehicles Produced	% of World Production	% of USA Production	% of Canadian Production	% of Michigan Production	% of Detroit Production
World Production	39,159,751	100	—			
U.S. Production	12,681,513	32.4	100			
Michigan	4,287,709	10.9	33.8			
Missouri (a)	1,405,677	3.6	11.1			
Ohio	1,318,848	3.4	10.4			
California	1,103,158	2.8	8.7			
New Jersey	1,267,505	3.2	10.0			
Wisconsin	637,499	1.6	5.0			
Georgia	734,658	1.9	5.8			
Delaware	429,286	1.1	3.4			
Illinois	432,100	1.1	3.4			
Maryland	359,215	*	2.8			
Texas	239,842	*	**			
Kansas	218,091	*	**			
New York	204,383	*	**			
Canada (b)	1,430,084	4.0	--			
Ontario	1,427,300	4.0	--	99.8		
Detroit (c)	3,106,331	7.9	24.5	--	72.4	
Detroit - G.M. production: (Detroit, Pontiac 2 plants, Ypsilanti)	1,097,669	--	--	--	--	35.3
Detroit - Ford production: (Dearborn, Wayne 2 plants, Wixom)	780,217	--	--	--	--	25.1
Detroit - Chrysler production: (Detroit 2 plants, Hamtramck, Warren)	1,228,445	--	--	--	--	39.5

(a) Data for Missouri and the remainder of U.S. states combines the 1973 model year for cars with the 1973 calender year for buses and trucks.
(b) Canadian and Ontario data are for 1972. Percentages are calculated accordingly.
(c) Wayne, Oakland and Macomb counties.

* Less than 1% ** Less than 2%

Source: 1. Michigan Statistical Abstract, 15th Ed. 1980, Graduate School of Business Administration, Michigan State University. pp's 561-563.
2. Bloomfield, Gerald; "The World Automotive Industry," David & Charles 1978, p. 168, Table 26.
3. Data supplied by Wards Communications, Detroit, Michigan.

TABLE 11

1973 Production of Motor Vehicles (cars, trucks, buses) by Major United States Manufacturers by Location

	Number of Vehicles Produced by Company in:	% of Companies Total Production in:	% of Companies U.S. Production in:	% of Companies Michigan Production in:
General Motors				
World Production (a)	9,024,515	100	--	--
United States	6,510,387	72.1	100	--
Canada	580,399	6.4	--	--
Abroad (1)	1,933,729	21.4	--	--
Michigan (Flint, Lansing, Detroit region)	2,265,236	25.1	34.8	100
Detroit (b)	1,097,669	12.2	16.9	48.5
Ford				
World Production	5,924,080	100	--	--
United States	3,442,323	58.1	100	--
Canada	613,452	10.4	--	--
Abroad (2)	1,868,305	31.5	--	--
Michigan	780,217	13.2	22.7	100
Detroit	780,217	13.2	22.7	100
Chrysler				
World Production	3,418,714	100	--	--
United States	1,933,932	56.6	100	--
Canada	283,932	8.3	--	--
Abroad (3)	1,201,490	35.1	--	--
Michigan	1,228,445	35.9	63.5	100
Detroit	1,228,445	35.9	63.5	100

(a) Minority interests in foreign producers excluded.
(b) Detroit region: Wayne, Oakland & Macomb counties.

(1) Abroad: Argentina, Austrialia, Belgium, Brazil, W. Germany, Mexico, N. Zealand, Philippines, Portugal, S. Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Venezuela.
(2) Abroad: Argentina, Austrialia, Belgium, Brazil, W. Germany, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Philippines, Portugal, S. Africa, United Kingdom, Venezuela.
(3) Abroad: Argentina, Austrialia, Brazil, France, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Portugal, S. Africa, Spain, United Kingdom, Venezuela.

Source: 1. Michigan Stastical Abstract, 15th Ed. 1980, Graduate School of Business Administration, Michigan State University, p. 563.
2. Data supplied by Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc., Detroit, Michigan.

TABLE 12

% Unemployment in US, Michigan & Detroit SMSA - selected years

Year	% Unemployed U.S.	% Unemployed Michigan	% Unemployed Detroit SMSA (a)	% Unemployed Detroit City
1949	5.9	7.3		
1950	5.3	4.0		
51	3.3	4.0		
52	3.0	4.1		
53	2.9	2.7		
54	5.5	7.1		
55	4.4	3.7		
56(b)	4.1	6.9	7.4	
57	4.3	6.6	6.6	
58	6.8	13.7	15.2	
59	5.5	8.4	8.9	
60	5.5	6.7	6.8	
61	6.7	10.1	11.0	
62	5.5	7.0	7.0	
63	5.7	5.6	5.2	
64	5.2	4.8	4.3	
65	4.5	3.9	3.5	
66	3.8	3.5	3.2	
67	3.8	4.5	4.1	5.2
68	3.6	4.3	3.9	5.1
69	3.5	4.0	3.6	6.6
70	4.9	6.7	6.4	8.1
71	5.9	7.6	7.5	9.4
72	5.6	7.0	6.9	8.9
73	4.9	5.9	5.4	6.9
74	5.6	7.4	6.8	8.5
75	8.5	12.5	11.8	14.5
76	7.7	9.4	9.0	11.1
77	7.0	8.2	7.8	9.9
78	6.0	6.9	6.6	8.3
79	5.8	7.8	7.8	10.1
80	7.1	12.6	13.1	16.5
81	7.6	12.3	12.8	15.7
82	9.7	15.5	15.9	20.3
83	10.1	14.2	14.6	18.7
84 (March)	7.4 (July)	12.5	12.3	15.5

(a) 1956-1969- Wayne Oakland & Macomb counties.
1970 - 1981 - Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Livingston, Lapeer & St. Clair Cos. (1973 Census definition).

(b) For Michigan there is a break in the comparaibility of the data in 1956.

SOURCE: (1) Michigan Employment Security Commission

(2) Michigan Statistical Abstract 16th Ed. 1981, Bureau of Business Research, School of Business Admin Wayne State Univ. Detroit. p. 138.

TABLE 13

Assessed Valuation of Taxable Property, City of Detroit and Rest of Wayne County. 1959, 1959 (adjusted) and 1969 (in millions of dollars)

	1959 Value (1959 dollars)	1959 Value (1969 dollars)	1969 Value (1969 dollars)	% increase or decrease in 10 year period in real terms
DETROIT	5486.5	7560.4	5188.2	-31.4
Rest of Wayne County	2243.3	3091.2	5629.5	82.1

SOURCE: Urban Incentive Tax Credits - A Self-Correcting Strategy to rebuild central cities. Detroit City Plan Commission. April 1972. p.37 (The table presented in this publication contains an error in the city of Detroit data for 1959 which has been corrected based on : City of Detroit budget, Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1981, Budget Dept. City of Detroit. p XI.)

TABLE 14

OFFICE CONSTRUCTION IN DETROIT, SOUTHFIELD & TROY 1960-1980 (a)

	# of sq. ft 1960	# of Sq.ft constructed 1961 - 1970	# of Sq. ft 1970	# of Sq. ft constructed 1971 - 1980	# of sq. ft. 1980
DETROIT	12,399,406	2,932,172	15,331,578	6,079,041 (2,600,000-REN Cen I)	21,410,619(b)
SOUTHFIELD	1,156,101	5,272,691	6,428,792	4,027,614	10,456,406(c)
TROY	0	169,300	169,300	4,932,160	5,101,460(d)

a) Excludes office buildings with less than 18,000 sq. ft.

b) Excludes 570,000 sq. ft. for Ren Cen. II constructed post 1980. Also excludes 80,000 sq. ft. for which date of construction N/A.

c) Excludes 62,500 sq. ft. for which date of construction N/A

d) Excludes 302,600 sq. ft. for which date of construction N/A.

SOURCE: "The Detroiter Office Guide" Detroit Chamber of Commerce, 1980

TABLE 15

Number of motor vehicles (cars, trucks, buses) produced in US Michigan & Detroit[a] 1978 and 1982

	1978 Production	1982 Production	Change 1978-82
U.S. PRODUCTION	12,899,202	6,986,018	5,913,184
MICHIGAN	3,995,560	2,395,076	1,600,484
DETROIT[a]	2,793,812	1,439,898	1,353,914
G.M. (DETROIT): Detroit City; Pontiac, 2 plants; Ypsilanti.	1,122,754	620329	502425
(G.M. will shortly be commencing production at 2 new assembly plants in Detroit City and Orion TWP).			
FORD (DETROIT): Dearborn; Wayne, 2 plants; Wixom.	888628	541733	346895
CHRYSLER (DETROIT): Detroit City, Jefferson Ave, Lynch Road (closed 1981); Hamtramck (closed 1980); Warren	782430	277836	504594

(a) Wayne, Oakland & Macomb counties.

SOURCE: Michigan Statistical Abstract. 17th ed. 1982-83. June 1983. Bureau of Business Research, School of Business Administration, Wayne State University, Detroit. Adapted from TABLE XVI-3 p.488.

TABLE 16

EMPLOYMENT IN DETROIT SMSA* (BY MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUP) 1978, 1982, 1983 & MARCH 1984. (numbers in thousands)

ITEM	1978		1982		1983		1984	
	Annual Average (thousands)	% of total Wage & Salary Employment	Annual Average (thousands)	Change from 1978 for selected categories (thousands)	Annual Average (thousands)	Change from 1978 for selected categories (thousands)	March (thousands)	Change from 1978 for selected categories (thousands)
BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE								
Civilian Labor Force	2003.4	-	1985.0	-	1975.8	-	1963.5	-
Employment	1871.2	-	1668.6	-	1686.9	-	1721.7	-
Unemployment	132.2	-	316.4	-	288.9	-	241.8	-
Rate (unemployment)	6.6	-	15.9	-	14.6	-	12.3	-
BY PLACE OF WORK								
Wage & Salary Employment	1794.8	100%	1554.2	- 240.6	1547.2	- 247.6	1568.8	- 226.0
Manufacturing	605.8	33.8	419.5	- 186.3	421.0	- 184.8	438.0	- 167.8
Durables	511.2	28.5	347.8	- 163.4	347.9	- 163.3	364.7	- 146.5
Lumber & Wood Products	2.2	**	1.3				1.3	
Furniture & Fixtures	1.7	**	1.1				1.3	
Metals	133.1	7.4	76.3	- 56.8	76.9	- 56.2	79.2	- 53.9
Primary Metals	47.6	2.7	24.7		23.3		25.2	
Fabricated Metals	85.5	4.8	51.6		53.6		54.0	
Nonelectrical Machinery	88.4	4.9	73.3		62.3		64.3	
Electrical Machinery	7.5	**	6.8		6.0		7.7	
Transportation Equipment	258.0	14.4	175.4	- 82.6	186.8	- 71.2	196.9	- 61.1
Motor Vehicles & Equipment	250.5	14.0	167.4		177.6		186.5	
Other Transport & Equip.	7.5	**	8.0		9.2		10.4	
Other Durables	20.3	1.1	13.6		13.5		14.0	
Nondurables	94.6	5.3	71.7		73.1		73.3	
Food & Kindred Products	20.2	1.1	16.9		16.7		15.6	
Textiles	18.2	1.0	11.4		12.4		12.8	
Paper & Allied Products	4.2	**	3.2		3.2		3.7	
Printing & Publishing	15.5	**	14.4		13.2		15.2	
Chemicals & Petroleum	19.4	1.1	14.3		14.0		12.1	
Other Nondurables	17.1	**	11.5		13.6		13.9	
Nonmanufacturing	928.8	51.8	905.0	- 23.8	899.9	- 28.9	912.8	- 16.0
Construction	61.2	3.4	39.7		39.6		35.4	
Trans, Commun, & Utilities	86.0	4.7	74.5		70.3		70.8	
Wholesale Trade	80.4	4.5	82.7		80.4		85.4	
Retail Trade	281.7	15.7	267.1		262.8		273.5	
Finance, Real Estate & Ins.	84.5	4.7	87.8		87.7		87.7	
Services	333.8	18.6	352.1		358.2		359.3	
Mining	1.2	**	1.1		0.9		0.7	
Government	260.2	14.5	229.7		226.3		218.0	
Federal	33.6	1.9	31.1		30.9		30.5	
State	31.4	1.8	31.0		30.9		29.5	
Local	195.2	10.9	167.6		164.5		158.0	

* County SMSA by 1973 definition - Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Lapeer, Livingston, St. Clair
** Less Than 1%

SOURCE: Michigan Employment Security Commission - Research & Statistics Division.

TABLE 17

CHANGE IN ASSESSED VALUATION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY[a] IN THE DETROIT REGION 1976-1982
($'s in thousands)

	Assessed value of industrial property 1976 (1976 dollars)	Assessed value of industrial property 1976 (1982 dollars)[b]	Assessed value of industrial property 1982 (non tax exempt)	No of tax abatement projects 1976-82[c]	Estimated value of property with tax abatement status 1982[d]	Estimated total value of industrial property 1982	Real change in value of industrial property 1976-82	% change in real value of industrial property 1976-82
Wayne Co. (including Detroit)	6500721	11051225	7486842	257	1111268	8598110	-2453115	-22.2%
Oakland Co.	1611562	2739655	2635829	114	492936	3128765	+389110	+14.0%
Macomb Co.	1590373	2703634	2469073	113	488612	2957685	+254051	+ 9.4%
Livingston Co.	96422	163917	152817	18	77832	230649	+66732	+40.7%
St. Clair Co.	395743	672763	1014361	54	233496	1247857	+575094	+85.5%
Washtenaw Co.	487739	829156	695868	57	246468	942336	+113180	+13.7%
Monroe Co.	733944	1247704	1231626	33	142692	1374318	+126614	+10.1%
City of Detroit	2484123	4223009	2101676	159	687516	2789192	-1433817	-33.9%
Region	11416504	19408054	15686416	646	2793304	18479720	-928334	-4.8%

Notes:
a) "True Cash Value" (market value) of land, buildings and machinery. Property tax is levied on "State Equalized Value" which is 50% of True Cash Value. Source: Michigan State Tax Commission.

b) 1976 values have been inflated to 1982 values based on a 70% increase in the Detroit Consumer Price Index 1976-1982. Source: US and Detroit Consumer Price Indices 1969-19892 in Economic Report of the Governor 1983, State of Michigan 1983, pp.134-135

c) Source: Michigan State Tax Commission. Data used is actually for the period 1974 (inception of the local tax abatement programme under PA.198) to 31.12.82. Very few abatements were awarded, however, in 1974/75. The programme became fully "active" in 1976.

d) This is based on an estimated average market value of $4,324,000 for the buildings and machinery associated with tax abatement projects. This figure is derived from known data covering the 110 projects for the city of Detroit up to 31.12.79. It is actually an estimate of the market value of property in respect of which the separate Industrial Facilities Tax (under PA 198 of 1974) rather than the regular property tax is being paid. Property for which an abatement is in force does not appear on the regular tax rolls. Source: City of Detroit, Finance Dept, Assessors Division.

TABLE 18

SELECTED TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS FOR S.E. MICHIGAN

(a) Total Number of Bus Passengers Carried by SEMTA and Detroit Department of Transportation for Fiscal Years 1978-1982

	SEMTA*	D-DOT
1978	9,059,909	65,354,000
1979	10,790,796	77,231,600
1981	14,072,503	65,677,000
1982	13,689,244	77,394,000

*This excludes commuter rail passengers carried by SEMTA which totalled 367,912 in 1978 and 349,887 in 1982.

(b) Total Number of Buses (Large and Small) Operated by SEMTA and Detroit Department of Transportation 1978-1982

	SEMTA (large bus)	SEMTA (small bus)	D-DOT* (large bus)
1978	241	111	830
1979	285	157	870
1981	376	266	807
1982	317	282	800

*Detroit does not operate a small bus service

Source: South-Eastern Michigan Transportation Authority, Annual Reports, various years.

TABLE 18 (cont.)

(c) Percentage of Workers by S.E. Michigan County Using a Car, Truck or Van, or in Car Pools as a Means of Transportation to Work : Census 1980

County	Using car, truck or van	In Car Pools
Wayne	89.0	17.2
Oakland	94.9	15.0
Macomb	95.4	17.0
St. Clair	92.2	20.5
Livingston	94.5	21.8
Washtenaw	81.2	17.0
Monroe	94.2	17.5

Source: Michigan Statistical Abstract 17th Ed. 1982-83. Bureau of Business Research, School of Business Administration, Wayne State University, Detroit. Table XVII-21 p.546

(d) Selected Travel Characteristics for Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Counties

	1965	1970	1975	1980
Autos per capita	0.374	0.460	0.501	0.594
Daily transit trips	452,000	430,000	290,000	358,330
Daily vehicle miles of travel	43,000,000	59,000,000	89,000,000	74,000,000
Daily person trips	9,832,000	NA	NA	NA

Source: Technical Development of the Regional Transportation Systems Management Plan. SEMCOG 1979, Table 3; and Technical Development of the Long Range Element of the Regional Transportation Plan, Phase 1, Planning Study Analyses, May 1982 SEMCOG Table 3

TABLE 19

EDC's, DDA's and TIFA's in SEMCOG REGION
(January 1983)

	EDC's	DDA's	TIFA's
Wayne	31	6	5
Oakland	25	7	3
Macomb	20	1	0
St Claire	8	2	0
Washtenaw	11	1	1
Livingston	9	0	0
Monroe	10	1	0
	114	18	9

Source: Data supplied by State of Michigan, Department of Commerce, Office of Community Development

TABLE 20

MAJOR FEDERAL REVENUES AS PROJECTED IN CITY OF DETROIT BUDGETS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1979/80 TO 1983/84

	$
1979/80	364,004,000
1980/81	336,165,000
1981/82	266,699,000
1982/83	236,669,000
1983/84	200,331,000

Source: City of Detroit Annual Budget, various years

APPENDIX II - LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

The following individuals were interviewed between mid-1980 and mid-1983. Most interviews were conducted face to face. Those conducted by telephone are marked (ph). Details of the interviewing procedure are given in Chapter One. Interviews vared in length between one and three hours.

The following symbols indicate additional relevant background of those interviewed:

- T - Top level involvement in government
- M - Middle level involvement in government
- PT - Primary responsibility transportation
- e - Experience of 20 or more years of the Detroit scene
- E - A subset of e. Top level governmental involvement in the 1950's and 1960's
- PL - Primarily a planning role

Martin Anderson (ph)
Transportation Systems Center, U.S. Department of Transportation, Cambridge, Mass (T, PT)

Tariek Ataman
Engineer, Route Location, State of Michigan, Department of Transportation (e, PL, M, PT)

Robert Boatman
Director, Metropolitan Regional Planning Division, State of Michigan, Department of Transportation (e, PL, T, PT)

Don Burton (ph)
Assessor, Finance Department, City of Detroit (M)

J Dobbs (ph)
Property Manager, First Federal Savings and Loan, Detroit

Diane Edgecomb
President, Detroit Central Business District Association (e)

Philip Essig (ph)
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